In Search of Continuity

By Simeon Tegel

Half-way through his six-year term, a chastened President Vicente Fox of Mexico used his annual Sept. 1 state of the union address to appeal to his nation’s legislature to cooperate with him and help enact the stalled structural reforms his country — and his administration — urgently need. Defeat two months earlier for his National Action Party (PAN) in the midterm congressional elections had left the charismatic chief executive further than ever from enacting legislation including a major rationalization of the fiscal system and market reforms to Mexico’s energy sector and various healthcare networks.

But Fox’s pleas for national unity may have fallen on deaf ears. Ideological differences and an intensely partisan political culture make it hard to see how the two main opposition parties, the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) and the formerly-ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), might drop their antagonism to Fox’s key legislative proposals. With none of the three parties holding an absolute majority in either house of congress, and with even the PAN split into pro- and anti-Fox camps, the President will find it difficult to build an alliance to pass any significant reforms.

continued on page 10
This fall the second annual meeting of the U.S.–Mexico Futures Forum was at the heart of the Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) program. The Forum, a joint effort of CLAS and the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) and funded by the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, brings together a network of policy makers, scholars and leaders from social movements and the business community to examine the current state of the U.S.–Mexico relationship and develop positive alternatives for the future (see page for a list of participants in the fall 2003 meeting).

This issue of the CLAS Newsletter features six articles reporting on the forum’s discussions. The articles range from immigration policy to globalization and include discussions of media reform in Mexico and politics in California. Over the course of the semester, we have featured a number of programs that have further explored issues raised at the Forum such as immigration policy that we will report on in our winter 2004 issue (see our Web site at clas.Berkeley.edu for a preview). Once again, I would like to thank the Hewlett Foundation for their invaluable support and my colleague, Rafael Fernández de Castro of ITAM, for all of his efforts in making the event a success.

In the spring 2004 semester CLAS will be holding three special month-long seminars featuring Jorge Wilheim, the former president of São Paulo’s Planning Department; Sergio Aguayo, a professor at the Colegio de México; and Jorge Arrate, who recently stepped down as Chile’s ambassador to Argentina. In this issue, we feature an article by Ambassador Arrate reflecting on the September 11, 1973 coup in Chile.

CLAS also plans an ambitious program on Brazil in the new year. In addition to Jorge Wilheim, who will be holding the Rio Branco Chair, we will be hosting Paulo Lins, the author of the novel, City of God, who will be the first recipient of the Mario De Andrade Chair of Brazilian Culture at UC Berkeley. We will be announcing a major series of public policy events related to Brazil on our Web site.
The movement of workers between Mexico and the United States predates the formation of our national boundaries and numerical restrictions on this flow were not imposed until the mid-1960s. Even after restrictions were imposed, Mexican labor continued to play a critical role in many of our industries and conditions in Mexico continued to push workers out of the country. As a result, an underground economy has developed with a large and growing unauthorized population in the United States. The inconsistency between our current immigration policies and these economic realities raises questions about the soundness of our approach. Is there a set of policies that would better reflect our economic reality and stem the flow of unauthorized immigrants? This article reviews our history, some of the issues we face and several policy alternatives.

The early efforts at restricting immigration began with the regrettable exclusion of Asian immigrants, including the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1870 (Fix and Passel, 1994). In addition to restricting Asian immigration, the emphasis was on excluding criminals, prostitutes, the physically and mentally ill and people who could become a public charge (Fix and Passel, 1994). In 1917, illiterate immigrants were also excluded, but Mexican laborers were for the most part exempted from the literacy test in response to warnings of labor shortages from southwest growers (Kiser and Woody Kiser, 1979).

The first numerical restrictions on immigration were imposed in 1921 and 1924, when the National Origins Act was passed (Fix and Passel, 1994). Again, Mexican immigrant laborers were exempt from the quotas. To make the exemption even more explicit, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1929 upheld an earlier administration decree declaring that those who commuted between Mexico and the United States were considered legal immigrants (Bach, 1989).
The Mexican media conglomerate, Televisa, has once again raised concerns over its enormous influence on Mexican politics, as the company’s dominance of television has generated mounting criticism for its capacity to charge huge fees for electoral campaign spots as well as for its selective coverage of issues. And the criticism holds important binational dimensions, given Televisa’s growing interest in Spanish language broadcasting in the United States — while Mexican political parties wrestle with the question of Mexican citizens outside of their country participating in elections back home.

Analysts estimate that Televisa controls as much as 70 percent of the television market in Mexico, forcing advertisers to pay large sums to promote their products on the media giant’s popular programs. Televisa’s tentacles reach far beyond television, however, as its interests range from sponsorship of sporting events and soccer teams to the recording and entertainment industries. The company also has holdings in radio broadcasting, publications, cable systems and satellite transmission. Crucial to its current grasp of the Spanish language media in Mexico is the company’s huge role in the production of television programming for stations serving Spanish-speaking audiences from Canada to Chile and from Madrid to Manila. Moreover, Televisa’s programs have been translated into other languages, such as Portuguese and Russian.

The reins of Televisa are presently in the hands of Emilio Azcarraga Jean, who represents the third generation of his family to control the broadcast empire. His grandfather pioneered the radio industry in Mexico and his father pushed the company into the television age. The company’s long history has facilitated its ties throughout the Spanish-speaking world. In this respect, Televisa has made a number of strategic partnerships with other media powers in order to extend the market for its programs, notably the Cisneros media group of Venezuela, another major purveyor of Spanish language programming for television. Although several other examples of this sort could be cited, suffice to say that Televisa has become an international media presence. Televisa does face competition inside and outside of Mexico. Nonetheless, Televisa has proven to be resilient in its drive to maintain a powerful and dominant role in the globalization of the Spanish language media.

In this light, Televisa’s recent move back toward the U.S. market has been of particular
interest. At one time, the Mexican company basically controlled the first Spanish language television network in the U.S., named appropriately the Spanish International Network (SIN). But the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) eventually found Televisa’s holding of SIN to be in violation of laws regarding foreign ownership of the media in the U.S. The Mexican company was forced to divest itself of SIN, leading eventually to the formation of the currently named Univision Corporation, the major source of Spanish language television broadcasting in this country. The majority of Univision’s programming comes from Televisa. Their relationship deepened in 2002, when, Fonovisa, a major recording label and Televisa subsidiary, was bought by the U.S.-based company. In exchange, Univision signed a programming deal with Televisa through 2017. Equally significant, Univision added the head of Televisa, Emilio Azcarraga Jean, to its board of directors, as the Mexican company increased its stake in Univision from 6 to 15 percent.

Furthermore, this year Univision gained control of the Hispanic Broadcasting Company, the dominant player in Spanish language radio broadcasting in the U.S. Univision radio stations will be able to promote the parent company’s television programs and recording stars, while having privileged access to Televisa’s shows — which will feature the recording artists of Fonovisa; this will be a tidy arrangement indeed. Through its ties with Univision, Televisa will have even greater access to the Spanish language media market north of the border, including the so-called Latino market, worth nearly $600 billion a year in consumer spending by most estimates. (Not to mention the non-Latino media market, as Mexican food products, for example, have become increasingly popular in the U.S. Non-Latinos now consume the majority of tortillas sold in the U.S., about half of which are produced by the U.S. subsidiary of the Gruma Corporation of Mexico, a major source of advertising revenues for Spanish language radio and television stations on both sides of the border.) The FCC disregarded critics of the merger between Univision and the Hispanic Radio Corporation and voted for approval along party lines, with Republicans supporting the deal and Democrats dissenting. The CEO of Univision, Jerrold Perenchio, a Republican,
“California’s Version of Racial Politics

By Lydia Chávez

If everyone else spent the weeks before California’s Oct. 6 recall election salivating over a surge in the Latino vote, Congresswoman Loretta Sanchez remained skeptical.

“Very few will come to vote,” she said several weeks before Election Day. Her reasons: no one other than the unions were spending get-out-the-vote money, fewer polling places would be open and the Democrats had a Latino candidate who failed to “energize” the electorate.

Rep. Sanchez was half right.

The Latino vote — variously estimated at 11 to 18 percent of the total vote — reached the solid levels of recent elections and confirmed the oft repeated wisdom that the Latinos — even in California where they are predominately Mexican-American — are not monolithic. Far more important, however, the recall results underscored the co-dependent relationship between the increasing Latino presence in California and white voters. It’s California’s version of racial politics, and ever since anti-immigrant fervor reached a peak in 1994 the bizarre dynamic, which can favor Republicans as well as Democrats, has swayed elections.

First, the Latino vote. It has grown from 8 percent in 1990, and it’s not one that either party has in the bank. Latinos, as it turned out, were only slightly less star struck in October than the rest of California voters. Despite earlier indications that Latinos thought it important to elect one of their own, according to the Tomas Rivera Policy Institute, some 31 percent supported Arnold Schwarzenegger. Political analysts talked about the actor’s negatives around his support for Proposition 187, but many Latinos — 65 percent — simply didn’t know about it or thought he had opposed the measure, the Institute’s survey found.

Schwarzenegger’s share of the Latino vote compared to 33 percent who voted for Wilson in 1990 and pretty much reflects the cut Republicans have always been able to count on. The exception, of course, was 1994 when Wilson ran on the anti-immigrant Proposition 187 and...
won only 22 percent of the Latino vote. Latinos were so upset that they began to register in greater numbers and in 1996 and 2000 they punished the Republicans by voting overwhelmingly for the Democrats.

In the 2003 recall, Latinos still preferred the Democrat, but the margin narrowed considerably with only 55 percent supporting Cruz Bustamante, compared to 65 percent for Gray Davis in 2002, and 71 percent in 1998.

That’s the Latino vote. Now, consider the warped relationship between the surge in the Latino population and the reaction it can instill in the white voter. During the boom years of 1980s, the Latino population grew from 19 percent of the population to 26 percent. By 1994 when a lousy economy and fears of more immigration were agitating white voters, Pete Wilson was able to parlay their anxiety into an electoral victory, embracing the anti-immigrant Prop. 187 and warning Californians that “they keep coming.” An economic boom and a distaste for immigrant bashing followed, but the economy is once again floundering. And playing the immigrant card still works.

