# Berkeley Review of Latin American Studies

## Fall 2010

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Climate change does not recognize borders, and policies to address its consequences need to be equally international. Over the last year, the Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) has been engaged in discussions and collaborations on this issue from Antofagasta, Chile, to Berkeley, California. Participants have included Chile’s former President Ricardo Lagos and renewable energy scientist and innovator Stanford Ovshinsky. Now, as part of our program “Alternative Energy and the Americas,” we are including Europe in the dialogue.

We begin this issue of the Review with an article about the Berkeley visit of Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a leader of the Greens in the European Parliament. Robert Collier, a visiting scholar at Berkeley’s Goldman School of Public Policy, lays out Cohn-Bendit’s argument that Europe has “the potential to join with Latin America to pursue multilateralism and low-carbon energy policies” and documents the political leader’s comments on the challenges that need to be surmounted.

In the same global frame, Kevin Gallagher writes about the meteoric rise of China’s influence in Latin America over the last decade. He notes that China “has created an unprecedented demand for Latin American and Caribbean goods, particularly commodities, which has helped boost the region’s growth” and then explores the possibilities and consequences this phenomenon entails.

As part of a year-long commemoration of Mexico’s centennials — the 1810 War for Independence and the 1910 Revolution — this Review presents three historical articles on Mexico. Brian DeLay discusses the role of indigenous peoples in the Mexican–American War (1846–48); Margaret Chowning examines the relationship between women, politics and the Church from 1810 to 1910; and Barry Carr looks at Mexico City as a haven for radicals and exiles in the decade after the Revolution. The last two articles were drawn from a conference convened by Berkeley’s Bancroft Library and co-sponsored by CLAS.

Finally, CLAS had an unusually active film program this fall, including advanced screenings of two films widely mentioned as possible Academy Award nominees for best documentary. Charles Ferguson came to present his riveting film “Inside Job,” which deconstructs the meltdown of the U.S. financial system, a catastrophic event with implications from Iceland to Latin America. And Berkeley anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes reviews “Waste Land,” an unusual and compelling film about Brazil, garbage pickers and art.

— Harley Shaiken

Harley Shaiken and Daniel Cohn-Bendit on the Berkeley campus.
Daniel Cohn-Bendit in front of solar panels during his 2009 electoral campaign.

(Photo by Frank Perry/AFP/GettyImages.)
The lack of American leadership on environment and climate change has created a power vacuum that many are hoping Europe will fill and Latin America will emulate. But after championing the Kyoto Protocol and taking the lead on action against global warming, European Union nations have been struggling to turn their good intentions into viable climate policies.

Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the leader of Europe’s Greens, says that while European integration is still a model for the world, it is weakening steadily. During a visit to the Center for Latin American Studies on September 29, Cohn-Bendit said that despite what he called Europe’s unwillingness to buck U.S. power, it had the potential to join with Latin America to pursue multilateralism and low-carbon energy policies.

“The Europeans with Latin America have to start what could be a feasible coalition with feasible laws that they can reach,” he told an audience of about 300. “The problem of this is [whether] the Europeans, in contradiction with what happened in Copenhagen, are really ready to organize themselves, to take the lead in the discussion, not just wait for the American president.”

Cohn-Bendit’s prescription was a sign that as the United States remains wracked with indecision about how — or whether — to do anything about climate change, Europe is having its own moments of angst.

He sharply criticized Europe’s failure to break from Uncle Sam’s embrace and take the lead in the UN climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December 2009.

“In Copenhagen, the big negotiations on climate, it was a catastrophe,” he said. “Why? Because the Europeans didn’t have the guts, the organization to lead. The Americans — Obama was afraid of Congress, so he didn’t do anything. The Chinese — even if they do [support a common climate strategy], they had one idea — that whatever we do, nobody can and should control us.”

Cohn-Bendit is one of the most iconic, cosmopolitan figures of the European left, playing a key role in both France and Germany.

He was born in 1945 in southern France to German-Jewish parents who had fled Nazism. Later, as an anarchist student leader in Paris, he became one of the central figures in the Paris student uprising and general strike of 1968. He was widely known as “Dany le Rouge” — “Danny the Red” — a description of both his politics and his red hair. The French government attempted to expel him from the country, leading students to take up the chant, “Nous sommes tous des Juifs allemands” (“We are all German Jews”).

In the following years, he settled in Germany and became a leader of that country’s “autonomist” movement, which blended anarchism and Marxism. Since 1994, Cohn-Bendit has been elected alternately as European Parliament representative of the German Greens, then the French Greens, and once again the German Greens — the only person to have been elected to that body from more than one country.

Along the way, Cohn-Bendit managed to anger both the right and left wings for his mix of radicalism and realism — from the right, for his Green Ideas From Europe

by Robert Collier

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backing of open immigration, the legalization of soft drugs and the abandonment of nuclear power, and from the left for his support for free-market economic policies and for European military intervention in Bosnia and Afghanistan.

Currently known as “Danny the Green,” he is co-president of the European Greens/European Free Alliance in the European Parliament. Yet he told his Berkeley audience that he is disappointed at Europe’s decision to bow to pressure from industrial lobbies by creating a cap-and-trade system that affects only the power-generating sector rather than all business sectors. He was quizzed pointedly about this and other European weaknesses from questioners posting via Internet.

“We are in the fringe of a backlash,” he admitted in response to a question from Rafael Fernández de Castro, special adviser for international affairs to Mexican President Felipe Calderón. “The big corporations and trade unions are working together to say, ‘the crisis is too big, we have first to resolve the economic and financial crisis, and then we will see what we can do to resolve the ecological crisis.’ I think this is a danger.”

Cohn-Bendit cast the stakes in dire terms:

It’s insane logic. I think that in the climate crisis, with the ecological crisis, we are slowly understanding that our way of production, our way of economy, is destroying the planet. If we destroy the planet, what will be the end?

Cohn-Bendit echoed his own uneasy experience trying to act as a bridge between radical and environmentalist wings of the French-German left. “With the ecological crisis, the mantra of the workers movement has to change,” he said. “And because there are jobs that people have that they will lose. And their way of production is changing ... coal mines, and all the ‘green coal’ rhetoric, also from Obama, is rubbish. Green coal doesn’t exist. Coal is black. Nobody has seen green coal. Neither has Obama.”

He cast Europe’s dilemma as a tug of war between nation-states and regional government on a wide variety of topics.

“With this financial crisis, we must decide: do we have a national strategy of regulation of financial markets or do we have a European strategy? In the ecological crisis, do we have national solutions or do we have a European solution? And with climate change, do we have a national or European solution?”

Cohn-Bendit added that only by regionwide cooperation can the economy be adapted to a high-tech, low-carbon future. “We see in Europe that the green movement’s electoral results are growing. So you have a growing sensitivity in Europe that Europe should take the lead and not permit the backlash. Because the ecological
transformation of the economy is the key of modernity. You will be an industrial leading nation, or part of the world, if you are leading in the ecological industry, because this is the industry of tomorrow.”

Ricardo Lagos, former president of Chile and currently Special Envoy on Climate Change for the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, sent a question asking whether Europe is truly capable of reaching its current climate commitments, known as the “three 20s” — increasing energy efficiency by 20 percent, reducing greenhouse gases by 20 percent and increasing renewable energy generation by 20 percent, all by the year 2020.

“Our position in the European Greens is that Europe is capable of doing the three 30s,” Cohn-Bendit said. “This is the fight that we have with the majority of European governments now. They say we can go to three-30 [only] if the rest of world will go to this, too. And our argument is that Europe, with the United States, is one of the most responsible for the climate problem, so we should go to three-30. And if we go to three-30, we will have the influence we need to push the Americans and others to go more rapidly.”

But Daniel Kammen, a professor in UC Berkeley’s Energy and Resources Group and now the World Bank’s newly appointed chief of renewable energy and energy efficiency, pressed Cohn-Bendit on whether his three-30 vision was politically feasible.

“I want a carbon tax,” Cohn-Bendit replied, mentioning the measure that many policy experts on both sides of the Atlantic view as most efficient at cutting emissions, yet one that remains politically unpalatable. “Europe has to impose a carbon tax. The more you produce carbon, you have to pay your tax. This is the way of regulation. A carbon tax will push in Europe [carbon] reduction.” But he admitted that such policies would require a seismic shift in European politics.

“This is a political decision,” he said, emphasizing his hope that the expected national elections in France and Germany in 2012 and 2013, respectively, will result in left-Green coalition governments that would forcefully advocate for European adoption of a carbon tax and more aggressive emissions targets.

Cohn-Bendit accused the United States of resting on the laurels of its military-space accomplishments and allowing other nations to take the lead in developing clean technology industries.

“The United States, in all military technology you are at the top of the world, but in the rest, you are a third-world country,” he said. “This is what I want to explain to...
the United States: you are completely backwards. If you [want to] have high-speed trains, you will buy them from France or Germany or China, but they won’t be American. Because you lived 30 years on the moon. You only got there once, you know, but you stayed there.”

Cohn-Bendit did not spare Latin American governments from his criticism, however.

“One of the big problems of Latin America is that the leading nations, on one side, they have taken ecological steps, they did it on the Amazon, but on the other side, like biofuels, they got completely mad. In Latin America, because you have countries like Venezuela with a lot of oil, the countries didn’t get to [the] core of the problem, with some exceptions like Costa Rica.”

Responding to a question from Martha Delgado, the environment policy chief of Mexico City, he also offered hope for autonomous action by city governments around the world. Cohn-Bendit advocated a “coalition of the cities for reduction of emission of CO₂.” He added, “if this coalition continues and the cities gave common benchmarks, it is one of the possibilities of arriving to global reduction of emissions.”

But despite his biting critiques of governments in Europe and around the world, Cohn-Bendit waxed lyrical about the potential of multinational integration.

The European integration process is a “dream of rivers,” Cohn-Bendit said, noting that Europe’s first barrier to drop was the Rhine, between historic enemies France and Germany. Then came the Oder, between Germany and Poland. “Now there’s not any more a border where people are shot,” he said. “You could continue to have this dream, the dream of Bosporus, to get Turkey in the European Union. This is highly controversial in Europe. But I think that it wasn’t Obama who invented ‘yes we can,’ it was the Europeans. They invented ‘yes we can overcome everything.’”

“Why do we need Europe? We need Europe because we need a multilateral world,” Cohn-Bendit said. He then concluded his talk on a wistful, ambiguously modest tone.

“So I still think Europe is still a dream. Worthwhile, I hope.”

Daniel Cohn-Bendit is Co-President of the European parliamentary group Greens/European Free Alliance. He spoke for CLAS on September 29, 2010.

Robert Collier is a visiting scholar at the Center for Environmental Public Policy at the Goldman School of Public Policy at UC Berkeley. He was a staff writer for The San Francisco Chronicle for 16 years.
An Italian high-speed train built in Europe.
(Photo by Ciccio Pizzettaro)
Latin America was hardly on China’s radar screen until the turn of the century, when the Asian giant’s entry into the World Trade Organization allowed it to integrate more fully into the world economy. China’s subsequent rise has created an unprecedented demand for Latin American and Caribbean goods, particularly commodities, which has helped boost the region’s growth for almost a decade. Ultimately, however, such export growth may prove unsustainable. Perhaps even worse, Chinese manufactured goods are more competitive than those from Latin America in both home and world markets. These twin trends may jeopardize Latin America’s prospects for long-term growth.

China’s rise has stimulated Latin American exports significantly. However, at the same time, China has leapt over Latin America to become the most competitive exporter of manufactures in the world — leaving 92 percent of Latin America’s manufacturing exports under threat from China in 2009. Indeed, one key (and new) finding exhibited in this brief is that China’s manufacturing exports are now the most competitive in the world when measured as a share of world manufacturing exports.

Manufactures and modern services are the key to long-run growth and prosperity. While China soars ahead by such measures, Latin America seems to be returning to a primary commodity-led export path. At a deeper level, China’s focus on building endogenous productive capacities has been far more effective than Latin America’s “Washington Consensus” approach.

The Bright Side

China and the Latin American-Caribbean region (LAC) began to implement economic reforms within a few years of each other: China in 1978 and much of Latin America in 1990. Since then the two regions have followed rather different paths to development, with China’s economic strategies and outcomes having several notable similarities to those of the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
America in 1982. In 1980, the collective economic output of Latin America and the Caribbean was seven times that of China — 14 times greater on a per capita basis. Nearly 30 years later, China had pulled ahead, with a gross domestic product of $2.7 trillion in 2009 versus a pan-regional GDP of $2.6 trillion in Latin America. Over the three decades, China registered a robust annual economic growth rate of 8 percent. Latin America, in contrast, experienced a more modest 3.8 percent average annual growth rate. Between 1980 and 2009, GDP per capita increased by 6.6 percent annually in China, while in Latin America per capita GDP edged up by a mere 1.7 percent annually during years that were marked by crises and volatility.

Boom times in China have been good for Latin America, whose exports to the Asian powerhouse increased nine times between 2000 and 2009 in real terms, far outpacing the region's overall export growth, which didn't even double over the same period. In 2009, LAC exports to China reached $41.3 billion. The pre-financial crisis peak for LAC exports to China was $22.3 billion. However, this windfall was not widely shared: a handful of products account for just over 80 percent of all regional exports to China, chiefly iron, soy, crude oil and copper.

China is increasingly investing in many of these same Latin American sectors. Hard statistics are difficult to come by, but Chinese firms have invested at least $25 billion in Latin America since 2005.

The majority of this foreign direct investment (FDI) is "resource seeking." China has invested heavily in sectors that provide resources needed to meet domestic demand, including copper, oil, iron and soybeans. However, Chinese FDI is also "market seeking," in that it seeks to reach Latin American markets such as the auto and tourism sectors. Finally, some Chinese investment in Latin America is "efficiency seeking." In this case, locations in Uruguay and Mexico serve as export platforms to Brazil and the United States, respectively.

Beyond creating a hungry new market for Latin American trade and Chinese investment, China's voracious appetite has resulted in more demand and higher prices for LAC raw materials and agricultural outputs in markets around the world. From 2000 to 2007, the year before the financial crisis hit, Chinese demand accounted for 20 percent of world export growth in metals, 11 percent for copper, 55 percent for iron and 58 percent for soy. Since the crisis, while global demand for these same commodities has decreased, Chinese demand for them has doubled.

Don't Stop There

Over the longer-run future, it is hard to predict whether China will be a sustained source of demand for Latin American commodities. Even if China's appetite for LAC resources remains undiminished, the consequences may still be mixed. Demand from China could accentuate Latin America's over-reliance on commodities exports and...
jeopardize the region's ability to diversify its export basket toward manufactures and modern services. It could also drive long-lasting social and environmental change with unknown effects.

For example, between 1995 and 2009, Brazilian soy production quadrupled, due in part to demand from China — the buyer of approximately half of all Brazilian soy exports. At the same time, employment in the soy sector shrank as cultivation became highly mechanized, and some 528,000 square kilometers of Amazonian forest was cut down to accommodate expanding soy production. Such deforestation has threatened the livelihoods of many indigenous Brazilians and contributed to global climate change.

Economists also express concern that China’s tug on the LAC export basket will infect the region with “Dutch disease,” a common affliction among primary commodity-dependent countries. Over-dependence on commodities has been shown to lead to deindustrialization because the discovery of valuable natural resources and their subsequent export raises the value of a nation’s currency, thus making its manufactured and agricultural goods, as well as its services, less competitive. This in turn eventually leads to increasing imports and decreasing exports, creating balance-of-payment problems and leading to poor economic performance.

The past few years have seen significant currency appreciation across Latin America, though it remains unclear whether such appreciation has been due to rising commodities prices or to other factors. In terms of competitiveness, however, it is fairly certain that China is outcompeting Latin America in world manufactures and services exports.

In 1980, China was not even ranked in terms of global competitiveness, but by 2009, China’s manufactures had become the most competitive in the world. Argentina, Brazil and Mexico are the only Latin American nations with significant world export share, and all three have struggled to maintain competitiveness.

Nearly all of the exports from Latin America and the Caribbean are under threat from China. Those products in global or home markets where China’s market share is increasing and the market share of Latin America and the Caribbean firms is decreasing are facing a “direct threat.” A “partial threat” occurs when Latin American market share is increasing at a slower rate than that of China.
Between 2000 and 2009, 92 percent of Latin American manufacturing exports, representing 39 percent of the region's total exports, came under threat from China.

Mexico is the most vulnerable, with 97 percent of its manufacturing exports — which represent 71 percent of the national export base — under threat from China in 2009. With the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta), Mexico pinned its future to hopes that it could serve as the low-wage export platform to the United States. Mexico had a nice run, with a surge in exports to the U.S. from 1994 to 2000. Everything changed when China entered the WTO, however. Now, many of Mexico’s chief export industries are hanging by a thread, particularly the textiles and apparel industries.

