Populism, Political Conflict, and Grass-Roots Organization in Latin America
A Comparison of Fujimori and Chávez

Kenneth M. Roberts
Associate Professor and Chair
Department of Political Science
University of New Mexico
Albuquerque, NM 87131
KenRob@unm.edu

Article forthcoming in Comparative Politics.
Populism remains a widely used but heavily contested concept in the field of comparative politics. This is especially true in the study of Latin America, where debates continue over the definitional attributes and empirical referents of the concept. In recent years some scholars have emphasized the intrinsically political character of populism, distancing the concept from any particular stage or model of economic development while arguing that it is compatible with both state-led import substitution industrialization (ISI) and market-oriented neoliberalism. Others have upheld more traditional, multidimensional conceptionalizations and questioned the applicability of the term to neoliberal political contexts with relatively low levels of social mobilization. In general, however, the debate over the political and economic correlates of populism has paid insufficient attention to the phenomenon’s variable organizational expressions. What makes populism so difficult to “pin down,” both conceptually and empirically, is in part its organizational malleability and association with diverse patterns of socio-political mobilization.

This article suggests that even with a reductionist political definition—under which the essential core of populism is understood to be the political mobilization of mass constituencies by personalistic leaders who challenge established elites—a broad range of organizational outcomes fit under the rubric. Whereas some populist leaders opt for direct, non-institutionalized, and unmediated relationships with unorganized followers, others have constructed formidable party organizations to encapsulate and discipline adherents. Still others have deigned to institutionalize their party organs, but devoted considerable energy to the development of civic associations such as labor and, in some cases, peasant unions. Some have built encapsulating organizations in both partisan and civic arenas. Furthermore, where populists
have engaged in serious organization building, they have relied on several different types of linkage mechanisms to secure their mass constituencies. In some cases corporatist bonds to horizontally-organized, class-based constituencies have been forged, while in others vertically-organized networks of patrons and clients predominate. As these two modes of societal linkage are hardly mutually exclusive, some populist figures have successfully welded them together within the same movement or party.\(^5\) Given this organizational variation, the support of unorganized masses cannot be a definitional property of populism, although it is a relatively common feature. Not surprisingly, then, recent attempts to define populism have steered away from any particular organizational attributes and focused instead on styles of leadership and electoral mobilization.\(^6\)

This organizational variation also suggests that part of the confusion surrounding the populist concept is attributable to its generic application to a broad range of political phenomena. Greater conceptual precision and analytical leverage could be gained by disaggregating the concept and identifying its organizational manifestations and subtypes. The first purpose of this paper is thus to delineate the various patterns of socio-political mobilization and organization found in Latin American populist movements. Based on their organizational expressions in both the partisan sphere and civil society, four distinct subtypes of populism are identified—organic, labor, partisan, and electoral.

My primary objective, however, is less descriptive or typological than theoretical— that is, to explain \textit{why} populism takes divergent organizational forms in different national settings or stages of socio-economic and political development. Since populist movements are umbilically tied to dominant personalities, the preferences and interests of these personalities weigh heavily
on organization building strategies in civil and political society. Political agency alone, however, provides an idiosyncratic and unsatisfactory explanation of organizational variation. It is widely believed, for example, that populist movements during the ISI era were more likely to construct dense organizational networks in partisan and/or civil society, whereas those emerging during the contemporary period of market liberalism and mass media communications tend to mobilize electorates while eschewing partisan and civic organization. Both structural and political-institutional explanations for this organizational contrast between so-called “classical” and “neopopulism” have been proposed. Structural explanations point to differences in labor markets and class structures, while political-institutional explanations emphasize the organizational saturation of the political marketplace. While these explanations do not claim that populist movements are strictly determined by structural or institutional contexts, they do suggest that an “elective affinity” exists between particular organizational forms and the social, economic, and political landscapes upon which they are constructed. This elective affinity, in turn, predisposes contemporary populist movements towards low levels of social and political organization.

This article does not suggest that these explanations are wrong, only that they are incomplete. The propensity for organization is a function not only of structural and institutional contexts, but also of the nature and degree of conflict between populist movements and elite, extra-partisan power structures. Populist figures who pose little threat to economic and military elites may well dispense with mass organizations, which typically limit the strategic autonomy of leaders. In contrast, those embroiled in conflict with such elites—typically due to polarizing rhetoric and leadership style and the promotion of more radical measures to redistribute income
or power– are likely to organize mass constituencies as a political counterweight to entrenched power structures. Therefore, electoral mobilization alone does not require that leaders organize grass-roots constituencies; instead, organization is often an instrument for pushing through social reforms and waging conflict in extra-electoral spheres of contestation.

This emphasis on conflict dynamics helps to decouple populist organizational forms from any necessary association with specific political or economic eras. Elective affinities aside, relatively well organized and poorly organized populist movements are capable of emerging in a variety of political and economic contexts. The “classical” populism of the ISI era spawned both ephemeral and durable organizational forms, and post-ISI “neo-populism” appears to do the same. This central point is illustrated through a comparative analysis of contemporary populist figures Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela.

**Organizational Subtypes of Populism**

Given its diverse organizational expressions, it is clear that populist mobilization varies considerably from one nation or time period to the next. Mass mobilization, especially of the lower classes or loosely defined “popular sectors,” is a definitional property of populism because without it the lines of demarcation between populism and other types of personalistic leadership are murky. Patrimonialism, for example, may also link a personalistic leader to loosely-organized followers, but it does not achieve the same level of popular mobilization, and it typically thrives where civil society is poorly developed and largely unactivated (or deactivated) politically. Patrimonial leadership is often gestated among traditional elites, and it coopts what little popular support it requires through patron-clientelism. It flourished during Latin America’s oligarchic era, when suffrage restrictions diminished the need to mobilize broad popular
constituencies. Nevertheless, patrimonialism survived into the modern era in nations that repressed or failed to develop strong labor movements and mass party organizations, and it remains a viable political force where economic crises and market reforms have dramatically weakened ISI-era mass organizations.⁷

In contrast, the rise of populism coincided with the dawning of mass politics during the early stages of ISI, when elections could no longer be won without votes from working and middle classes who demanded political incorporation. The political activation and representation of these groups frequently sparked new forms of popular organization in both civil and political society. Labor unions emerged to represent workers’ interests in the workplace and the political arena, and mass parties were built to challenge the patrimonial figures and oligarchic “parties of notables” that reigned supreme for most of the first century after independence.