Some 70 percent of the voters thought it was a bad idea to give undocumented residents the right to drive, exit polls showed. In San Diego County, author Mike Davis wrote, talk radio connected anger over the driver’s license issue with anger about the increased tax for car registration. To white voters, one promised more new immigrants and the other the money required to pay for them. Although Schwarzenegger too opposed the driver’s license legislation, he never uttered an anti-immigrant word. Republican conservatives on talk radio did that for him.

The immigrant card panics white voters — even liberal white voters. “I don’t understand it,” one of my students said referring to a conversation he had with his parents. McGovern progressives, they too hated the idea of undocumented workers having a driver’s license. They’re not racists. Neither were many of the voters who supported Proposition 187. But, rational or not, most people fear change and the big transformation in California continues to be the color of its residents.

But if the demographics are changing, the voting profile has yet to follow. To win the support of white voters is to win the election so the race card trumps the Latino vote. Take the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area where the vast majority of Latino voters live. There, Latinos represent 45 percent of the population, but only 40 percent of the population that is 18 and older and more important, only 25 percent of the population that has the age and citizenship status to vote, according to a study by USC’s School of Policy Planning and Development. In comparison, non-Latinos make up 54 percent of the population but 75 percent of the eligible voting population.

It’s no surprise then that the heavily Latino Los Angeles County supported the recall and Schwarzenegger.

As Latinos age and earn citizenship, their voting power and population figures — now 32 percent — will begin to mesh. Until then, politicians — or their surrogates — will be able to play the race card in elections. Or, they can help to educate a populous starved for leadership and direction.

In terms of fearing immigration, the driver’s license issue is really beside the point. With or without one, an undocumented worker can get a job, a bank account and a better life. They will keep coming.

The salient question is what to do about immigration. Washington leaders and our new governor appear excited about legislation that would give some undocumented residents earned amnesty and provide a guest worker program to regularize immigration for those who want to come. That begins a discussion that confronts reality rather than a retro rant that riles the worst in all of us.

Lydia Chávez is an Associate Professor of Journalism at UC Berkeley and a member of the U.S.–Mexico Futures Forum.
Currently, the United States Congress has pending 98 bills dealing with immigration issues. Despite the White House’s linking of the war on terror with strict border policies, the public debate on immigration simply refuses to disappear. Two challenges to turning these bills into law emerged during the U.S.–Mexico Futures Forum. First, how can legislators frame a compromise between liberal concerns for protecting immigrants from exploitation and conservative fears over national security and the burden to taxpayers of continuing in-migration? Secondly, how can negotiations between Mexico and the U.S. over an immigration bill be broadened beyond the executive level to incorporate the legislative branches, rather than just the two countries’ respective presidents?

Rejecting the Status Quo

Even in the context of the U.S.’s current national security priorities, both Washington and Mexico City appear to find unacceptable the status quo of large numbers of Mexicans entering the U.S. illegally to look for work. Belinda Reyes, a research fellow at the Public Policy Institute of California, warned that the current policy of militarizing the border and increasing arrests has proved ineffective. Indeed, one of the most notable consequences of law enforcement programs such as Operation Gatekeeper in California, Operation Hold-the-Line in Texas and Operation Safeguard in Arizona has been the dramatic increase in immigrant border deaths. Reyes also noted that, seen from a historical perspective, these policies of stricter immigration controls are a relatively recent phenomena. It has only been during recent

continued on page 14
I. The Multifaceted Process of Globalization

With the mention of the word “globalization,” all sorts of powerful yet stereotypical images come to mind: cargo airliners and ships ready to leave with goods for export, a team from the International Monetary Fund arriving in a third world country facing financial crisis, mass demonstrations in global cities such as Seattle and Geneva. Along with these images, there are also ideas we associate with this all-encompassing concept. Among these is the fear that in this brave new era ancient cultures will be lost forever as younger generations abandon tradition and roots, seduced by the irresistible pull of cultural products from Hollywood or Western Europe. Another common notion is that economic liberalization and deregulation are now the “only game in town,” when it comes to policy-making.

Of course, all the above is to some degree related to the complex set of processes we call “globalization.” Having said this, however, if we were pushed to encapsulate the core elements of it in a single idea, it would perhaps be akin to Mathias Koenig-Archipugi’s dictum: that is, that globalization has become the most common way to refer to a rapidly changing world. Given the many dimensions of globalization, it is not surprising that depending on who is using it or in what context, it becomes a matter of praise or denunciation. Thus, while most economists tend to greet the term with excitement, thinking of the gain in productive efficiency that a more interconnected world brings about, union leaders throughout the world regard globalization as a threat to their hard-won labor rights.

Beyond the perceived benefits or dangers of globalization, it is important to stress that the enormous increase in the movement of goods, capital and cultural products which characterizes globalization was neither spontaneous nor inevitable. Indeed, as was the case with the construction of national markets (a process so well described by Karl Polanyi in the case of England), economic globalization came about after a long series of treaties aimed at increasing international trade and foreign investment, a process that runs parallel to the globalization of human rights awareness, which was also constructed by numerous international meetings and treaties.

continued on page 17
before his term ends in December 2006. With the Mexican Constitution prohibiting presidential re-election, Fox may be pondering his place in posterity.

Ironically, then, it may be the U.S. Congress which provides the Mexican president with the elusive legislative breakthrough — and on the issue on which, more than any other, Fox has staked his political reputation. Slowly but surely, some U.S. politicians are starting to revive Fox’s ambitious plans for a comprehensive immigration deal with the U.S. to cover the estimated three to four million illegal immigrants already within the United States, as well as future migratory flows from Mexico. The issue appeared to drop off the White House agenda during the post-Sept. 11 security crackdown and the ensuing freeze in the once warm personal relationship between Fox and his U.S. counterpart, President George W. Bush. But now, as Latino voters from California to New York slowly begin flexing their electoral muscles, even some conservative politicians in the U.S. are starting to wake up to the fact that backing an immigration bill could win them enough new supporters from U.S. Hispanic communities to outweigh the votes lost from other constituencies.

The debate in the U.S. over such an immigration bill reveals the tension between Washington’s ongoing response to the horrors of Sept. 11 and the need for both the U.S. and Mexico to bring continuity and strength to their binational relationship. That dichotomy was a central theme at the second U.S.–Mexico Futures Forum, a conference organized jointly by the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of California, Berkeley and Mexico City’s Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) in Sausalito, California, in September, shortly after Fox’s state of the union speech. Uniting an impressive line-up of policymakers, academics and leaders from business, NGOs and the arts from both Mexico and the U.S., the conference examined issues including immigration, security, economic integration and electoral institutions. The atmosphere was noticeably more upbeat than at the forum’s inaugural meeting in Cuernavaca, Mexico, in November 2002.

continued on page 15
The U.S.–Mexico Futures Forum
San Francisco Bay Area
September 19-21, 2003

Gustavo Alanís Ortega, President, Mexican Environmental Law Center (CEMDA)

José Alberto Aguilar, Subsecretary of International Affairs, PRI

Carmen Aristegui, Journalist, Reforma and W Radio


Sherrod Brown, Member of Congress, Ohio

Gil Cedillo, State Senator, California

Lydia Chavez, Professor of Journalism, UC Berkeley

Maria Echaveste, Attorney and Consultant, CEO Nueva Vista Group; Deputy Chief of Staff to President Clinton

Bob Filner, Member of Congress, California

Juan José García Ochoa, Member of Congress, Federal District, PRD

Rolando García Alonso, Director of International Affairs, PAN

Amalia García Medina, Member of Congress, Zacatecas, PRD

Adriana González Carrillo, Member of Congress, Mexico State, PAN

Pete Gallego, State Assembly, Texas; Chair of the Mexican-American Legislative Caucus

Carlos Heredia, Advisor to Gov. Lázaro Cárdenas Batel on International Affairs, PRD

Mary Kelly, Senior Attorney and Program Director, U.S.–Mexico Border Initiatives

Patricia Llaca, Actress

Beatriz Manz, Professor of Geography and Ethnic Studies, UC Berkeley

Ricardo Obert, CEO, Productos Quimicos Mardupol

Cecilia Romero, Senator, PAN

Loretta Sanchez, Member of Congress, California

Alex Saragoza, Professor of Ethnic Studies, UC Berkeley

Conveners

Rafael Fernández de Castro, Chair, Department of International Studies, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)

Harley Shaiken, Chair, Center for Latin American Studies, UC Berkeley
Conventional wisdom suggests that democratic transitions are one-way movements and that they represent new experiences for the countries involved. Peter H. Smith, Professor of Political Science and Simon Bolívar Professor of Latin American Studies at UC San Diego, offered an alternative picture for Latin America based on a quantitative analysis covering the whole of the 20th century.

Professor Smith undertook the arduous task of coding each year between 1900 and 2000 as democratic, semi-democratic, oligarchic or authoritarian for 19 Latin American countries, based on the degree to which elections were free and fair. This massive analytic effort yielded a database that allows us to chart the rhythms of Latin American democracy during the 20th century and to address a fundamental question: Are these rhythms linear or cyclical?

Smith suggested that the answer to this question varies by region within Latin America. In Central America, the data indicate that most countries are currently experiencing democracy for the first time. They began the century under oligarchic rule — meaning domination by ruling elites who restricted voting to a small proportion of the population — or authoritarianism. Aside from brief experiments thwarted by foreign intervention, most Central American countries only began to experience democratic openings during the 1970s. One would therefore expect these countries to take a different attitude toward democracy than those of South America, which by and large experienced a period of redemocratization in the past two decades.