The electronics industry is facing the same set of problems. And it is amazing how fast the market has changed. In 2000, both China and Mexico had cornered about the same amount of the global computer market: 6 percent for China and 4.5 percent for Mexico. Yet by 2009, 47.7 percent of all the computers exported in the world came from China, while Mexico’s share had dipped to 3.6 percent. In an attempt to compete with China, multinational electronics firms have resorted to cost-reduction measures such as hiring workers through global temporary worker firms: workers are hired for short-term contracts that lack most benefits and salaried wages.

Central America, one of the poorest sub-regions in Latin America, is also of particular concern. In the 1980s, most of the countries in that region established processing zones that assemble apparel for export to the United States. By 2001, such zones generated 87 percent of all Salvadoran exports to the United States, 78 percent of those from Honduras and 63 percent for both Guatemala and Nicaragua.

As recently as 2001, China and Central America were on par, with each selling about $6.5 billion worth of apparel to the United States and each holding a 12 percent share of the American apparel market. In 2004, Central American clothing exports to the U.S. had risen to $7.5 billion, while those from China, whose entry into the World Trade Organization was under way, had jumped to $10.7 billion.

In 2005, the capstone of this relationship, the Central American Free Trade Agreement (Cafta) took effect. By lowering tariffs and locking in access to the U.S. economy, Cafta was supposed to solidify Central America as a clothing hub. Instead, clothing exports from Central America plunged 25 percent from pre-Cafta days to $5.6 billion in 2009. Central America’s share of American
China Discovers Latin America

apparel imports has slipped to 8.7 percent, while China now enjoys a commanding 38 percent share.

Mexico, and to a lesser extent Central America, had a unique opportunity to enjoy almost exclusive (low-wage) access to the U.S. economy. Rather than using that window to build longer-term capabilities, such as higher value added goods, Mexico especially acted as if it would simply remain a low-wage haven for exports to the United States. China changed all that, and now Mexico struggles to stay afloat.

China as a Latin American Opportunity

These analyses should not be taken as the latest reason to blame China for another country’s ills. China is not to blame. These trends are largely the result of policies put in place by Latin American countries. Many had adopted “shock therapy” or the “Washington Consensus.” Governments rapidly liberalized trade and investment regimes and reduced the role of the state in economic affairs, often through privatizations that, in a number of cases, went painfully awry. China has taken a more gradual approach to integrating with world markets.

Rather than blaming China, Latin America can build on some of its own recent successes and learn from its Asian competitor in order to maximize the gains from its new economic relationship with China.

First, the additional revenue generated by exports to China and elsewhere can provide new sources of funds for stabilization and growth programs. Chile and a handful of other Latin American nations have created stabilization funds that save some of the proceeds from commodities exports for periods when prices are low or the nation needs macroeconomic stimulus. Chile’s fund, which comes from copper exports, enabled that nation to put together an effective stimulus package in response to the financial crisis.

There is no reason why such funds need only be earmarked toward macroeconomic stabilization. Revenue from commodities exports could also be used to invest in environmental programs to mitigate the negative effects of commodity-driven growth and, perhaps most importantly, in programs to boost industrial competitiveness.

It is in terms of industrial competitiveness that Latin America can learn the most from China. That country’s path to integration with world markets has been gradual and strategic, whereas most Latin American nations rapidly relinquished the role of the state in economic affairs. While China may not be an ideal model for development given its autocratic state, it certainly should be a motivator for nations with manufacturing capabilities to think hard about competitiveness and upgrading.
Even though Latin America and China began their reforms at roughly the same time, their motivations for reform were quite different. Whereas Latin American reform began around 1982 as a reaction to the collapse in oil prices, Chinese economic reforms began in 1978, two years after the death of Mao Zedong and the end of the Cultural Revolution, as the country began to cautiously reopen to the world. In that year, China embarked on a program of economic reform aimed at strategic integration into the world economy by following a “dual track” policy. The policy consisted of liberalizing FDI and inflow of imported inputs to selected industries, while at the same time buttressing those sectors to the point of maturity and nurturing other sectors until they were ready to face competition with imports.

China’s industrial strategy has been three-pronged. First, government policy has focused on creating endogenous productive capacity by targeting specific industries through state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or government support, paying increasing attention to science and technology policy and linking the SOEs with the private sector and research institutes. Secondly, and very importantly, Chinese support for domestic industry has always had an eye on foreign markets: China has gradually and strategically integrated into world markets in order to gain access to technology and finance. Thirdly, in undertaking economic reform, China’s new leaders have taken an experimental approach, using the market and trade as a means to development. Hence, in the eyes of Chinese policy makers, the market and government policies should complement one another, while the weight of each should be allowed to change as the economy develops.

Such an approach stands in stark contrast to Latin America. The region experimented with industrial policy during its Import-Substituting Industrialization period (roughly 1940 to 1980). The approach was a modest success at best. The policy did help industrialize nations like Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and others in the region. Yet, with a few exceptions, the firms within those industries were extremely inefficient by global standards because there was too much focus on domestic markets. In addition, Latin American industrial policy was financed largely by debt, as opposed to export revenue and savings in the Chinese case. By the time LAC countries began their economic reforms in the early 1980s, dissatisfaction with the import substitution model had led to skepticism about any government intervention in the economy. There was an abrupt transition to free trade and market-based economies, which were seen largely as ends in themselves: it was taken for granted that free markets would lead inevitably to enhanced learning through trade, the deepening of industrialization and growth.

Both import substitution and unfettered free markets have proved less than ideal paths for Latin American and Caribbean development. Chinese investment in Latin America could be an opportunity for LAC countries to undertake new development strategies. Increased export revenue could be used to invigorate and expand stabilization funds and provide the capital for an innovative approach to industrialization. There are some signs that this is taking place. As previously mentioned, Chile’s stabilization fund allowed it to weather the global economic downturn. Brazil has also begun to take industrialization and modern services seriously again, particularly through its national development bank.

A business-as-usual approach, on the other hand, could be dangerous. Over-reliance on primary commodities could cause macroeconomic, employment and environmental problems in the longer term. What’s more, China is already swiftly out-competing Latin America in world manufacturing markets. As China has shown, nations can conduct economic reforms to great benefit. Latin America should follow suit.

Kevin P. Gallagher is a professor of International Relations at Boston University. This article draws from his new book with Roberto Porzecanski.
We’ve been told repeatedly over the past generation — and especially since 9/11 — that the world is more complicated than it used to be. The bipolarity of the Cold War is gone for good, and even a term like “multi-polar” seems naively tidy for an unprecedented and bewildering global era increasingly driven by nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, terrorist networks, insurgent groups, tribal councils, warlords, drug cartels and other non-state actors and organizations. Our times may be baffling, but they are hardly unprecedented. States have always shared the international arena with non-state actors. However, abetted by professional historians, states have usually promoted international narratives that leave non-state actors trivialized, distorted or ignored altogether.

Consider the U.S.–Mexican War of 1846 to 1848. Historians on both sides of the border have framed the war as a story about states. They’ve crafted narratives of the conflict with virtually no conceptual space for the people who actually controlled most of the territory that the two counties went to war over: the Navajos, Apaches, Comanches, Kiowas and other independent Indian peoples who dominated Mexico’s far north. These native polities are invisible, or at best trivial, in history books about the U.S.–Mexican War, Manifest Destiny and Mexico’s own early national period.

This fact testifies to a colossal case of historical amnesia because Indian peoples fundamentally reshaped the ground upon which Mexico and the United States would compete in the mid-19th century. In the early 1830s, Comanches,
Kiowas, Navajos and several tribes of Apaches abandoned imperfect but workable peace agreements that they had maintained with Spanish-speakers in the North since the late 1700s. They did so for complex reasons that varied from group to group, but declining Mexican diplomatic and military power and expanding American markets were the backdrop for the region’s overall plunge into violence. Groups of mounted Indian men, often several hundred and sometimes even a thousand strong, stepped up attacks on Mexican settlements. They killed or enslaved the people they found there and stole or destroyed animals and other property. When they could, Mexicans responded by doing the same to their Indian enemies.

The raids and counter-raids escalated throughout the 1830s and 1840s, reducing thriving villages and settlements into ghostly “deserts,” as observers at the time called them. By the eve of the U.S. invasion, the violence spanned nine states and had claimed thousands of Mexican and Indian lives, ruined much of northern Mexico’s economy, stalled its demographic growth, depopulated its vast countryside and turned Mexicans at nearly every level of government against each other in a struggle for scarce resources. This sprawling, brutal conflict — what I call the War of a Thousand Deserts — had profound implications not only for the northern third of Mexico but also for how Mexicans and Americans came to view one another prior to 1846, for how the U.S.–Mexican War would play out on the ground and for the conflict’s astonishing conclusion: Mexico losing more than half its national territory to the United States. This outcome, one that continues to shape the power, prosperity and potential of Mexico and the United States today, is incomprehensible without taking non-state societies and their politics into account.

And yet, at the time, few Mexicans or Americans saw Indians as important actors. By the 1830s, observers north and south of the Rio Grande agreed that while tribes could be troublesome to nation-states, they were no longer entities of national, let alone international, significance. The trouble was that northern Mexico’s worsening situation was indeed a matter of mounting national and international concern. Anglo-Americans and Mexicans overcame this interpretive problem by adjusting their gaze and looking through Indians rather than at them. They came to use Indian raiders as lenses calibrated to reveal essential information about one another. Rather than take native polities seriously, Anglo-Americans used Indians to craft useful caricatures of Mexicans, and Mexicans used Indians to do the same with Americans.

To understand how this was done, listen to Stephen F. Austin, the “founding father” of Anglo-Texas. When American colonists in Texas revolted against Mexican rule in 1835, they dispatched Austin to tour the United States in order to capitalize on sympathy for the movement. Austin delivered a stump speech in several cities, laying out the Texan case. “But a few years back,” he began, “Texas was a wilderness, the home of the uncivilized and wandering Comanche and other tribes of Indians, who waged a constant warfare against the Spanish settlements…. The incursions of the Indians also extended beyond the [Rio Grande], and desolated that part of the country. In order to restrain the savages and bring them into subjection, the government opened Texas for settlement…. American enterprise accepted the invitation and promptly responded to the call.”

This story, which we can call the Texas Creation Myth, would be repeated in scores of books, memoirs and speeches and was chanted like a mantra by ambassadors from Texas to the United States. The myth maintained that: (a) Texas had been a wasteland prior to Anglo-American colonization; (b) Americans had been invited to Texas in order to save Mexicans from Indians; and (c) the Americans did so. As one author put it, “the untiring perseverance of the colonists triumphed over all natural obstacles, expelled the savages by whom the country was infested, reduced the forest to cultivation, and made the desert smile.”
In Washington, friends of Texas enthusiastically rehearsed these arguments in the U.S. Congress. Sympathetic senators insisted that Americans had been “invited to settle the wilderness, and defend the Mexicans against the then frequent incursions of a savage foe.” Counterparts in the House explained that Mexicans had used the colonists as “a barrier against the Camanches [sic] and the Indians of Red River, to protect the inhabitants of the interior States,” and that thanks to the hardy Anglo-American pioneers, “[t]he savage roamed no longer in hostile array over the plains of Texas.”

The Texas Creation Myth introduced a set of ideas about Indians and Mexicans into American political discourse at a moment when the nation was taking notice of the whole of northern Mexico for the first time. In the decade after the Texas rebellion, American newspaper accounts, diplomatic reports, congressional documents, memoirs, travel accounts and regional histories detailed brutal, devastating raiding campaigns afflicting a huge proportion of Mexico’s territory, from New Mexico south to the state of San Luis Potosí. Geographically minded readers would have marveled at the distances involved. Had Comanches journeyed east from their home ranges instead of south, they would have been in striking range of Nashville or Atlanta. And, by all accounts, Mexican ranchers, militia, even regular military personnel could do little to stop the killings, theft, destruction and kidnappings that attended the far-flung campaigns. In 1844, for example, the important publication Niles’ National Register reported that Comanches had killed one fourth of General Mariano Arista’s entire northern army in a single engagement.

When Comanches had to face Americans, in contrast, they appeared “timid and cowardly.” So it was, another author insisted, that Comanches chose to attack Mexicans, a degraded, mongrel people, “an enemy more cowardly than themselves, and who has been long accustomed to permit them to ravage the country with impunity.” Here then, as in talk about Texas, American discourse about northern Mexico made Indians into the great signifiers of, rather than the reasons for, Mexico’s failures. Like Texas prior to colonization, northern Mexico was in tatters not because Indians were strong but because Mexicans were weak. And, as with the Texas Creation Myth, stories about Indian raids from across the north rhetorically invalidated Mexico’s claim to the land, only on a much larger scale.

Meanwhile, Mexicans themselves talked urgently about Indian raiding in the 1830s and 1840s. Their conversation was marked above all by division between northerners and national leaders in the center of the Republic. Northern editors, community groups and officials frequently styled raiders as psychotic animals killing just to kill. Nonetheless, they insisted that los salvajes posed a national threat and implored their superiors in Mexico City for help fighting the “eminently national war” against them. Mexico’s leaders thought northern rhetoric backward and sensationalistic; they often took a more paternalistic view and looked forward to the day when Apaches and Comanches would become Catholic, civilized Mexicans. Distracted by rebellions, budgetary and economic crises, coups and skirmishes with foreign powers, national leaders more or less ignored Indian raiding, treating it more like localized crime than a national war. “Indians don’t unmake presidents,” as one defense minister candidly put it.

Despite their differences, northerners and national officials had something in common with each other and with observers in the United States: they seemed incapable of taking independent Indians seriously as coherent political communities. Indian raiders were either disorganized, bloodthirsty predators or pitiful, wayward children. To maintain these views, Mexicans had to ignore masses of evidence that Indians were able to organize themselves to an astonishing degree in the pursuit of shared goals.

So Mexicans found themselves in a conceptual bind. But there was a way out. By the early 1840s, northern commentators began suggesting that Texans, and even Americans, might somehow be behind Indian raids. This idea developed unevenly at first, but then two things happened in 1844 that gave it irresistible explanatory power both in the North and in Mexico City. First, in the spring of that year, the Tyler administration in Washington asked the Senate to approve a treaty for the annexation of Texas. Low-level and mostly indirect tension with the United States suddenly became intense and direct. Second, after a relatively quiet 1843, the entire North experienced a huge expansion in the scope and violence of Indian raiding. The timing and severity of these attacks fueled speculation that Americans were involved, and small but significant details deepened these suspicions. In October 1844, for example, in the aftermath of a bloody battle with Comanches, Mexican forces discovered that some of the dead raiders had U.S. presidential peace medals around their necks. Other encounters elsewhere in the North also seemed to confirm the link.

It appeared that Indian raiding suddenly had, in the words of a northern editor, “more advanced objectives than killing and robbing.” More and more Mexicans subscribed to the idea of a conspiracy between Americans and Indians as international tensions increased. Soon after James K. Polk assumed the presidency in early 1845, no less a figure
than Mexico’s minister of war confidently explained to the Mexican Congress that the “hordes of barbarians” were “sent out every time by the usurpers of our territory, in order to desolate the terrain they desire to occupy without risk and without honor.” The minister described an agreement whereby the U.S. provided Indians not only with arms and ammunition but with a political education, with “the necessary instruction they need to understand the power they can wield when united in great masses….”

In fact, American provocateurs had little or nothing to do with native policy. However Comanches obtained the peace medals (if in fact the report was accurate), their leaders had slender connection to American officials and needed no encouragement to raid Mexicans. Still, the claim didn’t have to be true to be useful. Mexico had escaped its conceptual bind by looking through Apaches, Navajos and Comanches and seeing Americans on the other side. Mexicans were at last constructing a single
national discourse on raiding that could secure unity against Indians and norteamericanos alike.

But the consensus came too late. Once in power, President Polk tried to pressure Mexico into selling its vast northern territories. When that failed, he ordered General Zachary Taylor to march south of the Nueces River, into territory Mexico considered its own, in hopes that he would either compel a sale or precipitate a land war. He failed in the former but accomplished the latter. In the summer of 1846, Taylor provoked a Mexican reaction and started a war.

The War of a Thousand Deserts influenced the U.S.–Mexican War in two critical ways. First, it facilitated the U.S. conquest and occupation of the Mexican North and, by extension, helped make possible the decisive campaign into central Mexico. As they marched throughout northern Mexico, U.S. troops moved through a shattered, ghostly landscape, literally marching in the footsteps of Apaches and Comanches, to defeat an enemy that had already endured 15 years of war and terror. American officers had a message for these beleaguered people, provided in advance by Polk and the War Department. “It is our wish to see you liberated from despot[s],” General Taylor was to announce, “to drive back the savageCumanches [sic], to prevent the renewal of their assaults, and to compel them to restore to you from captivity your long lost wives and children.”

