# Berkeley Review of Latin American Studies

## Fall 2008

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Front cover: Argentina’s Perito Moreno glacier. The Patagonia region is experiencing the fastest glacial retreat on earth. Photo by Marina Población.
This issue of the Berkeley Review appears at a unique moment: the intersection of an historic U.S. presidential election and a devastating global financial meltdown. The challenge for President-elect Obama will be to convert a message of hope and change into a program capable of addressing a painful economic downturn. Against this backdrop, many are looking for the contours of a new U.S. policy toward the Americas.

Central to the future of the Americas are issues related to global warming, energy independence and jobs. We begin with three articles that have renewable energy as their theme. The first article reports on a CLAS workshop on alternative energy and the Americas with Stan Ovshinsky, the legendary scientist and inventor, who has been one of the most important pioneers in this area for the last five decades. The workshop brought members of the U.S.–Mexico Futures Forum, as well as other guests, to Detroit to see new production technologies in operation and to discuss the policy challenges ahead. The economic trauma the city is experiencing underscored the urgency of developing new industries for the future.

The second article describes the visit of Chilean President Michelle Bachelet to the UC Berkeley campus. While in Berkeley, she laid the foundation for a University of California–Chile agreement and studied the most advanced renewable technologies under development on campus and in the area. Important highlights of her stay included touring the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and receiving the Berkeley Medal, the university’s highest honor, from Chancellor Birgeneau.

The third article examines Costa Rica’s ambitious attempt to achieve carbon neutrality by 2021. One of the architects of the plan was the article’s author, Roberto Dobles, Costa Rica’s Minister of Energy and the Environment. Minister Dobles was also a participant in the Detroit workshop on renewable energy.

Another highlight of this issue is Professor Peter Evans interview with noted Cambridge University economist Ha-Joon Chang about issues related to development and trade. Chang draws a sharp distinction between the formative practices of industrial countries and the mainstream advice given to developing nations today.

Finally, we are saddened by the death of Ruth Cardoso, the gifted anthropologist and former first lady of Brazil. She taught at UC Berkeley several times, most recently in February 2000, and became a vital part of this community and a lasting influence on all those with whom she came in contact.

— Harley Shaiken

Chile comes to Berkeley, June 2008: (front row from left): Chilean Minister of Energy Marcelo Tokman; Chilean Minister of Economy Hugo Lavados; Berkeley Professor of Physics George Smoot, winner of the Nobel Prize in 2006; President Michelle Bachelet of Chile; Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs Alejandro Foxley; Professor Harley Shaiken; and Mariano Fernández, Chile’s Ambassador to the United States.
At first glance, Detroit seems an unlikely place to learn about the potential of renewable energy to transform the Americas. Yet some of the most exciting work on renewable energy anywhere — from pioneering research to advanced production — is taking place on the outskirts of the Motor City. Alternative energy technologies developed here could help jumpstart sustainable economic growth for Latin America and the United States as economies worldwide continue to slide into tough economic times.

Detroit is hardly a stranger to industries that change the world. The auto-industrial age began when Henry Ford introduced the moving assembly line at his Highland Park plant almost a century ago. Millions of Model T Fords rolled off the line, putting the world on wheels and transforming the 20th century in the process. In its heyday, the Detroit Model meant not only cars but also jobs and a growing middle class.

The plant is now an abandoned, rusting hulk in a neighborhood that has seen better days. A forlorn Michigan historical marker flags the site, pointing out that “mass production soon moved from here to all phases of American industry and set the pattern of abundance for 20th-century living.”

Few traces of that abundance can be found anywhere near the plant today. The shells of derelict houses and weed-covered, empty lots surround the beleaguered residents who remain, underscoring the devastating social cost of industrial collapse.

Thirty miles north, in Auburn Hills, Michigan, is a different scene entirely. In an unassuming one-story building, a remarkable machine stretching the length of a football field employs the power of mass production to manufacture flexible thin-film solar material in nine-mile runs.

Walking next to the massive, though strangely elegant machine, its soaring steel I-beams vaguely reminiscent of a cathedral, one has a sense of history being made. Perhaps this is what it felt like to walk next to the assembly line in Highland Park when the first Model Ts were rolling off in 1913.

The underlying science and technology for this pioneering production facility reflect a lifetime of work and the remarkable genius of Stan Ovshinsky, whom an editor of The Economist magazine called “the modern world’s most important energy visionary.” Ovshinsky has defined new paths as a scientist, inventor and entrepreneur. The range of what he has developed over the last five decades is awesome. It includes the mass production of thin-film photovoltaic solar material, the nickel-metal hydride battery that powers virtually all hybrid vehicles on the road today, solid hydrogen storage systems and new forms of nonvolatile computer memory.

Underlying these technologies is Ovshinsky’s paradigm-shifting scientific work on disordered or amorphous materials, which has resulted in a fundamentally new area of science named Ovonics in his honor.
The Triple Challenge

What was visionary in 1960 has become urgent today. The countries of the Americas face a potent triple challenge: achieving energy independence; reducing global warming; and creating jobs in the midst of an economic meltdown. The soaring demand for energy — projections indicate a 45 percent jump in global demand by 2030 — coupled with a heavy reliance on fossil fuels provokes tensions that can lead to war. The geopolitics of oil is particularly critical for the United States, which consumes about a quarter of global petroleum output but has only 3 percent of known reserves.

Climate change knows no borders and threatens catastrophic, irreversible results. Nobuo Tanaka, Executive Director of the International Energy Agency, points out that: “Current trends in energy supply and consumption are patently unsustainable — environmentally, economically and socially — they can and must be altered.” A new report from the Brookings Institution, Rethinking U.S.–Latin American Relations, predicts that “if current human activity remains unchanged, the hemisphere will likely suffer from a variety of ecological shocks, including declines in agricultural yields, water shortages, the loss of animal and plant species, and more frequent and destructive storms in the Caribbean Basin.” The net result of these changes “could bring devastation to Central America, the Caribbean, and the southeastern United States.”

Creating jobs is vital at a moment when the financial meltdown is paralyzing economies throughout the Americas. Supporting new industries that manufacture renewable technologies and investing in energy infrastructure could create both employment and a longer-term economic stimulus. The danger, however, is that economic paralysis could derail action on both energy independence and climate change. “Just as the world seemed poised to combat global warming more aggressively,” The New York Times pointed out in a front page story in late November, “the economic slump and plunging prices of coal and oil are upending plans to wean businesses and consumers from fossil fuel.”

So far, President-elect Obama has held firm to his support for alternative energy, arguing that the solution to the economic downturn lies in moving aggressively on new sources of energy. “We’ll put people back to work,” he announced in a post-election radio address, “...building..."
Jumpstarting the Americas

wind farms and solar panels, fuel-efficient cars and the alternative energy technologies that can free us from our dependence on foreign oil and keep our economy competitive in the years ahead.

Some Latin American countries have taken on an important leadership role. Costa Rica, for example, plans to become carbon neutral by 2021 and has begun adopting a range of policies to move in that direction.

To better understand the potential of alternative energy for the Americas, UC Berkeley’s Center for Latin American Studies organized a September workshop for academics, entrepreneurs, labor leaders and policymakers. They traveled to Detroit to spend a day and a half with Stan Ovshinsky and several of his colleagues. The workshop participants included Roberto Dobles, Minister of the Environment and Energy in Costa Rica; Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, President of Fundación para la Democracia in Mexico; Christopher Edley, Dean of the UC Berkeley Law School; and David Bonior, the second-ranking Democrat in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1991 to 2002.

The visit was part of the U.S.–Mexico Futures Forum, a joint project convened by Berkeley and ITAM, a Mexico City university. The forum, now in its seventh year, brings together an innovative and influential group of people to address the challenges the U.S. and Mexico face.

The visit to Detroit underscored the fact that lack of technology is not the main obstacle to tackling the energy challenges facing the Americas. New research is critical but should not displace the diffusion of the state-of-the-art renewable energy approaches that are available now. “Policy is going to be the place where we win or lose the global warming battle,” warned Daniel Kammen, the Class of 1935 Distinguished Professor of Energy at UC Berkeley.

An Energy Revolution

Stan Ovshinsky has an unusually bold vision when it comes to energy. “The ages of civilization have been classified by the materials they use: the Bronze Age, the Iron Age, the Silicon Age,” he has often remarked. “We are at the dawn of the Hydrogen Age.”

Ovshinsky has done more than just about anyone to get us there. He began in the early 1960s defining what he calls the “hydrogen loop” as an alternative to fossil fuels. The hydrogen loop starts with the unlimited energy of the sun — itself composed of hydrogen — and seeks to harness its rays through photovoltaic solar material to produce energy across a growing field of applications. He points out that an hour of sunlight could meet the planet’s energy requirements for a year.

While his vision may reach to the stars — hydrogen was born in the big bang — the science and technology Ovshinsky has pioneered exist right here on earth in working factories and state-of-the-art prototypes. Some highlights of the Detroit trip were touring production facilities, talking to
Stan Ovshinsky in the Auburn Hills plant where thin-film solar cells are mass-produced.

Photo by Brendan Ross.
Jumpstarting the Americas

engineers and technicians and evaluating the potential of solar energy production to meet current and future needs.

The solar production plant the group visited was built in 2003 by Energy Conversion Devices (ECD), the company Ovshinsky founded with his late wife Iris in 1960 and which he led until his recent retirement. Now the company operates six such facilities, with an additional four due to come online by 2010. For Michigan, ECD’s creation of several thousand new jobs — and the possibility that thousands more will be created in the near future — is welcome news in a dismal economic time.

The machine housed in this innovative plant represents a major advance over what has been tried before. Both the roll-to-roll technique and the scale are unprecedented. Skeptics abounded when Ovshinsky proposed expanding manufacturing capacity tenfold to a 30 megawatt machine in the late 1990s (1 megawatt serves 750 houses). Now, six rolls of thin stainless steel — each 14 inches wide and 1.5 miles-long — move in parallel through the largest high-frequency, vacuum-tight plasma deposition system in the world. A single run produces nine miles of solar material, achieving economies of scale reminiscent of the first moving assembly line.

The thin-film solar material “is cheap, durable and flexible enough to integrate into roofs,” according to The New York Times, making it equally suited for industrial nations or emerging economies. Ovshinsky’s panels now cover buildings ranging from warehouses in Southern California to houses in small Oaxacan villages; from a museum in Beijing to the world’s largest solar roof on a General Motors assembly plant in Zaragoza, Spain.

“These are ideas that we can put to work right now if we can have the right regulatory environment and the right public and private investment to drive it forward,” Berkeley Law School Dean Christopher Edley observed after the Detroit workshop.

Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas concurred. “We have to open the possibility of using inventions like those of Stan Ovshinsky and using hydrogen or solar energy as a fuel,” he said. “And that will make our economies work much better than they are working right now.”

Cárdenas also observed that collaboration on these new technologies could improve living standards and bring the United States and Mexico together in more constructive, collaborative ways. “We should find the ways to cooperate and different ways to use renewable energies,” he stated. One idea discussed at the workshop was constructing a photovoltaic solar facility spanning the U.S.–Mexico border in the desert, a symbol both of the links between the two countries and of the unlimited power available from the sun.
Participants were also introduced to Ovshinsky’s prototype hydrogen-fueled car, a Toyota Prius whose gas tank has been removed and replaced with a container filled with solid Ovonic material that safely stores hydrogen at low pressure. Reflecting his systems approach, Ovshinsky also demonstrated his prototype hydrogen refueling station that uses either photovoltaic solar energy or off-peak conventional power-plant electricity to generate hydrogen from water and then stores it in a medium similar to that used in the fuel container.

Ovshinsky’s Prius made its mark at a 2007 event for hydrogen-powered vehicles sponsored by The New York Times and held at the site where the Hindenburg, the giant, hydrogen-filled zeppelin airship, crashed and burned 70 years earlier. The modified Prius drove 190 miles without refueling, the longest range recorded at the event.

The current economic meltdown underscores the importance of creating jobs in a new energy economy. Expanding employment is vital throughout Latin America and in places such as Detroit, the city that served as a particularly poignant and moving backdrop for the discussion. David Bonior stressed the importance for the United States of policies that link renewable technologies to the creation of jobs and production facilities, particularly in areas of economic despair such as Michigan. Others pointed to the ways these technologies could build new industries and spur development throughout Latin America. An Alliance for Green Prosperity across the Americas could link research and development, manufacturing and the application of new technologies, insuring that policies for job creation, energy independence and the reduction of carbon emissions work together rather than at cross purposes.