Three South American countries — Argentina, Chile and Uruguay — experienced early episodes of democratization near the turn of the 20th century. By 1940, most South American countries had developed some form of electoral democracy. The period from 1940 to 1977 marked one “cycle” of democracy for the region, a cycle that has, in Smith’s data, a distinctly “M” shape, indicating an initial surge, a sharp decline, and then a resurgence, all within this 37-year period. By the late 1970s, however, most South American countries had fallen victim to an authoritarian regression. A new cycle of democracy began in the mid-1980s and has continued to the present day. For Smith, this historical experience with democracies that “failed” has led South American countries to adopt a much more limited form of democracy than they did during the earlier cycle of democratic opening.

This difference between South American and Central American historical experiences with democracy has had profound effects on the quality of current democracies in Latin America. The desire to avoid a repetition of the breakdown of democracy has led democratic leaders in South America to forge bargains with outgoing authoritarian elites that have resulted in a restriction of civil liberties and an impoverishment of political representation. The end result is that democracy is no longer “dangerous,” that is, it does not pose a threat to existing political and economic power relations — as did the more wide-ranging democratic openings of the mid-20th century.

In Central America, the novelty of democracy has had a dual impact. On the one hand, these countries have the potential to experiment with extending democratic liberties beyond electoral participation into the social
and even economic realms. On the other, they lack experience with democratic governance, leading them to model practices from other countries, particularly South American ones. It is the latter tendency that has prevailed, leading Central American countries to mirror the practices of their South American neighbors. As a result, Smith’s data show a cross-regional convergence on a model of “illiberal democracy.”

Democracy thus appears to have taken on a cyclical rhythm in South America during the 20th century, while in Central America its evolution has been more linear. Despite these differences, both regions face a common challenge: avoiding the “hollowing out” of democracy that Guillermo O’Donnell has identified as resulting from the co-existence of formal democratic rights with violations of civil liberties and ineffective channels of political representation. Smith’s diagnosis of the prevalence of “illiberal democracy” in contemporary Latin America points to some of the historical reasons for this troubling condition. It also serves to remind us that we must view democracy as more than the existence of free and fair elections. Without the protection of civil liberties and the practice of political representation, electoral democracy will remain an exemplar of unfulfilled potential.

Chris Cardona is a graduate student in the Department of Political Science at UC Berkeley.

Professor Peter H. Smith spoke at the Center for Latin American Studies on April 25, 2003 and was a visiting scholar at CLAS during the summer and fall of 2003.
decades that numerical restrictions have been placed on Mexican migration.

Despite this grim reality, Frank Sharry, Executive Director of the Washington D.C.-based nonprofit National Immigration Forum, insisted he was optimistic, detecting clear signs of political will for change despite the persistence of conservative opposition to any loosening of current immigration restrictions. "It is only a matter of time before we legalize," he told the forum. The choice, he added, was simple: "smugglers versus visas." Sharry cited grassroots-initiated achievements such as the recent extension of the California drivers' license to undocumented immigrants as a prime example. Other recent victories included the higher education bill passed in California and the continuing fight to have the matricula, an identification document offered by the Mexican consulate to Mexican citizens, accepted in the United States. Sharry also predicted that this impending sense of inevitability surrounding a future immigration deal was leading the country into a "congressional phase" likely to include bipartisan support. National security would also benefit, with U.S. authorities being able to track legalized immigrants who currently slip into the country illicitly and without official approval or knowledge.

Forging a Compromise in Congress

California State Senator Gil Cedillo (D-Los Angeles), who played an instrumental role in the driver’s license victory, also detected grounds for optimism. Powerful entities such as the Chamber of Commerce were crucial in framing this bill as a pro-business initiative, he said. Additionally, grass-roots community efforts from groups such as immigrant “Home Clubs,” community organizations that bring together individuals from common sending regions, were also very active in the campaign. Overall, Cedillo cited an amazing involvement of more than 1,000 immigrants in the driver’s license campaign.

Yet timing and framing remain critical elements in turning contentious bills into legislative reality. Post 9-11 concerns regarding national security are still crucial. In addition, there is the inescapable focus on local and national elections, where anti-immigrant rhetoric is often perceived as a reliable vote-winner. Texas State Representative Pete Gallego (D-Alpine) argued that since the anti-immigrant faction is a major base for the Republican Party, efforts to gain immigrant rights are increasingly difficult. Furthermore, in a fast-paced political world, where re-election is a constant concern, there is little time for the long-term vision that many would consider ideal. Even legislation such as the guest worker program outlined in Texas Senator
In terms of the long-awaited immigration deal, less could be more. At least two immigration bills were being prepared by U.S. representatives before the Congress was due to reconvene in the fall, with more possibly on the way. One bipartisan initiative, publicly unveiled two days after the forum, proposed allowing approximately 500,000 Mexican *indocumentados*, workers without official papers such as visas or work permits, to become legal residents. The limited scope of that proposal probably increases its chances of success. However, the sweeping immigration accord sought by Fox may still be on the table. The key doubt is not whether such a piece of legislation, covering all Mexican illegal immigrants in the US, passes but whether the critical political momentum is built up to bring on board President Bush and enough Republican members of Congress to achieve a deal before the next U.S. presidential elections in November 2004.

Yet the search for a breakthrough on immigration is not the only urgent challenge faced by the U.S. and Mexico. Overlapping with, but distinct from, the issue of immigration are questions of border security, Mexico's troubled on-going attempts to catch up economically with Canada and the U.S. and the need to develop democratic institutional structures within the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) framework to enfranchise the public in the three signatory countries and allow citizens' voices to be more effectively heard.

The appearance post-Sept. 11 of additional controls at the 2,062-mile U.S.–Mexican border, with chaotic long lines of waiting vehicles, provides, in fact, only an illusory sense of security. None of the 9-11 terrorists had arrived in the U.S. either illegally, as immigrants, or from Mexico. Failing to accept the reality of the economic pressures that cause migratory flows means that the estimated 350,000 Mexicans who do cross clandestinely into the U.S. every year are usually untraceable, a security risk in itself. It also forces those immigrants to risk their lives unnecessarily. “We don’t have smart borders, we have dumb borders,” Frank Sharry, Executive Director of the National...
Immigration Forum, a Washington, D.C.-based nongovernmental organization, told the conference.

The unpredictable delays at the border are also braking economic growth in regions along both sides of the only land boundary between the developed and developing worlds. In Mexico, this is particularly painful with maquiladora assembly plants and other industries already confronting growing competition from China, a future economic superpower. In the last 12 months, China has overtaken Mexico as an exporter to the U.S. in a range of products, from office computers to textiles. Many of the hundreds of thousands of people and vehicles that cross the U.S.–Mexican border every day are regular crossers, making their current wait-times unnecessary. Manufacturers operating with just-in-time supply networks were particularly badly hit by Sept. 11.

Without reform, integrated industries along both sides of the U.S.–Mexican border will again suffer some of the most serious economic repercussions following any future terrorist attack in the U.S.

Meanwhile, Mexican-Americans and other Latino groups in the U.S. continue to push and test the limits of their political power from the bottom up. There are growing bonds between African-Americans and Hispanic-Americans, with the latter increasingly paying tribute to the formers’ struggle for civil rights in the 1960s. A future coalition between the United States’ two largest minorities, sometime rivals in the past, would be hard for any politician to ignore. But hard lessons need to be learned. Hispanic candidates cannot take votes from their communities for granted. Close to half California’s large Hispanic electorate did not vote for Democratic Lt. Gov. Cruz Bustamante, the son of a barber from the San Joaquin valley, in the state’s gubernatorial recall election last October. At the same time, even with Bustamante a candidate to become California’s first Latino governor for more than a century, Mexican-American turnout was lower than for the population as a whole.

Should these trends coalesce into a successful immigration bill in the U.S. in the next 12 months, there would be direct implications for Mexican domestic politics with Fox finding his presidency re-energized from an unexpected quarter and his own credibility restored in the eyes of many of his compatriots. Right from the start of his presidency, Fox has prominently campaigned to secure an amnesty for the millions of his compatriots residing illegally in the United States. Finally achieving that goal would clear Fox of the accusation, levelled by his
II. Shaping the Global Order for the Better

Aware that the shape globalization will ultimately take is not a given, the U.S.–Mexico Futures Forum, an initiative of the Center for Latin American Studies at UC Berkeley and the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, had its third annual meeting last September. This initiative — itself an expression of a more interconnected world — provided academics, politicians and social actors from both Mexico and the United States with the opportunity to exchange views on the challenges and opportunities of globalization, as well as its impact on the relationship between the U.S. and Mexico.

In a session especially designed to address the issue of globalization, Lowell Jarvis, an economist from UC Davis, gave an overview of the rise in international trade and investment over the last fifty years. He pointed out that the increase in national income that usually follows a surge in exports by poor countries does not necessarily translate into better wages for workers. In fact, Jarvis told the members of the Forum, Taiwan grew rapidly for over twenty years before wages grew. Related to this, he mentioned the fact that although Chile has experienced impressive rates of economic growth over the last 18 years (more than doubling its GDP during that period), the huge income inequalities that characterize that country have remained constant.

According to Jarvis, the process by which the gains of free trade are distributed within each country is itself a political process, not an economic one. Thus, for example, income distribution would perhaps be improved in Latin America if there was a political decision to radically invest in public education, something that none of the countries of the region have done so far. The lack of strong investment in public education in this region contrasts with Taiwan and other Asian countries, which suggests that income inequality within countries participating in the global economy it is not an intrinsic element of globalization, but a contingent one that can be changed.

In the discussion that followed Jarvis’ presentation, members of the Forum discussed the challenges that globalization presents for labor rights, the protection of the environment and indigenous peoples. While some were more optimistic than others, all agreed that such a pervasive process should not be left unregulated.

continued on page 27
Cautious Optimism on Immigration

continued from page 14

Bill Cornyn’s Border Security and Immigration Reform Act of 2003, which he characterized as "a common sense solution to our broken immigration system" have received harsh public reactions, according to Gallego.