Northerners desperately needed help, because Apaches, Navajos and especially Comanches and Kiowas intensified their raiding activities during the U.S.–Mexican War. The destructive history and ongoing, even worsening reality of raiding seriously compromised northern Mexico’s contribution to the war effort. For the most part, Mexican military officials simply exempted northern communities from the draft because of ongoing Indian raids. When Mexico City did ask northerners for help, they rarely got it. In 1847, for example, when General Antonio López de Santa Anna was raising an army to confront Zachary Taylor, he planned on drawing about a fifth of his troops from the states of Chihuahua, Durango and Zacatecas. All three states were coping with Apache and Comanche raiders, and all three refused to send Santa Anna any men. In February of that year, in his best chance to reverse the dynamic of the war, Santa Anna lost the Battle of Buena Vista by the narrowest of margins.

Just as importantly, raids discouraged northern Mexicans from leaving their families and joining insurgents fighting the American occupation. A knowledgeable observer estimated that northern Mexico should have been able to produce 100,000 men to wage irregular warfare against American troops. Such an insurgency could have made the American occupation unworkable as well as making the later campaign into central Mexico a practical and political impossibility. But no such insurgency materialized. General José Urrea, a key northern guerrilla leader, attracted fewer than a thousand men, and his movement never became more than a nuisance to the occupation. Impoverished and embittered by Indian raiding, northern men understandably felt reluctant to leave their families and property undefended against Indians in order to help a government that had done so little to help them.

The second way that the War of a Thousand Deserts shaped the U.S.–Mexican War was that it allowed American leaders to style the dismemberment of Mexico as an act of salvation. By the time senators began talking seriously about how much territory to demand from Mexico, expansionists could draw on more than a decade of observations to describe a Mexican North empty of meaningful Mexican history and, by all appearances, increasingly empty of Mexicans themselves. “The Mexican people [are] now receding before the Indian,” a Virginian senator observed, “and this affords a new argument in favor of our occupation of the territory, which would otherwise fall into the occupation of the savage.” The crucial twin to this idea was that Americans would do what Mexicans could not: defeat the Indians and make the vast desert
that was northern Mexico smile with improvement and industry. President Polk himself made this case before Congress in 1847, when he defended the notion of annexing more than a million acres of Mexican territory. The cession would improve life for Mexicans north of the line, Polk insisted, but, more importantly, “it would be a blessing to all the northern states to have their citizens protected against [the Indians] by the power of the United States. At this moment many Mexicans, principally females and children, are in captivity among them,” the president continued. “If New Mexico were held and governed by the United States, we could effectually prevent these tribes from committing such outrages, and compel them to release these captives, and restore them to their families and friends.” One might dismiss this as tiresome, insincere rhetoric, but I think Polk believed what he said about Mexico’s plight and his nation’s ability to end it, and that most of his audience in Congress believed these things, too. Indeed, Article 11 of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ended the war, solemnly bound U.S. authorities both to restrain Indians residing north of the new border from conducting raids in Mexico and to rescue Mexican captives held by Indians.

As it turned out, however, the United States found it much harder than expected to control the independent Indians in their newly acquired territory. Cross-border raiding actually surged after the war, peaking in the mid-1850s. Raids would, in fact, continue in diminished form for decades, at least until the surrender of Geronimo and his Chiricahua Apaches in 1886. But despairing of its ability to honor the terms of the treaty and threatened with massive lawsuits from the Mexican landholders who had lost so much to raiding after 1848, the United States bought its way out of Article 11 in 1854 as part of the Gadsden Purchase.

In the years and decades following that little humiliation, historians on both sides of the border stuck to the longstanding notion that Indians were at best bit-players in the geopolitics of the U.S.–Mexican War — significant maybe as symptoms of Mexican weakness or American treachery but generally irrelevant in their own right. With stories about non-state actors crowding our newspapers, blogs and talk shows these days, perhaps it is time to revisit the U.S.–Mexican War and to acknowledge the centrality of stateless Indian peoples to that conflict and its manifold long-term consequences.

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Geronimo, 1886.
Many historians have assumed that Mexican women have a “special affinity” for the Catholic Church and that this close relationship has always existed. My research — on changes over time in how women have related to ecclesiastical authority within key institutional contexts — suggests that only the first of these assumptions is correct. That is, Mexican women do have a special affinity for the church, but it is a historical relationship — timeful, not timeless. Women played important roles in three types of ecclesiastical institution: religious orders, schools for girls and lay associations or cofradías. In this brief article, I will discuss only the changing relationship between women and the church in the cofradías.

The story begins in 1810. Before the outbreak of the wars for independence, women in cofradías were more visible than cloistered nuns, but barely. They participated in public demonstrations of piety, especially the religious processions and fiestas that the cofradías organized, but mainly as spectators. The officers and most-active participants were always men. In short, gender hierarchies in cofradías aligned seamlessly with gender hierarchies in colonial society, where women were also meant to be subordinate and relatively invisible.

This picture began to change in 1810 with the collapse of the Mexican economy, at its heart a collapse of silver mining and lending. Without mining to create new wealth...
and without lending to finance a recovery (since there were no banks and the church’s finances were immobilized by the inability of debtors to repay their old debts), the post-1810 depression was prolonged well into the 1830s. Everywhere in Mexico, church institutions, such as cofradías, along with private wealthholders, suffered. But the suffering was especially painful in the center-western region of the country, where dependence on silver had been greatest. It was there that one of the most extraordinary responses to economic hardship within church institutions took place: an upending of gender hierarchies within lay associations.

In light of the financial weakness of the cofradías, the concomitant decline in the prestige of membership and leadership, and perhaps also the availability, after independence, of alternative and more “modern” forms of sociability, men began to drift away from the cofradías. By the 1830s, women throughout the Republic had come to constitute large majorities of the membership, averaging almost 75 percent. But as the economy slowly recovered in Mexico City, the archbishopric of Mexico and the bishoprics of Oaxaca and Durango, most colonial-era cofradías stabilized financially. While they continued to register large female majorities, financial stability meant that enough men stuck with the cofradías that the principle of male leadership was not questioned. In the center-west, however, in the states of Michoacán, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Zacatecas and Aguascalientes, where the post-1810 depression had been most severe, many of the old male-led confraternities were almost totally dysfunctional. Here, a whole new model of lay association emerged, one that not only permitted but required female leadership, even in mixed-gender associations, producing what one priest called the “very improper and very inconvenient” spectacle of women governing men.

The revolution in gender relations began in San Miguel de Allende, where the parish priest had first tried, and failed, to revive many of the old cofradías. In April 1840, 32 ladies in San Miguel delivered a letter to their parish priest, proposing the foundation of a new devotional association dedicated to “perpetual vigil” over the Blessed Sacrament, the “Vela Perpetua.” Thirty-one señorases would be given the name of “cabezas de día.” Each cabeza would be responsible for signing up two people to sit vigil for every half hour of the day, beginning at 6:00 a.m. and continuing until 6:00 p.m., for one day of the month. The cabezas would elect an Hermana Mayor and a treasurer (later most Velas added a secretary). Men could join. But by constitutional rule, women were to be the officers.

When the petition from San Miguel reached the offices of the bishop, no one knew quite what to do. The first to see the petition was the bishop’s chief legal advisor (promotor fiscal), who cautiously and rather tepidly applauded the foundation before sending the petition on to the bishop. Ordinarily, the bishop would then have approved the recommendation of his promotor, but, breaking with normal practice, he asked another legal advisor, his provisor, to have a look at it. This advisor was clearly nervous about approving the petition. So, invoking the usually-ignored provision that civil authorities must approve new foundations of pious associations, he required the ladies of San Miguel to re-submit their request, this time to the governor of the Department of Guanajuato. They did so. The governor appointed a special departmental junta to discuss the case. If the bishop’s advisers had hoped that the civil authorities would bail them out of making a decision on the female-led Vela, they were disappointed. The departmental junta evaluated the Vela petition positively since, as they said, both the priest and the prefect, “individuals who inspire our confidence,” approved; since the Vela did not mix the spiritual with the political or civil; and since it did not threaten to “disturb the peace.”

This complicated set of delays and the confusion on the part of the church hierarchy confirms the obvious: that the Vela was different from anything that had come before. But once it was approved, the San Miguel Vela took on a new life as a precedent for the future. The Vela Perpetua spread quickly within the bishopric of Michoacán and by 1843 had reached the bishopric of Guadalajara, where there was another explosion of interest. By 1850, at least 50 Velas had been founded in these two dioceses — at an average of almost six a year — and by 1860, at least 82 were in existence. There was simply no precedent in the history of Mexican cofradías for the enthusiasm with which the Velas were received in these two bishoprics, or the rapidity with which they proliferated.

In the states of Michoacán and Guanajuato, the Vela attracted male membership that amounted to about 25 percent of the total — about what the balance between men and women had been in the old colonial confraternities. It is striking how easily the men who became members of the Vela Perpetua appear to have accepted female leadership. But the same cannot always be said of the priests. Although priests benefitted in a number of ways from the presence of a Vela Perpetua, they were not always happy to have to contend with such a popular, female-led organization.

The generally elite and middle-class women of the Vela understood how power worked and used that knowledge to defend their organization. This skill was especially important as the Velas began to raise significant sums of money. The more the Velas’ funds grew, the more priests
were tempted to try to dictate their use. Rafael Herrera, for example, the parish priest of San Diego del Bizcocho in Guanajuato, asked the Vela to pay some of his expenses, in light of the fact that it had accumulated so much money. The ladies responded that “their treasury is not his personal store” and accused him of abusing power and of interfering in their elections. Though after several exchanges he responded that he “desired to put an end to disputes with women,” he could not resist remarking that if he had in fact interfered in the last elections, “Doña Florentina Garate would never have been elected Hermana Mayor.” In 1850, the priest of Jaral, Guanajuato, José de Jesús Robledo, was locked in a similar battle with the Hermana Mayor of the Vela of that town. “The administration of this institution,” he fulminated, “has passed from the hands of the priest to the hands of a woman, one who functions as an arbiter of and superior to the priest. She is the one who ordains and disposes whatever she judges to be convenient to the Vela … She has bought some items for the cult, but these are only to be used when she disposes, or if I beg and plead, so that the Host… is subject to the will of the Señora… I have reproached her for her absolutism, telling her that she has been put in charge of the veladoras, but she has not been put in charge of the Church….”

And in another case involving the ladies of the Pátzcuaro Vela, the socially prominent Hermana Mayor, Doña María de la Luz Sierra and most of the cabezas and other officers threatened to resign over the issue of who controlled the Vela’s funds. Doña Luz argued her case in a lengthy and well-crafted letter to the priest, Victoriano Treviño. The Vela, she wrote, had been so successful that it was able not only to cover its costs but also to undertake the ambitious work of rebuilding the church, “rescuing it from its miserable and abandoned state and transforming it into the beautiful building we see today.” But now Treviño wanted to dictate which projects the Vela would pay for. He demanded that instead of paying for the roof of the sacristy, the Vela must finance repairs on the roof of the baptistery. As the ladies saw it, the sacristy roof repair prevented the ruination of a large part of the wall of the church, whereas the baptistery roof repair, besides being much more expensive, “only serves to protect a hallway that is of little use other than as a place for you to drink your chocolate and distract your imagination with agreeable vistas.” Beyond this specific issue, Doña Luz wrote, Treviño had offended the women of the Vela by calling them “impertinent old women.” “I do not consider myself capable of maintaining good harmony with you,” she continued, “and so I have decided to resign my task of leading the Vela.” Others joined her. Treviño backed down.

In all three of these cases, priests’ disgust with the Vela officers’ unwillingness to be submissive was expressed in obviously gendered language — Herrera’s dismissal of
“disputes with women,” Robledo’s calling the Hermana Mayor an “absolutist” and Treviño’s angry lashing out at “impertinent old women” — suggesting that the expectation of feminine docility and the ability at last to control lay associations was a part of the initial priestly enthusiasm for the Vela. Their attitude toward defiant, educated women in leadership positions is certainly not shocking. In my research on a convent rebellion in the 1760s, the epithets directed against the leader of the dissident faction — she was a “caudillo” and a “despot” — were similar to those used by priests against the Vela ladies. But female leadership in the Vela Perpetua (and in the other female-led pious associations that followed) opened up a much broader terrain on which those strained relationships between priests and (relatively) powerful women played out than the cloistered world of the convent. Furthermore, where convent rebellion was a transgression that was put down in such a way as ultimately to reinforce the very gender hierarchy it had challenged, female leadership of the Vela Perpetua was accepted (if grudgingly) by a church that needed to make important adjustments in order to survive in a treacherous political climate. Far from reinforcing old hierarchies, it permanently opened up new spaces for women in the church.

The Vela Perpetua was not political; it did not even hold meetings until much later in the century; it was not a coffeehouse or a tavern where politics were discussed. But I argue, building on the work of students of civil society who point out that even nonpolitical organizations have political implications (for example, Robert Putnam’s bowling leagues), that there are four ways that the Vela was political and that understanding it can help us better understand Mexican politics — indeed, that failing to understand the relationship between women and the church will prevent us from fully understanding Mexican politics.

First and most obviously, the Vela gave the mid-century clergy in the center-west a way to reconnect the laity to the church by means of novel, attractive, extra-liturgical ties. This show of power impressed, reassured and emboldened Catholic men, and it surely contributed to the change in liberal depictions of the relationship between the church and women. From the relatively benign associations of the early 19th century — when liberals gently relegated religion to a private sphere to which they had also relegated women, by calling women the natural guardians of Christian values — religion was now depicted as the business of “fanatical beatas and vulgar old women” and the church as “hiding behind the petticoats” of its female supporters. The very fact that liberals tried to denigrate the church by caricaturing its relationship to women strongly suggests that relationships like those forged in the foundation of the Vela Perpetua gave the church some of the power that the liberals had hoped to undermine.

Second, the Vela offered a way to appeal to and attract liberal Catholics and even religious liberals. When the Velas privileged private meditations in front of the Blessed Sacrament over participation in street processions; a personal relationship with Jesus Christ, embodied in the

Female soldiers in the Cristero War.
Sacrament, over the communal relationship with fellow processants; individual responsibility for organizing and keeping to an assigned schedule over once-a-year displays of passion — the interior over the exterior, the individual over the communal, the quiet over the exuberant, the rational over the emotional — they (unselfconsciously) embodied the kind of “modern” religious culture that “modern” Catholics could embrace.

The third way was more direct. By organizing elite and middle-class women under female leadership, the Vela and other female-led religious associations made it easier for women to petition, protest and demonstrate as women. The first major entry into politics of women self-identified as women came as part of the 1850s and 1860s protests against the laws of the Reform and other anticlerical measures. For the first time that I know of, numerous petitions came from the “señoras” of X town or city. Among my still incomplete sample of female protest, women’s groups in the center-west seem to have been disproportionately represented. Over 600 women from Guadalajara, over 500 from Morelia and hundreds of women from other, smaller towns in Jalisco, Guanajuato and Michoacán signed multiple petitions. It is impossible to connect the success of the Vela in the center-west to the high degree of activism of Catholic women in that region in other than a correlative way, but even the point of a correlation is worth making.

Finally, in a similar vein, several historians, attempting to discover what distinguished the regions of Mexico where the late 1920s Cristero rebellion flourished from other parts of Mexico where it did not, have concluded that the presence or absence of a vibrant Catholic associational life was an important factor. This raises the question — unaddressed in the literature on the Cristeros — of how that especially active associational life came into existence. Devotional associations had proliferated throughout Mexico beginning in the 1890s, a part of the Vatican-inspired “devotional revolution” in defense of global Catholicism. But my research suggests that in the center-west, the long history of women’s leadership of pious associations was clearly important in producing a dense landscape of religious associationalism with deep roots where the Cristero movement could flourish.

In sum, 1810 is a key date in the history of the relationship between women, the Catholic Church and Mexican politics. In the aftermath of the wars of independence, a chain of events was set in motion that led to the establishment of pious associations governed by women, and this infusion of new religious and organizational energies helped the church survive at the grassroots level during the dark days from the Reform until 1890 or so, when the regime of Porfirio Díaz reconciled with the church. That the Díaz regime chose the path of reconciliation may be seen as a reflection of the church’s ability to adjust, to accept the unacceptable idea of women as leaders of the laity, both male and female. The Vela Perpetua was a key part of that process. Moreover, the institutions for which it paved the way, like the highly political Damas Católicas, continued to help the church retain the political power that it seems, yet again, to have recovered since the 2000 elections, with the rise to power of the devout Felipe Calderón and the pro-Catholic Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN). In important ways, then, the story of the Vela Perpetua is a story not only of gender and church, but of gender, church and politics.

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Facing page: A monstrance holds the consecrated host.
Below: A modern vigil at the Church of Our Lady of Guadalupe.
Radicals, Revolutionaries and Exiles: Mexico City in the 1920s

by Barry Carr

In the interwar era, cities across the Americas became hubs in transnational networks that linked radicals and revolutionaries of all kinds: anarchists, Wobblies, Socialists, Communists, Garveyites, political exiles and vanguard intellectuals. While there were a number of these urban hubs — New York, Tampa, New Orleans and Havana all played a role — the largest by far was Mexico City.