The development of these new organizational forms was highly uneven, however, as populism emerged in some nations and became a formidable electoral force without leaving any significant organizational residue behind. It is thus essential to disentangle populist mobilization from political organization. The former, following Webster’s dictionary definition, signifies “to put into motion,” and it is a sine qua non of the populist phenomenon. Mass constituencies can be “put into motion” in any number of arenas, including the workplace, peasant communities, urban protests or rallies, and election campaigns. Mobilization may thus have extra-electoral connotations, but it need not; under competitive regimes the electoral arena is invariably a major, and sometimes the exclusive, domain for populist mobilization.

Likewise, mobilization may or may not entail significant political organization. Again following Webster’s definition, organization means “to arrange or assemble into an orderly
structured whole.” Clearly, populist constituencies vary widely in the extent to which they are orderly assembled. This is true in both civil society and in the partisan/electoral sphere. The organization of populist constituencies can be durable or fleeting, formal or informal, with variation existing both across cases and over time within the same case.

This variation is depicted in the two-by-two table in Figure I, which differentiates between high and low levels of organization in both civil society and the partisan arena. The upper left quadrant is labeled “organic populism,” as leaders build serious organizations in both of these primary domains of populist mobilization. The Mexican case under Lázaro Cárdenas is perhaps the best example of the organic populist pattern. Cárdenas inherited a revolutionary government in 1934 whose party (the National Revolutionary Party, or PNR) had been organized from above by the state, and it possessed neither a mass base of its own nor strong organic bonds to labor or peasant associations. The new president, however, quickly discovered that populist mobilization and political organization were valuable instruments for advancing his social reform agenda and countering the opposition of conservative rivals in the PNR. Cárdenas thus built mass labor and peasant confederations, using land reform and labor rights to secure popular support, then reorganized (and renamed) the party around these corporatist pillars of representation. In so doing, Cárdenas welded together mass secondary associations in civil society and a mass-based party organization in a hegemonic bloc capable of dominating Mexican politics for the next 60 years.

A second pattern, which I call labor populism, is found in the upper right quadrant of Figure I. The defining feature of labor populism is that organization in the partisan/electoral
sphere lags well behind that in civil society, allowing labor unions to become the primary vehicle for populist mobilization.\textsuperscript{10} Argentina under Perón was perhaps the paradigmatic case of labor populism. Before his entry into electoral politics, Perón used his position as the minister of labor to organize workers and cultivate their political loyalty. The unionized workforce increased nearly five-fold during the first ten years of Peronist influence,\textsuperscript{11} and virtually all of these workers belonged to the national trade union confederation (the General Confederation of Labor or CGT) that served as the organizational backbone of Peronism. Unions played an instrumental role in organizing the mass demonstrations that secured Perón’s release from prison in 1945, and they subsequently played a prominent role in his electoral campaigns and social programs.

In the partisan/electoral sphere, however, Perón was loathe to institutionalize a party organization, preferring an informal political movement that was utterly dependent on his personalistic authority. Determined to maximize his leadership autonomy, Perón avoided the development of a bureaucratic apparatus that could provide political resources to internal competitors.\textsuperscript{12} Consequently, the three party vehicles that supported Perón in his first presidential election in 1946 were quickly dissolved after he assumed state power, and although these were replaced by a series of new party organs, Perón generally looked to the CGT rather than his party to run election campaigns, distribute state patronage, and implement social programs. Following Perón’s overthrow and exile in 1955, the CGT consolidated its position as the organizational pillar of Peronism inside Argentina and effectively controlled what remained of the party apparatus.\textsuperscript{13} After Perón’s death, professional politicians finally asserted the party’s autonomy from the CGT in the late 1980's, but the party remained an underinstitutionalized network of local and regional machines, with a weak central bureaucracy and a lack of formal
rules to govern internal party affairs.\textsuperscript{14}

An alternative organizational pattern is found in the lower left quadrant of Figure I. This pattern, which I will call “partisan populism,” is the obverse of labor populism, as the development of labor and civic organizations lags behind the development of the party apparatus. Peru’s APRA under the charismatic leadership of Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre provides a good example of this pattern. APRA emerged in the early 1930's in Peru’s sugar-exporting northern coastal region, where it cultivated support among plantation workers, small farmers, and other groups. In an effort to avoid raising the ire of propertied interests, however, Haya de la Torre initially focused more energy on building his party than organizing labor unions.\textsuperscript{15} Indeed, operating under difficult conditions of periodic electoral proscription and political persecution, Haya de la Torre built a party whose “extraordinary organizational capacity” was matched by “its extraordinary capacity to create a sense of community among its members.”\textsuperscript{16} APRA’s organizational discipline, cohesion, and mystique demonstrated that charismatic authority does not necessarily preclude political institutionalization. The party established territorial organs at the local, regional, and national levels, as well as sports and cultural groups and affiliated associations representing students, workers, youth, and professionals.