Compromise is the name of the game in creating politically feasible solutions. Despite her frustration, United States Congresswoman Loretta Sanchez (D-Orange County) also saw a brighter future. In particular, she mentioned one immigration bill about to be introduced to Congress that would allow for earned residency and even citizenship. The Senate would be broadly “on board” and President Bush would approve the legislation, she predicted.

Opening Lines of Communication

But what actions can Mexico take to support pro-immigrant legislation efforts in the United States? Relations between Mexican President Vicente Fox and his U.S. counterpart, George W. Bush had appeared extremely warm before Sept. 11. Since then, communication between Mexican interior minister Santiago Creel and Tom Ridge, the U.S.’s head of Homeland Security, has also been positive. Yet, dialogue between the two nation’s legislatures has remained limited. Mexican congresswoman Amalia García Medina (PRD-Mexico City) suggested that what is continually referred to as a “migrant population” might better be characterized as a binational one, whose needs demanded a dialogue between the representatives from both the migrant sending and receiving communities.

Solutions to the need for increased binational communication could include the creation of a North American Parliamentary Union (NAPU) and the increased involvement of the Mexican consulates in the United States. The NAPU was proposed jointly by David Bonior, formerly the Democratic Whip in the House of Representatives and now Professor of Labor Studies at Wayne State University, and Mexican economist Carlos Heredia, a prominent adviser to his country’s Democratic Revolution Party (PRD). Professor Bonior told the forum that the NAPU would help bring stability to a binational relationship that currently tends to focus only episodically on important issues such as immigration.

Mexico’s consular network in the U.S. could also be used to create additional channels of communication, and opportunities for more involvement by Mexican officials, suggested UC Berkeley Professor of Ethnic Studies Alex Saragoza. He recalled an event, organized in Sonoma by the Mexican consulate in San Francisco, attended by many local representatives. Apart from being congenial public relations opportunities, such efforts have the potential to create dialogue between Mexican immigrant communities in the U.S. and their representatives back in Mexico. The infrastructure of the Mexican consular system would also provide the means to facilitate dialogue between community leaders and political representatives. Similarly, another forum participant, Ricardo Obert, CEO of a Mexican chemicals company, proposed the creation of a specialized, bipartisan team of diplomatic personnel within the Mexican congress.

In conclusion, conference convener Harley Shaiken, Professor of Geography at UC Berkeley and Chair of CLAS, reminded participants that efforts such as the forum itself contributed to improved communication between Mexico and the United States. With the U.S. economy continuing to offer work to Mexicans — and with Mexicans able to earn dramatically higher wages in the U.S than at home — continued immigration, illegal or otherwise, seems inevitable. Managing that immigration will be just one among many challenges faced by Washington and Mexico City. It will be up to a strong coalition of concerned politicians and citizens in both countries to decide what conditions and dangers these immigrants endure during their journeys north. In an era when NAFTA has facilitated the movement of commodities and production facilities across the southern border of the United States, it seems inevitable that considerations of migrant labor must eventually be addressed.

Shannon Gleeson is a graduate student in the Department of Sociology.

California State Senator Gilbert Cedillo, author of the California bill allowing undocumented immigrants to obtain a driver’s license.
For initially offering President Bush unerring support without demanding specific concessions in return.

The bill would mark the second time that Mexican communities in the U.S. have played a major role in Fox’s presidency. The first came before Fox even took office. On the campaign trail in 1999 and early 2000, he proactively sought their support with flying visits to the U.S. and tributes to the immigrants’ honesty and industry as they sought to better themselves, lauding them as patriotic “heroes.” That unprecedented rhetoric was a stark contrast to the official disdain that illegal immigrants had previously met with, not just in the U.S., but even in their own homeland. As an electoral strategy it may well have contributed to Fox’s eventual victory.

A fresh focus from Fox’s government on relations with U.S. legislators could also help them in their efforts to bring about the desired immigration package. Previously, the Mexican president’s policy for dealing with the U.S. has revolved almost exclusively around the executive hub and, more specifically, his personal relationship with President Bush. But the U.S. President’s initial slowness to push for an immigration deal followed by the shocking intervention of 9-11 has illustrated the shortcomings of this single-track approach.

A new effort to build bridges to the U.S. Congress and state-level political leaders could therefore provide the Mexican administration with an escape route from the current impasse. In early November, Fox returned to U.S. soil, visiting Texas, New Mexico and Arizona. During meetings with the three state governors, the President lobbied for support for an immigration package. More such high-profile visits from the popular Mexican chief executive to U.S. senators and congressmen with large Latino constituencies could help them electorally. It would also encourage them to push for an immigration package and motivate U.S Hispanic voters to organize. A concerted effort to show U.S. legislators what efforts are being made to economically develop migratory sending regions within Mexico might also lead to a better understanding from beltway insiders of the complex demographic and economic challenges that Mexico faces. Workers’ remittances sent from the U.S. to Mexico are now running at more than $1 billion a month, providing a major push to the Mexican economy and even prompting the federal government to offer to match local development funds provided by expatriates in the U.S. to their communities of origin.

Mexican and U.S. members of their countries’ respective congresses could also benefit from deepening and broadening their currently limited and uninstitutionalized channels of communication. Although the economic fates of Mexico and the U.S. are now closely intertwined through NAFTA, the treaty’s principal rights-holders are corporate. One way of filling this gap in the treaty’s scope would be a North American Parliamentary Union (NAPU), proposed again by forum participants David Bonior, formerly the second ranking Democrat in the U.S. House of Representatives and now a Professor at Wayne State University’s College of Urban, Labor and Metropolitan Affairs, and economist Carlos Heredia, a former PRD congressman and currently Vice President of the Mexican Council of International Affairs. Although initially limited in scope and powers, such a parliamentary union could, in time, blossom into a powerful, representative institution to allow the citizenry in all three NAFTA member countries to balance their interests with those of the corporations on issues such as the environment, labor rights and migration. Meeting regularly, it would also provide continuity in relations between members of the U.S., Mexican and Canadian legislatures, especially when most needed.

As the horror of Sept. 11 recedes into memory, its impact on U.S.–Mexican relations remains critical. Only now, more than two years after the attacks, does the question of a comprehensive immigration package appear to be moving back up Washington’s agenda towards the prominence it had on Sept. 10, 2001. Perhaps one positive permanent outcome could be the realization that the binational relationship is important, even to a superpower like the United States, and demands a transparent and accountable political institution to help navigate both the crises and the quotidian challenges of that relationship.

Simeon Tegel is a graduate student in the Latin American Studies M.A. program at UC Berkeley. He worked as a freelance journalist in Mexico City from 1999 to 2003.
Seven black-robed judges listen to Edmundo Castillo and Rosenaldo Castro, pugnacious lawyers for the Nicaraguan government, visibly irritated by the preposterous idea that the “Illustrious Nicaraguan State” be brought to court by Awas Tingni, a small indigenous community. At one side of the courtroom are three lawyers from the Organization of American States (OAS) — formally presenting the case — and James Anaya, an indigenous law expert and special counsel for the community. The room is packed with observers, including about 20 Awas Tingni community members. The atmosphere is tense.

Since the early 1990s, Awas Tingni had experienced increasing incursions into territories they consider theirs, most dramatically through a government logging concession granted to a multinational company. Awas Tingni attempted to use the Nicaraguan courts to protect their land rights, to no avail, and turned to the OAS Human Rights Commission. After two years of unsuccessful mediation, the Commission filed a petition on behalf of Awas Tingni in the Inter-American Human Rights Court, based in San José, Costa Rica. The petition cited violation of three articles, including Article 21, “Rights to Private Property,” of the Inter-American Human Rights Convention. For the first time in the Convention’s 30-year history, Article 21 was applied to property held collectively and validated by traditional occupancy rather than legal title.

I had approached the trial at the Inter-American Human Rights Court in hopes of contributing useful expert testimony; the idea of carrying out a cultural critique of the proceedings could not have been further from my mind. But the issue runs deeper. After all, the trial transcript is a 240-page treasure trove of claims and counter-claims, calling out for this kind of scrutiny. In the face of that call — which I do
heed to some extent — this article is an attempt to rationalize my adamant rejection of cultural critique as resting place.

My argument unfolds through a juxtaposition of activist research and cultural critique. By activist research I mean the methodological development of a political alignment with the people who are the subjects of research, and the construction of a dialogue with them about that research, its purposes and applications. A commitment to activist research has led me, together with my friend and colleague Ted Gordon, to take on two large studies of black and indigenous land rights, one in Nicaragua and one in Honduras, both funded by the World Bank. One might ask how it is possible to do “activist research” when the funding comes from an institution like the World Bank?

During the spring of 2002, while this Honduras research was still underway, a Garifuna activist intellectual named Gregoria Flores visited Austin and gave her answer to that question. One of the most articulate and acute activists I have met in 20 years work in Latin America, Flores recounted her organization’s successful campaign to stop a Bank-funded tourist project until Garifuna land claims to the area were adjudicated. Reluctantly, the Bank agreed to fund such a study. Sharply critical of Bank policies and neoliberal ideology, Flores concluded her talk: “We are using the system to fight the system.”

Now the words that come to mind are those of the poet Audre Lorde. Her famous dictum — “The Master’s Tools will never dismantle the Master’s house” — could be read as explicit criticism of Flores’ strategy. For many, progressive works of cultural critique contribute to this same re-visioning of politics that Lorde inspires. In contrast, I direct us to the improbable meeting ground between Flores and Lorde: there may be no way to begin casting off the Master’s tools of our trade, except by putting them to use in radically alternative ways, following Flores’ contradictory path of struggle from within.

Commission lawyers gave the Mexican anthropologist Rodolfo Stavenhagen the mandate, as expert witness, “to testify on the topic of indigenous peoples and their connections to ancestral lands.” Ancestral rights, Stavenhagen explained, were “the rights that a community enjoys, by virtue of historical continuity with its pre-Hispanic origins, to maintain its identity as a self-identified indigenous people.” In conclusion, Stavenhagen told the court: “There is an old saying, that an Indian without land is a dead Indian. And I think this is valid for many of the indigenous populations in our countries… This concept is deeply rooted in the culture of the indigenous peoples themselves; it is something that, unfortunately, those of us who live in the cities, who have become disconnected from our natural origins, often do not completely understand.”