Academics have long been interested in the ways in which foreigners were attracted to Mexico and Mexico City in the years after the revolution. Most of their work, though, has centered on the interest shown by North Americans. I’m thinking here of the work by Helen Delpar on the U.S. artists and intellectuals who were attracted by The Enormous Vogue of Things Mexican (the title of her splendid book). More recently, the University of Chicago historian, Mauricio Tenorio has been exploring this phenomenon, employing the term “Brown Atlantis” to describe the appeal of Mexico City to these U.S. cultural and academic constituencies. In using the term “Brown Atlantis,” and the same is true of Helen Delpar’s work, the emphasis has been very firmly on Mexico as the center of indigenous politics, art and philosophy. I have suggested to Mauricio, somewhat cheekily, that Havana played a similar role, albeit rather less substantial than Mexico City, and that the label in this case might be “The Black Atlantis” — given the passion shown by U.S. and European intellectuals, musicians and artists for things African or African-descended in Cuba in the 1920s and 1930s.

Particular attention has been paid to the U.S. artists, writers, folklorists and intellectuals who were captured in some ways by Mexico City. Some examples would include: the silver pioneer and Taxco jewelry designer, William Spratling; Anita Brenner and Frances Toor, two American women who mingled with and wrote about the artists and radical political practitioners of the 1920s Mexican artistic Renaissance; the Italian-American photographer, Tina Modotti, who also mixed with the radical left in Mexico City and fell in love with one of the Latin American exiles discussed later in this article, the handsome Cuban athlete, student leader and revolutionary, Julio Antonio Mella; Carleton Beals, the American journalist and prolific writer on Mexico and Latin America throughout the period 1920–60; and several U.S. Communists, such as Ella and Bertram Wolfe who combined radical politics and friendship with muralist Diego Rivera. From the late 1920s onwards — and especially in the 1940s and early 1950s — there was also a less well-known group of sexual pilgrims and outlaws who were attracted by Mexico’s allegedly more open and tolerant atmosphere for same-sex relations. These border-crossers joined at some points with U.S. Beats like William Burroughs, Jack Kerouac and Allen Ginsberg. Finally, there were the U.S. political refugees who fled to Mexico during the Macarthyite period of the late 1940s and 1950s, finding safety in Mexico City and in towns like Cuernavaca; their
experiences have been studied recently by several U.S. scholars including Diana Anhalt in her wonderful *A Gathering of Fugitives* and Rebecca Schreiber in *Cold War Exiles in Mexico: U.S. Dissidents and the Culture of Critical Resistance*.

The presence of non-Americans, however, whether Europeans or Latin Americans, has been much less well-registered and studied, although there has been some work on, for example, the arrival of an impressive group of anti-fascist intellectuals and politicians during World War II — such as the family of the prominent Austrian historian of Mexico, Friedrich Katz — which turned Mexico into by far the most dynamic and cosmopolitan cultural center in the Americas.

**Mexico City: Emporium of Revolution**

Push-pull factors brought exiles, émigrés, refugees, revolutionaries and dreamers to Mexico City throughout the 1920s. The Alvaro Obregón (1920-24) government’s embrace of literacy campaigns and educational and artistic vanguardism was part of this magnet’s attractive powers. No one was more powerfully instrumental in creating this pull than José Vasconcelos, Obregón’s Minister of Education. Modeling himself in part on the Soviet Union’s cultural czar, Anatoly Lunacharsky, Vasconcelos used his position to make the Ministry of Education a cultural patron of muralists and educators from all over the Americas. Most of the clients recruited into the muralism and education endeavor were Mexicans, but there was also a steady stream of Latin American cultural vanguardists and activists, too.

The Chilean poet and educator, Gabriela Mistral, was one of those; she arrived in Mexico in 1923. A somewhat less well-known member of the emporium was the Nicaraguan writer Salomón de la Selva, who became a supporter of Augusto César Sandino’s cause in Nicaragua later in the 1920s. Vasconcelos himself at this phase in his career embraced nationalist and anti-imperialist struggles in the Caribbean as well — especially those in Haiti and Puerto Rico. He was a delegate to the Communist International-organized Anti-Imperialist Congress in Brussels in February 1927, for example.

Another of the cultural figures who found their way to Mexico City and to Vasconcelos’ network was the young Peruvian intellectual and anti-imperialist, Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, who was exiled in 1923 by the repressive regime of Augusto Leguía. Haya embraced Vasconcelos’ cultural project, became his de facto private secretary for several months and borrowed key concepts such as “Indo-America” from Vasconcelos’ unfolding nationalist cosmology that later became one of the cornerstones of Haya’s own anti-imperialist project founded in Mexico as the APRA movement (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, American Popular Revolutionary Alliance).

The ongoing repression of the Leguía regime would produce a steady stream of political refugees from Peru over the next five years (1924-29), most of them involved politically with Haya de la Torre or with the young Marxist intellectual, José Carlos Mariátegui. Among these later Peruvian arrivals was Magda Portal, a poet nicknamed “La Pasionaria Peruana.” Portal would become a powerful advocate of women’s political agency in the Peruvian APRA movement in the 1930s and 1940s. Then, there was the Peruvian Jewish activist and sometime APRA member, Jacobo Hurwitz. Esteban Pavletich was another Aprista who spent a year fighting alongside the Nicaraguan guerrilla leader and anti-imperialist Augusto César Sandino in 1928.

The repression unleashed by the Leguía government in Peru is a reminder of one of the push factors involved in this “in gathering” of radicals in Mexico, and especially Mexico City, in the 1920s. Some exiles and refugees were certainly semi-voluntary in nature, but there were plenty of examples of involuntary movements as well, such as the writer Tristan Maroff who fled Bolivia for Mexico. But the most important sources of exiles generated by repressive governments were north of the Andes — in Venezuela and Cuba.

A group of daring young Venezuelan freedom fighters, many of them students who had been exiled after their involvement in struggles against the bloody dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gómez (1908-35), made their way to Mexico — sometimes after intermediate stops in Central America or Cuba. This Venezuelan group included figures such as Salvador de la Plaza, Carlos Aponte and the Machado brothers, Gustavo and his sibling Eduardo. For these
young Venezuelans, the ongoing armed conflict in the still youthful and undisciplined revolutionary Mexican state offered unique opportunities to acquire arms for the fight back home as well as the chance to enlist support from sympathetic Mexican military officers and high political officials who were prepared to support uprisings against dictatorship and reactionary regimes in the Americas.

The Venezuelans embraced armed struggle in their native country and later in Cuba, giving a 20th-century inflection to a much older Garibaldian tradition of heroic, armed action. They were aided in this endeavor by the preparedness of elements in the government of President Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-28) to provide quiet financial — and sometimes military — support to liberation struggles that could be seen as promoting regional Mexican interests, or at the very least a willingness to turn a blind eye, and give a nod and a wink, to the activities and plans of the exiles.

From Cuba, the best-known immigrant revolutionary was Julio Antonio Mella. He sought refuge in Mexico along with many other opponents of the increasingly autocratic government of Gerardo Machado. Mella fled Cuba in early 1926 after a highly publicized hunger strike. After some weeks in Honduras and Guatemala, he made his way to Mexico where he quickly entered the world of Mexican Communism and the burgeoning networks of Latin American political refugees. There, Mella built a network of exiled Cubans gathered around a project to mount an armed expedition to Cuba — 30 years before a young Argentinian doctor, Che Guevara, and a group of Cuban exiles around Fidel Castro launched a similar expedition to liberate their Cuban homeland. The plans for the military expedition to Cuba involved using arms left over from an earlier, frustrated plan to mount action against the Gómez dictatorship in Venezuela. Mella’s ultimately unsuccessful project was another example of radical Garibaldianism in Latin America. After his plans for an invasion were discovered, Mella was murdered in Mexico City in January of 1929 by agents of the Machado regime.

The revolutionary diaspora in Mexico City was enriched by a further wave of revolutionary activists coming from Central America. By far the best known of these was the Nicaraguan, Augusto César Sandino. Sandino had already spent three years in the steamy petroleum districts of Tampico on the Mexican Gulf coast during 1923-26 before he returned to Nicaragua to take up the fight in a civil war that eventually morphed into a national liberation movement directed against the occupation by U.S. Marines. In 1929 and 1930, Sandino returned to Mexico to seek help, unsuccessfully, from the government of Emilio Portes Gil. Nevertheless, from early 1928, Mexico City had become one of the nerve centers of the Sandinista movement, a center from which Central and South American activists travelled to join Sandino’s struggle, and the most important source of financial and political support raised by ordinary Mexicans as well as sympathizers in high office. The campaign mounted by the Hands Off Nicaragua Committee (Comité...
Manos Fuera de Nicaragua, Mafuenic) was an early example of the solidarity movements that would proliferate all over the Americas in later decades.

It was no accident then that Mexico City became a major hub of exiled revolutionaries in the 1920s, bound together by membership in common networks of politics and sociability. In the process, a new geography of resistance and agitation was created in downtown Mexico City. There were some obvious, important inner-city hubs on this new map. They included the offices of organizations and magazines that supported the exiles’ plans and disseminated their news — including the offices of the newspaper of the Mexican Communist Party, El Machete, and of the party headquarters itself on Mesones Street. There were magazines galore at the heart of this new political dreaming and agitation — El Libertador, the organ of the Anti-Imperialist League of the Americas, which began to circulate in Mexico in early 1925 and whose pages (illustrated by the Communist mural painter Diego Rivera) chronicled popular struggles throughout the Americas. The choice of the magazine’s title, The Liberator with its clear echoes of Bolivar, was very telling.

There were smaller, less-ambitious bulletins and newsletters targeted at particular countries: these included Cuba Libre, the organ of the Association of Newly Emigrated Cuban Revolutionaries (Asociación de Nuevos Emigrados Revolucionarios Cubanos, Anerc) founded by Julio Antonio Mella in January 1928 and which had branches in other radical Cuban diasporas — in New York and Paris, for example. Magazines and newspapers, often small in size and circulation, many of them enjoying an irregular existence, played an enormously important role in sustaining these transnational networks, binding Mexico to many other sites in the Americas and beyond. This radical print culture provided channels for communication among scattered activists and intellectuals as well as networks that were used to supply moral and material solidarity for popular struggles.

The reference to Cuban exile cells in Paris and New York is a reminder that the revolutionary diaspora gathered together in Mexico was one link, albeit a very important one, in an expanding transnational network of radical activists and insurgent intellectuals — “deracinated mobile identities,” to use Antoinette Burton’s phrase — who practiced a mobile form of contentious politics in which they slid or, more often, were pushed, across national boundaries, driven by economic need, ideological fervor, the desire for revolutionary adventure and, usually, the repressive actions of police and armies. These peripatetic individuals were animated by the radical ideas that they disseminated through articles, pamphlets and manifestos and via public meetings, demonstrations and activist conferences as well as

The Nicaraguan revolutionary Augusto César Sandino (center) en route to Mexico.
by founding new political parties and organizations. Their behaviors constitute what the Argentinian scholar Martin Bergel has felicitously called “a militant travelling culture.” The new cartography of resistance in Mexico City revolved around more than the politics of publication and public gathering. Many of the young men and women I’ve already mentioned (the Venezuelans, Mella, several Peruvian revolutionaries) came to share a house in central Mexico City that they soon discovered had historical associations with the life of “The Liberator,” Simón Bolívar. The Peruvian historian, Ricardo Melgar Bao, has noted that:

Chance allowed these exiles to sacralize one of the settings in the utopia which they had chosen as their country of residence. It happened that in Mexico City they discovered a large old colonial house where Simón Bolívar, the Liberator, had lived for a short while and which bore the name of the hero. The impact of this discovery was enormous for the Venezuelan exiles who, according to Eduardo Machado, decided to move to the house, together with exiles from other countries, thereby latinamericanizing Bolivar’s home in the middle of the 1920s.

And from another source: “Salvador de la Plaza, Gustavo Machado and I occupied the first floor along with the Peruvian Jacobo Hurwitz. On the second floor were Julio Antonio Mella, [his wife] Oliva Zandivar, Carlos Aponte Hernández and Bartolomé Ferrer (more Venezuelans).”

Reconstructing this long-forgotten world of exiled radical networks reminds us of how transnational a phenomenon the Mexican Revolution was. If we limit our engagement with Mexican history to developments unfolding within the borders of the nation state we will be missing all kinds of fascinating, and often unexpected, ways in which Mexican history was shaped by connections and border crossings that linked the country to the Americas as a whole.

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In 1325, Tenochtitlan was founded on an island in the lowest depression of a basin without natural outlets through which the excess water of the rainy season and the multiple rivers in the area could drain away. Because of the region’s geographic and climatic features, effective management of the water was, and continues to be, vital for the city’s very existence.

The body of knowledge developed during the pre-Hispanic era to manage water entailed a complex combination of religious practices and technical skills that allowed for a meaningful relationship to that particular environment. Under this paradigm, lake water was central to the lives of the region’s indigenous peoples.

The conquest of 1521 meant a complete break from this model, first because of the destruction of the city and, later, because of the general neglect of the indigenous hydraulic system. Beginning with this rupture, colonial texts reflect several tendencies regarding the integration (or lack thereof) of Indian knowledge of the basin’s waters. It is this aspect of colonialism that I would like to address here: the fact that it puts into contact and administers, at will, forms of knowledge of diverse genealogy and morphology. In one stroke, colonialism as a historical force renders forms of knowledge and practice inadequate, simply because they are unfamiliar or because they have been produced by peoples recently transformed into a labor force.

Here, I will discuss the ways in which indigenous water knowledge could be (and can be) articulated in different colonial and postcolonial projects. I will not delve into all of them, but I would like to mention a few. One of these is the exclusionary paradigm from the university, whose members, whenever they wrote about water, even well into the 18th century, based their observations on Aristotle, Hippocrates and Pliny, never seeming to contemplate the possibility that there existed a similar corpus among the conquered population. From this perspective, Indian knowledge did not exist, and the lakes were mere unpleasant markers of Mexico City’s boundaries.

Outside of this context, although from another important colonial institution, the research projects undertaken by priests such as Diego Durán and Bernardino de Sahagún inscribed knowledge about water within an anthropological perspective, which in many instances attempted to understand the indigenous systems on their own terms. Nevertheless, these texts aimed to preserve a memory of the past, while at the same time disassociating the rites and customs they presented from contemporary practices. These writings are the main sources of knowledge on Tláloc, the water deity in whose complex and varied representations, festivals and rituals, knowledge about water and the means to manage it were articulated.

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City of Lakes: Searching for Pantitlan
by Ivonne del Valle

Following pages: La Gran T ecochtitlán.
(© 2010 Banco de México Diego Rivera Frida Kahlo Museums Trust, Mexico, D.F / Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York.)
Due to the changing living conditions (erosion caused by cattle, for example) and the neglect of the hydraulic system, colonial Mexico City suffered constant floods from very early on. Finally, in 1607, after a severe flood, the authorities opted for drainage, a radical solution proposed since the first floods of the 16th century.

For most of the 17th century, Jesuits, Franciscans and Mercedarians were in charge of the public works related to water management. Despite being the groups most intimately in contact with Indian knowledge, except for on rare occasions — I will talk about one of them in a bit — the friars, in their roles as technicians and engineers in charge of the hydraulic works, did not refer to the existence of an Indian base of water knowledge. In fact, they committed themselves to the drainage plan, a system contrary to the pre-Hispanic one that their convents jealously preserved in chronicles and ethnographic accounts.

In addition to the dramatic changes drainage brought to the region (imagine a small island surrounded by water in the space now occupied by Mexico City), this decision is relevant because Enrico Martínez, one of its principal promoters, presented it as a product of discerning between genuine knowledge and inadequate or picturesque technical skills. In his dispute with Adrian Boot, an expert brought to Mexico City from Europe to help solve the flooding problems, Martínez asserted that drainage had to be the best option, considering that Boot’s proposal consisted of reviving the measures that the Indians had utilized for centuries. Thus, implicit in the drainage plan is the notion that in order to have any chance of being seriously considered, the knowledge employed must be something other than indigenous *techne*.

With drainage, a new body of knowledge emerged in the form of historical-technological archives put together by the city’s government as it attempted to respond to the question of how such an environment could be managed. Here, an important transformation took place. The multifaceted indigenous
system that addressed the contingencies of the environment was reduced in the archives to an almost mythological evocation: “Pantitlan,” the name-metaphor of a body of technical-religious knowledge converted into a fetish, a final solution that would bring an end to the flooding.

In the historical record created by friars and indigenous chroniclers, Pantitlan, a natural drain or sinkhole in the middle of Lake Texcoco, was one of the sites where human sacrifices and offerings to the water deities, along with what one might presume were technical interventions, took place. Unfortunately, by the beginning of the 17th century, there remained no reliable trace of Pantitlan’s location. The rumor of its existence persisted, however, and was kept alive by those who wished to avoid the huge expense of creating a drainage system. The Jesuit priest Francisco Calderón was among those who believed in the existence of Pantitlan, and he convinced the Viceroy to fund search parties to find it.

