Colombia 2002

The images coming out of Colombia are graphic: violence, guerrillas, paramilitaries, drug lords and displaced peasants. A decades-long insurgency has escalated sharply during the 1990’s, fueled by funds from the emergent drug trade. The bloody conflict poses a seemingly intractable set of challenges for Colombia, the region and, increasingly, the United States.

In an ongoing effort to understand the issues confronting contemporary Colombia, the Center for Latin American Studies sponsored a five-part spring series, “Colombia 2002,” designed to bring distinguished scholars, policy makers, and public intellectuals with distinct perspectives and expertise to Berkeley.

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This spring the Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) probed the conflict in Colombia, its historical roots and contemporary prospects in a series called “Colombia 2002.” Professor Charles Bergquist (University of Washington), Colombian writer Alfredo Molano, and Professor Mary Roldán (Cornell University), all examined issues informing the present traumas.

The series also sought to go beyond the conflict. Enrique Peñalosa, the former mayor of Bogotá, explored humanizing Third World cities and Professor Marco Palacios, the former rector of the National University, examined the power of Colombian economists. Finally, we introduce a new “Viewpoint” series in this issue with an opinion piece on Colombia by Robert Collier, a foreign-affairs columnist and reporter at the San Francisco Chronicle who has covered Latin America extensively.

CLAS was also pleased to introduce a new series entitled “Neighbors in a New Era” on the realities and possibilities of the U.S.-Mexico relationship. Democratic transformation in Mexico and the emergence of the Latino vote in the U.S. are transforming politics on both sides of the border, and increasingly what happens politically in Mexico influences U.S. politics and the other way around. We began a dialogue, reported on in this issue, that included Professors Denise Dresser and Sergio Aguayo, two prominent Mexican scholars and public intellectuals, and Antonio Villaraigosa, the speaker emeritus of the California Assembly and an important U.S. political actor.

Professor Rosemary Joyce reports on her research with Professor Christine Hastorf on “Cacao in Mesoamerica: The History and Economic Impact of Chocolate.” Professor Joyce is the recipient of a National Science Foundation grant that grew out of a CLAS pilot faculty research award.

Finally, CLAS is pleased to announce the inauguration of the Mário de Andrade Chair in Brazilian Culture, named in honor of the noted Brazilian modernist poet. The chair will contribute in major ways to an already vibrant program on Brazilian art, literature, and music at Berkeley.

Harley Shaiken
Chair
In the first of a series of public conversations, two Mexican academics and a U.S. Latino political leader engaged over the possibilities offered by Mexican President Vicente Fox’s insistence on a new era in U.S.-Mexico relations.

“We are in the middle of a fundamental transformation in the way we Mexicans see the United States, how we perceive the U.S. and how we have decided finally to defend our interests with a different and more assertive attitude,” said Sergio Aguayo, a founding member of the Mexican Academy of Human Rights and a professor at the Center for International Relations at El Colegio de México.

“The United States treated Mexico with disdain and indifference in the 19th Century and then took us for granted, and that is over,” he said. “It is not going to be possible to take Mexico for granted, for good or for bad.”

Denise Dresser, a columnist for Reforma and Proceso in Mexico City who also teaches in the political science department at Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, and Antonio R. Villaraigosa, California Assembly Speaker Emeritus and former Los Angeles mayoral candidate, agreed.

However, it quickly became clear that domestic politics in the United States complicated Fox’s efforts.

The conversation, “The U.S. and Mexico: Neighbors in a New Era,” is part of a larger effort by the Center for Latin American Studies to contribute to the debate on U.S.-Mexico affairs by asking prominent Mexican and U.S. academics, officials and public intellectuals to consider the shape and character of a new policy. To that end, the Center invited Dresser and Aguayo to teach month-long seminars at Berkeley.

The panel on April 12 was one of several discussions—private and public—in which U.S.-Mexico relations have been addressed.

“This is a new program that the Center will be sponsoring to explore the U.S.-Mexican relationship—where it is today and where it might be able to go in a way that improves the relationship and improves the lives of people on both sides of the border,” said Harley Shaiken, the chair of the Center.

In a sense, the discussions have flirted with a central question that Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda described in a private
Colombian journalist Alfredo Molano offered a sociologically rich set of explanations for the peculiar intransigence of Colombia’s guerrilla organizations and their connection to drug trafficking. Molano’s presentation, given at the Center for Latin American Studies on March 7, centered on peasants: their involvement in land invasions, their displacement by armed conflict, and their interaction with guerrillas. Although his assessment of the current situation was not optimistic, he did provide valuable insights into the social, political, and economic sources of the ongoing conflict.