A Vision for the Future

Ovshinsky shares this social vision. Deeply concerned about these issues, he has formed a new research and development company called Ovshinsky Innovations to develop the next generation of renewable energy technologies. He has plans to build a new solar manufacturing machine capable of producing 1 gigawatt (1,000 megawatts) of power.

Dean Edley summed it up best: “Stan is one of the most remarkable figures of our age. And, the opportunity to get a deeper understanding of what he’s been up to and the potential contributions to attacking the crisis in climate change was really a terrific opportunity.”

“We’re going to have a revolution in energy technologies, there’s no question about it,” Edley added. “And it won’t just be in developed countries like the U.S. It’s going to be in developing countries as well. And it’ll be a mix of technologies. But what I saw in Detroit, I’ll bet you dollars to doughnuts, that it’s going to be a big part of that mix.”

Harley Shaiken is Class of 1930 Professor of Letters and Sciences and the chair of the Center for Latin American Studies at UC Berkeley.
President Michelle Bachelet receives the Berkeley Medal.
California and Chile are linked by a deep bond and a sense of community, and for that reason, I have looked forward to coming here to share the good news of Chile’s success.” With this tribute to both a long history and a promising future of cooperation and academic exchange between her country and the state of California, Chilean President Michelle Bachelet began her speech before a standing-room-only audience in the Chevron Auditorium at UC Berkeley’s International House, sponsored by the Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS).

In a full day of activities in the Golden State, Bachelet addressed the California Chamber of Commerce in Sacramento, held a joint press conference with Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger in Davis and was awarded the Berkeley Medal, the university’s highest honor, by Chancellor Robert Birgeneau. During her stay, the president discussed the need for multilateral approaches to the challenges of globalization, examined alternative energy solutions to Chile’s growing energy crisis and formalized several research and education partnerships between universities in Chile and California.

Bachelet’s visit renewed a long tradition of cooperation between Chile and the state of California, in which UC Berkeley and other public universities have played an important role. In 1963, California Governor Pat Brown launched the Chile–California Program which sought to promote technical cooperation in areas such as agriculture, education, water resource management and highway transportation. As a part of this program, UC Davis trained a cadre of Chilean agronomists in the 1960s who returned home and became leaders in the development of its export agriculture industry. In subsequent years, many Chilean graduate students and academics have spent time at California universities to obtain master’s and doctoral degrees, collaborate on research and take advantage of the state’s excellent higher education. At least two of the cabinet members who accompanied Bachelet on her visit have Berkeley ties. Energy Minister Marcelo Tokman earned his Ph.D. in the Berkeley economics department in 1999, and Foreign Minister Alejandro Foxley served as a visiting lecturer of economics and a visiting scholar at CLAS in 1981.

One facet of the current effort to expand the Chile–California relationship is a program that grants scholarships to lower-income Chilean students for graduate studies in the United States, particularly in California. During a visit to Washington, D.C., in April 2007, Foxley and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice laid the groundwork for the U.S.–Chile Equal Opportunity Scholarship Program, which is jointly administered by the U.S. Fulbright Commission and Chile’s National Commission for Research in Science and Technology (Conicyt). In a recent national address, Bachelet announced $6 billion in funding for this initiative, which is designed to train more than 30,000 graduate students over the next decade. During his discussions with Rice in 2007 and 2008, Foxley also suggested...
Bachelet Energizes Berkeley

A new program of educational and economic cooperation specifically between Chile and California, due to their similarities in terms of geography, natural resources, climate and agriculture, as well as California’s excellence in technology and innovation.

The centerpiece of Bachelet’s visit to California was a meeting with Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and the signing of the joint declaration “Chile–California: A Partnership for the 21st Century.” This document reflects both parties’ commitment to developing academic and business partnerships in the coming years. The first such partnerships were formally launched during a joint appearance by Bachelet and Schwarzenegger at UC Davis, just before her visit to Berkeley. Two of these agreements establish cooperation with UC Davis in winemaking and crop genetics; a third proposes that the California State University system provide advice on curriculum development to the Universidad Tecnológico de Chile. Other partnerships that might be unveiled in the future include a program in which education specialists from California universities would help train Chilean public school teachers, as well as a potential Chilean collaboration with Berkeley’s Energy Research Institute on alternative and renewable power sources.

Energy was a major focus of Bachelet’s visit to California and the subject of a briefing at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) immediately prior to the president’s public talk. Historically, Chile has relied on hydroelectricity as its main energy source. In 1996, to meet growing demand, it also began to generate electricity using natural gas imported from Argentina. Over the past several years, Chile has been faced with severe shortages of both these energy sources, with a drought reducing hydroelectric generation capacity and Argentina restricting gas exports in order to maintain sufficient domestic supply. These shortages show no signs of easing in the near future. Nor will it be easy to limit Chile’s demand for energy, which has grown at the same rate as its rapidly expanding economy for the past 30 years. These factors, combined with rising global energy prices and the political sensitivity of new hydroelectric projects, have created strong incentives for Chile to explore alternative and renewable sources of energy.

During Bachelet’s visit to LBNL, five energy specialists briefed the president and members of her cabinet on
California’s recent energy initiatives and the potential to implement similar projects in Chile. Several presentations focused on harnessing solar energy for electricity generation, something of major interest to the Chilean delegation which visited the Nevada Solar One power plant on the last leg of their U.S. tour. Professor Ramamoorthy Ramesh emphasized the vast potential for generating solar power in Chile’s Atacama Desert. By covering the desert with photovoltaic cells, Chile could theoretically supply not only its own electricity needs but also those of the rest of South America. A presentation by Professor Jay Keasling focused on methods for producing ethanol from switchgrass and other sources of plant cellulose, another technology of interest to Bachelet, who noted that Chile hopes to avoid producing biofuels from corn or other crops that could exacerbate the global food crisis.

In her public talk at UC Berkeley’s International House, Bachelet focused on the steps that Chile is taking to confront the challenges of globalization as well as the need for global cooperation to address problems such as climate change and the rising demand for energy. Bachelet characterized Chile as a development success story, not only because of its rapid economic growth but also because it has focused on social protections to ensure that its people are secure in the face of globalization. As a result, the percentage of Chileans living in poverty has been reduced from nearly 40 percent in 1990 to only 13.7 percent in 2006. Bachelet stressed that her government is prioritizing education to prepare people to compete effectively in the global economy. The Equal Opportunity scholarships for international postgraduate study and the collaborative research agreements with California universities are an important part of this effort, as is increased funding for childcare and primary schooling. In a country where one out of every three families is led by a single mother, assuring the wellbeing of young children gives women the chance to find jobs and escape from poverty.
Chile is not the only nation to have experienced rapid development in recent decades, and increased global prosperity is creating new challenges that call for international cooperation. As Bachelet pointed out, the past 30 years have seen a fourfold increase in the number of people who live in countries that are already wealthy or have high-growth economies. Moreover, most of this growth has occurred in the developing world. Prosperity brings numerous benefits, but it also creates new challenges, ranging from climate change to the global food crisis to threats of nuclear proliferation. “For this reason,” argued Bachelet, “the 21st century will be increasingly complex, and greater efforts will be demanded of us to ensure that the new international system brings an advance in global governance.”

Along these lines, the president outlined three challenges for the international community. The first task is to recognize that global problems can only be solved through increased international cooperation and collective action. Building upon this recognition, a second step is to construct effective, representative and transparent institutions that will facilitate such cooperation — “a task in which the United States will bear an unavoidable responsibility.” While Bachelet lamented the preference for unilateralism in recent years, she expressed optimism that multilateral approaches might be strengthened in the future and pointed to the recent United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali as a step in the right direction.

Finally, the president identified a third challenge for the international community: ensuring that the process of globalization is an equitable one and that traditional cultures and those who cannot compete in the global economy are given adequate protection.

The question-and-answer session following Bachelet’s talk gave her the opportunity to expound on several of the policy issues that her government has faced, especially with respect to women’s rights. As Chile’s first female president, Bachelet has devoted particular attention to issues of gender equity. Recent laws have strengthened the enforcement of child-support payments and mandated that working women be allowed to breastfeed their infant children. A bill currently pending before the Chilean Congress would ensure that men and women with the same jobs receive the same salary. Bachelet acknowledged that domestic violence and the feminization of poverty remain serious problems in Chile, but she also underscored her government’s progress in these areas. Previously, domestic violence that did not result in death was treated as a misdemeanor; a new law has increased the severity of that crime. With respect to the number of women in poverty — a significant problem, given the percentage of families headed by single mothers — Bachelet pointed to the benefits of a soon-to-be-enacted pension reform. Starting July 1, 2008, the Chilean government will offer pensions to housewives who work at home without salaries.

Bachelet’s public talk at the International House and briefing at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory constitute an important step in advancing the longstanding partnership not only between Chile and California, but also between Chile and UC Berkeley. Building upon recent visits by past President Ricardo Lagos and former United Nations Ambassador Juan Gabriel Valdés, the ongoing
cooperation between Berkeley and Chile offers prospects for novel solutions to some of the most important problems facing Chile, California and the world.

Michelle Bachelet is President of Chile and a former Minister of Health and of Defense. She gave a talk for CLAS on June 12, 2008. A webcast of the talk is available at clas.berkeley.edu.

Taylor Boas is a Ph.D. candidate in the Charles & Louise Travers Department of Political Science at UC Berkeley.
The National Climate Change Strategy

In the face of the potentially devastating social, economic and environmental consequences of climate change, the world is taking only minute and isolated actions, ignoring the fact that any effective response must be collective and simultaneous. While the causes of climate change are country-specific, the effects are global and cumulative. Policy change is required at both the national and international levels. Time is running out. We cannot afford further delay.

Developed nations and the large developing countries have an important responsibility in addressing climate change, and they should act as soon as possible. However, this does not mean that smaller countries should sit on the sidelines. In Costa Rica, we have unilaterally declared it our goal to become climate neutral by the year 2021, the bicentennial of our independence.

Our first step was to put climate change at the top of the government agenda. The current administration has integrated the National Climate Change Strategy (NCCS) into its National Development Plan. Designed after careful analysis of the complex interactions of economic, social and environmental factors, the NCCS outlines two complementary and equally important agendas: the National Agenda and the International Agenda. The National Agenda has been defined around six strategic axes: mitigation; adaptation; metrics; capacity building and technology transfer; education, culture and public awareness; and financing. The International Agenda is also structured around six strategic components: exerting international influence; attracting foreign capital; leadership; legitimacy; presence in multilateral and binational forums; and international capacity building.

The National Agenda

According to several studies, Costa Rica is located in one of the regions most threatened by climate change. Thus, the country is strongly motivated to do what it can to reduce its vulnerability. The National Agenda stresses two main action areas: mitigation and adaptation. The goal of mitigation is to reduce total carbon emissions, while the adaptation component is intended to protect economic growth, social development and ecosystems from the dangers of climate change.

To mitigate carbon emissions, Costa Rica plans to reduce emissions by source; enhance its carbon sinks through reforestation, natural forest regeneration and avoided deforestation; and develop carbon markets and the C-Neutral brand.

Tropical forests are one of the most precious ecosystems on the planet, home to diverse species and a wealth of genetic resources. Forests provide crucial environmental services, from soil and watershed conservation to protection against floods, landslides and other natural disasters. They also draw tourists, an important source of income for Costa Rica. Furthermore, forests play a crucial international role in maintaining the climate balance as “carbon sinks” or reservoirs of greenhouse gases. Standing forests are the most important terrestrial reservoir of carbon dioxide. To enhance this function, Costa Rica is implementing a new tree planting campaign linked to Wangari Maathai’s United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) campaign to plant one billion trees worldwide. In 2007, our country planted more than 5 million trees. For 2008, the target is 7 million trees, which translates into approximately 1.5 trees per capita.

The Costa Rican government is also actively promoting the “C-Neutral” or carbon-neutral brand as a way to reduce emissions while at the same time differentiating the country and its products in the global marketplace. We envision a future when goods ranging from hotel rooms to coffee beans to Intel processors manufactured in Costa Rica carry a C-neutral label assuring consumers that the good or service was created in a carbon-neutral process. Companies wishing to earn the label would need to reduce their emissions and purchase carbon offsets to make up for carbon emitted in the production process. The administration is betting that the makers of C-Neutral products will become stakeholders in the campaign for carbon neutrality with strong incentives to push for continued “green” innovation.