Government lawyers tried a number of tacks to discredit the Awas Tingni claim. Early on the government argued that community members could not possibly use all the land they claimed. This assertion was trumped by a remarkable sequence of cross-examination of Jaime Castillo, a monolingual community leader:

Nicaraguan State: Señor Castillo, could you tell us what distance you normally travel to hunt and fish?

Witness (through an interpreter): In the whole area that we have marked off as ours, we carry out different activities, given that there is no other way to earn a living.

Nicaraguan State: Excuse me, what distance do you travel to hunt and fish?

Witness: He does not specify distances, rather, he thinks in terms of the area as a whole; it doesn’t interest him to be measuring distances from here to there.

Nicaraguan State: But really, the Nicaraguan State wants to know this distance.

Witness: In this case, the government has the obligation to come to our community, and see for yourself, rather than asking these questions without ever

continued on page 25
During the Second World War, labor shortages increased the need for Mexican labor and in 1942, the Bracero Program formalized the migration that was already taking place between both countries. Although there was a formal process for Mexican workers to enter the country, many laborers entered the U.S. outside the program, and the United States exercised a policy of benign neglect for those who entered through the back door (Calavita, 1992). In some cases, unauthorized crossers were escorted to the border and later brought back into the United States as legal braceros. In addition, the Border Patrol was discouraged from deporting unauthorized immigrants, in many instances, until there was no longer a labor shortage. To make things even simpler for employers, the Texas Proviso of the 1950s made employers immune to any risk involved in employing unauthorized immigrants (Calavita, 1992).

Although the U.S. approach was not designed to stop immigration or to remove Mexican workers already in the United States, there was concern over Mexican immigration even in these early years. Two periods saw especially strong opposition that led to major repatriations of workers: the Great Depression and the 1950s, during which Operation Wetback was launched. However, many immigrants were leaving voluntarily during the Depression, thereby reducing the number of Mexicans in the United States in the 1930s. Moreover, the deportations in the 1950s did not lead to shortages because the INS either legalized a large number of immigrants, “exchanged” illegal workers for braceros, or increased the number of temporary immigrants to ensure an ample supply of workers for employers (Calavita, 1979).

The first numeric restriction on Mexican immigration did not take place until 1965, when Mexico was placed on a Western Hemisphere quota of 120,000 visas annually (Fix and Passel, 1994). Since then, appeals for immigration controls have increased and our policies have become ever more restrictive. Nevertheless, the number of unauthorized entries has increased. Today, we have one of the most ambitious border control policies in U.S. history. At the same time, we also have the largest number of unauthorized immigrants. The latest estimates from the Division of Customs and Borders are that we are spending about $3 billion a year trying to deter illegal immigrants from crossing the U.S.–Mexico border. This budget is greater than the federal aid to states and local governments in 2002 for vocational and adult education ($1.8 billion), one of the major programs states use for immigrant integration (Statistical Abstract, 2002, Table 412).

Despite this spending, the latest estimate of unauthorized immigrants is that there were approximately eight million unauthorized immigrants in the United States in 2001 and more than half are believed to be from Mexico (Bean, Van Hook and Woodrow-Lafield, 2001). This population is larger than the population of 39 different states and is more than twice the number of unauthorized immigrants in the United States at the time of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), passed in 1986.

The pattern of Mexican unauthorized immigration, which has been characterized by its temporary nature, also appears to be changing to a more permanent settlement in the United States (Reyes, Johnson and Swearingen, 2002). Part of the explanation for the change is the maturation of social networks for Mexicans in the United States and the IRCA legalizations. However, the build-up at the U.S.–Mexico border may have also made it necessary for people to stay in the United States and not risk a return. Some of these migrants may have preferred to come to the United States to work and return to Mexico, but U.S. policies are making that migration pattern increasingly difficult.

People on both sides of the immigration debate argue that these numbers indicate the failure of current U.S. Immigration Policy. Some argue that we should put even more resources at the U.S.–Mexico border. The basic premise of the U.S. border control policy is that increased enforcement will force immigrants to give up their efforts to cross illegally. However,
apprehension does not deter illegal immigration. As long as people can earn substantially more in the United States than in Mexico, as long as children cannot afford to go to school and as long as Mexicans feel that their country has little to offer to them, they will continue to come, whichever way they can.

It is also true that U.S. businesses continue to rely on unauthorized labor. In some industries, like agriculture, construction, hotels and restaurants, immigrant labor is indispensable. It is hard to imagine the economic aftermath if the estimated eight million illegal immigrants working nationwide were gone overnight.

Moreover, their contribution is not limited to low-skill, low-wage labor: Immigrants are rebuilding many communities in the United States. Immigrants are generating cultural, social, political and economic energy throughout the nation. As the Chicago Tribune puts it, “The population and economic prospects of large metropolitan areas like Chicago would have shrunk if it hadn’t been for large influxes of immigrants, legal and illegal.”

An alternative to increased enforcement is the creation of legal avenues for immigration. There are three guest worker bills being debated in Washington. One of them is the Agricultural Jobs, Opportunity, Benefits and Security Act of 2003, the so-called AgJOBS Act. This legislation would grant temporary legal status to farm workers who came here illegally but have worked in agriculture for 575 hours or 100 days during the 12 consecutive months between March 1, 2002 and August 31, 2003. Their spouses and children would be allowed to stay in the United States but would not be allowed to work during the period of temporary status. If temporary workers labor an additional 360 days in agriculture over the next six years, they and their families will qualify for permanent residency and, eventually, citizenship.

However, this law would apply only to those who work in agriculture, and, most unauthorized workers no longer work in agriculture. Consequently, broader sets of policies are being discussed in both houses. Republicans McCain, Kolbe and Flake introduced a guest-worker bill in the House of Representatives (H.R. 2899) that would create two types of visas — one for foreigners who want to enter the United States to work and the other for illegal immigrants already holding jobs here. In addition, Republican John Cornyn introduced a plan in the Senate (S. 1387) that would let

continued on page 24
foreigners apply to work on a year-to-year basis for up to three years. Of these two bills only the MaCain-Kolbe-Flake bill deals explicitly with some of the issues that have been of greatest concern: not tying workers to employers, not limiting the program to agriculture and allowing for the readjustment of status. It also deals with issues of families of temporary workers.

Although a move in the right direction, these efforts must to be accompanied by a comprehensive regional development plan in Mexico. Some programs in Mexico match immigrants’ remittances with government moneys, and there are new types of banking opportunities being created, but these programs are partial and remain at the state level (Carrillo, 2004). The political will is lacking in Mexico to create a comprehensive federal plan that addresses issues of health, education, housing, employment and infrastructure development in sending regions. Also critical is the participation of the United States in helping the Mexican government with these efforts. The United States and Mexico started the Partnership for Prosperity to coordinate their efforts in economic development, but so far the emphasis has been on business development and not on the regional development, poverty reduction, health, educational and housing reform that are critical for real progress to take place.

Creating legal avenues for Mexican immigrants in the U.S. will improve conditions in the United States and will better respond to our economic realities. But it should not be expected to solve all the problems. The long-term solution to unauthorized immigration rests on creating economic opportunities in Mexico and the enforcing of labor standards in the United States. Unless Mexico makes the commitment to create opportunities at home and the United States recognizes a common destiny with Mexico and cooperates in creating realistic long-term policies, the pattern of unauthorized immigration will persist.

Bibliography:

Belinda I. Reyes is a research fellow at the Public Policy Institute of California.
Eventually, the government, sputtering with frustration, was forced to ask the question in a way that Jaime Castillo was comfortable answering. In the process, the government lost the specific point and proved inadvertently that Mayagna people do indeed conceptualize their land differently. My testimony, and that of Galio Gurdián, co-director of the Nicaragua indigenous and black land rights study, helped to rebut another government objection. We assured the Court that overlaps between the claims of Awas Tingni and neighboring communities was no cause for doubt. Common throughout the region, we explained, these overlaps were an expression of traditional indigenous land tenure.

As the trial proceeded, government lawyers focused increasingly on the question of ancestral rights. While the observation that “indigenous people” lived in the region prior to the arrival of the Europeans is uncontroversial, proving “continuity” between contemporary indigenous groups and a discrete group of pre-Hispanic inhabitants is more problematic, a fact not lost on Castro. He told the judges: “The only proof in support of the supposed ancestral occupation of these lands that they claim is a document constructed solely on the basis of oral testimonies of the interested parties, a study that has no documented source, no archeological evidence, not even testimonies of the neighboring communities.”

Castro concluded in a seemingly conciliatory tone, offering to grant Awas Tingni title to community lands in non-ancestral areas. He apparently reasoned that if the ancestral rights argument disappeared, the entire claim would collapse, or better yet, revert to the generic category of claims by landless peasants, who, if they are lucky, receive a miserable 10 hectares per person from the Agrarian Reform Ministry.

Anaya then used his final arguments to give the legal strategy a new twist, contrasting the “modern” approach that states may follow in response to indigenous people’s claims with another, which, though Anaya did not name it, is associated with the past. I will call it the “backward” approach. The backward approach seeks to assimilate indigenous peoples, “stripping away their cultural attributes, their cultural essence, preventing them from prospering in the lands where they have lived.”

The modern approach, in contrast, is found in recently approved international laws, backed by the United Nations, which “strengthen the cultural essence, the lifeways of indigenous peoples, assign value to indigenous religious and philosophical beliefs (cosmovisión) and to their relations with the land.” Anaya gave the word “modern” and its cognates a striking amount of air time in those final minutes. For example, to refute the objection that the Awas Tingni are too mobile to have formed a continuous bond with a specific area of land, Anaya told the judges: “According to the modern criteria of the modern approach, reflected in the modern judicial instruments, it doesn’t matter how much you move around; what matters is the continuity of a historically constituted group, which maintains traditional traits and patterns. This has not been disputed.”