Molano approaches history as a journalist—collecting testimonies from participants in the conflict, whether peasants or guerrillas. He has focused on two major themes: colonización (colonialization) of land invasions by peasant squatters, and desplazamiento interno (internal displacement) of citizens by armed conflict. The connections between these two phenomena, forged by violence, are at the crux of his argument.

To account for these linkages, Molano pointed to the thwarting of agrarian reform. He emphasized the 1930’s, a period in which the Liberal Party government undertook a broad series of reforms, including agrarian reform. The Conservative Party abruptly halted these initiatives in 1946, a year that Molano identified as the start of the civil conflict known as la Violencia (the Violence). At first, this conflict was partisan; the Conservatives and Liberals fought an undeclared war through private armed groups.

As the conflict spread, it evolved from a political to a social struggle. By 1956, purely partisan groups had been shut down, but non-party groups continued fighting over access to economic resources. Under military dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, the state declared war on the guerrillas. During this period, the guerrillas were an amalgam of many different armed groups, including combatants who had been involved in the struggle over agrarian reform and colonización. As state forces gained the upper hand, the guerrillas retreated to the eastern plains region and began recruiting more former colonos (peasant squatters) into their ranks. The conflict between the state and the guerrillas became intimately connected with the struggle between landowners and peasants. Two new opposition groups emerged: colonos and guerrillas.

Rojas Pinilla was deposed in 1957, and the Liberal and Conservative parties reached an agreement to end partisan conflict. Despite this settlement at the national level, peasant organizations in the countryside did not

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As the crisis in Colombia escalates, it is important to stand back and place the current situation in historical perspective. What I would like to do, in particular, is examine some of the paradoxes of Colombian history as they affect the Colombian left. I will do this in part by comparing several historical developments in Colombia to those of other Latin American countries.

The first paradox is this: the same country that confronts such a powerful leftist guerrilla movement today—a guerrilla movement so strong that it threatens the integrity of the Colombian nation itself—has had historically one of the weakest lefts in the hemisphere. Moreover, the terms of this paradox are related. Because the Colombian left was so weak historically, it developed the strategies and tactics—and the intransigence at the negotiating table—that are the hallmarks of the Colombian guerrilla today.

Colombian political parties of the left, indeed third parties in general, have never been able to crack the political monopoly of the two traditional Colombian political parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives. Unique among the major nations of Latin America, Colombia still has two important political parties, both of them formed in the middle of the 19th century. Throughout the 20th century, even in very recent times, the left has typically garnered only a tiny percentage (less than five percent) of the vote in presidential elections.

This paradox can be illustrated in a different and striking way by comparing income distribution and electoral support for the left in Colombia and in Brazil today. Income distribution in recent years is more regressive in Colombia and Brazil than in other major Latin American countries. Yet the degree of support for labor candidates currently running for president in the two countries could hardly be more distinct. In Brazil, José Ignacio da Silva, “Lula,” the candidate of the Labor Party (PT), is currently leading all contenders in the polls. In contrast, in Colombia Luis Eduardo “Lucho” Garzón, the former head of the largest labor federation, is near the end of the pack of a half-dozen presidential candidates. He currently has the support of less than 2 percent of prospective voters. Garzón is one of the most intelligent candidates and effective speakers the Colombian left has ever placed before the voters. He has taken enlightened and sensible positions on the questions of drugs, peace, and social reform. Garzón’s platform is a reasoned, moderate alternative to the neo-liberalism of the other...
Truth commissions are appearing all over the world. While there has been considerable debate concerning the nature and meaning of such commissions, the consensus is that the phenomena are on the rise. Who has the power to determine the truth about the past? How will this “truth” about past atrocities influence power relations in the future? What does it mean to have such discussions relegated (and possibly confined) to the space of a truth commission?

To explore these questions, I observed the experiences of truth commissions in Guatemala and South Africa for my dissertation in geography at UC Berkeley (“The Body of the Truth,” 1999). Clearly, the unique circumstances of each nation’s conflict influenced the experiences of each truth commission. Yet both shared two key features common to the genre: the commissions were established following a period of bitter violence, and during a negotiated political transition.

First, in each case the truth commissions arose out of demands to address a history of intense violence, and the systematic violation of human rights. Furthermore, the nature of this violence had been systematically denied. In both Guatemala and South Africa, the nature of the violence contributed to pressures to investigate, discuss, and acknowledge the details of the repression. The nature of the repression provoked demands for an official re-presentation of a history that had been ignored, denied or covered-up. For example, in Latin America, the principle of “the right to the truth” was a response to practices of repression such as los desaparecidos (the disappeared), extra-judicial assassinations, and other forms of violence that have been called deniable forms of repression.