The irony expressed at the end of the 17th century by Carlos de Sigüenza y Góngora, one of the leading intellectual figures of New Spain, is an indication of the success of Calderón’s efforts. Writing in 1692, after another rainy season that had threatened yet more flooding, Sigüenza y Góngora poked fun at those who were still thinking about Pantitlan. One of the search expeditions had returned after having found not a drain, but a fountain, a fact that would be a laughable matter, he wrote, were it not that affairs of the utmost “seriousness” depended on it, which gave the incident a tragic turn.

I would like to conclude this brief recollection of how Pantitlan appears in drainage-related documents with what was said in 1748 by a member of the city government. In case Pantitlan did exist, he pointed out, “it would be in name only, because the slime of more than two centuries would have clogged the drain, and it would not be possible to find it, nor to make it function.” This statement presents a crude, though probably accurate, evaluation of the effects of more than 200 years of colonization. In any case, it serves as a double metaphor that accepts the possible existence of an alternative way to proceed with the water at the same time that it recognizes
Behind the Pristine City...
When I first lived on a rocky cliff of the Alto do Cruzeiro, a hillside shantytown in the sugar plantation zone of Brazil in the mid-1960s, sharing a tiny wattle and daub hut with a railroad worker and his wife, we had to make do sans electricity, running water, sanitation, sewers — without any amenities to speak of. I marveled how, through the torrid heat of summer and the torrential rains of winter, the 5,000 odd squatters living cheek by jowl did not stink. Not badly, anyway. Nor did their huts stink. To be sure, the few outdoor pit latrines stank to high heaven, and necessary nocturnal visits to the pits were softened with the help of lemons and guava fruit split in half and worn like a clown’s nose. But most offensive to the keen olfactory sensibilities of the people of the Alto was the giant mound of garbage dumped at the bottom of the hill awaiting weekly pick up. By Sunday night, the dump crawled with rats, giant cockroaches and the ominous gathering tribes of urubu or black vultures. The birds circled overhead, adding their odiferous scent, the catinga-de-urubu to the mix. The primitive viaducts that carried waste water from the Alto to the local river also

About 1,400 trash pickers are given access to Jardim Gramacho’s spoils.
reeked, but not nearly as badly as the stench that oozed from street drains in the most elegant sections of Recife, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador and São Paulo.

Human detritus, like death, is a great social equalizer. Those born and raised in shantytowns, shack cities and squatter’s camps the world over (but especially in Brazil) develop a magnificent economy of the body. They learn to exist and move about in a compact fashion that makes community life endurable. In the Alto do Cruzeiro, the economic care of the self, care of the body, was raised to an art form. My neighbors taught me how to take daily baths from a one-liter can of water. Water was, next to food, the most precious commodity as it had to be collected from the public water spigot and carried up the hillside in two gallon cans on the heads of women and children. Water equals life itself, and a common graffito painted on the walls of the drought-plagued município was a reference to the words of Jesus dying on the cross: “Estou com sede!” — “I thirst.” What a liter of water couldn’t resolve was taken care of with a few dabs of inexpensive cologne — “Miss France” was a favorite among women of the Alto. [“You smell like my maid,” a son of a sugar plantation owner once told me as we danced the frevo during Carnival celebrations at the local Sport Club.]

Trash/Waste

According to the Brazilian Census Bureau or IBGE, Brazil produces some 125,281 tons of household waste every day. The majority of Brazil’s 5,500 municipalities dispose of their city’s domestic waste in public dumps, many of them landfills. Another IBGE survey found that one in every thousand Brazilians is a garbage picker. Some work in the same municipal dump; others roam from city to city as urban scavengers/hustlers/dumpster
diers. Some are self-employed independents, while others are employed by junkyard dealers. “Você é lixo!” (You are garbage!), or worse, “Your mother is a rag picker!” are some of the cruel taunts that Brazil’s tens of thousands of catadores have to live and sometimes to die with. The struggle to shake off and to resist the stigma-by-association with trash (“We are not pickers; we are actually recyclers.”) is no easy task. The association of the pickers with the hated vultures that also circle the giant garbage dumps is too immediate, too obvious.

Garbage is the shadow side of production/productivity. “Two kinds of trucks leave the factory yards every day — one kind of truck proceeds to the warehouses and department stores, and the other one goes to the rubbish heap,” observes Zygmunt Bauman in *Wasted Lives: Modernity and Its Outcasts*. We, the discriminating consumers of the former and the proud producers of the latter, prefer to be oblivious to our quotidian ecological mindlessness. Public dumps reveal what is normally hidden: our slovenly, wastrel habits. The garbage producers of the world, those of us who live far from the dumps, are not privy to the daily scenes of giant bulldozers spewing out their indiscriminate cargo of our domestic waste — plastics and paper; foodstuffs: raw, cooked and rotten; toxins: electronic and human.

“Waste Land” — The Film

“Lixo Extraordinário” — misleadingly translated as “Waste Land” rather than the more accurate “Spectacular Trash” — is a majestic and breathtaking full-length documentary film co-directed by Lucy Walker, Karen Harley and João Jardim.

Released in the United States just in time for the 2010 Thanksgiving weekend, it premiered at a special event hosted by UC Berkeley’s Center for Latin American Studies. The audience was stunned, and at its close, there was that moment of suspended silence before a thundering applause. “Waste Land” arrived trailing clouds of glory, including several international film festival awards; rave reviews in *The New York Times*, *The Village Voice* and *The Hollywood Reporter*; and many insider bets on an Oscar nomination for best documentary film of 2010.

“Waste Land” is a visual and narrative extravaganza, filling the big screen with incredibly beautiful, wide-angle views of monster dumpsters and monstrous vultures circling Jardim Gramacho, a dump on the outskirts of Duque de Caxias, a rough working-class town just north of Rio de Janeiro, constantly replenished with migrants from Brazil’s impoverished Northeast. Many of my anthropological informants’ children from Timbauba and the Alto do Cruzeiro now live in Duque de Caxias, and several of the
characters in the documentary speak with the distinctive accent of Northeast Brazil.

Jardim Gramacho is Latin America's largest municipal dump. Viewed from above, it is transformed into an obscenely beautiful anthill invaded by a constant parade of tiny figures climbing and descending the mound, each carrying a treasure trove of recyclables. Each picker has his or her specialization — colored glass, carnival regalia, pipes, electronic parts, clothing, torn and discarded books. It is an orderly and mannered ritual of salvage, rebirth and renewal. That the scene of so much daily struggle is so seamlessly transformed by the filmmakers into a beautiful human ballet is a bit disconcerting, even for Vik Muniz, the photographer at the center of the film, who awkwardly refers to his living, breathing, passionate and heart-breaking subjects as “the human factor,” as if they were a somewhat resistant, amazing, inscrutable and unpredictable clump of clay in the sculptor’s hands. “Waste Land” is built around two settings — the cosmopolitan world of artists, their patrons, collectors, galleries, museums and auctions in Rio, New York and London and the everyday life of the garbage pickers of Gramacho, who, when they are not scavenging in the dump, live in a nearby workers’ compound of shacks made from scrap materials.

The film opens with Muniz, a Brazilian photographer and visual artist, whose artistic mediums had been mundane found objects — sugar, chocolate syrup, electrical outlets, arrows, magnifying glasses, peanut butter — explaining his new obsession with garbage. There are early clips of the artist as a young man, recently escaped from his tough working-class neighborhood in the periphery of greater São Paulo. His flight to New York City followed a close call with a bullet meant for someone else. He drops his pants to show the scar. “And that’s why I am here today,” he says of himself, his art and this film.

Now, moderately successful and moderately well off, Muniz is ready to return to Brazil to pursue his dream of exploring the infinite possibilities for material, human and artistic transformation. His vision is to launch an artistic and social experiment around garbage and the lives of those who make a living from it, and along the way to “mudar a vida,” to change the lives of the pickers. Muniz says he wants “to give something back” to Brazil and to give the pickers a glimpse of another life — a shinier, cleaner life — beyond the dump. The hubris of the artist to have it all is evident — art, fame and a revolutionary or at least a revolutionizing politic. Humans, like the garbage, are there to be transformed.

Muniz is the vehicle for filmmaker Lucy Walker, who accompanies the artist to Gramacho to discover what the pickers are all about. And because Brazil is Brazil and because “Deus é Brasileiro” (God is Brazilian), we are not

Below: Muniz compares Magna’s photo and portrait. Following page: “The Gypsy Magna.” (Photo by Vik Muniz.)

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Rubbish People
too surprised by the richness of the “human factor” that the artist stumbles upon. Through Muniz, we meet the real artists in this film — hunger artists, survival artists, balancing artists. We meet the likes of Isis, Zumbi, Tião, Valter, Irmã, Magna and Suelem, all of them graceful, beautiful, articulate, high minded and as bright as our average undergraduate students. What are these people doing shoveling through smoldering and toxic waste in a dump that resembles a scene from Dante’s Purgatory? What professor wouldn’t give a fortune to have Zumbi or Tião in a graduate seminar? To observe them lapping up not just the trashed and trashy books recovered from the dump alongside the odd copy of a classic — Machiavelli’s *The Prince*, its cover torn off, many of its pages missing — but also Machado de Assis, Gabriel Márquez, Giorgio Agamben or maybe a bit of Foucault, Deuze or Derrida. You know that they’d devour what parts of it they could get and tell you point blank whether they thought it was bullshit or not. These survival artists are full of dignity and honor, despite the constant reminders of their shame, as when Isis turns up her nose to imitate the bus passengers who dare to notice the faint whiff of the dump on her body.

If the IBGE stats are correct and one of every thousand Brazilians is a catador, maybe ten of every thousand pickers are as fascinating, compelling and photogenic as the characters that Muniz and company have rounded up, capturing them both at ease and anxious, playful and sad, hopeful and literally down in the dumps. There is a confessional quality to the stories as the pickers share their dashed dreams, their love affairs gone awry, their wit and their wits. Muniz opens one kind of door for them, at least fleetingly transforming them through his photographic wizardry into kings, queens and dictators for a day. And so we see the hapless Suelem posed with her two children and turned into the image of a Renaissance Madonna. Zumbi is transformed into Millet’s “Sower.” And best of all, handsome Tião is posed languishing in a stained bathtub, producing a stunning facsimile of Jacques-Louis David’s “Death of Marat,” only this Marat is floating in a sea of plastic bottles and abandoned toilet seats.

Zumbi learns to read with books tossed away by Rio’s bourgeoisie, just as an earlier literary catador, Carolina Maria de Jesus, wrote her memoir *Quarto de Despejo* (*Child of the Dark*) in the 1950s on bits of scrap paper and newsprint she had gathered from São Paulo’s public dumps.

Irma feeds the pickers hearty rib stews and soup made from bones and bits of leftovers, spoiled meats and greens thrown out by the well-fed, a Brazilian version of the Russian fairy tale, “Stone Soup.” “No one here goes hungry because of me,” she says proudly. Nothing is wasted. But of course the pickers are perennially hungry. During a protest in front of city hall led by Zumbi, Tião and the pickers of Gramacho,
someone calls for a hunger strike. “Yes, sure,” replies one of the other demonstrators, “but not until after I have my lunch at noon.”

Before the film ends, we are able to witness Tião’s improbable journey to London with Muniz where his portrait is sold at auction for a modest $50,000, which is donated by the artist to Zumbi’s workers’ cooperative. And we get to vicariously experience the length and breadth of the visit across town, but also across submerged cultures and histories, as the garbage pickers attend the opening of Muniz’s exposition of his garbage project at the Museu de Arte Moderna in Rio. As the pickers, dressed in their somewhat tawdry finery, enter the museum to see the transformed images of themselves hanging on the walls, they are clearly delighted and proud. But Irma, for one, cannot always decipher herself in the photographs. Another one of the pickers comments: “Sometimes we see ourselves as so small, but people out there see us as so big, so beautiful.” Later, when Muniz delivers smaller prints to hang on the fragile walls of his subjects’ shacks, a few of them struggle to hide their disappointment. “How did I [my painting] become so small this time?” Irma comments as Muniz tries to bang a hole in the thin plywood wall of her home as the assembled children and/or grandchildren look on, not terribly impressed.

In the end, what can we say about Vik Muniz’s social project? Has he managed to “change poor peoples lives” through his engagement with a half-dozen garbage pickers? Muniz’s former wife has one of the best and most soul-searching moments in the film when she raises her doubts. Can you really know what impact this project will have on people for whom you are, in a sense, lifting a curtain to a very different life outside? Can they really escape the dump, or will they have to confront, on a daily basis, everything that has had to be submerged to make life there minimally livable? Will they be able to retain their pride? Their vitality as they fight their way up the mountains of refuse, these disposables of the late-modern Brazilian miracle?

Nancy Scheper-Hughes is a professor of Anthropology at UC Berkeley. “Waste Land” was screened by CLAS on November 10, 2010.

Isis and Valeria.
the impossibility of utilizing it. I want to suggest that, at least in reference to documents about Mexico City, this air of having finally triumphed, not in the form of a supposed Baroque synthesis, but instead in the recognition of the indigenous world as an abated and impenetrable remainder, permeates much of the production of an 18th century.

Pantitlan was never found, and drainage has been the approach used since 1607. One can say that the Gran Canal — inaugurated in 1900 during the Porfiriato, when it was announced that the drainage system was finally completed — was but another milestone in a continuum that persists through today with the construction of the deep-drainage system (Drenaje Profundo), built in the 1970s, and the Eastern Collector (Canal Emisor de Oriente), which will be inaugurated in 2012. Each new measure has promised to end the threat of large-scale flooding once and for all. These projects can be seen as a series of attempts to domesticate something that resists being tamed. They are also an invitation to seriously contemplate the ever-expanding monster that exists below the city’s subsoil, without which the city would not be viable, but because of which the problems and threats multiply, such as the possible rupture of one of the enormous subterranean pipes, the sinking of the city and the vulnerability of water-depleted soils to seismic activity.

I don’t think it is a coincidence that historical and ethnographic studies on indigenous water knowledge have been revived precisely during the construction of new drainage works, especially since the 1970s. In a dramatic reversal, in recent years the work of the university has been to safeguard practices and know-how on the verge of being dismantled by modern technology. Owing to this effort, Indian water knowledge is currently being revitalized in at least two spaces. The first is the work undertaken by anthropologists and historians interested in preserving forms of knowledge ostensibly in danger of being lost. The second is the series of projects by architects, urban planners and scientists who in one way or another, and making reference to the religious and indigenous archives of the 16th century, propose a “return” to the city of lakes, in other words, to overturn the drainage paradigm either by re-flooding the desolate area surrounding what remains...
of Lake Texcoco or by liberating the rivers that have been channeled into the drainage system.

Nevertheless, one must ask, in what way can the university articulate, and not simply archive, the knowledge of those who practice the now “minor” knowledge, who in villages and towns at the foot of the volcanoes in central Mexico, continue interpellating, on another scale and with objectives distinct from those of the pre-Hispanic sorcerers, the gods of water? Another question is whether this preservation is even possible in the face of a technological system that is in opposition to it.

To conclude, let me return to the recognition in the 18th century of the accumulation of slime over Pantitlan, which had undermined technological practices, distorting them beyond recognition after subjugating them for many years. Although much has changed, what remains is the problem of what can be done now with knowledge produced to manage the water of an area that at the moment of conquest had, at most, 2 million inhabitants, and which now — and to a great degree thanks to the expulsion of the water achieved at the beginning of the 20th century — is home to nearly 22 million. In what sense can this knowledge not be condemned, by a simple question of magnitude, to being but an interesting piece of information in the accumulation of historical knowledge or a quaint reminder of a time that is evoked for tourists in Xochimilco but is no longer a coherent and organic possibility? Yet it seems to me that its existence must continue to be proposed as a counterpoint to a developmentalist technology that lacks the capacity for self-reflection. To properly address the historical events that brought about the depreciation of this knowledge, we ought to insist on the colonial character of the relationships I delineate here. This exercise is indispensable for various reasons, among them the need to return to a moment when a decision was possible, when in the history of water management it would have been feasible to choose A, B or C, in order to understand what was at stake in the philosophical or ideological posture that underlay each one of those options.

Ivonne del Valle is a professor of Spanish and Portuguese at UC Berkeley. She spoke for CLAS on September 13, 2010.
The increased frequency and intensity of social, ecological and financial crises underscore a complex set of challenges facing the modern global system. Environmental degradation and climate change have called into question models of industrial development that rely on deforestation, non-renewable resource extraction and increasing carbon emissions to fuel growth. For much of the world’s population, water stress, loss of livelihoods and social and cultural upheaval have become hallmarks of everyday life. These challenges have caused policy makers, financial institutions and civil society actors to increasingly turn their attention towards sustainability.

Such complex socio-ecological problems are at the forefront of Paz Gutierrez’s research on sustainable technology innovation. For Gutierrez, a professor of Architecture at UC Berkeley, the critical question is one of “repositioning ourselves” with respect to resources in order to sustain the world’s population and ecosystems. She argues for a fundamental shift in the way in which materials are conceived and utilized in the making of the built environment.