One of the priorities of the adaptation component of the National Agenda is to identify the economic, social and environmental risks of climate change by geographic zone and sector (energy, transportation, etc.). Based on this
information, adaptation measures can be prioritized and an action plan developed to reduce the effects of climate change. Management of water resources, health, agriculture and livestock, infrastructure, coastal areas, fishing, land and marine biodiversity and ecosystems will be key components of the adaptation strategy, as well as disaster preparedness and risk management.

Mitigation and adaptation alone will not be enough, however. All programs implemented must be measurable, reportable and verifiable in accordance with international methodologies. After all, what cannot be measured cannot be managed. Proper financing mechanisms and adequate technology are also required. Last but not least, no strategy can ever be well implemented without proper education and public awareness efforts. It is the people, after all, who will determine the outcome and success of this strategy.

The International Agenda

Climate change knows no borders. Just as it is true that greenhouse gases generated within our territory will have a negative impact not only within our borders but on the rest of the world as well, it is also true that global actions (or inactions) directly impact Costa Rica. It is therefore time to recognize that the current social, economic and environmental situation demands that we transcend the limitations of the traditional nation-state and accept the common responsibilities we share. For our part, we in Costa Rica are committed to contributing to the dialogues and negotiations that will eventually lead to a new international climate regime when the Kyoto Protocol expires in 2012. We will reach out to allies abroad and serve as a replicable model for other nations with similar circumstances.

Our country has historically dedicated considerable effort towards the protection and conservation of our natural resources. We continued to build on that tradition at the 10th Special Session of the UNEP Governing Council / Global Ministerial Environment Forum, which took place in Monaco in February 2008. At that meeting, Costa Rica successfully launched the Climate Neutral Network (CN Net, www.climateneutral.unep.org). The network’s aim is to create a truly global information exchange open to all sectors of society. Three pioneering countries have joined
Costa Rica in this network so far: Iceland, Norway and New Zealand. Four cities — Arendal, Norway; Rizhao, China; Vancouver, Canada; and Växjö, Sweden — have also joined the CN Net. Additionally, over 30 companies and organizations have agreed to participate in the initiative, clear proof of Costa Rica’s role as an international climate change leader.

Achieving our goal of carbon neutrality requires access to financial resources. Costa Rica supports international efforts to develop appropriate financial instruments and carbon markets that provide effective incentives for developing countries. We visualize a more flexible future climate regime, oriented toward streamlining the various financial mechanisms and carbon markets, in order to guarantee greater cost efficiency.

We are currently organizing a series of workshops on carbon neutrality in order to introduce our Climate Change Strategy to the international audience. This effort begins a process by which we hope to gain access to adequate financial, technological and human resources and forge an international network of allies willing to act against climate change. We began this dialogue in May with a series of workshops hosted by the Natural Resources Defense Council and held at the University of California at Berkeley and Harvard University. UC Berkeley’s Center for Latin American Studies has been a crucial supporter of Costa Rica’s initiative, allowing us access to invaluable academic and technological resources and inviting us to take part in the “Alternative Energy and the Americas” workshop held jointly with Ovshinsky Innovation, LLC, on September 29 of this year.

We plan to maintain the momentum of this initiative by putting together another cycle of similar workshops. The goal is to enable a mutually beneficial dialogue between our country and universities, NGOs, think tanks, government entities, businesses and financial institutions, in order to lay out a road map for the decarbonization of our country while, at the same time, building an international network of allies against climate change.

Further Reflections

The target of carbon neutrality will not be reached without a combination of national efforts and international support. The Bali agreement recognizes the need for this combination by stipulating that developing countries should undertake “nationally appropriate mitigation actions in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner.”

In a collaborative effort among the respective Ministries, Costa Rica will launch policies and measures that provide incentives for reducing emissions in a variety of sectors. These national policies are necessary but not sufficient to achieve the intended emission reductions. After an arduous process of awareness raising and broad consultation, both public and private sectors have come onboard and are willing to invest. However, it is clear that the total cost cannot be covered domestically. Access to international funds will be critical to cover the difference between national investment and the total cost of going carbon neutral.

In this context, Costa Rica notes with concern that international resources are being earmarked for mitigation efforts in the high-emitting emergent countries where the volume of potential reductions is high. However, it is entirely possible that, with the proper international financial support, smaller countries may be able to achieve reductions more quickly than large countries, and would therefore be able to harness the benefits associated with early reductions. Furthermore,
leaving small and medium-size economies out of the global transformation toward low-carbon development condemns these countries to the continued use of soon-to-be obsolete technologies, perpetuating already unacceptable poverty levels.

Costa Rica calls for international funds to be awarded to developing nations based on each country’s merits, privileging those that have launched and implemented climate-friendly regulatory frameworks. Disbursement of these resources cannot be based on the mere existence of “green” policies but rather should be made once the reductions in greenhouse gas emissions have been nationally measured and reported and internationally verified.

It is in this manner that Costa Rica interprets the Bali agreement and declares itself ready to accept its common, but differentiated, responsibility. It is time to diverge from business as usual and refrain from picking only the low-hanging fruit when it comes to taking serious action against climate change. Tackling a problem as complex as global warming, while simultaneously protecting the social and economic pillars of development, requires a major paradigm shift.

Almost 200 years ago, we pledged to become an independent nation, where all our citizens could be free men and women living in peace, and we succeeded. Costa Rica now pledges to become free from climate change by declaring peace with nature and striving to reverse global warming and its deadly consequences. We have begun the journey from words and theories to concrete actions; the time to act is now. Will you join us?

Dr. Roberto Dobles is the Costa Rican Minister of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications. He gave a presentation at the CLAS-sponsored conference “Alternative Energy and the Americas” held in Detroit, Michigan, on September 29, 2008.
After several decades of neoliberal dominance, during which even left-leaning presidential candidates implemented or defended market reforms once in office, Latin America has entered a period of greater ideological conflict. In recent years, the scope of the debate between statist and market-oriented options has widened considerably, along with the introduction of more statist policies in such countries as Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela. As during the 1930s and 1980s, this shift in national development models is producing important political struggles between ideological adversaries. Unlike these earlier periods, however, the contemporary shift toward statism at the national level appears to be generating considerable territorial conflict as well. In Bolivia and Ecuador, for example, leftist presidents Evo Morales and Rafael Correa face their most significant opposition not at the national level but in the subnational regions of the east (Bolivia) and west (Ecuador). More so than in the past, understanding the nature of the resurgent conflict over economic policy requires that we examine the conflicts that are unfolding between national and subnational actors.

This article focuses on the conservative autonomy movements that have arisen over the last decade in Santa Cruz, Bolivia, and Guayas, Ecuador. Based on interviews with movement participants and leaders in each case, my research seeks to understand the similarities and differences that characterize these two movements.

The similarities begin with a quirk of geography: in both countries, political authority and economic dynamism are not concentrated in the same subnational region, a fact
which helps explain why these movements have emerged in Bolivia and Ecuador and not elsewhere in Latin America. The movements themselves have articulated common demands and deployed comparable tactics. However, despite these similarities, the Santa Cruz autonomy movement has developed greater strength than its counterpart in Guayas, a difference that I attribute to a number of factors, including the location of natural resources, the scope of prior market reforms and the role of the military.

The greater strength of the Santa Cruz movement is reflected in the fact that, although both Presidents Morales and Correa presided over constitutional revision processes beginning in 2006 that essentially ignored the demands of the autonomistas, Correa’s new constitution was approved on time (on September 29, 2008) and by an overwhelming majority of Ecuadorians (though it lost narrowly in Guayaquil). In contrast, Morales was forced to delay the constitutional referendum and, more importantly, to agree to changes in the draft constitution that had been demanded by the movement in Santa Cruz, including the creation of regional assemblies and the insertion of language protecting large landholdings from possible land reform.

At the conceptual level, I posit the use of “conservative autonomy movement” as an appropriate label for the phenomena that have unfolded in Santa Cruz and Guayas over the last decade. Although both movements have demanded greater political and fiscal authority (demands that could quite easily fit under the rubric of “decentralization”), they share a much deeper commitment to developmental autonomy, defined as the independence necessary to pursue an economic development model that differs from that of the national government. At the same time, movement leaders in both cases reiterate that autonomy for them does not include sovereignty (though they warn that demands are likely to radicalize if national governments prove unresponsive). As a result, what we are seeing in each country is the articulation of a demand for a “one country, two systems” type of institutional arrangement. Given their commitment to free-market economic principles, the autonomy drives in Santa Cruz and Guayas could just as accurately be labeled “liberal” as “conservative.” But conservative is a more useful term because it describes the right-of-center space that these movements occupy within each country’s political system, including ties to the Social Christian Party (Partido Social Cristiano, PSC) in Ecuador and to the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, MNR) and Social and Democratic Power (Poder Democrático y Social, Podemos) parties in Bolivia.

In pursuit of similar demands and against similarly hostile national governments, advocates of autonomy in Santa Cruz and Guayas have adopted the range of activities that theorists commonly associate with social movements. These include regionwide strikes, signature-gathering campaigns, media statements that laud the economic successes of each subnational region and some of the largest rallies and demonstrations ever held in either Bolivia or Ecuador. To give two of the most sensational examples: in June 2005, 350,000 cruceños demonstrated to demand a vote on autonomy, and in January 2008, 200,000 guayaquileños demonstrated for the inclusion of autonomy in the country’s new constitution. While the participation of ordinary people in these activities certainly merits the “social movement” label, it is important to note that these
movements have also been disproportionately influenced and financed by economic elites, wealthy firms and business associations. Likewise, considering the logistical and symbolic support offered by subnational officials at the municipal and provincial levels (e.g., Guayaquil Mayor Jaime Nebot, Santa Cruz Prefect Rubén Costas), these are social movements that clearly cross the traditional state–society divide.

Moving beyond the important similarities that they share, why have these conservative autonomy movements emerged in Bolivia and Ecuador and not elsewhere, and why have they emerged now and not earlier? I argue, first, that the sharp spatial disjuncture between the location of political and economic power is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the emergence of these movements. In Bolivia and Ecuador, political power is concentrated in the national capitals, La Paz and Quito, while economic power is concentrated in Santa Cruz and Guayas, home to each country’s most vibrant private sector. This stands in sharp contrast to the majority of Latin American countries, where the most dynamic economic region is also the seat of the national government (e.g., Argentina, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela). Thus, in most countries in the region, private sector actors who are displeased with the statist leanings of the national government simply do not have the autonomy option that exists in both Bolivia and Ecuador.

This structural disparity notwithstanding, for decades, economic and political elites in Santa Cruz and Guayas were able to exercise tremendous leverage in the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the national government. Beginning in 1985, Bolivia’s three traditional parties adopted and implemented market-oriented reforms that favored agricultural exporters in Santa Cruz, and the Ministry of Agriculture was typically reserved for a cruceno. In Ecuador, candidates from Guayaquil and Quito essentially alternated in the presidency from the time of the democratic transition in 1979 until the onset of political instability in 1997. Even when a quiteño occupied Carondelet Palace, Leon Febres Cordero (president from 1984 to 1988 and mayor of Guayaquil from 1992 to 2000) managed to use the vast clientelistic network he constructed as president for Guayaquil’s benefit.

So long as they could reasonably depend on their representation in national institutions, economic actors in Santa Cruz and Guayas accepted the concentration of political power in La Paz and Quito and the exceedingly limited authority that this arrangement left for their regions. However, a rapid chain of events in each country has
The Hybrid Sources of Frida Kahlo

by John Zarobell
Frida Kahlo was an exceptionally original artist whose paintings sometimes seem to emerge from her consciousness and experience without prior mediation. While Kahlo was an innovative artist who possessed a highly particular vision, it is not true that her art is without sources. The problem is that few art historians outside Mexico are familiar with the pictorial source material from which she drew her inspiration. Many scholars have documented the interest of Kahlo and her husband Diego Rivera in Pre-Columbian sculpture and Mexican folk art, but her other influences are less well-known. This article will look at Kahlo’s art in relation to a body of sources including 19th-century Mexican portraiture, European modernist art and Spanish colonial painting in order to provide a more complete picture of the resources she deployed in generating her unforgettable imagery.