Agents of the state, suspected as the perpetrators of these crimes, operated within the security of state-sponsored impunity, and investigations and prosecutions were rare. Ignacio Martin-Baro, a prominent social psychologist and Jesuit in El Salvador, wrote in 1989 (shortly before his assassination by the military) that the power of this particular form of terror was the state’s ability to deny that such crimes were happening while simultaneously making the entire society aware that it could kill with impunity. Establishing the truth became important, precisely because the regime was able to carry out its terror by lying, presenting distortions of the truth or covering up important information.

Secondly, in both Guatemala and South Africa, the truth commissions emerged within a negotiated political transition. The negotiated transition involves compromise and accommodation; the particular equation reached in negotiations is predicated on the balance of power between the parties to the negotiations. For example, in South Africa, the negotiation process that led to the dismantling of apartheid and the institution of a more inclusive electoral democracy was preoccupied with concerns regarding the fate of those conducting the negotiations. The National Party clearly feared that majority rule would bring civil and criminal
procedures against its members; its leadership argued that members of the security forces would refuse to cooperate with and thereby threaten the process if they thought that such a transition would result in jail sentences. The African National Congress eventually accepted amnesty as a part of the truth commission process in order to placate members of the security forces otherwise capable of obstructing the transition.

The important point is that though each of the truth commissions were mandated to address the suffering caused by the violence, it is the balance of power among those negotiating the transition that dictates the terms under which such commissions operate. Although established in the name of “the victims,” both the Guatemalan and South African truth commissions were designed by the protagonists in the conflict—parties more interested in amnesty than truth. It is this tension that shaped the experiences of the Guatemalan and South African truth commissions. Even as other arenas, like battlefields, are pacified through peace treaties, many of the problems that gave rise to the conflict remain in dispute. Truth commissions are therefore sites of struggle.

The practices of these two truth commissions were quite distinct. In South Africa, the process was extraordinarily open for public consumption and participation. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1996-2002) conducted public hearings throughout the country, making the front page on a regular basis, and provoking comment from many areas of the political spectrum. In addition to witnessing the public performance of participants providing testimony, for my research, I interviewed scores of people about what that experience meant to them. Staff members and commissioners were also available and eager to be interviewed. Moreover, a crew of journalists covered the truth commission on a regular basis.

In contrast to the South African experience, in Guatemala the Commission to Clarify the Human Rights Violations and Other Acts of Violence that Have Caused the Suffering of the Guatemalan Population (1997-1999) was an extremely closed affair. From its conception, through its term in operation, through the writing of the final report, the Guatemalan truth commission was shrouded in secrecy. Staff members were required to sign an oath of secrecy, swearing that they would refrain from discussing any information relating to the work of the truth commission. The Guatemalan press was equally in the dark, and rarely published reports concerning the truth commission. These obstacles existed within the already dangerous terrain of conducting social research in Guatemala. To even broach the subject of the violence and its meanings, much less to raise the question of responsibility, was venturing into dangerous terrain.

Yet even in circumstances in which the truth commission, as mandated, appears incredibly weak, and the internal situation in the country seems to preclude an extensive truth-telling project, it is important to remember that many surprises can occur. In South Africa, poet Antjie Krog writes, “The vocabulary around the Truth Commissions has changed from phase to phase, but the word that turns up
In recent years, Colombia has achieved international notoriety for the highest homicide and internal displacement rates in the world. It is also known as the largest single source of narcotics smuggled into the United States, and host to the Western Hemisphere’s oldest guerrilla insurgency. The emergence of armed leftist revolutionary groups in the 1960’s and narco-trafficking in the 1970’s marked the beginning of what most analysts call Colombia’s contemporary violence. The spread of illicit organizations dedicated to processing and commercializing marijuana, cocaine and heroin, along with the leftist insurgency, have made Colombian violence more acute during the last two decades. The roots of persistent conflict, however, may be traced back to an earlier phenomenon known as la Violencia (the Violence) which took place between 1946 and 1966.

As a result of la Violencia, an estimated 200,000 Colombians died. Over two million more Colombians either migrated or were forcibly displaced from their homes. The majority never returned. The impact of la Violencia was so great that it provoked Colombia’s only 20th century military coup, and led to an unprecedented agreement between the Liberal and Conservative parties to alternate control of the presidency and share political power for nearly 20 years.