APRA competed with the Peruvian Communist Party for control of organized labor, effectively consolidating its leadership of the labor movement during the mid-1940's when the party was temporarily able to place a political ally in the presidency. Nevertheless, organized labor was a relatively small and weak political actor in Peru’s underdeveloped economy, and APRA made little effort to mobilize the Andean peasantry around claims for land reform. The party shifted to an increasingly conservative stance after the mid-1950's in an effort to achieve
political incorporation, and by the 1970's it had been overtaken by leftist parties in the mass organization of both workers and peasants. Consequently, although APRA helped to organize civil society in its early decades, its level of organization in the partisan sphere was more extensive and formidable.

A final pattern, which might be labeled “electoral populism,” is found in the lower right quadrant of Figure I. Electoral populists do not engage in extensive organization-building activities in either the partisan or civic spheres. They mobilize voters in electoral campaigns without encapsulating them in party organizations, labor unions, or other large-scale secondary associations. The relationship between the leader and populist constituencies is thus direct and largely unmediated by representative institutions. Political loyalty is generated through some combination of charisma or personal leadership qualities, discursive attacks on established elites, and the promised distribution of individual or collective benefits. Perhaps the best historical example of this pattern was José María Velasco Ibarra, who was elected president of Ecuador five different times but managed to complete only one term in office.\(^{17}\) Velasco was a compelling orator who thrived when addressing the masses in campaign rallies, but he harbored nothing but disdain for party organizations and did little to invigorate Ecuador’s chronically weak labor movement. The dearth of organized support behind the leadership of Velasco surely contributed to the political fragility of his administrations. A more recent example of electoral populism was Alberto Fujimori in Peru. As explained below, Fujimori founded no less than four different “parties” between 1990 and 2000 that were, in reality, little more than registration labels for his independent campaigns.

These distinct patterns of political mobilization and organization, all frequently labeled as
populist, clearly attest to the diversity of the phenomenon. The question, however, is whether these organizational patterns are randomly distributed or causally related to the social, economic, and political contexts in which they emerge. Structural and political-institutional explanations agree that conditions were more favorable to the development of organized variants of populism during the ISI era than in contemporary Latin America. Although the two approaches emphasize different stimuli and impediments to organization, they both lead us to expect a generalized shift from the various modes of organized populism toward the lower right hand quadrant in Figure I, that is, toward atomized patterns of electoral populism. The following section briefly reviews these arguments, assesses their limitations, and redirects attention to the dynamics of political conflict that shape the character of populist experiments.

**Economic Transition, Organizational Saturation, and the Structuring of Populist Mobilization**

Populist cycles typically occur during periods of political and economic transition that shift or loosen the social moorings of party systems. Populist leadership thrives when working and lower class groups are detached from existing parties and available for electoral mobilization by political newcomers. This detachment may be attributable to the emergence of new groups who have never been politically incorporated, or to the rupturing of bonds between voters and established parties. These are precisely the conditions that have existed during the critical junctures that marked the transitions from one political-economic era to another in 20th century Latin America.

The first such transition occurred with the demise of the oligarchic era and the rise of mass politics during the early stages of industrialization. The growth of urban working and middle classes forced traditional oligarchic parties to share the political stage with new, mass-
based competitors, as populist figures employed charismatic appeals to weld together multi-class coalitions for reform. Despite the personalism of these movements, conditions were ripe for populist leaders to organize their followers in both civil and political society. Following the logic of structural arguments, industrialization encouraged the organization of civil society, as it concentrated large blocs of workers with common interests in new factory settings that were conducive to collective action. Labor unionization thus accelerated rapidly across much of the region. Likewise, agrarian conflicts over land tenure spawned peasant movements that offered another potential constituency for political organization. As states expanded their developmental, regulatory, and redistributive roles under ISI, they formed corporatist relationships with secondary associations of workers and peasants, exchanging material benefits and bargaining rights for a measure of control over demand articulation and leadership selection. For populist leaders, these encapsulating organizations were vehicles to channel material rewards, secure the political loyalty of grass-roots constituencies, and discipline their political participation.

As political-institutional approaches suggest, motives also existed for populist leaders to create party organizations. Since workers generally did not owe political allegiance to traditional oligarchic parties, they were an untapped electoral market—a latent constituency that was amenable to mobilization by new mass parties that embraced their demands for higher wages, social benefits, and organizational rights. Parties were used to mediate corporatist exchanges between states and unions, and they provided a vehicle to translate societal encapsulation into bloc votes in the electoral arena. In the pre-television era, electoral campaigns were labor-intensive affairs, and grass-roots party organs were useful for integrating new social actors and mobilizing the vote. Likewise, mass rallies and other forms of demonstrating popular appeal
required “some nucleus of organized support, especially a cadre of activists.”

As the Ecuadorean case under Velasco indicates, mass organization was not a universal tool of populist figures following the onset of mass politics. A direct relationship with atomized masses was sometimes adequate for electoral success where oligarchic parties were in disarray, labor movements were weak and divided, and populist leaders were not inclined to implement radical redistributive reforms. In most countries, however, populist movements triggered a sharp increase in the levels of civic and partisan organization as leaders mobilized political resources to challenge traditional elites, redefine the developmental role of the state, and implement ambitious social reforms. Consequently, the first cycle of populism had an elective affinity for the organizational patterns depicted in the top and left-side quadrants of Figure I.

The socioeconomic and political transitions associated with the more recent, so-called “neopopulist” cycle of populism were markedly different. Both structural and political-institutional approaches identify conditions that discourage popular organization. In civil society, labor movements entered the new democratic period of the 1980's chastened by authoritarian repression and gravely weakened by the dislocations engendered by economic crises and market restructuring. Union density declined throughout the region, while the capitalist modernization of agriculture undermined collective action among the peasantry. New social movements created more pluralistic civil societies, but their localism and fragmentation deprived populist movements of the large-scale secondary associations that provided organizational pillars in the past. Furthermore, neoliberal reforms diminished the regulatory and redistributive roles of the state, making it more difficult for political leaders to exchange collective benefits for organized support. In an era of market individualism and flexible,
segmented labor markets, neither populist leaders nor labor movements have much leverage to construct corporatist exchanges like those that prevailed during the ISI era.