In her CLAS talk, Gutierrez laid out an approach to architectural research and practice that contrasts strikingly with traditional architectural thought, which “tends to think in terms of designing things as independent entities.” She used the term “resourcing resources” to characterize this broad-based and interdisciplinary approach to sustainable building technology. The scale and scope of today’s socio-ecological pressures require a rethinking of the relationship between the organic and inorganic world. In essence, she argued that architectural design must “work with nature” and not attempt to resist the natural world.

Nowhere have the negative consequences of industrial development been felt more acutely than in the developing world. In order to visually depict the uneven geographical distribution of socio-ecological vulnerability, Gutierrez presented a series of maps showing projected increases...
in water stress, biodiversity loss and energy demand. By 2030, developing countries will use five times the energy of the developed world, the vast majority of which could come from non-renewable resources if alternatives are not actively sought. By the same year, 70 percent of the world’s population will likely be affected by water stress, with the most extreme cases occurring in developing regions.

Gutierrez’s current work focuses on the developing world, in particular Latin America. Her own experience growing up travelling between South America and Europe has shaped her thinking, not only about environmental issues but also about the unequal social and cultural contexts in which sustainability challenges unfold. Moving between different worlds caused her to think about the contrasts between the “bounty of the living world” and the everyday “struggles to access resources that occur in marginalized spaces.”

While working for a corporate firm in the United States, Gutierrez suffered a crisis of confidence. Concerned about the inaccessibility of sustainable design innovation at the community level, she resigned her position. Fortunately, she was hired on as a consultant by the same firm. This allowed her to focus on using “high-end” technologies for community-based projects and to pursue broader approaches to sustainable innovation. This position has also allowed her to pursue academic research and teaching, most recently at UC Berkeley, where she established a research group comprised of architects, scientists and engineers, called Bioms, or Bio Input Onto Material Systems.

Addressing the problems of increasing population, diminishing land access and higher energy consumption requires interaction across academic disciplines. Taking such a collaborative approach has placed Gutierrez at the cutting edge of sustainable architecture. Under her leadership, the Bioms project recently landed a $2 million National Science Foundation grant for research on sustainable building technologies for developing regions.

The Bioms group is developing prototypes for thermal energy management, gray-water reuse and waste recycling, among other innovations. The project operates according to
Sustainable Architecture

three fundamental principles. First, all stakeholders must be brought to the design table at the earliest stages of project development. Second, project materials must be adapted to their environment. Third, design problems must be addressed at multiple scales, from the geologic to the nano.

Responding to the social, cultural and physical factors associated with environmental pressures is central to the goals of Bioms. According to Gutierrez, in considering ideas for prototype development, she “always chooses worst-case scenarios.” The Andean Altiplano, with its combination of extreme water stress, abundance of sun and cold nighttime temperatures, provides a case in point.

For this region, Bioms is working on a project that utilizes solar power to disinfect gray-water for use in floor heating systems.

During her talk, Gutierrez discussed three projects in detail, all of which focus on employing material bio-responsiveness to address socio-ecological problems. The first project is engaged in creating deployable housing for flood-prone regions. In Latin America, many of the areas at high risk for flooding are heavily populated. Poor infrastructure and poor resource-management practices often exacerbate flood problems in these regions. Gutierrez and her research team are working to design structures that can be shipped and set up easily in times of crisis. In order to combine the advantages of a tent (i.e., lightweight and breathable) and a pneumatic structure (i.e., durable for the long term), they searched for materials that could be used for cooling and dehumidifying purposes in hot, humid climates.

Here, as in all of her work, Gutierrez looked to nature for models of efficiency to incorporate into her architectural design. In nature, insects are among the best equipped to identify comfort zones in places where high temperatures meet standing water, as in flooded areas. The team thus developed a dehumidification membrane that incorporates micro-lenses based on insects’ eyes to detect natural light. The micro-lenses allow team members to create pores in the material that open and close depending on heat and humidity levels. They hope to have the prototype field tested and ready to be deployed within three years.

The second project looks to integrate agricultural surpluses and the reduction of plastic waste into the creation of building materials. Research has focused on the development of a sugar-based polymer that can achieve a level of transparency and refraction equivalent to that of glass. The goal is to create materials that are biodegradable and have the potential for less energy-intensive production. The project exemplifies the kind of “re-thinking of material resources to capitalize on the flows of nature” that Gutierrez called for in her introductory remarks.

Researchers on this project have also taken into account the role that agricultural commodity subsidies play in the global economy and the environmental effects of these agro-industries. Heavily subsidized commodities such as corn and sugar are increasingly being used for ethanol, with significant environmental and social implications. The project is working with sugar because sugar ethanol involves lower carbon emissions than its corn-based counterpart. Gutierrez noted that, while water use remains a concern in sugar production and processing, it still has significant advantages.

The project team hopes to harness the potential of this alternative fuel technology to develop wall systems that are opaque on one side and transparent on the other, with the ability to refract light and control thermal conductivity.
A final project attempts to simultaneously address development issues and shoreline inundation, using salt water as an “asset for energy efficiency.” There are two types of shoreline ecologies vulnerable to inundation — salt marshes in temperate climates and mangroves in tropical zones. Rising sea levels have increased the risk of flooding, particularly for those who rely on coastal ecosystems for their livelihoods, such as fishing communities. Such communities are also among the most susceptible to development pressures, as on the Chilean coast where the project is focused.

In this case, rising marine water could potentially be diverted into salt ponds, where it could be desalinated using solar energy. Such technology could serve the dual goals of increasing freshwater supply and energy production to power high-density development. Of course, the downsides to desalination remain a concern, given the production of contaminants and the potential to harm ecosystems that it entails. Nevertheless, Gutierrez argued that it is important to work towards developing technologies that will, over time, significantly reduce our dependence on non-renewable resources.

Gutierrez concluded by underscoring the importance of community involvement in sustainable technology design. Architects must be aware of the social and cultural conditions in which they work, conditions that are largely forgotten when working at the “high-end” of sustainability innovation. When asked to elaborate on the project’s engagement with communities, Gutierrez noted that this component of the project is still being developed. In the coming year, she plans to spend several months working with communities in Latin America to evaluate how efforts in the lab connect with on-the-ground realities. Gutierrez noted that her past experience working in the United States had provided a valuable lesson in the critical importance of community involvement. In a fight with the Philadelphia School District over the use of experimental sugar-based materials for floor construction, community support tipped the scales in favor of approval for the project. Gutierrez hopes that her work in Latin America will engender the same level of support.

Paz Gutierrez is a professor of Architecture in the College of Environmental Design and the founder of the Bioms research group. She spoke for CLAS on November 8, 2010.

Sandy Brown is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Geography at UC Berkeley.
Latin America’s Cleantech Future

by Christian E. Casillas

In spite of being flush with renewable energy resources, Latin America has attracted little cleantech investment relative to global trends. Worldwide, investment in the clean-energy sector has remained high over the past several years, despite the economic downturn. According to the United Nations Environmental Programme’s *Global trends in sustainable energy investment 2010*, roughly $162 billion was spent on clean energy in 2009, and estimates suggest that spending in 2010 will be closer to a record $200 billion. Yet only 10 percent of new financial sector investments in 2009 occurred in South America, most of them (67 percent) in Brazil, Latin America’s cleantech leader.

Dr. Luis Aguirre-Torres would like to see these investment trends in Latin America change. The CEO and president of GreenMomentum, a California firm dedicated to understanding and promoting clean-energy investments in Latin America, Aguirre-Torres recently moderated the panel “Cleantech Outlook in Latin America” at UC Berkeley’s Haas School of Business. The inaugural event for the student initiative “Renewable Energy Latin America” drew close to 100 students and professionals looking for insight into Latin America’s cleantech future.

According to panelist Adam Mendelson, a manager for Sunpower, companies develop projects where profit margins are largest. In the case of the solar industry, which has seen installed capacity grow by an average of 60 percent per year since 2004, margins are greatest where government policies allow solar to compete with conventional generation sources, such as coal, nuclear or large hydro power.

Europe has been a hot spot for solar investment, with generous feed-in tariff policies that provide guaranteed grid access and long-term price contracts. In contrast, as of 2009, the only Latin American countries with feed-in...
tariffs were Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Nicaragua, and most of these programs were limited in scope. Argentina provides a premium of $0.23/kilowatt-hour (kWh) for solar photovoltaics in addition to the regulated electricity price. This is much less attractive than the feed-in tariffs offered by a number of European countries which range from $0.40 to $0.65/kWh.

Although feed-in tariffs are arguably among the most effective policies, there are many alternatives, such as quotas, capital subsidies, tax credits, net metering, favorable financing and public competitive bidding. Mandated quotas, or renewable portfolio standards, are used in the United States, and have been adopted by Chile and Uruguay. Chile recently passed a standard requiring that 5 percent of new generation contracts come from renewable energy sources, increasing to 10 percent by 2024. Developers will only receive government financial support for feasibility studies, however, which account for a small percentage of a project’s total cost.

Despite its relatively few subsidies, Chile’s excellent solar resources have spurred the development of a 1 megawatt (MW) solar plant in Calama, a city in the Atacama Desert. This project will be notable for being the largest solar installation in South America, having the highest rate of energy production per installed capacity in the world and being the first industrial-scale solar plant built without subsidies. The Calama project notwithstanding, Mendelson remained doubtful that continued investment growth would occur without sufficient subsidies.

Mexico and Brazil provide examples of the success that can result when governments combine a number of policy approaches. Following the oil crisis of 1973, Brazil sought to reduce the dependence of its transportation sector on imported oil. It now has over 30 years of demonstrated success, with 50 percent of its gasoline demand displaced by ethanol derived from sugarcane. Although Brazil’s land and climate provide a comparative advantage for high sugarcane yields, the transformation would not have occurred without direct subsidies, tax preferences, protective tariffs and government mandates, leading to the evolution of one of the most efficient production systems for ethanol on the planet.

According to Richard Chow, president of the geothermal exploration company Thermasource, risk aversion and the scarcity of capital are additional barriers to cleantech investment in Latin America. Energy projects require enormous investments, Chow noted, ranging from hundreds of millions to billions of dollars. The frequency of natural disasters and political instability has likely also made investors reluctant to commit such large sums. In Latin America, private investment has historically taken a backseat to financing from international lenders, such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and country development banks.

The Export-Import Bank of the United States is an alternative lender stimulating cleantech investment south of the U.S.–Mexico border. The Ex-Im Bank takes on credit and financing risks that the private sector is unwilling to accept, targeting projects that create or maintain jobs in the United States. Earlier this year, it funded a 68 MW wind project in Oaxaca, Mexico. Clipper Wind, a California-based turbine manufacturer, benefitted from $80.66 million in direct loans for the project, which is the largest wind farm in Latin America to utilize U.S.-made turbines. Panelist Robert Guthrie of the Ex-Im Bank said that the loan was provided with extremely favorable conditions: a 13.5-year payback period and an interest rate of 3.85 percent. Most banks are unwilling to lend money to projects that have a timeline greater than 10 years, Guthrie pointed out, and interest rates are typically four times the lending rate for the Mexico project.

Guthrie believes that there are a number of factors that will result in a rapidly expanding cleantech sector in Mexico, not least of which is the country’s decreasing supply of oil. The United States is certain to be Mexico’s primary industrial partner in project development, given its close proximity and favorable trade regulations. Mexico has rich wind and geothermal resources. In fact, Mexico already has the fourth-largest installed capacity of geothermal generation in the world, with 960 GW, and the project in Oaxaca is located on one of the planet’s best wind sites. There are plans in the works for additional wind farms to be added in the same location.

Another factor holding back cleantech investment in Latin America is the hesitancy of companies to be among the first movers, Chow asserted. Risks manifest in foreign currency fluctuations, poorly enforced regulations, undeveloped business networks and the possibility of corruption. Because energy projects require significant infrastructure investment, Mendelson explained, they are not equivalent to just “moving money around.” Before a company like Sunpower becomes involved in a project, it needs to put in place a substantial amount of its own infrastructure and manufacturing capabilities, and it depends on favorable government policies.

The panelists seemed to be in agreement that once the roadblocks to financing are reduced and companies gain in-country experience, cleantech investment in Latin America could blossom. While the majority of global cleantech investments in 2009 went to wind (56 percent)
and solar (12 percent), Latin America also has abundant resources in biomass, hydro and geothermal energy. Chow explained that, in the western hemisphere, the so-called Pacific “ring of fire” extends from Alaska down to the tip of South America and is a hotbed of geothermal activity. Contrary to the intermittent nature of wind and solar generation, geothermal power can substitute for coal and hydro to fulfill baseload demand and has proven to be cost competitive with conventional production, without generation subsidies.

According to Chow, geothermal is a mature technology that has been shown to have minimal environmental impact. He argued that in countries such as Chile, the population’s experience with the mining industry complements geothermal production. Not only do local companies have substantial experience with resource extraction, but there is familiarity with permitting and regulating mineral resources, making geothermal a natural fit. However, while several projects are in the planning stages, the country does not yet have any geothermal production. Chow explained that even though Chile is home to excellent geothermal resources, firms rarely want to be the first to take on the upfront exploration and drilling costs needed to verify a site’s potential. Countries such as the U.S. and Iceland have found that government subsidies for exploration and drilling are critical for encouraging geothermal development.

Bill Mott of Agland Investment Services pointed out that the massive and growing transportation sector desperately needs low-carbon liquid fuels. He believes that second generation biofuels are right around the corner. These depend on new technologies for economically transforming high-cellulosic materials, such as sugarcane bagasse or fast-growing grasses, into ethanol. Mott said that Brazil already has a number of second-generation pilot projects, many of which are receiving money from both venture capitalists and oil companies. While Brazil continues to dominate ethanol production, Colombia, Peru and Ecuador are all producing biodiesel from African Palm. Mott maintained that the primary challenge faced by Latin American countries is figuring out how to produce at large scales and low costs.
Large-scale projects raise concerns, however. Along with large-scale hydro, the production of biofuels often brings environmental and social challenges, usually related to the magnitude at which these projects are implemented. Panelist Brian Orion, a lawyer from San Francisco who focuses on environmental law, noted that it is critical that the cleantech industry in Latin America be developed in a manner that adheres to existing legal statutes and provides adequate environmental protection.

While the panel’s primary focus was to explore how U.S. companies can capitalize on opportunities for cleantech investment in Latin America, Orion sought to add nuance to the discussion. He raised the question of how the development of cleantech markets might also benefit Latin American industrialization, preparing domestic companies to compete in external markets.

As if to drive home the need for a more balanced inquiry into the role of cleantech development in Latin America, one of the last questions of the night came from a Ph.D. student who had just returned from Brazil. There, he had witnessed local opposition to several wind projects, and he asked the panelists what role local communities and local politics will play in the development of the cleantech industry.

Mendelson, who previously worked for the Inter-American Development Bank and has also witnessed heated meetings related to the development of wind and solar projects, acknowledged that there will inevitably be winners and losers. One or two individuals may stand to benefit by renting land to a project, while the surrounding neighbors receive nothing but construction dust. These projects are never black and white, he argued. There is almost always some segment of the population that is left out. It is critical, however, that developers recognize the needs and realities of local stakeholders, Mendelson continued. He noted that in his work with Brazil’s National Development Bank, projects were required to set aside social funds that guaranteed a percentage of revenue for public goods such as community schools.

As the global economy regains momentum and technologies continue to mature, there is little doubt that within the next decade, international policies will be put in place to provide incentives for companies and nations to transition away from carbon-intensive fossil fuels. Increasing streams of revenue will also be available to developing countries through instruments such as the United Nation’s Clean Development Mechanism. Among the many stakeholders, from international investors to local community members, it remains to be seen who will be the winners and losers in the development of cleantech in Latin America.

The panel discussion “Cleantech Outlook in Latin America: Opportunities and Challenges for California Companies” was held at UC Berkeley’s Haas School of Business on November 16, 2010.

Christian Casillas is a Ph.D. student in UC Berkeley’s Energy and Resources Group.
Death Dealing in Guatemala City

by Anthony Fontes

The day I am to leave Guatemala City, I meet Guillermo at his home in Zone 3. A daughter answers the door — she has his deep set eyes and round face — and smiles shyly before hurrying upstairs to fetch her father. Juan, Guillermo’s protégé at the Ministry of Sports and Culture, sits on an overstuffed couch smoking a cigarette. “El mormon ha llegado!” he shouts. The Mormon has arrived. I am not certain how that became my nickname, but I am stuck with it.

Guillermo and Juan grew up in this neighborhood a generation apart. After running away from home at the age of eight, Guillermo lived on the streets, in and out of a local orphanage. At 14 he became the first leader of what would become a central clika of the 18th Street gang (M18), one of the two major transnational pandillas operating in every major Central American city. He has a round face and a round belly and looks older than his 39 years, though he often exhibits the energy of a child at play.