On the surface, linking la Violencia with Colombia’s current drug-fueled and armed violence of the right and left may seem unsubstantiated. Mid-century conflict has been CONTINUED ON PAGE 10

Nidia Rojas and her son, refugees from Colombia’s conflict, sit in their make-shift tent outside of the Red Cross building in Bogotá.
For a man from a war-ravaged place like Colombia, Enrique Peñalosa is surprisingly cheerful. The former mayor of Bogotá said he did not come to Berkeley to talk about Colombia’s bloodshed or booming narcotics trade. Instead, he wanted to talk about the dangers of driving on sidewalks.

“In my country, we are just learning that sidewalks are relatives of parks—not passing lanes for cars,” Peñalosa said, earning laughs among the some 200 people who crowded into the Doe Library for his presentation titled “Towards a More Socially and Environmentally Sustainable Third World City” on April 8. Peñalosa enthusiastically described his efforts to inspire more pedestrians in this city of nearly seven million perched high atop the Andes. “God made us walking animals,” he said, as part of the “Colombia 2002” series sponsored by the Center for Latin American Studies. “We need to walk to be happy.”

Keeping Bogotá’s sidewalks clear of traffic is just one part of Peñalosa’s ambitious vision for a new kind of Third World metropolis. This vision could well propel him to candidacy in Colombia’s next presidential election—a possibility that he will neither confirm nor deny. But whether his talk at Berkeley previewed future campaign promises or not, the tall, silver-haired Peñalosa articulated his ideas with the grace of a skilled politician.

While serving as Bogotá’s mayor from 1998 until December 2000 Peñalosa spearheaded a dramatic makeover for one of the world’s more dangerous cities. He ordered the construction of over 70 miles of bicycle paths, more than 1,000 parks, restricted car use during rush hours, and modernized the bus system. He brought electricity, water and schools to the city’s poorest neighborhoods, and planted more than 100,000 trees.

And he did not stop at mere physical improvements. Among the many accomplishments listed on his curriculum vitae, Peñalosa said he “[l]ed the transformation of a city’s attitude from one of negativist hopelessness to one of pride and hope.”

At times during the talk, Peñalosa came across as a municipal Robin Hood, contesting traditional notions of land use. Take, for example, the exclusive country club in one of Bogotá’s tonier neighborhoods that Peñalosa sought to convert into an open access park. Or the public bicycle paths he wants to run through the gardens of the rich. He called these proposals “urban land reform,” and the controversy they provoke “the ideological debate of our time.”

As is the case all over the developing world, Bogotá has grown dramatically in recent years as job-hungry peasants stream in from the countryside. High-density expansion is Peñalosa’s antidote to U.S.-style suburban sprawl. In Bogotá, which would be 20 times as

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large as Atlanta if it had the same number of people per hectare, restricting car use is a question of survival, Peñalosa said. He imagines a city of wide promenades, where the classes can mingle peacefully on foot as they go about their business—a place where money does not determine the quality of life. “If we define our value by income alone, we are condemning ourselves to be losers for the next 500 years,” he said. “Happiness is what it should be all about.”

Although Peñalosa belongs to the Liberal party and leans to the left on issues of public space, he advocates a strong central government, and stricter law enforcement. Part of Colombia’s violence is due, he believes, to the public’s lax attitude towards rules.

Peñalosa’s critics accuse him of authoritarianism—a label he challenges. The orderly, green urban environment he envisions will promote democracy and protect the poorest people, he said. Law-abiding places like Denmark and Sweden are his inspiration, but in order to reach their level of sophistication, he said, the Colombian government must first gain legitimacy in the eyes of its people.

When asked about his strategy for coping with the estimated two million people displaced by the war, Peñalosa called those numbers "exaggerated." He said most of the rural migrants flood to cities like Bogotá in search of economic opportunity, not because they are fleeing violence. Peñalosa also did not address the issue of rural poverty. While he admitted that internal refugees are a problem, he did not mention specific plans to help them. “We have to treat all displaced people in the same way,” he said.

Ultimately, it is the city—not the countryside—that lies at the heart of Peñalosa’s plan to rebuild Colombia. A city where people are no longer afraid or resentful of their neighbors, and where class differences are minimized by generous public space and eco-friendly transportation.

Peñalosa is determined to remain upbeat about his country’s future. “Urban reform is the most urgent—and the easiest to make happen,” he said. “There is nothing more important than building schools, roads and parks.”

Annelise Wunderlich is a graduate student in journalism and Latin American studies.
untapped statistical and archival data—public order reports, government communiques, the private correspondence of regional and local officials, and interviews with participants and survivors—all paint a more complex picture of regional violence.