Consequently, most of the leaders identified as “neopopulist” have mobilized electoral support among atomized or loosely organized popular sectors, and made little effort to penetrate or organize civil society. They have not made organized labor a core constituency, and several have clashed with labor movements allied to traditional parties. In Peru, for example, Fujimori largely ignored organized labor, which had been decimated by the economic crisis of the 1980's. By the 1990's the informal sector claimed over half the Peruvian workforce, while the level of unionization had dropped to less than six percent of the workforce. Unions bitterly opposed Fujimori’s neoliberal project, but they were far too weakened as a political and organizational force to offer effective resistance.

In Argentina, Carlos Menem won the Peronists’ presidential nomination with a populist style and the backing of organized labor, but once in office he curtailed labor’s influence in the party and implemented neoliberal reforms that fractured the labor movement. While deemphasizing corporatist ties to labor, he made Peronism increasingly dependent on patronage to maintain electoral support. In Venezuela, Hugo Chávez mobilized electoral support among the poor with little assistance from the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV), an historic ally of Acción Democrática (AD). While some pro-Chávez labor leaders sought to organize informal workers and create a parallel union confederation, others preferred to democratize and capture the CTV. Instead, the CTV renovated its leadership and joined the national business confederation at the forefront of the anti-Chávez protest movement.

Since the most recent populist cycle has not spawned strong class-based secondary
associations, the organic and labor types of populism located in the top quadrants of Figure I are largely absent. Corporatist linkages to unions provide little electoral payoff where organized labor has been weakened by economic crisis and reform, and they are difficult to sustain where populist leaders themselves impose market restructuring and employ patronage tactics to attract the unorganized poor. Even where populist outsiders like Chávez reject neoliberalism, their ability to woo organized labor is likely to be limited by the political bonds between unions and traditional parties.

As Weyland’s political-institutional approach suggests, mobilization by populist outsiders in the contemporary period is also less likely to engender strong partisan organizations. In contrast to the first cycle of populist mobilization, contemporary populists encounter a “saturated” polity where urban and rural masses have been previously incorporated politically. Although economic hardships may have eroded loyalties to established parties, creating a detached electorate that is available for mobilization by outsiders, they have also encouraged populist leaders to tout their independence and lack of association with discredited political forms. These leaders adopt “antiorganizational tactics” and “appeal to people who distrust established parties and interest groups,” while opting for highly personalized political representation. At the same time, the mass media and public opinion surveys have neutralized the competitive electoral advantages of party organizations. They enable populist figures to appeal directly to mass constituencies and demonstrate popular support without any sort of institutional intermediation. Small teams of professional pollsters and media consultants now perform campaign functions that previously were labor intensive affairs within the domain of mass party organizations. A figure like Fernando Collor in Brazil could thus parlay his media
support into mass electoral appeal even without a national party apparatus. And while Fujimori lacked resources for a media campaign when he first ran for president, after taking office he relied heavily on state-controlled or manipulated media rather than his political party to reach mass constituencies.\textsuperscript{25}

Taken together, these structural and political-institutional factors would appear to create formidable, if not insuperable, obstacles to more organized variants of populism in contemporary Latin America. As demonstrated below, however, they do not preclude it, nor do they preordain purely electoral forms of populism. The degree of organization is also contingent on the character of social and political conflicts unleashed by populist movements, as a comparison of recent populist experiments in Peru and Venezuela shows.

\textbf{Socio-Political Conflict and Party Organization}

According to rational choice theorists like Aldrich,\textsuperscript{26} party organizations are created by political entrepreneurs to resolve coordination and collective action problems encountered in the process of mobilizing voters and passing legislation. Parties provide information shortcuts to voters, and they offer politicians reputational or “name brand” loyalties that help deliver votes so that candidates don’t have to mobilize the electorate from scratch during each electoral cycle. Weyland’s argument outlined above, however, suggests that contemporary populists may well have alternative instruments available to meet the demands of electoral mobilization, making investments in party organization less attractive or necessary. Where party organizations drain human and financial resources, limit a leader’s strategic autonomy, or supply internal competitors with organizational resources, a rational populist may well decide that parties are not worth the effort. Indeed, where parties have thoroughly alienated voters, they may come to be
perceived as electoral liabilities that taint their candidates and drain support away. Consequently, electoral competition alone may not induce populist leaders to invest in political organization.

An alternative, more sociological perspective views political organization as a means of collective empowerment, particularly for working and lower class groups. It is only through organization that the many with few resources can leverage their weight in numbers as a countervailing power to the concentrated economic or institutional resources of elite groups. In the absence of mass organization, there is little to challenge the political dominance of elite groups that control property or capital, the modern means of mass communication, or the instruments of military force—what Latin Americans sometimes call the *poderes fácticos* (loosely translated as de facto power structures). Parties are thus seen as the institutional crystallization of contending societal interests in the political arena, rather than mere instruments of political entrepreneurs.

Whereas the rational choice model downplays parties’ societal linkages and representative functions, the sociological perspective says little about how parties are shaped by the strategic behavior and interests of political elites. The two perspectives, however, shed valuable light on different aspects of organization-building dynamics under populist leadership. Given the weight of personalistic authority, partisan vehicles founded by populist movements are inevitably instruments that serve their leaders’ interests. These interests, however, may transcend formal electoral and legislative arenas. Populist leaders are often polarizing figures who generate fervent loyalties and intense opposition, particularly among elites who feel threatened by populist reforms, rhetoric, redistributive measures, or mobilizational tactics. The
more radical the discourse and behavior of populist leaders, the more intense the opposition, and the more likely that socio-political conflict will be channeled into extra-electoral arenas. These conflicts create incentives for populist figures to organize and empower their followers for political combat. Followers not only vote, but they may be called upon to mobilize for rallies and demonstrations, participate in strikes and occupations, or even take up arms to defend their leader in times of peril.