In the late 1990s, Juan transported drugs and money for the narcos who dominate Barrio Gallito, a subsection of Zone 3, until rivals shot him through the arm as he was delivering a backpack full of cash. For a time, he worked as a junior minister for an evangelical church. He can still entertain a crowd from the stage. Now, working with a laughable budget, the two men crisscross the capital and its dangerous suburbs promoting “peace initiatives”: community-based efforts to end the internecine warfare between rival gangs. Guillermo’s network of contacts in the underworld of gangs and prisons is vast, as is his reputation, and he manipulates both to push for solutions to the violence in those neighborhoods where “no one goes.”
I came to Guatemala to learn how the “epidemic of violence” sweeping across the country and metastasizing in its cities affects everyday life for the poor and what it looks like through the eyes of those doing the killing. For four weeks, I shadowed Guillermo and his crew in their work. It was a schizophrenic world of creaking bureaucratic machinery, a defunct and swollen prison system and encounters with the victims and the perpetrators of street violence. In the mornings, I drank sweet Nescafé in the marble-pillared National Palace and played chess with bored government functionaries. In the afternoons, we visited slum dwellings in the city dump, the families of the recently murdered and squatting colonies of street children huffing solvent.

Guillermo is a bridge between the logic of the streets and the rusted mechanisms of state power. He and his crew (composed primarily of an old friend from prison, a teetotalling 23-year-old and Juan) must navigate the bureaucracy of a government in fiscal crisis. I tagged along on various meetings with the “good works” committee, run under the auspices of First Lady Colom — painfully long, somnolent affairs, though the tea sandwiches were divine. Exercising true street wisdom, Juan always polished off the leftovers before the liveried servants carted them away. Seeing as how no one in their department had been paid in four months, this seemed appropriate.

In these meetings, the discussion turned on loads of concrete, light fixtures and event planning for parades in the capital’s blighted neighborhoods. Despite what seemed like good intentions, most, if not all, of the government officials at these meetings hadn’t a clue about the “situation on the ground” in the city’s most dangerous neighborhoods, which have become killing fields for a generation of youth in recent years.

It was Guillermo who spoke for the streets, though it was unclear whether his voice was heard.

But today — a brilliant, hot Saturday — is not for work. We drink beers and walk a few blocks to the national cemetery. Stepping through the metal gate holding up 25-foot walls of cracked yellow plaster, the rush and holler of the city streets fade quickly. Guillermo holds his daughter’s hand, and Juan signals to a cemetery worker, pant legs caked with mud and plaster. Pedaling a rickety bicycle, he leads us to the back of the cemetery, which borders the city dump. Hundreds of vultures perch in trees and on mausoleum roofs and crucifixes. Some take to the air as we approach, greasy wings creaking as they wheel above the trucks and bulldozers and the countless humans foraging in the trash-filled ravine. Our guide points at a concrete slab half covering what looks to be the opening of a well. Shading our eyes against the glare, we peer in. Somewhere in the darkness below are the disinterred remains of those who did not keep up with their payments. Guatemala City’s population has swollen to 3.5 million, and the cemetery’s authorities have long found it difficult to find space for the newly dead. In recent years, with the capital’s homicide rate peaking at around 109 per 100,000 — slightly behind Mexico’s notoriously violent Ciudad Juárez, which had a murder rate of 130 per 100,000 in 2009 — a plot in the national cemetery has become valuable indeed.
Juan steps away whispering a prayer and crossing himself. I linger until my eyes adjust, and I can see the rough plastic bags in a heap about 30 feet down. Sacks of dusted bone and decomposing flesh. Another low, cement olla sits nearby, sealed. The cemetery worker says it’s filled up already. I give him 10 quetzales, and he goes on his way. We walk away from the mass graves, past the discarded coffins lying among twisted rebar and concrete debris spilling down the slope and into the dump below.

Everyday Homicide

Violent death has become routine in Guatemala City. Officials estimate that 17 to 20 Guatemalans are murdered every day, this in a country of 12 million. The capital and its extensive suburbs form the epicenter of the homicidal violence. Accounts of the killings are smeared across the front pages of the major papers. Accompanied by graphic color photos, the murders are described in morbid but sparse detail: the sex, age and occupation of the victim; the assassins’ technique; and perhaps a description of the alleged killers and how they escaped (they nearly always escape). But journalists provide little beyond these cold facts. Reporters often collapse separate murders into a single article. A July 19, 2010, headline from La Prensa Libre, the newspaper of record according to the U.S. Press Secretary, reads “Two Massacres Leave 11 Dead.” In the closing sentences of the 150 word article, the writer names victims of unrelated homicides in San Benito, Petén and Ciudad Quetzal.

Day after day, such headlines greet readers all over the country. It is as if there is a war going on, and the newspapers are reporting the death toll. But just who the opposing armies are and what they are fighting for remains unknown. Newspapers are reporting the death toll. But just who the country. It is as if there is a war going on, and the police and judicial system have proved largely useless in combating the violence and impunity that have risen with such vigor since the end of Guatemala’s civil war. Only 2 percent of violent crimes committed in Guatemala are ever resolved and the perpetrators punished. The National Police Force, which was formed out of the shards of the civil war-era police as part of the 1996 peace accords, is known to be laughably incompetent and rampantely corrupt. According to some experts, 60 percent are in the pay of narcotraffickers — though mentioning this statistic to taxi drivers, day laborers and shopkeepers around the city center inevitably draws bitter laughs. “Pure bullshit! More like 99.9 percent.”

In any case, few Guatemalans put much faith in the authorities. Since the police lack the capacity to catch and punish the perpetrators of violence, the criminals and their motives remain mere ghosts, specters that haunt the collective social imagination. I am reminded of Phillip Gourevitch’s writings on the Rwandan genocide. “If everyone is implicated, then implication becomes meaningless.” In this case, the inverse is true. When no one can be implicated in daily slaughter, what meaning can be assigned to the recurring violence?

On July 20, 2010, three days before our visit, unknown gunmen shot and killed three people attending the wake of a murdered bus driver. The deceased was the victim of a new pattern of violence targeting urban transportation networks.

Since the introduction of a new bus system in early 2010 that uses a prepaid card rather than cash fares, there have been “terrorist attacks” on public busses across the country. But who is assassinating bus drivers and throwing grenades onto busses, and why? Is it some consortium of disgruntled bus drivers from the old system who have lost their jobs to the new one? Are they members of 18th Street or Marasalvatrucha, whose transportation extortion rackets have been severely curtailed by the introduction of prepaid cards? Or, is it a campaign of random violence pushed by occult powers to destabilize President Colom’s regime in the run-up to elections a year and a half from now?

The rationale behind the transport killings are difficult to discern, just as it is hard to understand why that violence spilled over into the funeral of one of its victims. Three men carrying handguns hid behind the mausoleums and fired nearly a dozen shots into the crowd of mourners.
The gunmen escaped through the stone alleys and out the adjoining dump. At the time of reporting, it was unknown whether their targets were relatives of the murdered bus driver or a man working for a private security firm who attempted to hide among the mourners. In any case, three people died. Those who know why will never tell. So it goes.

Death Dealing

I recount this story to Guillermo as we walk through the cemetery. He shrugs and shakes his head. People are murdered every day, and of course, much of the dying is concentrated among those who do the killing. Guillermo began living and fighting on these streets when he was eight years old, and he quickly rose high among those vying for respect and power in the city’s poorest quarters. Now, nearly everyone from his past life is dead. We walk down random corridors in the alleys of the dead, cubbyholed mausoleums rising up on both sides of the cracked cement aisles. Every several meters, Guillermo points out a plot belonging to a friend, a kid he knew on the streets, the son or daughter of a neighbor. Guillermo, usually so full of laughter, is quiet now, holding tightly to his daughter’s hand. We stop before a makeshift plot, the name etched roughly in the pitted cement. It belongs to the son of an old friend, a boy of 17 who got involved in the gangs and was shot down by a rival outfit. His plot number is scrawled in black paint over his name. Guillermo takes off his hat and lowers his head. I ask him how it is to visit these monuments to the dead. He is quiet for a moment and inhales deeply before replying.

I try to block it in my head and in my heart because, look, it’s really sad. There are people who walked through parts of my life. I had a friend who I knew since we were in the jail for orphans together... and he came with me to Mexico after the war. And the police came to where he was working and put bullets in him, and, oh God, my brother who has lived with me all my life, from one night to the morning is dead.

Guillermo closes his eyes and wipes sweat from his face with the back of his hand. “Better not to remember; better to block out their memory. That is what I try to do.”

But today, for my sake or for some unspoken reason, Guillermo is remembering. In one breath, he is mourning his lost loved ones and the senseless waste of life. In the next, he is telling a story of how he and his homeboys massacred a rival Marasalvatrucha gang as they mourned their dead leader. He tells it as if describing a scene in a movie: the homies gathered around the coffin, the dirt mounds and piles of flowers. As the body was lowered into the earth, the mourners fired bullets into the sky. Guillermo’s M18 gang was there too, burying one of their own. They heard the gunshots. Guillermo and his boys crept up among the tombstones, and on his signal, after their targets’ magazines were empty, he ordered the attack. It was a bloody day. They killed six and injured a dozen others.

Those were the days when, in his words, “nothing was of value” to him. When he could eat heartily of his cellmate’s dinner as the man sobbed in his plate because the police just shot his wife, who had brought the food, while she ran an
errand outside the prison. Skirmishes over drug transport routes, rights to street corners and extortion rackets were the bloody business that he and his crew engaged in daily. Another ex-gang member, Juan Antonio, who Guillermo helped escape from his former life, told me: “Killing is easy. When you shoot somebody, you don’t feel anything. But when you get shot, it’s different. You feel the pain.” I don’t believe I’ve ever heard anyone say that out loud—except perhaps James Gandolfini in the 1993 classic “True Romance.” He’s a hired killer, telling Patricia Arquette what it’s like to kill people. “Now I just do it to see their expression change.” But that’s the movies.

Is it the ever-present possibility of dying that makes killing banal for those living “la vida loca”? Though reliable mortality records for gang members and other perpetrators of violence do not exist, anecdotal evidence paints a picture of mass tit-for-tat slaughter. Seven years after leaving gang life, 29-year-old Juan Antonio claims that of his 90 compatriots in his former M-18 clika, only five are alive today. In his estimation, 40 percent were killed by rival gangs, 30 percent by the police and the other 30 percent by their own outfit. For most pandilleros, death seems to be the only exit from a life of killing.

**Killing Is Easy; Dying Is Hard**

For many city-dwelling Guatemalans, the extermination of criminal youth has become the most viable solution to the endemic violence. Day after day, in conversations with taxi drivers, waitresses and other working class Guatemalans, I heard the same phrases repeated. “The violence is tearing our lives apart. We need a strong hand to come down and clean up the streets.” “Criminals are parasites on society. If they aren’t worth anything, then why not terminate them?” In this logic, served up daily in the country’s conservative newspapers, the constitutional reforms and democratic changes that have taken place since the civil war ended in 1996 have only led to chaos. Civil rights only help delinquents escape punishment. Elections only allow politicians to steal from the country’s dwindling coffers. Among many city-dwellers, there is a deep sense of nostalgia for the days of the civil war. In that epoch, at least, you knew who the targets were and where the bombs would fall. The military offered an ordered violence against the chaos of revolution.

Today, the collective hope is that the generals might exact a similar punishment against the enemy within.

Of course, it was never so simple then, nor is it simple now. The threads connecting the past violence of the civil war to today’s exploding murder rates are both obvious and obscured. Members of the military who were discharged at the end of the civil war, according to many experts, are deeply involved in the illicit trade of drugs, international adoptions, mining and timber. Certain elements in Guatemala’s aristocracy hire gang members as sicarios—hit men—to threaten or kill human rights activists or factory workers attempting to organize unions. But all of this is unconfirmed rumor or well-known public secret, depending on who you talk to. At every level of society, there are those who feed off the death and fear caused by all this violence.

…

The light is waning, and I have a bus to catch. I am hesitant to leave, lingering, waiting for some elegiac conclusion to my time in Guatemala. We pause at the final resting place of one of Guillermo’s old friends. They had been pandilleros together before leaving that life, and his friend had started him in anti-violence work. Guillermo’s shoulders slump, and he closes his eyes. Aware that I am tearing at old wounds, I ask him how the man died.

“We had been working the whole day removing graffiti when two cars passed by… I usually stayed late to finish the job while he went home, but that day I wasn’t feeling well so he told me, ‘You go. I’ll stay and finish.’… and when I got in the car to go, a half block later—PA-PA-PA-PA-PA-PA. He nearly shouts the staccato gunfire. “I return, and I see him.” Guillermo convulses his body, mimicking the motion of an epileptic seizure. “I thought that he was alive, and I tried to stop the blood. But he was already dead. He was my brother… He showed me how to do the work I do today and be a good person. He was a good person. He was 29 when he died. One of the best people I ever knew. My daughters loved him very much. He was like an uncle.” He looks to his daughter, whose eyes are downcast. Juan, too, is silent.

“Was it a fight between the gangs?” I ask.

“No, it was the police who killed him.”

“The police?”

“The police didn’t want… Look, in that moment it was possible to stop the gangs and go back to something different… But that didn’t suit the police… because then they lose their support, the money they make. So it wasn’t convenient…”

We take a final picture together—Guillermo, Juan and I, flashing mock gang signs before the oversized mausoleum of some 19th-century general, all three of us grinning. But I am left with the image of Guillermo holding his friend’s body convulsing in his arms, the blood pumping away onto the pavement. The chance for some kind of peace, if it ever existed, lost in the now-distant past.

Anthony Fontes is a graduate student in the Department of Geography at UC Berkeley. He received a CLAS Robert & Alice Bridges Summer Research Grant to travel to Guatemala in 2010.
El Salvador. For many in the United States, the name conjures up memories of the bloody civil war that ravaged the country from 1980 until 1992, leaving 75,000 dead and resulting in the migration of nearly a fifth of the population. More recently, it triggers images of earthquakes and devastating natural disasters or of a crime-ridden country, where violent gangs terrorize the population with relative impunity.

But as with all countries, there are many important stories to be told beyond those captured by U.S. headlines. One of those stories is the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community’s struggle to secure human rights protections. Since 1994, William Hernández has been at the forefront of that struggle, fighting for the rights of the Salvadoran LGBT and HIV-positive community, at great personal risk.

Hernández is the founder and executive director of Asociación Entre Amigos (Among Friends Association), the leading LGBT and HIV advocacy organization in El Salvador. Entre Amigos’ work centers around its policy reform advocacy and HIV-prevention activities. Its members educate the public about preventing infection, help them to be tested and assist them in accessing needed treatment and support services. The emphasis on serving HIV-positive individuals is due, in part, to the fact that four out of every six new infections from sexual activity in El Salvador are within the LGBT community. Despite this statistic, health services and other resources are not directed to meet its members’ particular needs. Hernández says that by addressing the HIV issue, his organization is able to empower those it could not reach otherwise because “LGBT human rights are still not recognized in El Salvador.”

While the LGBT and HIV-positive communities in El Salvador are not one and the same — a large percentage of HIV-positive Salvadorans are straight — there is significant overlap and common concerns between the
two. Hernández points to the marginalization of the LGBT community, which leads to a lack of social and familial support and employment opportunities. As a result, many members are forced into underground employment, including sex work, where they are vulnerable to HIV infection. HIV-positive gay and transgender persons then face discrimination in seeking out needed health and other services. This double marginalization is what compels Hernández and Entre Amigos to work on both issues.

Hernández’s awareness of the intersection of social issues also drives Entre Amigos to work in solidarity with other civil society groups in El Salvador, supporting worker rights, women’s rights and other social movements. However, Hernández says, Entre Amigos and those it represents do not always receive such support in return. “Our human rights are still questioned, even by human rights organizations in El Salvador.”

While the Salvadoran legal community working on human rights has bravely and tirelessly advocated for justice for atrocities committed during the civil war, it has been largely silent on issues facing the LGBT community. “Human rights organizations have become frozen in time, and their work remains focused on war crimes,” Hernández explains. “But we have not been at war for 20 years. They don’t want to recognize… the human rights associated with sexual diversity.” The marginalization of these issues within human rights circles shows just how much work lies ahead for Entre Amigos.

In the 16 years since Entre Amigos was founded, however, there have been signs of progress. In 2009, Mauricio Funes was elected president, marking a historic political shift in the country. As the first president from the left-leaning Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), the former guerrilla group turned political party, there have been some gestures of support from the government. The Secretary of Social Inclusion, directed by the First Lady of El Salvador, Vanda Pignato, now hosts a Sexual Diversity Division to address issues affecting the LGBT community and works closely with advocates. Another sign of hope is Executive Order 56, signed by President Funes, which prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity by state officials. While the order marked an important step toward providing the public policies necessary to protect LGBT rights, it appears to have been primarily symbolic.

“Since the president signed the order,” says Hernández, “the police have increased attacks against transgender women, despite the fact that they themselves are obligated to follow Executive Order 56.” For Hernández, the goal is to move the anti-discrimination initiative from an executive order to a law. A national law would extend beyond government officials and provide much-needed enforcement mechanisms that could truly prevent discrimination and abuse.