Kahlo’s interest in retablo painting, particularly the ex-voto tradition of producing paintings as offerings to saints in order to request intervention or give thanks for miracles performed, is evident throughout her work. Another popular painting tradition in 19th-century Mexico was portraiture, as demonstrated by the careers of artists such as José Maria Estrada (1811-62) and Hermenegildo Bustos (1832-1907). The portraiture of Bustos, in particular, demonstrates a certain skill with painterly materials though it is clearly not the product of academic training. His paintings were made to commemorate special occasions, and they possess a frankness and immediacy that provide an air of authenticity. Neither the sitters nor the artist appear pretentious, and it is this spirit and tradition that guide Kahlo in her portraits from 1930 to 1931, including her own so-called wedding portrait, “Frieda Kahlo and Diego Rivera,” 1931 (San Francisco Museum of Modern Art). The painting exhibits a naïve style that she absorbed from this earlier tradition, and the use of this style shows that Kahlo intended it as an intimate picture for a close friend, the philanthropist and collector, Albert Bender. Kahlo produced this portrait as a gift for Bender, who had been instrumental in helping secure a U.S. visa for the communist Rivera, presumably to thank him for his generosity. In this sense, the motivation for the picture does derive from the retablo tradition (Bender intervened on Rivera’s behalf), and Kahlo has even dressed herself in the colors of the Mexican flag to stress her national roots.

Comparing Kahlo’s “Self-Portrait on the Borderline Between Mexico and the United States,” 1932, with a 19th-century portrait by Estrada, “Young Woman with Pearl Necklace” reveals Kahlo’s interest in, and even identification with, the subjects of 19th-century portraiture. In her self-portrait, Kahlo pictures herself on a pedestal between the industrial North and a Mexico characterized by Mesoamerican art and ruins and native flora. This painting has been analyzed thoroughly in previous literature, and Kahlo’s ambivalent position between these two cultures is reflected in her blank expression and the fact that the pedestal on which she stands is not labeled “Frida Kahlo” but “Carmen Rivera.” There is also a flatness in the way the figure is painted, a rigidity in the modeling of the figure, dress and face; her pose is stiff and artificial.

Left: Frida Kahlo painting “Self-Portrait on the Borderline Between Mexico and the United States,” 1932. This work, shown on pages 26-27, was completed during Kahlo’s stay in Detroit with Diego Rivera while he worked on the “Detroit Industry” fresco. (Courtesy of the Rivera Archives at the Detroit Institute of Arts, 1932. Photograph © 1932 The Detroit Institute of Arts.)
Comparing her image to the subject of the Estrada portrait, it seems almost as if Kahlo has copied this figure with certain alterations, such as the addition of the gloves, the Mexican flag and the cigarette she holds. The pink dress and coral necklace are there (photographs of Kahlo show that she owned both the dress and necklace) but also the turn of the head is the same, as is the line of hair that surrounds the faces of the two figures. Following Estrada, Kahlo has given her face a rigid appearance though there is ample evidence to demonstrate that her facility with oil paint by this point would have allowed her to render herself more realistically. In other words, Kahlo was looking either to this portrait or to similar works in order to craft a particularly Mexican art and image of herself.

Other paintings demonstrate that Kahlo borrowed from European modernist art as well. In “Self-Portrait with Thorn Necklace and Hummingbird,” 1940, her debt to both Catholic and Mesoamerican religious symbolism is visible in the use of the crown of thorns, which has here become a necklace, and the hummingbird, an Aztec mythological symbol. Yet it is difficult to look at the background of this painting without thinking of the fantasy jungle paintings of Henri Rousseau (1844-1910), such as “Landscape with Monkeys,” c.1910. Rousseau was a self-taught artist who was befriended and admired by members of avant-garde artistic circles in Paris, including Pablo Picasso and Guillaume Apollinaire. (Kahlo’s husband Rivera also moved in these circles during his time in Paris before he met her.) Rousseau never left Paris and its environs, so his jungle scenes were conjured entirely from his imagination and visits to hothouse gardens. It seems odd for an artist from Mexico, whose territory includes tropical jungles, to be generating jungle imagery modeled on that of a modern Parisian. Yet the particularity of Rousseau’s pictorial style comes across in Kahlo’s work. Standing before a forest of huge leaves does not make sense in any realistic notion of pictorial space, but there is uncanny vividness in her portrayal: it projects the idea that the world the artist inhabits is a fantasy construction all her own. As with Rousseau, the modern world is repressed in this image, providing a background that exhibits the free reign of the artist’s imagination.

More pointed is her reference to Dada collage in “My Dress Hangs There,” 1933 (Femsa Collection, Monterrey, Mexico), which records Kahlo’s impressions of New York. The painting is a small work replete with urban imagery. Upon careful inspection, it becomes clear that the artist inserted images of crowds cut from local newspapers and magazines in the lower segment of the work. These crowds, whether attending protests, military parades or baseball games, provide a sense of seething life to the otherwise unoccupied city depicted by Kahlo. Her cutting and pasting in this work is contemporary to the collages of John Heartfield (1891-1968) in Germany. However, it is even closer to the most well-known collage from

continued on page 29 >>
Oil on canvas, 24 5/8 x 18 7/8 in.
Harry Ransom Humanities Research Center, The University of Texas at Austin.
Images on pages 25-29 © and reproduced by permission of the Banco de México Diego Rivera & Frida Kahlo Trust.

Oil on metal, 12 ½ x 13 ¾ in.
Collection Maria Rodríguez de Reyero.
Oil over laminate, 30.5 X 35 cm.
The Art Archive / Dolores Olmedo Patiño / Gianni Dagli Orti.
Berlin Dada, Hannah Höch’s “Cut with the Kitchen Knife...,” 1919-20 (Staatliche Museum zu Berlin). Kahlo would have identified with this liberated and radical woman artist who was known for her caustic attacks on German postwar idealism and bourgeois culture, though her artistic aims were ultimately distinct.

Kahlo’s life was unquestionably cosmopolitan, whether in Mexico City or New York, and she had access to many artistic sources, but it was Mexican imagery that she drew upon more than any other. In addition to the 19th-century portraiture that influenced her early career, there is another, less-explored source of Mexican imagery reflected in Kahlo’s work, namely Spanish colonial painting. Kahlo’s father, Guillermo Kahlo, was a photographer charged with the mission of recording Spanish colonial churches throughout Mexico. It is not known whether Frida accompanied him on any of these visits, however she did work as his assistant and so would have been familiar with the paintings of this period (from the 16th to the early 19th century) which, during the first half of the 20th century, mostly hung in churches. For the purposes of this analysis, one comparison will have to suffice to make these connections clear.

This final comparison casts light on one of Kahlo’s most enigmatic and powerful images, “My Nurse and I,” 1937. In this painting, Kahlo depicts herself as a baby with the head of her adult self nursing at the breast of her dark-skinned Indian nursemaid whose face is replaced by that of an Olmec stone sculpture. In this work, Kahlo’s assertion of her Mexican identity (mexicanidad) is evident; she is drinking the milk of her spiritual Mesoamerican ancestors, and from this source her identity is formed (complete with unibrow). This interpretation is extended when one compares this image with a painting by the renowned baroque Mexican artist Cristobal de Villalpando (1649-1714) from the second most prominent cathedral in Mexico City, the Church of Santo Domingo. In this painting, Saint Dominic is seen receiving the supreme reward for his hermetic, spiritual life: milk from the breast of the mother of Christ that can be seen shooting across space into his mouth. If Saint Dominic becomes the “milk brother” of Christ as he miraculously drinks from the same holy breast, Frida portrays herself as the recipient of a similarly miraculous occurrence. On the one hand, she is a baby drinking at the breast of her nursemaid; on the other, she is the full-grown milk sister of all Mesoamericans. This painting makes visible her indigenous identity and sources of artistic inspiration even as she depicts this spiritual formation in a Rousseau-inspired jungle. Her creativity is unmistakable and was in many respects unequalled, but like her, it emerged from multiple hybrid sources.

John Zarobell was the Coordinating Curator for the Frida Kahlo exhibit at the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art. He spoke for CLAS on September 24, 2008.
Power and Autonomy

threatened politics as usual and dramatically limited the national influence of these dynamic subnational regions. Critical in Bolivia has been the collapse of the traditional party system beginning in 2002 and the historic emergence of a powerful indigenous party, the Movement Toward Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo, MAS). Whereas the failure of any presidential candidate to receive a majority in the years before 2005 threw the selection of the president to Congress, typically ensuring an important role for Santa Cruz, the outright victory of MAS candidate Evo Morales with 54 percent of the vote in 2005 signified a new and potentially threatening era for the department.

In Ecuador, the reliability of Guayas’ input in the national government has also come into question over the course of the last decade. First, Ecuador has experienced even higher levels of political instability than Bolivia, with seven different presidents in office in the decade that began with the congressional removal of President Bucaram in 1997. In addition to Bucaram, Presidents Mahuad (1998-2000) and Gutiérrez (2003-05) also failed to finish their terms in office due to a combination of widespread protests in Quito and the removal of support on the part of the military. This intense political volatility at the national level contrasts sharply with the dominant position the PSC has enjoyed in Guayas. Since 1992, the PSC has steadily controlled the prefecture of Guayas, the mayoralty of Guayaquil and majorities on both the Guayas regional council and the Guayaquil municipal council. The second factor contributing to Guayas’ declining influence has been the success of the anti-party and anti-Congress platform articulated by Rafael Correa, who won the presidency in 2006 by opting not to run legislative candidates at all and by running against all of the traditional parties, including the previously powerful PSC.

Thus, conservative autonomy movements in Bolivia and Ecuador both emerged in response to threats to the influence that Santa Cruz and Guayas were traditionally able to leverage at the national level. Despite this similarity, these movements have developed in different environments, and different factors help explain the greater strength of the movement in Santa Cruz. There are three critical differences between the movements, the first and most obvious of which is structural: whereas Santa Cruz and the other eastern departments that are pushing for autonomy are the site of significant endowments of hydrocarbons, Ecuador’s hydrocarbons are concentrated not in western, coastal Guayas but in the impoverished and underdeveloped provinces of the Amazon to the east of the Andes. The desire to control the department’s oil and gas wealth has motivated participants in Santa Cruz’ autonomy movement, while their counterparts in Guayas fear that autonomy might threaten their access to Ecuador’s oil rents.

The second factor has to do with the much greater scope and depth of neoliberal reforms in Bolivia as compared to Ecuador. Bolivia experienced one of the most radical processes of economic stabilization and liberalization in the entire region, and nearly two decades of market reform (1985-2003) produced significant and tangible benefits for Santa Cruz. More specifically, the adoption of competitive

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**Power to the Left, Autonomy to the Right (continued from page 21)**

Within Bolivia, Santa Cruz accounts for:
- 24% of population;
- 29% of GDP;
- 42% of tax revenue;
- 40% of export revenue.

Exports: soy, cotton, coffee, sugarcane, timber, vegetable oils, gas and oil.

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**Department of Santa Cruz, Bolivia**

Within Bolivia, Santa Cruz accounts for:
- 24% of population;
- 29% of GDP;
- 42% of tax revenue;
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Exports: soy, cotton, coffee, sugarcane, timber, vegetable oils, gas and oil.

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Data courtesy of Kent Eaton.
exchange rates generated new opportunities for producers of a range of agricultural and natural resource exports in the eastern lowlands (e.g., cotton, sugar, soy, timber, gas). Morales’ attempts to roll back these reforms therefore serve as a significant motivating force for the department’s autonomy movement. If Bolivia’s market reforms were among the most aggressive in Latin America, Ecuador marks the other extreme. Despite President Correa’s claim that traditional parties like the PSC imposed neoliberalism on Ecuador, opponents of market reforms were, in fact, able to sharply limit their scope. Due to the absence of significant neoliberal reforms in Ecuador, Correa’s favored economic policies constitute a much less radical departure than do Morales’ in Bolivia and hence provide less of an incentive for the autonomy movement in Guayaquil.

Finally, while the military has criticized autonomy movements in both cases, Ecuador’s military is much more politically interventionist than its Bolivian counterpart, and its greater political influence has created far more important setbacks for the movement in Guayas. In 2001, the military succeeded in squashing the most promising window of opportunity that has yet to open for those who seek to advance the cause of provincial autonomy in Ecuador. Because the military negotiated the ascension to the presidency of Guayaquil native Gustavo Noboa after the removal of Jamil Mahuad in 2000, the generals were subsequently in a position to veto Noboa’s attempt to schedule a nationwide referendum on provincial autonomy. This veto by the military deflated the autonomy movement at its moment of greatest strength.

Given the highly fluid and tumultuous nature of politics in both countries in recent times, it is still too early to offer a definitive assessment of the success of these conservative autonomy movements. What does seem clear is that in Bolivia and Ecuador, and perhaps elsewhere in the region, a full understanding of the ideological clashes over development that have reemerged in Latin America will likely require serious attention to the territorial dimensions of these conflicts.