Modernity was a space the judges, and the Illustrious Nicaraguan State, imagined themselves to occupy, especially in contrast to the Mayagna. Anaya had simply added a key attribute to that space: judges and states, if they are indeed truly modern, recognize and affirm the rights of indigenous communities. After lengthy deliberations, the judges delivered a sentence that resoundingly supported the Awas Tingni.

Commission lawyers used the system to fight and, if legal precedent matters, change the system. Yet to prove Awas Tingni had special rights, the lawyers were virtually obliged to “essentialize” Mayagna culture. This contradiction, specific to the Awas Tingni case, finds an echo in broader struggles for land rights in Central America. Economic conditions in Honduras and Nicaragua are nothing short of desperate. The specter of starvation, virtually unknown since
CLAS annually funds 25-30 graduate students to carry out summer field research in Latin America and the Caribbean. Grants are awarded to students from a range of departments and professional schools. The following is one example from among many varied research projects carried out in the summer of 2003.

Karen Levy, a graduate student in the Department of Environmental Science, Policy and Management, traveled to Ecuador this summer to study the impact of road-building on the spread of infectious waterborne diseases in the northern coastal region of Esmeraldas Province, where a new road is opening up previously remote villages to the outside world. In development studies, roads tend to either be sanctified, as sources of new wealth that bring people closer to health care and other services, or vilified, as bearers of environmental devastation, disease and increased disparities in wealth. However, very little research has been done to study their actual effects. In her project, Levy explored the linkages between environmental change and health outcomes for people living in the region. She carried out a demographic census, mapped the study villages, trained local health promoters to collect surveillance data and studied the webs of contact amongst individuals within and between villages.
After debating the most important aspects of globalization, the discussion centered on the impact this process is having on Mexico and the United States. The participants agreed that these two countries have become so interdependent that it would not be an exaggeration to say that, in spite of the fact that they are two distinct states, they constitute “overlapping societies.” The U.S. and Mexico share common problems and should therefore start working together to solve them. This is apparent when it comes to immigration, an issue that remains a source of conflict and even tragedy, after decades of constant Mexican migration to the United States.

One of the virtues of the debate that ensued was that it provided concrete examples of such abstract notions as “transnational citizenship,” that so often are used to describe the new features of a globalized world. For example, one of the Mexican congressmen told the audience that candidates for public office in that country now feel compelled to go to U.S. cities such as Chicago to campaign, due to the thousands of Mexican voters who live north of the border and vote regularly in the elections of their country of origin. Another participant told the audience that of the nearly $8 billion that Mexican workers residing in the U.S. send to their relatives in Mexico, more than a $1 billion is lost in fees paid to intermediaries. These two anecdotes represent very telling images of the degree to which globalization has changed the very nature of politics and citizenship in these two countries. Given this context, the innovative proposition advanced some time ago by one of the participants in the forum, David Bonior, for creating a North American Parliamentary Union that would bring together politicians from the U.S., Mexico, and Canada to discuss issues of common concern for the peoples of all three countries, seems like common sense.

Javier A. Couso is an Associate Professor of Law and Political Science at Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago, Chile.
Activist Research v. Cultural Critique

continued from page 25

the 19th century, has returned. One of the only viable offers to support efforts toward demarcation and titling of black and indigenous lands comes from organizations like the World Bank, responsible, in a general sense, for the economic devastation from which these communities suffer. The Bank offers a Faustian bargain: recognition of multicultural rights in return for endorsement — implicit or otherwise — of the cultural, political and economic project of neoliberalism. Few can flatly refuse.

If anthropologists aligned with these organizations follow them into the Faustian pact, we live the same contradictions. We use the language of science to defend the claims that our research documents, the same language that our graduate students decry as the oppressive “logocentrism” of Enlightenment reason. We certainly do not face the risks that the organizations themselves assume, but we do place reputation and conscience on the line, asserting that we are, on balance, advancing efforts toward social, economic and racial justice. This assertion was borne out in the modest contribution that our study made to the Awas Tingni court victory. Yet if anthropologists opt to live the contradictions, we inevitably go beyond cultural criticism, to produce knowledge from within the same spaces that our political allies are forced to occupy. Positioned in this way, we engender a more acute understanding of these processes, because we are forced to think through and decide how to act upon the very dilemmas and problems that activists themselves confront.

Activist research requires us to stand in two disparate intellectual worlds. One foot is planted in the rarified space of cultural critique: generating the best analysis that empirical research and theoretical reflection can muster. The other steps towards positivist law, demographics, geographic information systems and other technologies of objective social science — the very realms that cultural critics have deconstructed. It is not a comfortable resting place. It requires deft deployment of varied intellectual registers and it leaves our audiences edgy and discontented. But this may be a necessary concession to brute realities. It surely entails a more accurate reflection of the contradictory struggles of the people with whom we are allied and, more important still, the kinds of knowledge they need us to produce.

References Cited


Charles Hale is Associate Professor of Anthropology and Associate Director of the Teresa Lozano Long Institute of Latin American Studies at the University of Texas, Austin. Professor Hale spoke at the Center for Latin American Studies on March 17, 2003.
reportedly donated money to then-Governor Pete Wilson of California, the author of the infamous proposition 187. Several Latino politicians and advocacy groups, however, came to the defense of the merger, which will reinforce Univision’s grip on Spanish language broadcasting in the U.S. with obvious benefits for its Mexican partner, Televisa.

The ripple effects of Televisa’s far-flung interests and media clout are not lost on political parties in Mexico, as the 2006 presidential elections loom on the horizon. One of the ironies of the PAN’s successful break of the PRI’s stranglehold on Mexican politics has been the campaign costs of a more open political system; political competition has made for a financial drain for the contesting parties and a bonanza for the Mexican media, Televisa most importantly. As a result, the political grumbling in Mexico has led to growing talk of reforming the relationship between the media and politics. Much of the discussion has focused on the public financing of electoral campaigns as a means of lessening the burden of campaign costs, primarily that of paying Televisa for prime airtime. After the July 2002 midterm elections in Mexico, it was reported that Televisa raked in about $35 million from political advertising.

Thus far, no formal proposal has been made to the Mexican congress, while President Vicente Fox has offered mixed and vague views on the matter. With a round of major gubernatorial contests in Mexico slated for 2004, the current discussion of this issue will likely move toward the submission of formal legislation on the matter. This question will also complicate the discussion about Mexican citizens who reside in the U.S. but wish to vote in Mexican elections. The state of Zacatecas, for instance, is considering a means to have its citizens living in the U.S., participate in next year’s (2004) elections for governor. Some analysts estimate that as much as half of the state’s voting age population may reside in the U.S. for much of the year. Thus, this is no small matter for the contending parties in Zacatecas, which will force them in effect to pay Televisa for airtime on both sides of the border. And all of Mexico’s major parties stand to gain — or lose — in any legislative effort to reform campaign financing via radio and television.

In 1985, the Australian-born media tycoon and majority owner of News Corporation (e.g., Fox Network), Rupert Murdoch, became an American citizen as a means of evading FCC rules on foreign ownership of U.S.-based media. A story in the Los Angeles Times in July 2003 suggested that Emilio Azcarraga Jean has made noises about moving to the U.S. for perhaps similar reasons. Stay tuned…

Alex Saragoza is a Professor of Ethnic Studies at UC Berkeley.
The Unidad Popular represented the only moment in Chilean history in which political reality seemed about to change, when a self-conscious mass of people existed who believed they were about to achieve effective positions of power, who believed that they governed or were about to govern.

So what led to the defeat on September 11, 1973? This question has fueled relentless self-criticism on the part of the Left in Chile. Although I continue to affirm the central ideas that I held then, I now believe it is necessary to take another look at the Unidad Popular coalition and re-evaluate its nature and purpose within the historical context.

The Unidad Popular arose in a bipolar world and in a time in which revolutions were both possible and desirable. Even though revolutions had suffered more defeats than victories, some indeed had triumphed during the 20th century: the Mexican Revolution in 1910, the Soviet in 1917 and later, the Chinese Revolution and the fight for national liberation that had revolutionary results in Yugoslavia, Algeria and other countries and the Cuban Revolution in 1959.

Within Chile, moreover, the Unidad Popular and the government of Salvador Allende comprised a unique event in a very disciplined history. This was the Chile of landowners and bishops and of those who lived off the rent of the sodium nitrate and copper mines — it was the Chile of those who later profited from the state protection of a nascent national industry. The Unidad Popular emerged out of that orderly Chile which had traditionally been governed by
just a few.

The Unidad Popular included the Communist Party as well as leftist Christian groups. The Communist Party, a huge, disciplined force, had a clearly defined political view shared by all its members. Its most moderate positions coincided in large part with those of the president. However, like all of the left, the Communist Party was a prisoner of its strong adhesion to rigid theoretical precepts that had been constructed in the doctrinaire debates of the international and national Marxist movement. In Chile, the Party was never able to accept Allende’s thesis that socialism could be constructed without the dictatorship of the proletariat. There was, as I pointed out thirty years ago, a mismatch between the actors and the project.

On the one hand, the members of Chile’s Communist Party shared Allende’s plan and on the other, it maintained, in theory at least, a desire to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was contradictory to attempt to move toward socialism by democratic means while proposing this as a goal. Even though an argument was made that it was a form of democracy, everyone understood that the dictatorship of the proletariat was, in reality, the suppression of the other parties. The examples of Russia and the other countries of Eastern Europe proved that point.

The Unidad Popular coalition was not the only force on the Left. There were at least two others that should be mentioned: the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR) and the Socialist Party. The MIR was a party that advocated a more radical leftist agenda than the Unidad Popular. Although it never attained electoral success, the MIR was a significant force because it garnered support and exerted considerable influence among the young as well as in the poor neighborhoods and the countryside.