Consequently, where populist party organizations develop, they are typically instruments of collective empowerment that serve the strategic needs of populist figures whose social reforms or rhetoric have engendered serious political conflict with elite opponents. The level of organization should thus vary positively with the depth and breadth of social reforms and the degree of conflict they trigger. Even where mass organization has ceased to be a prerequisite for electoral success, it may be a powerful resource for populist leaders in other domains of political contestation. The comparison of the Peruvian and Venezuelan cases that follows identifies how distinct conflict dynamics shape the strategic incentives for organization-building under populist leadership.

**Fujimorismo and Electoral Populism in Peru**

Over the course of a decade atop Peru’s turbulent political system, President Alberto Fujimori founded four different “parties.” Essentially, Fujimori created a new party for virtually every electoral cycle between 1990 and 2000, but he never consolidated any of them. Neither did the Fujimori regime make a significant effort to organize civil society, though it did try to co-opt it. As such, *Fujimorismo* was a paradigmatic case of electoral populism. The dearth of partisan organization gave Fujimori the strategic autonomy that he needed to switch economic
policies and win over elite opponents. This ameliorated political conflict and diminished the need to organize popular constituencies as a counterweight to elite power structures.

Fujimori burst onto the political scene at a time of acute crisis, when established parties had been gravely weakened by a combination of hyperinflation, economic recession, and political violence. An obscure academic and political novice, Fujimori sought unsuccessfully to obtain a position on the legislative list of a small center-left party in the 1990 elections, then decided to pursue the presidency as an independent outsider. Along the way he cobbled together a loose network of friends, colleagues, and representatives from small business and evangelical groups, baptizing his movement *Cambio 90* (Change 90). A mere two months before the first round of the election, Fujimori barely registered in the polls, and the famed conservative novelist Mario Vargas Llosa— who had the backing of the business establishment, the partisan right, and a well-financed media blitz— was the overwhelming favorite to capture the presidency. Fujimori stunned the political establishment, however, by riding a last-minute surge in popularity to make it into the presidential run-off against Vargas Llosa. He attracted lower class voters who previously supported APRA or the left but were now looking for a viable alternative to Vargas Llosa and the neoliberal “shock” treatment he proposed to stabilize the economy. Fujimori’s outsider, “anti-shock” candidacy was staunchly opposed by business groups, however, and it provoked rumbles of discontent in other elite institutions, including the armed forces and the Catholic Church. Fujimori’s landslide second-round victory demonstrated the electoral viability of a populist outsider with little organized support. It should be noted that this electoral appeal was *not* based on mass media exposure, but rather on face-to-face contact with voters and informal networks of political communication, as Fujimori lacked the resources to contest
Vargas Llosa’s dominance of the airwaves.\textsuperscript{28}

Even before taking office, however, Fujimori moved to neutralize the potential threats posed by elite opposition. The president-elect made contact with technocrats and think tanks with close ties to the business community, traveled to Washington to meet with representatives of international financial institutions, and baffled supporters and opponents alike by embracing the kind of neoliberal shock program he had campaigned against.\textsuperscript{29} He also named a conservative party leader to head his cabinet, jettisoned the heterodox economic advisers who accompanied him during his campaign, and offered strong support to the military in its counter-insurgency war against the Shining Path insurgency. Although this about-face neutralized and won over elite opposition, it was hard to accept for some of the president’s initial supporters. Nevertheless, the lack of organizational bonds allowed Fujimori the autonomy he needed to switch policies and appeal to new groups. Indeed, with little need to organize popular constituencies as a counterweight to elite opposition–a late 1990 survey of business leaders found 95 percent in favor of Fujimori’s new course\textsuperscript{30}–the president quickly demobilized \textit{Cambio 90} and marginalized the civic support groups that had backed his campaign. Fujimori’s first cabinet included six independents, five military or retired military officers, and five individuals from other political parties, but no one from \textit{Cambio 90}.\textsuperscript{31} The president clashed with his “party” over economic reforms and the procedures for selecting congressional candidates, leading him to remove \textit{Cambio 90}'s secretary general, close its central office, and resist policy input from its parliamentary bloc.\textsuperscript{32} The empty shell of \textit{Cambio 90} would remain with Fujimori throughout his decade in power, while its congressional leaders disclaimed any intention to form a party, preferring to think of \textit{Cambio 90} as a “political movement” instead.\textsuperscript{33}
Ultimately, Fujimori’s policy shift allowed him to drive a wedge between Peru’s economic elite and its political establishment, using rhetorical attacks against traditional parties to maintain his populist outsider appeal while adopting neoliberal reforms that were embraced by foreign and domestic business elites. At the same time, he adopted hardline counterinsurgency tactics that were favored within the military and intelligence institutions. Fujimori used the army to build roads and social projects, and he transformed the intelligence service, leading television networks, and tabloid newspapers into instruments of his electoral campaigns. These *poderes fácticos* formed an authoritarian coalition that supported Fujimori in a 1992 presidential coup (or *auto-golpe*) when he closed the congress, purged the judiciary, and suspended the constitution. Following the *auto-golpe*, Fujimori held elections for a constituent assembly and created a new registration label for the occasion, *Nueva Mayoría* (New Majority, or NM), but again he made no effort to institutionalize a party organization. *Nueva Mayoría* was a collection of professionals and technocrats who served in Fujimori’s government, and its linkages to social constituencies outside the business sector were all but nonexistent. According to NM leader and congressional president Ricardo Marcenaro, *Nueva Mayoría* was not a party but “a group of independents who collaborate with President Fujimori,” and their institutionalization as a party would be a sign of “our weakness, not strength.” Later, in preparation for municipal elections in 1998, Fujimori created a third party vehicle, *Vamos Vecinos* (Let’s Go Neighbors). This party sought to use state resources and municipal social programs to organize clientelistic bases of support at the local level, a strategy that clashed with the technocratic bent of other members of Fujimori’s inner circle. Finally, in 2000 Fujimori ran for reelection under the label of Peru 2000, an informal alliance of supporters and remnants of his previous partisan vehicles.
Organizationally, these “parties” were empty vessels that served at the whim of their autocratic founder. Although Fujimori maintained high levels of popularity for most of his presidency, especially among the lower classes, he made no effort to encapsulate voters or institutionalize their support. This is clearly seen in his penchant to create a new partisan vehicle for each electoral cycle rather than build on established foundations. These “parties” did not have national organizations with local branches, central bureaucracies, rules for internal governance, policy platforms, or affiliated members. With the fleeting exception of *Vamos Vecinos*, they were incapable of fielding candidates in most municipal districts, and thus failed to translate Fujimori’s personal popularity into a more institutionalized structure of governance. Completely devoid of any organizational identity independent from that of their founder, these parties virtually disappeared when the Fujimori regime imploded in 2000 and the president fled to Japan.