Kent Eaton is an associate professor in the Politics Department at UC Santa Cruz and a visiting professor at CLAS. He gave a talk for CLAS on November 24, 2008.
Mexico’s Right-to-Know Reforms

by Jonathan Fox

Mexico’s laws and official political discourse now emphasize transparency. Citizens’ “right to know” is assumed to encourage more accountable governance. But what difference have these reforms made in practice, and how do we know?

After the historic presidential elections in 2000, the momentum for institutional change quickly stalled. Once incoming president Vicente Fox proved unable to assemble a working majority in Congress, the “reform of the state” dropped off his list of priorities. National regulatory agencies remained weak and ineffective. Democratic electoral change at the subnational level — widely credited with helping to drive the national transition in the 1980s and 1990s — turned out to produce relatively little in the way of innovative democratic governance. Impunity for human rights violations persisted.

Against this backdrop, which can be described more as regime transition than state transformation, Mexico’s public information access reform stands out as the most clear-cut qualitative break with past patterns of national governance since the end of one-party rule. In 2002, a coalition of media and civil society elites forged an unusual consensus among Mexico’s normally fractious political parties and were able to persuade Congress to unanimously pass a potentially powerful federal transparency law in 2003. Unlike so many new laws, this one was backed by a brand-new agency, unburdened by the PRI’s legacy, with a powerful voice and substantial institutional capacity: the Federal Agency for Public Information Access (IFAI).

By the time of the 2006 presidential election campaign, national political rhetoric was peppered with newly obligatory references to transparency and accountability, as even old-fashioned politicians attempted to retool their images by appropriating the discourse of good governance. While the term is new to national politics and still sounds a bit bureaucratic to many, the concept of accountability has long been contested in Mexico, from Zapata’s call for the rule of law to the 1968 student movement.

The transparency law mandates a very explicit presumption in favor of disclosure. That is, the law requires that all documents and information produced by the federal government should be publicly accessible — unless they fall into a category specifically covered by a clearly bounded exception. In addition, the IFAI includes a robust system for citizens to appeal information denials by government agencies. The appeals tribunal is made up of the IFAI’s governing council, which has sided with citizens more often than with government agencies.

The IFAI uses an electronic information request system called the System for Information Requests (Sistema de Solicitudes de Información or SISI). Requesters can easily fill out an online form to solicit data from a federal agency. The request then goes directly to the agency, which responds to the citizen through the same electronic system. Citizen demand has been increasing steadily, with more than twice as many requests in the past year as in the system’s first year.

But there have been a few catches. In principle, the information request process is quite straightforward for those familiar with the Internet. Both the IFAI and civil...
society organizations have produced useful manuals that clearly explain the procedures. Yet filing a request is often not enough to actually access the information requested. This is in part because of the challenges involved in the crucial step of formulating the request. It turns out that filing a successful request requires one to already know a great deal about what one is looking for. This poses a classic “chicken-and-egg” problem. Citizens need to know exactly where to direct their requests; otherwise they will be rejected because agencies can reply with: “that’s not our department.”

The second catch is that in order to achieve a quick consensus on the founding law and to avoid the need for a new constitutional reform, Congress limited its scope to the federal government, and the IFAI’s jurisdiction was limited to the executive branch. This meant that much of the state, including the judicial and legislative branches, as well as state and local governments, ended up with lower standards for public access. In response to these loopholes, Congress followed up with a constitutional reform in mid-2007, intended to raise the bar. Little actual compliance has followed, especially among the more opaque state governments.

Third, it turns out that government agencies are increasingly responding to citizen requests with claims that the information does not exist. Such claims are very difficult to disprove, especially since the information law was not accompanied by a rigorous archives law. Moreover, even when the IFAI tribunal rules in favor of citizens, agencies have learned that the IFAI has no independent capacity to issue sanctions for noncompliance. Indeed, the federal agency that is responsible for such sanctions, the Ministry of Public Administration, is itself the agency with the highest rate of noncompliance with IFAI rulings in favor of disclosure.

Testing the Transparency Reform

Many civil society organizations have recognized that in order to put the transparency reforms to work and unearth information that is relevant, they must make substantial investments in learning the system. Thanks to support from the Hewlett Foundation, this researcher was able to participate in several applied research exercises that were designed to uncover the strengths and limitations of the information access reforms. The following section outlines findings from three of these studies, some of which are still in progress.

The first exercise was an attempt to track an internal government document produced by the Oaxaca state branch of the federal Social Development Ministry (Sedesol). The document detailed the state government’s systematic use of federal anti-poverty funds to bolster allied social organizations during the run-up to the 2004 governor’s election. Although the study named names, it was simply filed away by higher-ups in Mexico City, and impunity persisted. The document — leaked to this researcher by a federal official who prefers to remain anonymous — appeared to constitute a useful case to test the federal information law. We knew it existed, and we could request it with its exact title and date (information request: 0002000016905).

The Ministry claimed that the document did not exist, declaring in its official response that the report requested was not an “official document” — and could not be — because of the nature of its contents. Sedesol argued that it would be prohibited from preparing such a report because it documents illegal activities. According to Sedesol, it would never commission a study that addressed the electoral use of social programs because such activity is against the law. University of California, Santa Cruz research project associate Libby Haight filed an appeal, including a copy of the document in question with an electronic footprint that showed it had been created on a Sedesol computer (Appeal file number 730/05). The IFAI tribunal rejected the ministry’s claim that it could not, by definition, be an official document because

The rising number of claims that documents “do not exist” points to bureaucratic resistance to transparency reforms.
of its content. Yet the tribunal also ruled that there was inadequate proof that it was an official document. It is not clear whether providing additional information about the document’s origins would have persuaded the tribunal, but doing so would have put the whistleblower at risk. In the end, the IFAI tribunal ratified the government’s denial of responsibility for the document. The broader lesson was that, when it comes to official “declarations of nonexistence,” the burden of proof falls squarely on the requester.

The second exercise involves a network of rural women’s civic and social organizations in the Costa Grande region of Guerrero, which has tried to use federal and state information access reforms to address concerns about the performance of their local public clinics, including issues of quality and access to care. By federal law, the government is required to cover the clinics’ operating expenses, such as electricity and the cost of a basic set of medicines which are to be distributed free of charge. However, citizen monitors discovered that, in practice, the free medicines are rarely available, and participants in the government’s flagship welfare program, Oportunidades, are obliged to pay the clinics’ electricity bills through so-called “cooperaciones.” In principle, it should be possible to “follow the money” from congressional national health budget appropriations, to the state government, to the regional health districts and down to the clinics. In practice, the funds nominally allocated for medicines for the public clinics disappear into the black hole of the state government budget. After a year, several rounds of requests, a victory in the IFAI appeals process, internally contradictory budget data and steep fees for documents with numerous irrelevant or blank pages, the state government finally promised to provide the disaggregated budget data that would show the missing links from the health district to the local clinics, by line item. But the health ministry wanted to charge more than US$1,600 for the documents, which included a 60 percent tax on the 20 cents per page fee. Community organizers and their advisors were offended. Not only did they lack the money to pay the fees, they also considered them to be illegitimate (indeed, the taxes and fees clearly violated the newly established constitutional standards). Grassroots organizers are now concentrating on strengthening their capacity to monitor the quality of, and public access to, health service delivery, gathering their own evidence to identify broader patterns of violations of health rights.

This example illustrates a wider problem. Budget information is one of the transparency issues that has generated the most sustained civil society attention in Mexico, based on efforts by the national watchdog group FUNDAR to track budget earmarks for preventing maternal mortality and to address HIV/AIDS. Yet in all the cases where federal funds were disbursed to state governments, as in the case of health programs, it proved impossible to “follow the money.”

The third exercise was inspired by the Environmental Working Group’s (EWG) U.S. farm subsidy database, which reveals the high concentration of farm subsidies in a small number of large corporate farms. In Mexico, the government spends substantially more on agriculture per capita of its rural population than do most Latin American countries, but a huge proportion of these funds are captured by a few large producers in a small number of northern states. With technical support from Libby Haight, Mexican campesino advocates and right-to-know activists partnered with EWG and FUNDAR to launch the first farm subsidy database in a developing country (see http://subsidiosalcampo.org.mx). As in the U.S., this database takes vast official lists of subsidy recipients that are nominally public and uses a software platform to make access user-friendly — even to the point of seeing what payments were received by specific individuals and companies.

The new FUNDAR database currently covers just two of the largest direct payment programs, which together account for less than half the federal agriculture ministry’s budget (which itself leaves out water and electricity subsidies, which are also concentrated among privileged northern producers). However, these two payment programs — both originally justified in terms of compensation for Mexico’s acceptance of free trade — represent over 70 percent of direct payments to farmers in Mexico. In the future, the site will include information about Mexico’s many other agricultural subsidy programs.

Meanwhile, a month before the site was launched, Mexico City’s lobby for state agriculture ministries charged in a presentation to the president that the idea of reforming farm subsidy policy to “take away from the rich to give to the poor… sounds like anachronistic populism and demagoguery that would provoke conflicts that undermine the country’s stability.” It is too soon to tell whether user-friendly public access to data about who gets what from the farm subsidy system will actually inform the policy process, given the readiness of powerful vested interests to mobilize. In the end, the effectiveness of the database may depend on the media’s capacity to “name and shame,” as journalists trying out the new system begin to uncover the long list of politicians receiving farm subsidies.
Conclusions

To conclude, one of the main lessons from these three experiments is that campaigns for the “right to know” are broader than efforts to use transparency reforms. The right to know goes beyond access to government documents. To really “know” what the government is doing requires independent civil society monitoring of the policy process to generate reliable and independent information about the public sector’s performance. While information alone is not enough, the combination of independent policy monitoring and institutional transparency tools can potentially bolster broader reform strategies.

The fact that a second generation of constitutional reforms designed to raise Mexico’s minimum national standards for transparency moved forward in 2007 indicates that this process of learning has advanced significantly in a short period of time. Yet as these three snapshots of applied research experiences indicate, directly affected stakeholders are only just beginning to get involved in efforts to harness transparency reforms to right-to-know campaigns. Indeed, the construction of any right is a long-term process — and the right to know is no exception.

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Selected online resources on information rights in Mexico:

- IFAI: Federal Institute for Public Information Access
  www.ifai.gob.mx
- FUNDAR: Center for Research and Analysis
  www.fundar.org.mx
- Mexico Transparency Collective
  www.mexicotransparente.org.mx
- Right to Know
  www.derechoasaber.org.mx
- Open Mexico
  www.mexicoabierto.org
- Mexican Center for Environmental Law
  www.cemda.org.mx
- Farm Subsidy Database
  subsidiosalcampo.org.mx/
- Government external evaluations of social programs:
  www.coneval.gob.mx

Note: Most Mexican states and large cities have their own online information access portals.
Not since Franklin Delano Roosevelt has an incoming U.S. president inherited a situation as complex as the one that Barack Obama will confront. President-elect Obama will have to spearhead a reformulation of capitalism and a restructuring of the relationships among the world powers, and to top it off, he will have to put an end to, or at least contain, the wars being waged in Iraq and Afghanistan. And these three issues are all interrelated.

Clearly, Latin America will not be a priority for the Obama administration when it takes the White House this coming January.

That’s nothing new. With the exception of the short-lived Cuban missile crisis, the U.S. has never tackled a serious conflict in our region, which it still views as its “backyard.” For the United States, Latin America isn’t the most significant part of the world in economic terms either. When Washington thinks of Latin America, only Mexico and Cuba come to mind and, more recently, Venezuela.

However, three current issues may change this longstanding perception:

1. The appearance (in some cases, the reappearance) of other superpowers and emerging powers in the region, a phenomenon that Gabriel Tokatlian has described as the end of the Monroe Doctrine.
2. The threat of Balkanization in South America, which is latent in the political crisis in Bolivia.
3. The impact of the imminent global recession on our region, home to some of the world’s most extreme social inequities.

The Death of a Doctrine

After flexing its muscles in Europe (with the invasion of Georgia), Russia is now doing the same in Latin America at the invitation of Hugo Chávez. The Venezuelan president has been on a Soviet spending spree, purchasing tanks and MiG-19 fighter planes. Chávez has also confirmed that he’s expecting an entire Russian fleet, complete with atomic sub, to visit Venezuelan waters and suggested that joint military maneuvers are on the table.