The Socialist Party in Chile was comprised of, among others, anarcho-syndicalists, socialist libertarians and the Trotskyites who had split with the Communist Party. As a group, they held a variety of Marxist and social-democratic views; some sectors held positions very similar to those of the Communist Party and other sectors were ideologically closer to the more radical MIR. A large and important segment, however, held views that were consonant with that of President Allende.

The Socialist Party believed itself to be the melting pot party, but it did not always achieve an effective synthesis of the views held by its members. As a result, there was a good deal of divisiveness about the so-called “Chilean way” and its proposal of nonviolence. Allende himself admitted that the Unidad Popular’s revolution was a process that could require violence, but a defensive violence: “contra la violencia reaccionaria, la violencia revolucionaria” (“against reactionary violence, revolutionary violence”). There was also a very important wing of the Socialist Party that believed in the inevitability of conflict. History appears to support their view, but one must admit that it also could have been a self-fulfilling prophecy.

There was one great actor on the Left: Salvador Allende and Allende-ism. Allende was a personality and he made important contributions beyond what has traditionally been recognized. First, Allende, who was a member of parliament for many years, was a political negotiator. He practiced politics 100 percent. There was no political space that Allende did not occupy, with both his strengths and his weaknesses. He ran four presidential campaigns on the platform of unity among the workers.

Second, and this is a point I want to stress, is that both in practice and in the theories that he expressed in his written works, Allende formulated an implicit criticism of the Chilean Left. In a subtle but effective way, he criticized the scholarly leftist parties who read texts and made biblical interpretations of Marx, who paid too much attention to processes that had occurred in other realities.

Another trait of Allende’s that has been insufficiently appreciated is that he was uncompromising on certain core principles. He refused to extradite the Argentine revolutionaries who fled to Chile from Trellew jail, in spite of those who made strong arguments in favor of doing so. He did not accept the conditions that the Christian Democrats imposed, which consisted of the formation of a government made up of the military and technocrats who would have the power to remove mid-level civil servants because he believed that this would constitute a relinquishing of the Unidad Popular project.

The opposition from the Right was made up of three parties. Its fascist spearhead was undoubtedly Patria y Libertad (Motherland and Liberty), but it could also count on the National Party, traditionally the choice of the continued on page 36
The women laboring in Chile’s fruit and vegetable export industry are no longer poster children for the damage wrought by neoliberal economic policies. According to Walter Goldfrank, professor of Sociology and Latin American & Latino Studies at UC Santa Cruz, they have instead become a struggling but distinct new interest group in the Chilean labor scene.

Women make up more than half of the workforce employed to pick and clean the table grapes, stone-fruit and kiwis that flourish in the fertile valleys of the country’s Andean foothills. The majority of these rural female workers are temporeras, or temporary workers, said Goldfrank. This means they work without benefits and without a contract, or with one that only officially employs them for a short period of time. But, said Goldfrank, they have brought a new dynamic to the labor landscape in Chile. Unlike other groups of workers, who organize and operate through Chile’s Labor Ministry, they tend to work more with the government agency SERNAM (Servicio Nacional de la Mujer), which more directly with women’s concerns. So, while rural female workers actively press for formal work contracts including work benefits and enforcement of pesticide regulations, they also are lobbying for household-related alternatives such as community kitchens and daycare options, issues which have not typically been union concerns.

Chile’s export agriculture sector boomed in the late 1980s and early 1990s when a new demand for fresh, rather than canned, produce emerged in the United States and Europe. Chile’s counter-seasonality allowed it to send its summer crop of fruit to the Northern Hemisphere while the latter’s fields lay fallow for the winter. According to Goldfrank, a number of factors have contributed to what has become known as the “Chilean Miracle,” a national move into new export products such as kiwis and cranberries. These factors included the expansion of Chile’s proletariat during the socialist administration of President Salvador Allende, heavy investment in ports and highways during the years of the Pinochet dictatorship, state-sponsored marketing campaigns in Europe and the U.S. and increased technical assistance to help growers assure quality control.

But the “Chilean Miracle” has come at a high price. The expansion of large industrialized farming has seen the emergence of pesticide problems and increased infant mortality. Smaller farmers have been squeezed out of business. Meanwhile, control of the lucrative industries of fruit packing and shipping remain in the hands of transnational corporations. And, according to Goldfrank, the boom has also brought two key factors to play in the Chilean labor dynamic. First, the work environment has become highly gendered. Women pick and clean the fruit, while men are involved more with planting, spraying and machine operation. Second, the workforce now lives primarily in Chilean urban centers and is bused into agricultural areas only to labor in the fields.

In the early 1990s, Goldfrank researched worker demographics in the Aconcagua Valley, a strip of fertile farmland 80 miles northeast of Santiago, in the shadow of the Andes. Working in conjunction with the Aconcagua Valley Project, a program educating farmers to shift to organic production of table grapes, Goldfrank interviewed field workers from local communities.

He found that almost 90 percent of workers only had short, temporary contracts, often long expired. Women made up 63 percent of the labor force and earned between $6 and $9 a day during the low-season but more during the harvest when they often worked shifts of 14 to 16 hours. Ten to 15 percent of workers were found...
to live in extreme poverty, which surprised the researchers, who had expected a higher percentage of laborers to fall into this demographic. Ninety-two percent owned televisions.

Pesticide regulations were only sporadically complied with in the valley, with only a quarter of growers keeping their workers out of the fields the recommended 24 hours after the application of agro-chemicals. Almost half of the workers reported medical problems.

Living in conditions of harsh poverty, and with few worker protections, the women laborers have been perceived by many to be victims of the expanding neoliberal export agriculture business. Struggling to feed and clothe their families, working with SERNAM on issues specific to their concerns, women farm workers in Chile have ceased to be these poster children, said Goldfrank. Instead, they have become a special interest group with a political influence that, even if small, was inconceivable a little over a decade ago.

Daniel Lavelle is a grad student in the Department of Latin American Studies.

Walter Goldfrank is Professor of Sociology and Latin American & Latino Studies at UC Santa Cruz. He spoke at CLAS on September 29, 2003.

A Chilean temporera sorts apples for the export market.
The trade policies of Latin American countries have led to very different levels of success. While Chile is reaping large economic gains from its international trade relations, other countries such as Argentina have benefited to a far lesser extent from external trade. Conventional wisdom holds that these different outcomes are due to low state capacity to implement long-term plans in the less successful countries.

In a joint presentation Professor Vinod Aggarwal and doctoral student Ralph Espach, of UC Berkeley’s Department of Political Science, challenged this view. Presenting results from a volume they edited with Joseph Tulchin, Director of the Latin America program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, they highlighted the way the trade policies of Latin American countries are guided by different strategies that yield varying political and economic outcomes. They illustrated their argument with case studies of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Chile.

Professor Aggarwal introduced the theoretical framework for their analysis of trade policy. He classified trade governance according to product scope (few vs. many) and actor scope (uni-, bi-, mini- and multilateral), generating a matrix with eight fields. As the scope of actors varies, trade governance is expected to have different advantages and disadvantages, both politically and economically.

Most Latin American countries engage in cross-sectoral agreements, or agreements that cover many products, according to the analyses of Aggarwal and Espach. Among the case studies, Mexico and Chile stand out with a very high number of trade agreements, many of them bilateral. Based on their trade strategy, the four countries were classified as follows:

Argentina is a “regional partner.” The focus of its trade policy is minilateral, regional agreements.

Brazil is a “regional leader.” While, like Argentina, it emphasizes regional, minilateralism, it is also active in negotiations for multilateral agreements.

Chile is a “multilevel trader.” Its trade policy includes unilateral liberalization, bilateral, geographically dispersed agreements and multilateral activities.

Mexico follows a “hub market strategy”. It focuses on bi- and minilateral agreements, taking advantage of its position as the “entrance door” to the U.S. market.

Espach went on to explain how Mexico’s hub strategy is centered on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Its close ties to the U.S. have led to high economic growth rates and dramatic increases in exports and foreign direct investment. Furthermore, this strategy has turned Mexico into “a market that cannot fail” as could be observed during the U.S.-led bailout package during the 1995 “Tequila Crisis.” A third benefit that Mexico receives from NAFTA is the institutional learning process that comes from close cooperation with U.S. counterparts.

The downside of Mexico’s approach is the limits it sets to autonomous economic and political action. Economically, Mexico is highly dependent on the U.S. business cycle. The recent downturn in the United States has slowed Mexico’s growth to 0.9 percent in 2002. Politically, Mexico cannot risk a crisis in the relationship with its major trading partner. If the U.S. economy remains weak, these ties might form a threat to Mexico’s political stability.

Argentina’s strategy as a regional partner also brought economic gains at the cost of political autonomy, but on a much smaller scale. Strongly centered on the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), Argentina’s economy showed high growth rates while Brazil boomed but was hit extremely hard by the devaluation of the Brazilian Real in 1997. This blow was exacerbated by the fact that the Argentine peso could not devaluate because it
was tied to the U.S. dollar. MERCOSUR created regional security in the 1980s and proved a useful platform for further trade negotiations in the early 1990s, but the Argentine government failed to extend its trade ties during these good times. Moreover, trade negotiations with outside partners such as the EU and the Andean Pact were complicated by Argentina’s membership in MERCOSUR. According to Espach, Argentina’s overall trade policy was guided by short-term considerations and a lack of a long-term vision.

Brazil, a regional leader, also centered its trade policy on MERCOSUR, but complimented this with a strong extra-regional focus. Since trade plays a much less important role for Brazil than for Argentina, both costs and benefits from its strategy were very limited. Politically, Brazil fared considerably better than its neighbor to the south. Due to its size and regional importance, Brazil, like Mexico, “could not be allowed to fail” and received benevolent treatment from lenders. Additionally it managed to take a prominent position in international negotiations such as the World Trade Organization and the Kyoto protocol. Overall, Brazil’s strategy can be described as a careful “hedging” of both domestic costs and international risks. While successful in minimizing risks, some opportunities, most notably expanding ties within MERCOSUR, have been missed.