If Fujimori mobilized voters without organizing a serious party, neither did he organize civil society during his decade in power. Organized labor bitterly opposed Fujimori’s turn to neoliberalism, but its capacity to mobilize workers in opposition was gravely diminished following a decade of economic crisis and political violence. Given the pro-market thrust of his policies and his clear preference for an unmediated relationship with popular constituencies, Fujimori declined to organize a “loyal” labor movement, and he relegated existing leftist unions to the margins of the political system. Since his social programs posed no threat to private property and required little redistribution— they were largely funded by international contributions that flooded back into the country after creditworthiness was restored— there was no need for popular organization to counterbalance elite opposition or push forward radical
social reforms. Instead, Fujimori used state resources and social programs to generate economic dependency and coopt the atomized poor. The president’s office controlled programs for poverty relief, food assistance, school construction, and milk supplements for children and pregnant women, transforming them into instruments of state patronage. Although local committees were sometimes established to deliver these social benefits, they were generally project specific, ephemeral in their existence, vertically dependent on state resources, and largely devoid of horizontal or partisan linkages that would have been necessary to transform them into political actors.\

In Peru, then, there were few short-term incentives for Fujimori to invest in partisan or civic organization. Competing parties had been devastated by the crisis of the 1980’s, as had once-powerful labor and peasant movements, creating an atomized sociopolitical landscape that was almost entirely devoid of representative institutions. Popular support could be garnered through patronage and attacks on traditional actors, while Fujimori’s direct personal appeal diminished the need to fill the void with new representative institutions. Indeed, his embrace of neoliberal reforms and hardline counterinsurgency policies made it possible to derive political sustenance from the poderes fácticos in Peruvian society—namely domestic and international capital, the military-intelligence apparatus, and the mass media. Consequently, there was little incentive to organize popular constituencies to contest de facto power structures; Fujimori merely needed to engage in periodic electoral mobilization by employing his control over the media and state patronage resources.

Over the longer term, this autocratic, uninstitutionalized mode of governance left the Fujimori regime vulnerable to popular disaffection when it resorted to blatant anti-democratic
practices to reproduce its authority.\textsuperscript{39} Indeed, the organizational vacuum played a critical role in the registration, electoral, and bribery scandals that caused the implosion of the Fujimori regime after a decade in power. The absence of partisan organization— a defining feature of Fujimori’s early outsider appeal— ultimately proved to be a congenital defect of \textit{Fujimorismo}, one that was deeply embedded in the sociopolitical context that spawned its gestation and reproduction.

\textbf{Chavismo, Socio-Political Conflict, and Popular Organization in Venezuela}

In Venezuela, the charismatic authority of President Hugo Chávez has also proven resistant to institutionalization. Nevertheless, it is grounded in a much higher level of grass-roots partisan and extra-partisan organization. This organization is indelibly related to the different genetic conditions and socio-political conflicts spawned by \textit{Chavismo}. Indeed, as conflict intensified with elite power structures, both in Venezuela and abroad, Chávez made popular organization a centerpiece of his strategy for political survival.

Long before it emerged as an electoral force, \textit{Chavismo} existed as a clandestine civil-military conspiracy aiming at the overthrow of Venezuela’s post-1958 political order. Chávez and other young military officers founded the clandestine \textit{Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200} (MBR-200) in 1982, and subsequently made contact with leaders of leftist parties and former guerrilla movements.\textsuperscript{40} These contacts intensified in the aftermath of the February 1989 riots that followed the imposition of neoliberal reforms by President Carlos Andrés Pérez. The MBR-200 launched a failed military coup in February 1992, landing Chávez and other leaders in prison. The revolt, however, transformed Chávez into a symbol of rebellion against political corruption, market reform, and two-party dominance.

Following a presidential pardon in 1994, Chávez traveled across Venezuela and
organized grass-roots “Bolivarian committees,” complete with membership oaths and study circles that helped to instill his movement’s nationalistic doctrine. These local committees were coordinated at the municipal level and vertically linked to regional bodies and a national directorate, which had both civilian and ex-military representatives. Local and regional assemblies were also organized to disseminate the movement’s political tactics and ideological principles. In 1997, the MBR-200 abandoned its stance of electoral abstention and chose to compete in the 1998 national elections, forming a broader electoral front known as the Movimiento Quinta República (MVR) for this purpose. Although not initially conceived as a party, the MVR displaced the MBR-200 as the primary organizational vehicle of Chavismo after its leader’s stunning landslide victory in the 1998 presidential election.