The President of Iran was warmly received in Venezuela, where he signed agreements on energy and trade, and will soon travel to Bolivia. And while the U.S. and Europe denounce Iran’s intent to manufacture atomic weapons, Brazil and other countries from our region justify Iran’s nuclear plan, which they insist is inspired by peaceful motives.

China has also signed broad trade agreements with Latin America; the region is a strategic provider of raw materials that the burgeoning economic power requires. Today, China is Latin America’s third-largest trading partner. So why shouldn’t it donate arms to Bolivia and sell radar equipment to Venezuela? India is also notching up economic relations with the region.

Such changes pose an economic and political challenge but not a military threat to U.S. hegemony in the region.

So why did the United States make the surprise move of reactivating the Fourth Fleet, a relic from World War II that had been deactivated in 1950? Shortly thereafter, Brazil

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Southern Exposure

by Daniel Coronell

It happened in the last debate between Barack Obama and John McCain. In a moment as sudden as it was fleeting, a South American issue surfaced in the U.S. presidential campaign. The Republican candidate — in yet another attempt to blindside his opponent, portraying him as soft on enemies and ungrateful to allies — pulled the Colombia Free Trade Agreement (FTA) out of his sleeve.

“Let me give you another example of a free trade agreement that Senator Obama opposes,” began Senator McCain, “…the goods and products that we send to Colombia, which is our largest agricultural importer of our products… Senator Obama, who has never traveled south of our border, opposes the Colombia Free Trade Agreement. The same country that’s helping us try to stop the flow of drugs into our country that’s killing young Americans.”

Obama, more informed about Colombia than his adversary expected, countered with the following: “The history in Colombia right now is that labor leaders have been targeted for assassination on a fairly consistent basis, and there have not been prosecutions.” He added: “…we have to stand for human rights, and we have to make sure that violence isn’t being perpetrated against workers who are just trying to organize for their rights…”

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President-elect Barack Obama campaigning in 2008.
Monroe No More? (continued from page 36)

joined with other South American countries to launch a regional defense council to resolve local conflicts without U.S. intervention. Well aware of its global importance and jealous of its sphere of influence, Brazil had already announced plans to strengthen its navy and build an atomic submarine.

Danger in Bolivia

Meanwhile, Bolivia’s internal conflict continues to strain the power relations that have ensured territorial integrity and peace in South America for over 70 years — a noteworthy exception compared with the rest of the world. The cry for autonomy from the country’s richest departments is the latest expression of the economic and racial conflicts that have always been part of Bolivian politics. Today, they are more visible and more important simply because the government of Evo Morales represents a sizeable portion of the country’s indigenous population.

If the conflict and the struggle for autonomy lead to secession, a Balkanized Bolivia could destabilize the entire region:

• The direct participation of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in defense of his principal ally, Evo Morales, is to be expected. Chávez has already stated that he won’t just sit back with his arms crossed.

• Bolivia and Peru still bear serious grudges against Chile, the victor in the War of the Pacific (1879-83), which left Bolivia landlocked. What sorts of alliances and agreements could spring up among these Andean nations and the eventual Bolivian factions?

• What action will Chávez ally Ecuador take, bearing in mind the past spats with Peru over national borders?

• And what of Colombia, which has fallen out with Venezuela and Ecuador for allegedly providing safe haven for Colombia’s notorious FARC guerrillas? Regardless of what happens in Bolivia, the conflict between Colombia and Venezuela may still explode. These two countries were on the brink of war only months ago, when the Colombian army attacked and killed guerrilla troops in Ecuadorian territory.

• And what about Argentina? The ruling couple is feeling the double burden of corruption and the end of the economic boom. With its leftist rhetoric, the Fernández de Kirchner administration might be tempted to boost its legitimacy by scapegoating foreign enemies to inspire nationalist sentiment.

• Brazil’s attitude will be decisive. The South American giant will use all its influence and leadership to avoid the Balkanization of Bolivia.

The Most Unjust Region

This global context combined with the region’s socioeconomic conditions add up to a high-risk situation. According to the United Nations, Latin America suffers from the most severe social injustice in the world. It may not be the poorest region — Africa takes that “prize” — but Latin America is undoubtedly the region with the greatest gap between the haves and the have-nots. With very few exceptions, our societies are hugely divided and teeming with resentment. Decades of economic adjustment policies have so weakened the state that governments cannot be relied on to mitigate these tensions and inequities: 42 percent of the population lives in poverty and has merely seen the benefits of the commodities boom from afar. The global recession will only worsen this situation.

Such is the region that Obama will find when he takes office, and we haven’t even discussed Mexico, the United States’ closest neighbor, with its increasing narco-violence and tensions from illegal immigration.

For the reasons given at the beginning of this article, it is unlikely that the U.S. will be disposed to contemplate the situation in Latin America. Indeed, President-elect Obama has not even hinted that he perceives the need to improve the quality of policies towards the region and to rebuild dialogue in the hemisphere. Until this happens, the vacuum will be filled, by default, with the military actors and their political allies who have held sway with the Bush administration. These are the same people who encouraged the coup against Chávez in 2002.

It is cold comfort for Latin America that the excessive influence wielded by the military and its allies is one of the principal problems that the next president of the United States must resolve, regardless of what is best for the region south of the Rio Grande, if he really wants to achieve change.

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Anxious to have the last word on the matter, McCain insisted: “Senator Obama doesn’t want a free trade agreement with our best ally in the region but wants to sit down across the table without precondition with Hugo Chávez, the guy who has been helping FARC, the terrorist organization.”

It was no surprise that the issue of Colombia — a matter of little or no interest to the average American voter — didn’t make the front page of the U.S. newspapers. There was just a tiny flutter about McCain’s statistical mistake: Canada is actually the largest importer of U.S. agricultural products; Colombia is much lower down the list, at number 12.

But in Colombia after the debate, various sectors of public opinion encouraged the notion that McCain was Colombia’s champion while presenting Obama as the adversary of the Colombian people and their government.

Practically no one in the Colombian press mentioned the statistics on murders of unionized workers, which totaled 41 in the first months of 2008 according to research by the Escuela Nacional Sindical, an independent nongovernmental organization that tracks labor statistics in Colombia. Reality eloquently chalks up one point for Obama.

Just days before the U.S. elections, Latinobarómetro, a research group based in Chile, took a public opinion poll in South America to measure sympathy for the U.S. presidential candidates. Barack Obama was the favorite across the board, but Colombia was the place where John McCain had the most support.

The tremendous popularity of Colombian president, Álvaro Uribe, is also clearly evident in the perceptions of the country’s citizens on international issues.

Uribe has visited the United States 11 times in an effort to win approval for the free trade agreement. He has met with President Bush, members of Congress and leaders in the business community. To satisfy the influential Black Caucus — and Congressman Charles Rangel, in particular — Uribe named an Afro-Colombian woman as cabinet minister. Every week, the president visits the rural areas of the country to defend the need for the FTA, an agreement which some claim will spell certain doom for the nation’s weak agricultural sector.

At the same time, the United States’ military support, through Plan Colombia, has been the basis for Uribe’s popularity and his success in the fight against the FARC. Inherited from the previous president, Andrés Pastrana, the plan proposed to cut Colombian coca production by half.

Eight years into Plan Colombia, the reality is quite different. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the research agency of the U.S. Congress, the areas of coca cultivation in Colombia have actually increased by 15 percent. Presented in the kindest possible fashion, the GAO study documents the failure of this strategy, which has already cost some US$12 billion, half of which came out of the pockets of U.S. taxpayers.

As if that weren’t enough, investigations into human rights violations in Colombia continue to multiply. The same day that Barack Obama was elected president of the United States, the commander of the Colombian Army resigned.

General Mario Montoya — a long-time friend of President Uribe and commander of “Operación Jaque,” which without firing a single shot rescued 15 hostages kidnapped by the guerrillas, including former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and three U.S. citizens — left his post in the midst of the scandal surrounding what are being called “false positives” in Colombia. Under pressure to show “results,” military units assassinated dozens of civilians from poor neighborhoods, presenting them as guerrillas killed in combat.

Supporters of President Uribe, as well as his detractors, know that with a Democrat in the White House, many things are going to change. Under the Bush administration, the United States’ sole priority in the Andean region was to contain Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez. Perhaps that’s why the U.S. government has looked the other way when reports surfaced about its ally’s human rights violations and government interference with judges investigating the relationships among politicians and members of the paramilitary.

On the morning of November 5, while the United States continued to celebrate the victory of President-elect Obama, there were long faces in Colombia.

Luis Carlos Villegas, president of the National Association of Industrialists (Asociación Nacional de Industriales, ANDI), the country’s leading private enterprise association and one of the most fervent promoters of the FTA with the United States, made this declaration: “We will have greater difficulties in the discussion about our FTA, not because of Obama’s election, but as the result of the extremely painful, complicated and shameful acts that we have endured in this country in recent weeks.”

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Develop as We Say, Not as We Did

Professor Peter Evans interviews Ha-Joon Chang, author of *Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism*.

**Evans:** In *Bad Samaritans* you make a strong, well-documented argument that the current policy prescriptions imposed by the developed countries of the North and the global institutions they control are not consistent with either the historical experience of developed countries themselves or with the experience of more contemporary cases of successful development, such as Korea or Taiwan. This raises an obvious question: “Why are policies without historical or contemporary evidence to justify them being promoted?” Two kinds of answers might be offered: 1) that the policies proposed serve the interests of the now developed countries and the corporations based in them at the expense of the interests of the Global South; 2) that the policies being proposed are consistent with the theoretical frameworks that prevail among economists working on development policy, who are blinded by their own theoretical paradigms. What do you feel is the relative importance of these two explanations in generating these policy prescriptions?

**Chang:** In short, interests and ideologies interact with each other in a complex way, so it is not possible to attribute exact weights to each of them.

Even the ideologues are partly driven by self-interest. Having built their whole career advocating a certain worldview, they have a lot to lose if they come to admit that they have been wrong. Also, championing a worldview that is comforting to the powerful brings them prestige, influence and financial gain. When you advocate ideas that serve powerful interests, you get more research grants,
invitations to more prominent public forums, higher lecture fees and more air time and column inches in the media.

However, this is not to say that everything is driven by interests. Many of those who advocate free-market policies would actually benefit from different policies. This is a point that I emphasize in the book: allowing developing countries to use policies that suit them, rather than forcing them to adopt blanket pro-market policies, would promote economic growth in those countries, which in turn would bring more business to rich country corporations and employees in the long run. To the extent that people do not see this because of their ideological blinkers, we could say that ideology makes people ignore even their own self-interest.

Evans: Assuming that the dominant rich countries (most crucially the United States) are likely to continue being “bad Samaritans,” creating a global policy environment that tries to limit the range of development strategies in which countries in the Global South can engage, what is the most effective response from the South? Is it effective for individual countries to try to engage in industrial policy “below the radar”? Is resisting multilateral and bilateral “free trade” agreements the key strategy? Or is the most important strategy collective resistance of the kind that occurred in Cancún in 2003?

Chang: Recognizing that the current global rules are not going to change radically any time soon, countries in the South should do everything they can to pursue necessary industrial policies “below the radar.”

However, it does not always need to be below the radar, because there is still considerable “policy space” available. Under WTO rules, the “least developed countries” (LDCs), roughly defined as countries with less than $1,000 per capita income, have no upper limits to their tariffs and can use export subsidies, which other countries cannot. Even many middle-income countries can still use relatively high tariffs (30 percent or so). Developing countries can impose trade restrictions of up to eight years on the grounds of balance of payments problems or for infant industry protection. There are also certain subsidies that they can legitimately use (e.g., agriculture, research and development, regional equalization).
However, in practice most developing countries do not even get to use up all the policy space they have. Many LDCs have low tariffs because they have liberalized their trade due to International Monetary Fund/World Bank loan conditions, not because of the WTO rules. Others refrain from intervention because they are ideologically influenced by the orthodoxy.

Most worrying is the fact that the policy space for developing countries is constantly being eroded. The only way in which they can resist this shrinkage is through collective action in multilateral negotiations. By the same logic, bilateral negotiations are to be avoided at all costs, as most developing countries have very little bargaining power in isolation.

Evans: Your analysis in *Bad Samaritans* suggests that some kind of industrial policy is necessary for successful development. Yet, most scholars would agree that poorly conceived industrial policy can have anti-developmental effects (e.g., Peru’s efforts to start an auto industry in the 1960s). Sanjaya Lall talked about “smart” industrial policy. Are there rules of thumb that you could recommend for Latin American policymakers trying to distinguish smart industrial policy from misguided industrial policy?