Chile can be considered a multilevel trader. Starting in the 1970s it unilaterally liberalized much of its trade legislation. Since then, the country has been engaging in bilateral trade agreements around the world and has been very active in multilateral negotiations. This strategy has resulted in large gains from trade with a high degree of political flexibility. The professionalism of Chile’s trade negotiators gives it an edge in multilateral talks. Furthermore, many countries such as South Korea have used Chile to gain experience in bilateral economic agreements since any agreement with Chile bears little domestic cost. This has helped Chile reach very beneficial terms. However, Chile’s eclectic net of partners provides no strong political bonds and might be a threat to security when international tensions arise.

Aggarwal and Espach provided a remarkably clear and well-structured account of the different options and strategies for trade policy. Their analytical framework proved very effective in shedding light on the reasons for the varying outcomes of trade strategies. Questions about the causes of different strategy choices and evidence supporting the strategic nature of trade policy might, nevertheless, have merited closer attention.

Sebastian Karcher was a visiting scholar in the Department of Political Science at UC Berkeley during the 2003-04 academic year.

Professor Vinod Aggarwal and graduate student Ralph Espach spoke at the Center for Latin American Studies on April 7, 2003.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categorizing Modes of Governance in Trade</th>
<th>Actor Scope</th>
<th>Bilateral</th>
<th>Minilateral</th>
<th>Multilateral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Product Scope</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Few products (sectoralism)</td>
<td>Quotas or tariffs on specific products. Repeal of Corn Laws (1)</td>
<td>U.S.–Canada auto agreement (2)</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community (4)</td>
<td>Information Technology Agreement (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many products</td>
<td>Tariffs such as Smoot–Hawley, or APEC IAPs (7)</td>
<td>U.S.–Canada free trade agreement (8)</td>
<td>NAFTA, EU (10)</td>
<td>FTAA, APEC, EU–MERCOSUR (transregionalism) (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mexico–Chile free trade agreement (9)</td>
<td></td>
<td>GATT or WTO (globalism) (12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
oligarchy, and on the Christian Democracy, a centrist party that was supported in large part by the middle classes. Each party’s opposition to the Allende regime forged a link that united these otherwise disparate groups. The Right understood two very important facts early on: 1) that it would need Patria y Libertad to drive the process forward and, 2) that it had to maximize its influence over the Christian Democrats. A virtual battle for the Christian Democrats ensued. The Right expertly engaged in the fight, knowing that winning was a prerequisite for putting an end to the Unidad Popular government. The Unidad Popular did not, I believe, conduct itself with the same skill.

It is important to note that big business was behind the National Party and Patria y Libertad. In Chile, even today, the overlapping of economic power and rightwing politics is almost absolute. On the other hand, business associations, which were identified with the middle class, were also important actors. These associations were the principal actors in the October 1972 strike. While the parties were busy making elaborate plans, it was the truck-owners’ association, the factory owners, wholesalers and retailers, in other words the various branches of commerce, who launched the October strike.

The international backdrop of these events was the Cold War world. In those years we lived in a world in which the two great powers were competing for the planet. This context is crucial in explaining what happened during the period of the Unidad Popular coalition. The Cold War experienced by the citizens of Prague — who were invaded by Soviet tanks in 1968 — was not the same as that experienced by the citizens of Santiago. In reality, Chileans were not threatened by Soviet tanks. The Communist world was theoretical and it exerted an ideological influence in Chile via political parties and the Cuban Revolution. On the other hand, the direct political and financial intervention of the United States was both significant and decisive.

Trade unionism became a significant force, and the unions logically lined up behind Allende. In addition to trade unionism, another form of social organization emerged which generated discussion and debate. I refer to the so-called “cordones industriales” (workers’ coordinating committees). These were groups of union and social leaders in the country’s industrial belts that combined the leadership of unions with that of neighborhood organizations and the Popular Distribution Committees (JAP) who distributed food in times of scarcity. These coordinating committees were constituted in areas of industrial concentration.

None of these actors or organizations remained inert. They all went into action simultaneously at the top and at the bottom. An unavoidable dimension of any analysis is the relationship between the top and bottom. The cordones industriales confronted the unions and the political parties because they wanted autonomy. This generated a demand from the bottom that influenced the direction of the process and pressed Allende to go farther, to push the limits. Allende’s political base also wanted to go further and insisted that the governmental authorities and the President of the Republic adopt a more radical position. They wanted to give a different rhythm to the process.

Some of the parties were converted into virtual battlegrounds. One of these was the Socialist Party. In the Socialist Party everything was open for debate: Allende, the MIR, the Cuban Revolution and the Communist Party. A second battleground was the Christian Democracy that, more than a centrist party, was a social doctrinaire platform from which the Unified Popular Action Movement sprang in 1969; the Christian Left split off in 1971. To be fair, the splintering of these groups did not leave Christian Democracy without any leftist tendencies because progressives like Radomiro Tomic, among others, did not leave the party.

But the right continued to exercise a pitiless force over the Christian Democracy and in the end, the most conservative spirit of the party dominated. It is a debatable point, but I am convinced that the dialogue Allende opened with the Christian Democracy, against fierce
socialist opposition, never bore fruit because of forces that were already operating inside the party.

The third and final battleground was the Armed Forces. With respect to the Armed Forces, one has to ask: “Why didn’t it occur earlier? Why did it take three years for them to stage a military coup?” What I would like to suggest is that there had to be something in Allende’s military policy that allowed the Armed Forces to abstain, in general, from any action against a revolutionary process that had as a goal a break with the past. They behaved this way, I believe, because they were imbued with a respect for the law that was finally exhausted, breaking under the pressure from the right and the influence of the United States.

Was the Unidad Popular’s project viable? Yes, I believe it was possible. There are no linear revolutionary processes in which everything comes together perfectly like the pieces of a puzzle. There were decisive moments for Unidad Popular. In some moments, much could be done, in others, little, in still others, almost nothing. The critical moments, I think, were the following:

- The municipal elections of April, 1971. The Unidad Popular received 51 percent of the vote, and there were some who called for a plebiscite in order to form a constituency, approve constitutional reform or call parliamentary elections.

- The assassination of Edmundo Pérez Zujovic, a high-level leader in the Christian Democracy, in July of 1971. It was carried out by an extreme leftist group that had no relation to the Unidad Popular or the MIR. But it ended up severely distorting Christian Democracy’s view of the Unidad Popular, and they distanced themselves from the coalition.

- The nationalization of copper. This was a great moment. The move was unanimously approved in the Congress, and it opened up the possibility for the government to broaden its base of support. It was unable to capitalize on the opportunity.

- The strike of October, 1972. By that point, the distance between the Unidad Popular and Christian Democracy was very great. Attempts were made to foster dialogue between the two parties. There are those who claim that the Socialist Party was responsible for the failure of these discussions. As I already mentioned, I do not share that vision.

- The parliamentary elections of March, 1973, when the Unidad Popular received 43 percent of the vote and kept the opposition from gaining a two-thirds majority in Congress. The right debated whether to attempt to impeach the president — which would require a two-thirds vote — or to stage a coup. In reality, with the parliamentary elections of ’73, the right was convinced that the constitutional route was

continued on page 38
impossible and that a coup was their only option.

- The frustrated coup attempt of June, 1973, the “Tancazo,” that would serve as a test to see what the reaction would be to an event of this nature. The attempt was put down by General Prats without any members of the military having to exchange fire.

- General Prats’ forced resignation from his role as Commander in Chief of the Army in August of 1973 and the very unfortunate choice of his successor, General Augusto Pinochet, made by President Allende.

These last two moments corresponded with the military’s abandonment of its traditional respect for legitimate authority and opened another possibility for Allende and the Unidad Popular. I have already mentioned the plebiscite and the agreement with Christian Democracy. But there was a third possibility, which on occasion was toyed with during the Unidad Popular’s three years in power: the exercise of legal power in relation to the Armed Forces. Legally, the president could replace the commanders in chief as well as high-ranking officers.

Three options existed: a political accord in the parliament, a plebiscite which took the matter to the people and finally the use of presidential power over the military, which could eventually have led to a different outcome. President Allende worked tenaciously on the first option. He turned then to the second, making the announcement on Sept. 11, 1973, when circumstances were already critical for the government. In any case, as demonstrated with his defense of La Moneda, the presidential palace, Salvador Allende never considered surrendering the program put forth by Unidad Popular or declaring the project a failure.

Jorge Arrate is President of the Universidad ARCIS in Santiago de Chile, ex-President of the Socialist Party of Chile and former minister during the Allende, Alwyin and Frei administrations. He was Chile’s Ambassador to Argentina under President Lagos.

Amb. Arrate will be teaching a course titled “Argentina and Chile: Democracy and Integration” in the spring of 2004 at CLAS.
Professor Jorge Wilheim
Urban Planning: Innovations From Brazil

The Rio Branco Institute of Brazil and the Center for Latin American Studies are pleased to announce the appointment of Professor Jorge Wilheim as the Rio Branco Visiting Chair of Brazilian Studies at UC Berkeley for spring 2004. His one-month seminar is open to graduate and advanced undergraduate students and will cover several themes in the history of urban planning in Brazil.

Jorge Wilheim was formerly the Deputy Secretary-General of Habitat II. A well-known Brazilian architect and town planner, he has been, at different times, the country’s Secretary of State for Planning and for the Environment and São Paulo’s President of the Planning Department.

Paulo Lins
Novelist

The Brazilian Ministry of Culture and the Center for Latin American Studies are pleased to announce the appointment of Paulo Lins as the Mario De Andrade Chair of Brazilian Culture at UC Berkeley for spring 2004. Mr. Lins is the author of the novel City of God, upon which the award-winning film of the same title is based. Mr. Lins will be in residence during March 2004.
Magical Mexico: Paintings by Xavier Castellanos

Center for Latin American Studies
University of California, Berkeley
2334 Bowditch Street
Berkeley, CA  94720-2312
clas@uclink4.berkeley.edu
Tel: 510-642-2088
Fax: 510-642-3260
clas.berkeley.edu