Chávez made little effort to institutionalize the MVR during his first two years in power. Attention was focused instead on regime-level institutional change, as Chávez convoked a constituent assembly to write a new constitution and refound the political order. The MVR was placed in a permanent state of electoral mobilization, as the government sponsored referendums to establish the constituent assembly and ratify the new constitution, organized general elections to fill the assembly, and then held yet another round of general elections to renew Chávez’ mandate and those of other authorities in 2000. Given Chávez’ direct personal appeal and the virtual collapse of traditional parties, populist electoral mobilization was possible without a high level of formal political organization. As Weyland argues, the MVR was “a victim of its own successful expansion” during these first two years, as the movement “achieved a series of striking electoral victories too quickly and easily” and “never devoted enough time or energy to integration of the massive influx of supporters who came on board or to institutional
Nevertheless, as political conflict intensified and shifted to extra-electoral arenas after 2000, Chávez poured new energy into diverse forms of grass-roots organization. In contrast to Fujimori, who criticized Peru’s “political class” but cultivated support among business groups, Chávez was a deeply polarizing figure who antagonized both political and economic elites with his inflammatory rhetoric, and even non-elite groups like organized labor that belonged to the old order. In addition to his populist reforms, Chávez’ revolutionary symbols and discourse unleashed a torrent of conflict with traditional power structures in Venezuelan society. The armed forces divided into pro- and anti-Chávez sectors, while the peak business association, private media, and national labor confederation hardened their opposition stances following a series of presidential decrees in late 2001 that allowed for the expropriation of unutilized farmland and strengthened executive controls over oil production and financial institutions. Chávez tried unsuccessfully to wrest control of the national labor confederation from union bosses allied to traditional parties, and organized labor joined the national business confederation in declaring a general strike in December 2001. A wave of protests followed, culminating in another strike and lockout led by managers of the state oil company in March 2002. When street protests turned violent in April, Chávez was briefly removed in a military coup supported by business interests, organized labor, and the media, but a furious counter-mobilization by Chávez supporters in the military and lower-class urban districts restored him to the presidency.

This counter-mobilization provided an impressive demonstration of Chavismo’s organizational capabilities, as newly-formed grass-roots “Bolivarian circles” played an important role in mobilizing the urban poor to protest the detention of Chávez. The first circles–
successors to the “Bolivarian committees” formed by the MBR-200 in the mid-1990's– were created in 2000. Their primary organizational impetus came in 2001, however, when Chávez turned his attention to social reform and political conflict intensified. When he first took office, Chávez relied heavily on the military for public works projects and the delivery of social services, but after 2000 community organizations like the circles became increasingly important partners of the government in a variety of health, education, nutrition, and other social initiatives, particularly in urban lower class districts. By 2003 the government claimed that over 2.2 million Venezuelans were registered in some 200,000 circles. Although many of these circles were thought to be inactive, and independent analysts estimated a membership well below the official figures, there is little question that the circles grew out of an extensive process of grass-roots organization.

Indeed, the circles were only one of several different organizational forms that proliferated in the early 2000's in the kaleidoscopic landscape of grass-roots Chavismo. Some 150,000 persons participated in local land committees, which assessed land claims as part of an effort to redistribute and deliver titles to public lands. Another 659,000 individuals belonged to some 10,000 cooperatives, which were established in diverse production and service sectors of the economy with horizontal linkages at the local, regional, and national levels. Pro-Chávez “Bolivarian” organizations for youth, women, workers, and professionals were also formed, along with grass-roots networks to mobilize voters and coordinate the local work of national “missions” related to food, health care, and education.

Interestingly, much of this organizational impetus was not directed by or channeled into Chávez’ party, the MVR, which was plagued by ongoing conflict between its ex-military and
civilian tendencies. For example, Bolivarian circles coordinate their work at the regional and national levels– the circles even held a national programmatic and ideological congress in December 2003– and they sometimes create community “houses” for social and political work comparable to a party local. Nevertheless, they define themselves as participatory community organizations or civic networks, separate but parallel to the MVR, rather than as party organs. Indeed, grass-roots Chavismo is often wary, if not disdainful, of political parties, including the MVR. As stated by Rodrigo Chávez, the national coordinator of the circles, “parties were not the best way to guarantee people’s participation in the democratic process because of their infighting and struggle for positions of leadership,” leading to the formation of the circles “as independent cells of support for the revolution.” Even President Chávez disavowed any intent to transform the circles into a party organization, stating that “the Bolivarian Circles cannot be . . . a political party, no, the Bolivarian Circles were not born for that, it would betray the spirit of the Bolivarian Circles and the gigantic effort they have made.” Nevertheless, at the same time that Chávez was organizing grass-roots alternatives to the MVR, he was also taking measures to institutionalize his party. In June 2003, the MVR organized a million party members in 30,000 base units to vote for the first time in internal elections for representatives to help select a national directorate.

Consequently, as a populist movement Chavismo boasts extensive grass-roots organization, but it remains fluid, heterogeneous, and decentralized. A plethora of partisan, community, and social organizations exist, varying widely from one locale to the next, with nebulous linkages and porous boundaries between different networks. These diverse local expressions of Chavismo sometimes cooperate but often compete amongst each other, with
loyalty to Chávez and his “revolutionary” Bolivarian project serving as the primary point of convergence. Although Chavismo remains poorly institutionalized and inordinately dependent on charismatic authority, it clearly contains a level of popular organization—both partisan and civic—that far surpasses anything imagined in Peru under Fujimori. This grass-roots organization was the linchpin of Chávez’ efforts to deepen social reforms and counter the opposition of powerful adversaries, who pursued both electoral and extra-electoral strategies to remove him from office.