Chang: In my view, there are two important things that industrial policymakers in developing countries should bear in mind.

First, governments need to be realistic about the industries they pick and not to try to “jump” too far. By this I do not mean following the market signals. All successful industrial policies look “wrong” at the start because they go against market signals. It took 40 years of protection and subsidies before Japan could export its cars. When the Korean government applied for a loan to build a modern steel mill in the late 1960s, everyone thought it was a crazy thing to do for a country whose main exports were fish, seaweed and wigs made with human hair.

The second point is that protection and subsidies should be accompanied by investments in capability building. Without the protected firms ultimately raising their productivity to the international level, the resources spent on protection and subsidies will have been wasted. Therefore, firms need to invest in better machines, worker
training and eventually research and development. Governments need to back these efforts up with policy measures — e.g., tax breaks or accelerated depreciation allowances for equipment investment, subsidies for R&D and training, mandatory training requirement for large firms and provision of training through public institutes for smaller firms. Successful countries are the ones whose firms and government have done these things well.

**Evans:** Most would consider state capacity to be one of the essential elements of effective formulation and implementation of development strategy. You argue that many currently developing countries have more state capacity than the original industrializers did at the time they industrialized, but presumably state capacity still remains an important determinant of developmental success. How important do you see the role of variations in state capacity in determining differential developmental success in the contemporary period?

**Chang:** When they were developing countries, today’s rich nations were grossly lacking in state capacity, even by today’s developing country standards. Most of them did not have a professional bureaucracy with meritocratic recruitment and promotion until the late 19th century (Prussia, which introduced such bureaucracy in the early 19th century, was the exception that proved the rule). If they were not openly sold, public offices were distributed according to political loyalty rather than technical competence. The judiciary was not much different, with many countries not requiring legal training for judges-to-be. Tax collection capacity was also limited.

In comparison, today’s developing countries have relatively high state capacity. Of course, the problem is that they now have to compete with countries with very highly developed state capacity, which did not exist in the 19th century. However, it is wrong to think that a country cannot develop unless it has a state like that of Japan or Sweden. Many developing countries have achieved quite impressive development records in the last half century without having such a state. In this context, it is useful to know that, until the late 1960s, South Korea was sending its bureaucrats to countries like the Philippines and Pakistan for extra training.

There are countries where lack of capacity is a real constraint, but for most countries, the bigger issue is to recover the independence of mind that has atrophied under neoliberal hegemony. Once you lose it and try to replicate (a highly idealized version of) what the rich country states do, it is not a big surprise that you do not succeed. Developing countries need pragmatic states that can think for themselves.

**Evans:** The United State and other large, early developers relied on a combination of manufacturing and commodity exports (cotton, wheat, etc.). The recent commodity boom, driven in part by demand from China, has refocused many Latin American countries on commodity exports. What do you see as the principal benefits and pitfalls of a resource-based exports strategy in the contemporary “Sino-centric” global economy?

**Chang:** I have no objection to resource-based exports in and of themselves. After all, if they want to move forward, developing countries need to earn foreign exchange to pay for their imports of advanced technologies (e.g., machines, technology licensing royalties). So, if you have lots of natural resources to export, that is a good thing. Indeed, the reason why countries like Korea and Japan had to be so harsh with their workers was because the only thing they could export was cheap labor embodied in labor-intensive products.

However, the point is that these natural resources benefit a country in the long run only insofar as the export earnings they bring in are used to diversify and upgrade the economy away from those very resources. Few countries are fortunate enough to maintain a high standard of living solely on the basis of natural resources, especially in the long term, when technological progress may come up with synthetic substitutes for their natural resources.

The best illustration of this point is the U.S. It built a powerful economy on the basis of its cotton and wheat exports exactly because those earnings indirectly subsidized manufacturing industries. If the South had won the Civil War and liberalized U.S. trade, manufacturing development would have been retarded and the country would today look more like Argentina than the economic force it has become.

**Evans:** Can you give us two or three examples of what you view as the most successful development strategies in Latin America over the last several decades and explain briefly how these examples connect to your overall model of development?

**Chang:** The most successful example of economic development in Latin America is obviously Brazil between the 1950s and the 1970s. Even as late as 1961, Brazil was one of the poorest economies in Latin America, with $129 per capita income (in the same year, per capita income was $143 in Ecuador). By 1980, it had emerged as the industrial powerhouse of the continent. Mexico was another good performer. Between 1955 and 1982, per capita income in Mexico grew by 3.1 percent (contrast this to the growth rate of around 1 percent that it has recorded since Nafta).
During these periods, Brazil and Mexico promoted new industries through protection and subsidies and had some significant successes (the best example being Embraer). In this sense, their experiences support the infant industry argument, which is at the base of my model.

However, the development efforts by countries like Brazil and Mexico had some serious limitations. First, they did not seriously attempt to develop their export capabilities, which meant that their economies kept hitting balance of payments constraints. Second, they often took the easy way out in terms of developing local productive capacities, by inviting in transnational corporations. This often gave them better products and higher productivity in the short run, but in the long run, it made them fall behind countries like Korea, which strictly regulated FDI and concentrated on building local firms with global standards. Third, they failed to improve income distribution, so the fruits of growth were unequally distributed, making people question the legitimacy of the development strategy.

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Ha-joon Chang is a Reader in the Political Economy of Development at Cambridge University and a fellow at the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, D.C. He spoke for CLAS on April 7, 2008.
From all regions of the country, protesters converged on Rosario’s Monumento a la Bandera. The rally was a who’s who of Argentina’s disparate political opposition: Buenos Aires’ viscerally anti-Peronist elite, excited to have a rallying cause; leftists disgruntled by the government’s friendly relations with multinational corporations; opportunistic senators eager to associate themselves with a mass movement; and, of course, the protagonists of the event, farmers enraged at the national government’s aggressive taxation and emboldened by their newfound ability to resist.

I was among the crowd of over 200,000 people in Rosario on May 25, 2008, as rural leaders held a demonstration of unprecedented scale. The protest had begun in March as a tax revolt, a rejection of recently elected President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s increase of export taxes on agricultural commodities. Yet, as indicated by the diverse crowd and the slogans calling for the revamping of Argentina’s federal system, it had clearly become much more.

Three months earlier, a political movement of this magnitude would have seemed impossible in Argentina. That it had grown so fast was even more surprising given the prevailing economic and political winds. Despite a booming economy, the months-long protest included more than 5,000 piquetes (roadside protests typically involving...
the blocking of traffic), more than during the 2001-02 economic collapse. Moreover, the dispute accomplished the seemingly impossible feat of uniting the fragmented political opposition against the Kirchners, who had previously faced little organized resistance.

This most-recent episode in Argentina’s tumultuous political history thus raises several questions: Why did a farmers’ protest in March evolve into something much larger? And why were the Kirchners — despite dominating the national political scene and benefiting from rapid economic growth fueled by soaring commodity prices — unable to contain the situation?

To the Streets

On March 11, the Minister of Economy announced a new regime of progressive agricultural export taxes under which tax rates would increase with the price of commodities. This effectively raised the export tax on soybeans, Argentina’s leading export, from 35 to 44 percent. Following the announcement, the four traditional political organizations representing the rural sector — the Sociedad Rural Argentina (SRA), Confederaciones Rurales Argentinas (CRA), the Federación Agraria Argentina (FAA) and the Confederación Intercooperativa Agropecuaria (Coninagro) — jointly called for farmers to suspend grain sales for 48 hours. This was to be accompanied by small rallies in towns in the interior.

The goal of the initial protest was to increase the urban population’s awareness of the government’s perceived injustice to the rural sector and thereby turn public opinion against the new taxes. Rural interests had very little access to relevant economic policymakers in the Kirchner administration; as long as policy was determined behind closed doors, they had little hope for a favorable outcome. By taking the debate to the streets, rural leaders hoped to expand the scope of the political conflict, giving them a greater chance of success.

Even so, the rural organizations’ initial protest announcement was quite modest, perhaps reflecting concern about their ability to rally the troops. Previously, the rural sector had been unable to sustain large-scale mobilizations, even in 2007 when the government twice raised taxes on agricultural exports.

However, the response in the countryside far exceeded expectations. Farmers assembled at roadside demonstrations, distributing flyers to motorists and
sometimes blocking traffic. Some traffic stops were intended to enforce the ban on commerce and prevent the passage of trucks carrying agricultural goods; others stopped all traffic. Many of the demonstrators labeled themselves “autoconvocados,” emphasizing that they were there of their own volition and had not been ordered out to the streets by a political organization. The overwhelming response led the rural leadership to extend the protest beyond the initial 48 hours, and within several days, piquetes had spread throughout Argentina’s central agricultural region.

Once the protest had begun, the government’s response only fanned the flames. Initially, the Kirchner administration largely ignored the protest and refused to negotiate or reconsider the export tax regime, defending the redistributive measure on the grounds of social justice. Meanwhile, organized labor and informal workers’ leaders, widely considered surrogates for the Kirchners, decried the “rural oligarchy” for its aspirations to overthrow the democratically elected government. The goal was to marginalize the rural protesters, casting their demands as selfish and not in the general interest. At the same time, though, these claims increased the sense of polarization between kirchneristas and the rural sector and helped swell the ranks of the roadside protesters.

From the Streets to the Senate

Throughout the month of March, the situation steadily escalated, reaching a climax on April 1, when President Fernández de Kirchner held a massive afternoon rally in the Plaza de Mayo. It was a dramatic show of force: 100,000 people attended, many of whom were bused in for the event.

In closing her otherwise sharp speech, Fernández de Kirchner invited the rural protesters to step back from the highways and negotiate. The rural leadership obliged, calling a month-long suspension of the mobilization after 21 days in the streets.

Yet it was not solely the president’s invitation that led to the temporary détente. On the contrary, rural leaders had already decided that they needed to shift tactics. There was some concern that farmers, unaccustomed to organized political action, might be fatiguing. Rural leaders were also concerned with preserving the sector’s image among the urban population. Shortages of meat and dairy products — a consequence of the piquetes throughout the country — had reached Buenos Aires, and images of protesting farmers feasting on roasted cow alongside their highway demonstrations did not sit well with carnivorous urbanites who could not buy beef for themselves.

Retooling their approach, rural leaders managed to convert the countryside’s raw expression of anger and frustration into a much more strategically astute campaign. Most significantly, rural leaders expanded the scope of conflict further, reaching out to governors, mayors and members of Congress and appealing to their common interests in the dispute.

Because export taxes are outside Argentina’s complex system of revenue sharing between central and subnational governments, governors and mayors also had reason to feel that the March rate increases were unjust. The higher taxes, collected by the national government, meant more money leaving their jurisdictions, increasing their dependence on the federal level.

Rural leaders shifted their rhetoric to include discussions of federalism and fair revenue sharing. Most of the speeches at the mass rally in Rosario in May, and even the rally’s slogan — “Con el campo por un país más federal” (With the countryside for a more federal nation) — dealt with federalism as much as the rural sector. Moreover, groups of farmers targeted individual mayors and governors previously loyal to the president and convinced many to defect.

This tactic of targeting individual politicians was expanded to include
legislators after the president introduced the export tax increase, previously set by administrative decree, as a congressional bill in June. Facing questions regarding the constitutionality of the decree-based tax increase and unable to win the battle in the streets, Fernández de Kirchner shifted the conflict to the institutional arena, hoping that her comfortable majorities in both houses of Congress would put the matter to a definitive end. She didn’t count on the intensive lobbying efforts of the rural sector, which managed to pick off members of the president’s coalition by warning of dire consequences in the next election if legislators went against the wishes of the rural electorate.

In spite of the ruralists’ strong-arm tactics, they failed to block the bill’s passage in the lower house, setting the stage for a dramatic final showdown in the Senate. Following another day of intense mobilization in Buenos Aires — in which rural groups assembled over 200,000 people, far more than attended the pro-government rally across town — the ruralists were able to turn enough kirchneristas to force a tie in the Senate. Then, at 4 a.m. on July 17, Vice President Julio Cobos took the microphone to cast his tie-breaking vote — against the president’s tax increase.

His “no” vote was the coup de grâce, effectively ending the conflict. Within a few days, the Minister of Economy issued a new decree resetting the export tax rates to March 10 levels. While the strategic shift took months to play out, the rural groups’ decision to expand the scope of conflict from purely agricultural issues to a debate on the Argentine federal system ultimately proved successful.