While some political gains have been made, Hernández stresses that much work remains to be done, both in the political and social realms. According to World Bank statistics, 54 percent of the Salvadoran population believes that HIV/AIDS is God’s way of punishing prostitutes and homosexuals for their lifestyle. Salvadoran society remains deeply rooted in religion, with the Catholic Church and a growing Christian evangelical movement exercising a great deal of influence on both politicians and the general population.

The significant role that religious groups play in Salvadoran political life was highlighted in 2009, when the Congress considered legislation backed by religious organizations and a right-wing group called Red Familia (Family Network) to outlaw both gay marriage and adoption by members of the LGBT community. During the heated debate, the Catholic Church presented Congress with a petition containing 300,000 signatures in support of the ban. In the days before the vote, the Archbishop of El Salvador suggested that blocking the measure would have political consequences for the FMLN in the form of conservative legislators withholding votes on key pieces of legislation. Entre Amigos and other organizations intervened, and the proposed constitutional amendment ultimately failed. “We were able to defeat the proposal… by being clear that the constitution cannot be amended based on myths and prejudices.” However, given the gravity of the human rights situation, Hernández says the issue of gay marriage is not a priority for advocates. “It is useless to get married if we die of AIDS. There are many more important things in El Salvador to talk about than marriage.”

Police brutality and the failure to investigate crimes against LGBT community members are among the more pressing concerns for Entre Amigos. The transgender population is particularly vulnerable and faces the most extreme forms of discrimination and violence. In 2009, 24 members of the LGBT community were murdered in El Salvador and of these, 14 were transgender women. It is common for police officers to decline to take formal reports regarding crimes committed against gay and transgender individuals. When reports are taken, a formal investigation rarely follows. The police themselves are sometimes involved in the assaults and murders. Hernández argues that more resources should be devoted to training the police force, given that the current level of violence against LGBT individuals and people perceived to
be members of this community is at unacceptable levels. Hernández himself has faced death threats and physical assaults as a result of his advocacy work, and the Entre Amigos office in San Salvador has had to relocate several times due to repeated raids and burglaries.

To address the pressing issues facing the LGBT and HIV-positive communities, Hernández is working to establish a legal services component to the work of Entre Amigos. His organization has done successful public education campaigns and advocacy work but sees a need to provide direct legal services. Many existing legal service organizations offer free or low-cost consultations but do not provide actual legal representation to individual clients. Hernández hopes to create a legal clinic that works in conjunction with a Salvadoran law school and U.S. lawyers to provide much-needed direct legal services as well as to begin to address policy reform issues.

Many times individuals require legal representation to gain access to certain courts or government offices where their legal issues could be resolved, Hernández notes. Because the social exclusion suffered by the LGBT community frequently results in poverty, it also translates into legal exclusion for those who can’t afford lawyers, which further perpetuates marginalization. “Just the fact of having someone standing with us who would say, ‘I will work with you,’ would change the landscape for achieving LGBT human rights.” But social exclusion can also extend to the lawyers themselves. If a lawyer were to come out as gay, Hernández says, it would lead to “social death.” Similarly, “immoral” behavior, such as homosexual acts, can be used as the basis to revoke a lawyer’s license to practice. Hernández points to this as part of the reason that so many professionals leave the country and seek asylum elsewhere.

As the wounds from the civil war continue to heal in El Salvador, Hernández works to shine a light on the human rights abuses currently taking place in the country. It is an uphill battle in a country struggling with poverty and crime and where homosexuality carries a heavy social stigma. However, it is a necessary step in moving El Salvador to an era of equality and peace.

William Hernández is the co-founder and executive director of the Asociación Entre Amigos. He spoke for CLAS on October 25, 2010.

Allison Davenport is the director of WILD for Human Rights at the Miller Institute for Global Challenges and the Law, a research and policy center at Berkeley Law School.

A man gets tested for HIV/AIDS test at a San Salvador health clinic.
To make a documentary about beloved soccer star Andrés Escobar, who led Colombia to the 1994 World Cup and was killed at the apogee of that nation’s drug violence, the directors needed his friends, family and team to tell the story.

Of those who consented, nearly all warned that they would walk out of the interview at the slightest suggestion of a link between soccer and drug money. And yet, within minutes, unprompted, most began talking about narco-fútbol.

It soon became clear to Jeff and Michael Zimbalist that the short film they had set out to make for ESPN was not just about the murder of a soccer hero after he accidentally scored for the opposing team, eliminating Colombia from the World Cup competition. Nor was it simply an exposé of the involvement of drug money in Colombian soccer.

“We became less interested in who pulled the trigger and much more interested in what kind of society and circumstances would lead to the murder of a soccer player for a mistake on the field,” said Jeff Zimbalist.

To understand the societal conditions in the Colombia of the early 1990s, they probed the unlikely entanglement of two unrelated men who shared a last name and a love of fútbol: the idealistic young “Gentleman of Soccer” and the nefarious narcotics kingpin Pablo Escobar. Ultimately, “The Two Escobars” transcends both its namesakes to tell the story of a wounded nation.

Since airing on ESPN in June, “The Two Escobars” has been released in movie theaters and featured at the Cannes, Doha, San Francisco and Bogotá film festivals, among others. With rapid-fire cuts and pulsating music, parts of the film have the feel and pace of a high-stakes soccer match, while the calm, often poetic, testimonials of those connected to Pablo and Andrés bring them and the era all too vividly to life.

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**The Rise and Fall of Narco-Soccer**

by Sarah Krupp

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The Rise and Fall of Narco-Soccer

As the head of the Medellín Cartel, Pablo Escobar was the most powerful drug lord in Colombia from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s. In those years, both U.S. demand for cocaine and Escobar’s wealth seemed limitless. Investing in Colombia’s Atlético Nacional soccer team allowed the drug lord to combine his billions of illegal dollars with his lifelong passion for soccer in the ideal money-laundering scheme.

With Escobar supplying the funds to recruit foreigners and to retain the best local players, the team began to win, and it kept winning. For the first time, a Colombian soccer team was competing at the international level. By the time the team won the South American championship, soccer had become much more than a game. It was the country’s pride, hope for millions living in desperate poverty, positive international recognition for a nation that had become synonymous with drugs, violence and guerilla warfare. Rich and poor, paramilitaries and guerillas, politicians and drug traffickers cheered for Atlético Nacional.

“Our country is very proud of you,” then-President César Gaviria said in a recorded phone conversation with striker Faustino Asprilla. “You have given Colombia a good name.”

Yet without drug money, in the words of Atlético Nacional’s coach, “Colombian soccer didn’t exist.”

In the film, Andrés is portrayed as impossibly good, a saintly figure. But Pablo Escobar becomes flesh and blood. Jeff Zimbalist said he hoped to show the narcotrafficker as both “devil and angel.” He wanted the audience to see the side of Escobar that is unfamiliar and incompatible with his better-known image as a murderous thug. When Escobar saw hundreds of people living on the edge of a garbage dump, living off refuse, he built them houses. With his ill-gotten riches, he constructed schools, health clinics and soccer fields. Many Colombian soccer players learned how to play on those fields and grew up admiring Escobar and feeling beholden to him.

Yet, to get in Pablo Escobar’s way was to invite death. Anyone who happened to be nearby was collateral damage. Escobar is often said to have risen to the top not because he was the cleverest but because he was the bloodiest. There is no official tally, but by the estimate of Pablo’s right-hand man, the Medellín Cartel killed 4,500 people.
When a rival cartel boss bribed a referee to ensure that his team beat Atlética Nacional, Escobar ordered the referee’s assassination. When presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galán called for the extradition of drug traffickers to the United States, Escobar had him killed. When Galán’s successor, the future president César Gaviria, appeared to be doing well in the polls, Escobar had a bomb placed on a plane the candidate was thought to be taking. Although Gaviria was not on the plane, 110 people were killed in the crash, among them two Americans.

These high-profile attacks triggered a 15-month-long manhunt carried out by U.S. Special Forces, the Colombian National Police and an alliance of drug traffickers known as Los Pepes (Los Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar, People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar). Escobar was finally found and shot dead on December 2, 1993, seven months before Andrés’ death. Some say that if Pablo had still been alive, no one would have dared to risk the kingpin’s wrath by murdering the unlucky soccer star.

Narco-fútbol died with Pablo and Andrés Escobar. It became too visible to launder money through teams. Without the infusion of illicit funds, the nation’s soccer clubs began to disintegrate. Of Colombia’s 14 teams, 12 are now on the verge of bankruptcy, and Colombia has not reached the World Cup in the years since 1994. The Colombian drug trade, however, did not disappear. The rival Cali Cartel quickly came to dominance after Pablo Escobar’s death, and when it fell, another took its place.

Violence in Colombia has ebbed since the Escobar years. The homicide rate has halved, though it remains high. Mexico is now the main transit route for narcotics destined for the United States, and it has taken Colombia’s place as the battlefield in the War on Drugs. In the past three years, drug-related violence has killed an estimated 28,000 people in Mexico and, in another echo of the Escobar era, assassinations of Mexican politicians and journalists are on the rise.

Meanwhile, the U.S. appetite for drugs persists unabated.

CLAS held a screening of “The Two Escobars” followed by a question-and-answer session with director Jeff Zimbalist on October 11, 2010.

Sarah Krupp is a graduate student in Latin American Studies at UC Berkeley.
On March 23, 1980, in what was to be the last of his Sunday homilies heard throughout El Salvador, Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero made a final attempt to halt the rising tide of violence that would soon consume his country. The Salvadoran Army, effectively transformed into roving death squads through counterinsurgency efforts supported by the U.S. government, had already disappeared, tortured and slaughtered tens of thousands of Salvadorans. Among them were dozens of clergy from the Catholic Church who had been involved in organizing and educating their mostly rural congregations about their rights in the face of centuries of repression by rich landlords. Knowing full well that the military would consider it an act of treason, Romero made a last — and in retrospect, doomed — attempt to make his voice heard amidst the cacophony of violence:

I want to make a special request to the men in the armed forces: brothers, we are from the same country, yet you continually kill your peasant brothers. Before any order given by a man, the law of God must prevail: “You shall not kill!”...In the name of God I pray you, I beseech you, I order you! Let this repression cease!”

According to his legal counsel, human rights lawyer Roberto Cuellar, this desperate plea was probably his death sentence. The next day, while Romero said mass at the chapel of La Divina Providencia Hospital, a red Volkswagen Passat stopped outside the open doors of
the chapel. A tall, thin man sitting in the backseat raised an assault rifle and fired an exploding .22 bullet into the monsignor’s heart. While nuns screamed and fell to their knees around his body and blood mixed with the spilled wine from the sacramental chalice, the assassins, in no particular hurry, drove away. Twelve years of bloody civil war between the U.S.-backed Salvadoran military and leftist guerrillas would follow.

The three years leading to this moment — the crescendo of violence aimed primarily against El Salvador’s rural poor and Romero’s effort to expose the mounting atrocities and preach peace to all sides — is the subject of the recently released documentary “Monseñor: The Last Journey of Óscar Romero,” a film directed by Ana Carrigan and Juliet Weber and produced by Latin American/North American Church Concerns. It is an astonishing compilation of gritty film footage and photographs from the pre-civil war era. The monsignor himself enters as a spectral narrator through the recorded diary entries he made during his three years as archbishop of El Salvador (1977-80). Most striking, however, are the voices and memories of rural people recounting the terror and bloodshed that consumed their communities and the hope that Romero provided through his steadfast support for the government’s victims. The civil war survivors sit before the camera and attempt to bring back what it meant for someone to recognize the profound and brutal atrocities that occurred in their midst, day in and day out. In this sense, while the film certainly can be understood as a hagiography for a modern martyr, it also forces us to see violent repression and war through the eyes of its primary victims, the peasants who attempted to stand up against hundreds of years of exploitation or who simply found themselves caught between warring factions they could not escape.

By all accounts, Romero was an unlikely candidate to speak truth to power. He received his religious training in Rome and was known for his traditionalist, markedly neutral stance towards politics of any kind. His 1977 appointment as archbishop of El Salvador was met with general consternation by the more activist priests preaching liberation theology — a leftist ideology of social justice for the poor — to their downtrodden congregations. How did this “self-effacing, not particularly articulate, stubborn man,” as journalist Alma Guillermoprieto described him, become the icon of resistance and social justice for an entire generation of his countrymen, and, indeed, a hero for the repressed around the world? Like so many unwilling revolutionaries, he was catalyzed into action when the government’s wanton violence struck so close to home.
that he could not turn away. A few weeks after Romero became archbishop of El Salvador, Bishop Rutilio Grande, a close friend and colleague who had been organizing and educating his rural congregation, was found shot to death on the side of the road. We cannot know what internal transformation took place inside the once reticent and conservative archbishop, but later he would recall that, as he looked upon his friend’s body, he thought to himself, “if they have killed him for doing what he did, then I too have to walk the same path.” As Cuellar remembers, the archbishop was forced to ask himself “Whose pastor am I?” He decided he was the pastor of the oppressed. “And he went for it, until they killed him, too.”

Once Romero’s eyes were opened to the terror and bloodshed claiming his countrymen, he worked tirelessly to expose the horror to the rest of the nation and to the world. He created a legal aid office — Socorro Juridico — under the auspices of the Catholic Church. Its main task was to meticulously record the daily disappearance, death and torture carried out by government death squads. Every day, peasants would queue up outside the church to report the death or disappearance of a loved one. His weekly Sunday homilies became an account of death and terror and an indictment of those responsible. Transmitted on the Catholic Church radio station across the country, families would gather around their radios to listen to “the newscast of the poor.” With the country’s only opposition newspapers effectively gagged, Romero’s sermons became the only beacon of light shining in the terrifying darkness surrounding the targets of government repression.

In the film, a peasant activist who lived through those dark times recalls how each family would make sure to have new batteries for the radio so as not to miss a minute of the sermon. It didn’t matter if you had to leave your home before the sermon was over, he added, because you could hear Romero’s voice echoing from each of your neighbor’s houses as you walked through the village.

Thirty years later, “Monseñor” gives us a window into this past. Grainy footage captures a mother listing the names of her five dead or disappeared sons, while another woman describes the acid burns on her husband’s mutilated body. With an unstinting attention to the carnality of death that has become rare in this age of sterilized and censored media accounts of war, we see bodies fished out of ditches, throats cut, more bodies, limbs horribly akimbo, strewn across a bloodstained village square. Onlookers — friends, relatives, neighbors, paid government informers — stare into the camera and then look nervously away. Shirtless and bruised men on their knees with their thumbs tied with cord behind their backs keep their eyes down as young soldiers brandish machetes behind them.

What does it mean, on the 30th anniversary of Romero’s murder, to revisit these horrors and to meditate upon his resolve in the face of overwhelming physical force and cruelty? As Professor Harley Shaiken told the audience for the Center for Latin American Studies’ presentation of “Monseñor,” “the legacy of Oscar Romero is not simply a thing of the past, but one that ought to inform the future.”
Romero was a person who eschewed violence of all kinds and for whatever purpose. When he was alive, his weekly sermons denounced the brutalities committed by all sides in the burgeoning conflict. Thirty years later, his message of peace still bears listening to. El Salvador, like much of Central America, continues to be consumed by poverty and violence. While the organized massacres of suspected guerrilla supporters are a thing of the past, they have been replaced by internecine criminal violence; today, yearly death-by-homicide rates surpass the mortality levels of some of the worst years of civil war. In this world, Romero’s words, and the sincere conviction behind them, still resonate: “I believe in peaceful solutions, and I believe our people are capable of achieving them.”

CLAS screened the film “Monseñor: The Last Journey of Óscar Romero” on October 27, 2010.

Anthony Fontes is a graduate student in the Department of Geography at UC Berkeley.
Fernando Botero’s “Country Wedding”

by Peter Selz

Fernando Botero, born in Colombia, has achieved worldwide fame for his painting and sculpture. He presently lives and works in Paris, New York, Monte Carlo and Pietrasanta. In 2004-05, compelled by the reports of torture inflicted by the American military on Iraqi prisoners, he produced a remarkable series of paintings and drawings on that topic, 60 of which he donated to the Berkeley Art Museum.

After completing this painful collection, Botero resumed painting his former subjects, mostly men and women engaging in their daily activities. His figures – impassive, voluptuous and voluminous – seem larger than life. Typical is “Country Wedding” (2009), which presents a peasant and his bride, dressed in festive attire as they stand silently in front of hills and mountains to pose for the requisite wedding picture. Botero has remained aloof from all the different modes of modernist art. Nevertheless, he wrote in 1997: “My painting and sculpture recapitulate much of the history of art, but belong ineluctably to the 20th century. The important thing to me is that anybody viewing a work of mine shall recognize it as a Botero.”

Peter Selz is Professor Emeritus in the History of Art Department at UC Berkeley and was the founding director of the Berkeley Art Museum.

“Country Wedding,” 2009, oil on canvas, 180 x 142 cm. Image courtesy of Fernando Botero.
Rescued Chilean miner Edison Peña sings Elvis's “Suspicious Minds” on “The Late Show With David Letterman.”

Photo: Jeffrey R. Staab/CBS.