This comparative analysis suggests that the depth of socio-political organization by populist leaders is contingent on the level and character of the political conflicts triggered by their social reforms. Mass organization is first and foremost a political instrument for mobilizing the weight of numbers against elite actors who derive political power from their strategic economic or institutional location. Where populist leaders pose little threat to these elites—for example, where they embrace neoliberalism, mobilize lower-class support through patronage rather than redistributive reforms, and direct their anti-establishment challenge against discredited parties rather than business interests—they may well derive sustenance from elite power structures and eschew organization building strategies. Under such conditions, grass-roots organization is required neither for electoral contestation nor for the construction of an institutional counterweight to the poderes facticos.

Alternatively, where populist leaders challenge both traditional political and economic elites, sharply polarizing the socio-political landscape, mass organization is far more likely to be promoted as a counterweight to elite power structures. In this sense, Chavismo has much more in common with classical expressions of populism than with the prototypical “neopopulist”
movements that graft neoliberal projects onto populist political leadership. Although classical populist leaders crafted (temporarily) multi-class alliances between organized labor and urban capitalists who shared an interest in state industrial promotion, they clashed with traditionally-dominant agrarian elites and the political parties (and sometimes military institutions) that defended their interests. Like Chávez, they organized mass constituencies as a counterweight to these elite power structures. Ironically, this mass organization can be a two-edged sword; as the Venezuelan case demonstrates, it enhances the political leverage of populist leaders, but it also inflames elite opponents who recoil at the specter of political domination by organized (and often radicalized) popular majorities. For such elites, the prospect of a long-term loss of control over the state may be more threatening than the specific content of populist social and economic reforms, which were relatively modest in Venezuela during Chávez’ first several years in power.

A populist leader backed by atomized masses and powerful elites is easily removed when he ceases to serve elite interests, as the case of Fernando Collor in Brazil amply demonstrates. One backed by organized masses in opposition to elite interests, however, is more formidable, and is likely to trigger a more powerful elite counter-mobilization and more acute political conflict.

Conclusion

Populist movements vary significantly in their degree of mass organization in both civil and political society. While some populist leaders eschew institutional intermediaries in their mobilization of mass constituencies, others organize parties and/or civic associations to encapsulate and control their followers. In general, organization building was more common during the first wave of Latin American populism that marked the onset of mass politics during the transition from agro-export development to state-led industrialization. It has been less
common in the more recent wave of populism that erupted during the turbulent transition from ISI to neoliberalism.

The correspondence between political eras and the level of populist organization is not uniform, however, suggesting that different patterns of populist mobilization are influenced but not directly determined by underlying structural and institutional conditions. Whether or not populist leaders organize their constituencies is heavily conditioned by the political alignments and conflicts engendered by their reforms. Electoral competition alone is not a sufficient condition to produce extensive grass-roots organization, especially where mass media appeals have diminished the labor-intensive character of electoral mobilization. Instead, mass organization is an instrument for deepening social reforms and challenging entrenched power structures. Leaders like Fujimori who pose little challenge to non-partisan elite actors have few incentives to build organizations that limit their strategic autonomy. In contrast, those who contest elite power structures are likely to organize mass constituencies as a political counterweight and as an instrument for waging socio-political conflict. This latter pattern links Hugo Chávez to the classic populist figures of the past who engaged in acute conflicts with elite interests and left highly durable organizational legacies in their wake.

During the heyday of neoliberal hegemony in the 1990's, populist movements tended to challenge party establishments without threatening elite economic interests. As such, they were characterized by low levels of socio-political organization and unmediated leader-mass relations. In recent years, however, political challenges to the neoliberal model have grown, as evidenced by the rise of Chavismo, the election of left-leaning governments in Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile, and the toppling of presidents by mass protest movements in Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia.
Although these challenges have not produced a well-defined economic alternative, they do suggest a potential opening of political space for new forms of popular mobilization. Given its organizational malleability and policy flexibility, populism is likely to thrive under these conditions and remain a central feature of the region’s political landscape. Far from running its course, the cycle of populism appears to be in full swing.
Notes

1. The author thanks Kurt Weyland, Carlos de la Torre, Steve Levitsky, Alan Knight, and the anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier versions of the manuscript.


10. It is theoretically possible that social organizations other than labor unions—such as peasant communities or neighborhood associations—would be primary vehicles for populist mobilization. There are no clear-cut historical examples of such “civic populism,” but Venezuela under Hugo Chávez approximates this model, given its reliance on extra-partisan, non-labor based community organizations, as discussed below.


13. The CGT was itself internally fractionalized and subjugated to Perón’s personal authority. Nevertheless, inside Argentina, it was the foremost organizational expression of Peronism until the second half of the 1980’s.


24. Ibid.


33. Author’s interview with *Cambio 90* congressional leader Luz Salgado, Lima, March 18, 1999.


37. Fujimori eventually paid a steep price for his antipathy to institutionalization and his insistence on starting from scratch in every electoral cycle. In 2000 his campaign team forged over a million signatures in a frantic attempt to register his fourth party, unleashing a scandal that exacerbated public concerns over violations of democratic norms.


42. Kurt Weyland, “Will Chávez Lose His Luster?” *Foreign Affairs* 80, 6 (November-December 2001), p. 84.


48. Ibid., p. 4.

49. See the interview in “Venezuela: Bolivarian Circles in Frontline of the Revolution,”


52. For a more extensive analysis of the differences between these two leaders, see Steve Ellner, “The Contrasting Variants of the Populism of Hugo Chávez and Alberto Fujimori,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 35 (2003): 139-162.

53. In December 2002, managers and white-collar workers in the oil sector launched a devastating two-month lockout/strike that was designed to force Chávez’ resignation, but it was eventually broken by the government. Thereafter, the opposition shifted to a strategy of removing Chávez’ by means of a recall vote, which Chávez also defeated in August 2004.