A Conflict With Institutional Roots?
Stepping back from the events, it is striking how unnecessary the four months of conflict were. After all, this struggle occurred while the economy was booming and agricultural commodities were bringing record prices on the international market. In principle, it should have been possible to divide the expanding economic pie such that everyone received a larger piece.

Yet the government and rural sector failed to compromise, and consequently, much of the country suffered the costs of the conflict. Several elements contributed to this suboptimal scenario. Certainly, strategic and ideological factors on both sides led to intensification of the conflict, undermining opportunities for compromise.

At a deeper level, however, institutional incentives and the structural weaknesses of the Argentine state underpinnned the failure to bargain. Fiscal centralization has been key to the Kirchners’ political domination of Argentine politics since 2003. By concentrating their control over public resources, they could reward loyal politicians and punish the disobedient. Export taxes became increasingly important for this fiscal centralization because of two institutional features. First and foremost, under Argentina’s system of revenue sharing between the national and subnational governments, export taxes belong exclusively to the national government, while other major taxes must be shared with governors. Hence, raising revenue through export taxes increased the president’s power relative to the governors.

Second, unlike other levies, export taxes could be increased without legislative approval due to a clause in the Customs Code dating back to the most recent military regime. Intended to increase the government’s agility in responding to macroeconomic crises, the clause was increasingly exploited by the Kirchners in noncrisis times to raise revenue without undergoing potentially costly congressional debate.

While in many ways politically desirable for the president, using export taxes as a redistributive instrument also has its downside. Importantly, they are regressive in nature, affecting small producers’ incomes more than those of large producers. Export taxes uniformly reduce the price that producers receive for their grains, yet smaller-scale producers have higher unit costs. So, an export tax rate that takes a moderate level of large farmers’ incomes may be onerous enough to inflict losses on small farmers.

While not mobilized political actors prior to 2008, small farmers became the crux of the conflict. Small and medium-sized farmers were the ones manning the roadside protests and appearing on television in Buenos Aires every night. Moreover, with smaller, less-affluent farmers involved, the government’s attempt to characterize the protesters as greedy oligarchs was implausible. In their attempt to manage the crisis, members of the Kirchner administration reasoned that if small farmers could be removed from the protests, the piquetes would dissolve, the rural sector would be divided, and the government could more easily isolate the large producers and take a share of their soaring profits.

However, because export taxes are such a blunt instrument, the government was left with an awkward policy option: taxing the exports of all farmers and then buying off the small farmers with subsidies. The Kirchner administration attempted to use this strategy early on in the conflict, offering subsidies to the smallest 80 percent of farmers while steadfastly refusing to alter export tax rates. Farmers roundly rejected the proposal, even as the government continued to increase the subsidies on offer.

Why did small farmers refuse the subsidies, even though by the end of the conflict the proposed subsidies were greater than the tax increase? On an institutional level, the government could not credibly commit to delivering
the subsidies. Moreover, farmers already felt that they were dealing with a government that did not negotiate in good faith, and they had no assurance that their agreement to demobilize would be rewarded. And given the historic nature of the rural sector’s mobilization, overcoming years of fragmentation and relative inactivity, farmers were justified in their concern that if they stopped the protest they might not be able to restart it later. Furthermore, the government seemed to be banking on this return to political ineffectiveness, demanding that the roadside protest and grain-trading embargo be lifted before negotiations could begin. Small farmers thus decided that rather than have the government tax (with certainty) their incomes and then later return the money to them (with much uncertainty), they would prefer that the government not tax them in the first place.

A Lost Opportunity?
Argentines are quick to note that a century ago their country had the sixth-largest economy in the world and was poised to enter the exclusive group of developed countries. Yet internal political strife, miscalculations and tough breaks in international markets frustrated those aspirations.

With global markets turning down in recent months, it seems Argentina has missed another golden opportunity. The four months of struggle resulted in millions of dollars of potential export revenue foregone, and now that international commodity prices have fallen sharply from their record highs in March and April, the window for an export windfall may have closed.

Alternatively, the rural conflict of 2008 may instead turn out to be an opportunity: a chance for a new political opposition to form and for the rural sector to find its political voice. Whether the mass mobilizations and piquetes have a lasting effect on the political scene, however, remains to be seen.

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Ruth Cardoso always had a new project. There was always something new that she wanted to understand and, frequently, something she would like to change. She had an incredible sensibility to detect emerging social practices, a sensibility anchored in ethnographic research and observations about the everyday. When she embarked on any of her projects, one thing was certain: she was not going to take a conventional approach. She always looked for alternative perspectives, and many of her initiatives both in academia and in her roles as public intellectual, feminist and politician were far ahead of her time. As a result, she faced quite a bit of opposition, which she took calmly but also forcibly. When she died unexpectedly on June 24th of this year, everyone agreed that she had created her own space and left a strong mark on all of the many spheres in which she had crafted her life: anthropology and the university, her family and friends, the field of nonprofit organizations and social policy and the institution of the “first lady of Brazil.”

Ruth, as she liked to be called by colleagues and students, was born in Araraquara in the interior of the state of São Paulo in 1930. She went to the capital to study and earned a B.A. in Social Sciences at the Universidade de São Paulo (USP) in 1952. During her college years, she was part of a group of intellectuals who would become extremely influential in Brazilian academic and political life and with some of whom she developed a lifetime of collaborative work. It was called “The Capital Group” after the title of Marx’s book, which they discussed in weekly meetings. Among the members of this group was Fernando Henrique Cardoso, whom she married in 1953. She went on to earn an M.A. in Anthropology at USP in 1959.

After the military coup of 1964, the Cardosos and their three children went into exile in Chile. Ruth taught anthropology at several universities in Santiago between 1965 and 1967. After a period in France,
they returned to Brazil in 1968. Ruth earned a Ph.D. in anthropology in 1972 at USP with the work *Familiar Structure and Social Mobility – A Study of the Japanese in the State of São Paulo*. She taught at USP until 1991 and was a visiting professor at universities in the U.S. and Europe, including UC Berkeley and Columbia. (Her last period as a visiting professor at UC Berkeley was in 2000, during Cardoso’s presidency. She deeply appreciated the opportunity to return to the classroom and library and to spend time without security personnel, just enjoying the pleasures of being with her friends and taking care of her everyday grocery shopping and cooking).

Ruth was an intellectual always in search of new theoretical paradigms to understand the emerging social processes that she had a special talent for detecting in her ethnographic research projects. Lacking support for her research in the Department of Anthropology at USP, she joined the Department of Political Science in the early 1970s. It was there and at Cebrap, the Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning, that she developed her most important research projects. In these multidisciplinary contexts, she investigated *favelas*, criticized the theory of marginality, theorized about the role of urban social movements, studied the transformations of youth, investigated the new role of NGOs and developed an important critique of ethnographic methodology summarized in her edited volume *A Aventura Anthropológica* (1986). In these environments she and Eunice Durham formed at least two generations of urban anthropologists who now occupy prominent positions in the field. They were trained in weekly extracurricular seminars that addressed international debates and pushed the frontiers of the discipline to foster an understanding of contemporary transformations (for example, in the 1970s and ’80s, they discussed Althusser and Gramsci, the work of the Birmingham Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies, Foucault, Lacan, Castells and Touraine).

One of the most important research projects that Ruth developed at Cebrap in the early 1980s investigated the formation of new types of political action. Brazil was democratizing, social movements were emerging daily in the urban peripheries, and Ruth was convinced that the available theoretical frameworks and information did not allow for the understanding of what interested her the most: the novelty of the political action articulated in the peripheries. It was a moment of perplexity for the left, which had failed to detect the potential of the social movements, most of which had been organized by institutions such as the Catholic Church. The research was designed as a two-year-long ethnographic project in several neighborhoods in the peripheries. Ruth met weekly with the seven members of the research team (of which I was part), visited neighborhoods with them, listened to countless hours of interviews and, at the end, organized an unusual debate at Cebrap in which all the researchers sat in the audience to listen to a discussion among five neighborhood leaders. This has always been her way of working: getting totally involved, taking nothing for granted, relying on countless observations and details and looking for new ways of framing questions and interpretations. As a result, she published important articles analyzing the role of social movements in Brazilian democratization and the type of relationship that they had established with the state. This research also unfolded in several other projects in the peripheries done either by her or by her students. These studies became important references for her conceptualization of public policies after she moved to Brasília.

Ruth was always a public intellectual. She had a special role in Brazil’s feminist movement and democratization, helping to bring the interests of women to the forefront of public policy. However, she reluctantly approached the role of first lady when Fernando Henrique became president in 1995. Nevertheless, she transformed this role by downplaying its ceremonial aspect, insisting on separating her private and public lives and maintaining her independent opinions and professional activities. Most importantly, she had a decisive role in the creation of innovative public policies to combat poverty that fostered citizens’ autonomy by encouraging them to claim their own rights. Under the label of “solidarity community,” she created a series of social programs that focused on literacy, education, re-qualification of the labor force and the generation of income that have become models for social programs well beyond Brazil. The Brazilian media consider her to have been the most influential first lady in modern Brazilian history.

I met Ruth in 1976 when I was an undergraduate student at USP and soon became her advisee and later her research assistant and colleague at Cebrap. I learned with her the craft of anthropology, and it is still her voice that I hear when I teach my students about fieldwork or when I play with ideas for a new project. She was my close and dear friend. It will take me time to believe that her phone is silent and that she will not reply to the emails I keep thinking of sending her.

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Elizabeth Bishop has become one of the most admired figures in 20th-century American poetry, yet the two places she felt most at home were Nova Scotia and Brazil, associations that link the poet to the Americas beyond the United States. Nova Scotia was the land of Bishop's early childhood, while her attachment to Brazil was formed by happy accident. During a trip around South America, she was delayed in Rio de Janeiro because of an allergic reaction to a cashew fruit sampled at the home of Lota de Macedo Soares. Her host became her nurse, and by the end of Bishop's convalescence, the two had fallen in love. Bishop spent the next two decades living off and on in Brazil, incorporating the country's sights and culture into her poetry while also translating several Brazilian writers into English.

At the time of Bishop's arrival, Lota was building a modern house in the middle of the rainforest on her land, the Fazenda Samambaia, on the outskirts of the mountain town of Petrópolis. The house later became the site of the poem printed here, which first appeared in The New Yorker on October 8, 1960, and was later collected in Questions of Travel (1965). The poet describes her wonder at the landscape in a letter to Marianne Moore dated February 14, 1952, about two months after her initial arrival:

I have been staying mostly at my friend Lota's country place in Petrópolis, about 40 miles from Rio, and it is a sort of dream-combination of plant & animal life. I really can't believe it at all. Not only are there highly impractical mountains all around with clouds floating in & out of one's bedroom, but waterfalls, orchids, all the Key West flowers I know & Northern apples and pears as well.

In this poem, inspired by the house and its surroundings during the peak of the summer rainy season, the speaker envisions a future time in which the fog has lifted and the water has dried up. The mountainous rock above the house did indeed stand bare when I took this picture while visiting Samambaia this past July, during the Brazilian winter, and my imagination moved back in time to the softer, more romantic season of the poem, which celebrates the cherished “warm breath” of this lover's retreat.

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Hidden, oh hidden
in the high fog
the house we live in,
beneath the magnetic rock,
rain-, rainbow-ridden,
where blood-black
bromelias, lichens,
owls, and the lint
of the waterfalls cling,
familiar, unbidden.

In a dim age
of water
the brook sings loud
from a rib cage
of giant fern; vapor
climbs up the thick growth
effortlessly, turns back,
holding them both,
house and rock,
in a private cloud.

At night, on the roof,
blind drops crawl
and the ordinary brown
owl gives us proof
he can count:
five times — always five —
he stamps and takes off
after the fat frogs that,
shrilling for love,
clamber and mount.

House, open house
to the white dew
and the milk-white sunrise
kind to the eyes,
to membership
of silver fish, mouse,
bookworms,
big moths; with a wall
for the mildew’s
ignorant map;
darkened and tarnished
by the warm touch
of the warm breath,
maculate, cherished,
rejoice! For a later
era will differ.
(O difference that kills,
or intimidates, much
of all our small shadowy
life!) Without water
the great rock will stare
unmagnetized, bare,
no longer wearing
rainbows or rain,
the forgiving air
and the high fog gone;
the owls will move on
and the several
waterfalls shrivel
in the steady sun.

Sítio da Alcobaçinha
Fazenda Samambaia
Petrópolis
Quito, Ecuador.
Photo by Fernando Sánchez.