Early episodes of violence resulted in very few casualties. During the first phase from 1946 to 1949, sporadic violence mainly occurred in “core” towns—communities that were densely populated, centrally located and integrated economically and politically. Disputes arose over either electoral fraud and intimidation or out of political appointments and state-determined patronage hiring. In most core towns—even those with a Liberal majority or where the Liberal opposition controlled public offices—officers of the regional Conservative government responded to partisan violence with negotiation rather than repression. In fact, the inhabitants of many core towns actively opposed attempts—often made by non-local political appointees or selective regional extremists—to promote partisan violence. They did this partly out of a local tradition of bipartisan cooperation, and partly to prevent possible repercussions of violence on the local economy.

Core town residents shared common characteristics that enabled them to deploy non-violent means to pressure the regional state to stop violence. They had democratic mechanisms to express political dissent, such as popularly elected town councils and locally paid and appointed public order officers. They had a tradition of negotiating power with the regional state, either directly or through mediation by important private producer associations like the Federation of Coffee Growers. Core inhabitants also were bound by bonds of kinship, shared economic interests and common cultural values. They perceived themselves as “white,” hardworking, legitimately married, religiously devout and politically conservative—regardless of their political affiliation. The relationship between citizens and the regional state in core Antioqueño towns was reciprocal, but unequal. This bargain made it possible to use negotiation instead of force to impede the severity and spread of la Violencia.

In 1949, 75 percent of deaths officially registered by the governor’s office that listed violence as the cause of death occurred in core
towns. By 1950, however, the pattern shifted. Official violence-related deaths numbered in the hundreds and were concentrated in towns located in the furthest southwest. Half of the more than 4,000 people killed by violence registered by the governor’s office between 1949 and May 1953, were killed in just five municipalities: Dabeiba, Puerto Berrio, Urrao, Cañasgordas and Remedios—all located on Antioquia’s periphery. With the exception of the highly populated southwest, all of these areas with high casualties were the least populated in Antioquia.

Like core areas, peripheral areas and their inhabitants also shared cultural practices and distinct ethnic or racial identities. Compared to core inhabitants, who represented themselves and were seen by the regional elite in positive terms, peripheral residents embodied dissidence, rebellion, licentiousness, barbarity and laziness in official discourse. The periphery, unlike the core, was colonized largely by migrants from other Colombian regions or by groups perceived to be racially inferior to the Antioqueño-held “white” ideal.

Towns in the periphery experienced explosive growth in the decade before la Violencia. The bulk of Antioquia’s extractive industries—logging, gold mining and oil production—and its capital-intensive production—cattle ranching and commercial agricultural production—were concentrated in peripheral towns. Antioquia’s only access to the Caribbean Sea and to the ports of Colombia’s strategic lifeline—the Magdalena River—were located in peripheral areas like Urabá and the middle Magdalena Valley. Despite the periphery’s extraordinary strategic and economic value, the government had invested very little to improve the lives or win the loyalty of local inhabitants. Periphery residents viewed regional authorities as representatives of a colonial power that exercised its power by forced imposition and repression rather than negotiated consensus.

Violence on the periphery took the form of armed bands, some organized by members of the Liberal party, others mobilized by local Conservative extremists. The two contenders rarely met state forces—police, army and customs officers—in direct confrontation, preying instead on civilians, especially workers and poor settlers. Outside the core, certain sectors of the regional government spearheaded violence to achieve political control over historically uncooperative and politically left-leaning populations. They deployed the police and

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A displaced family waits to board a boat in San Pablo, about 200 miles north of Bogotá.
As I write, Kirsten Tripplett, a UC Berkeley postdoctoral researcher, collects botanical samples from cacao plants in Mexico. Tripplett is doing research for a program that she, Professor Christine Hastorf, and I proposed to the National Science Foundation (NSF), to develop ways to identify direct evidence of cultivation of cacao, the botanical source of chocolate, in archaeological sites. After further collecting in Belize and Honduras, Tripplett will work in the McCown Archaeobotany Laboratory that Professor Hastorf directs, experimenting with the samples she has collected and simulating the effects of cacao processing and discard in ancient settlements. She will produce a reference collection for comparison to fragmentary plant remains recovered from archaeological sites like Puerto Escondido, Honduras, where my ongoing excavation project is exploring the possibility that cacao production was a specialization as early as 1000 B.C.

Why this interest in the early history of cacao? When archaeologist Rene Millon titled his 1955 doctoral dissertation, “When Money Grew on Trees,” he captured the European fascination with the use of cacao as a standard of value for economic exchange in pre-Hispanic Central America. The idea of currency that could be cultivated raised questions researchers have struggled to address for decades. Cacao has been credited with a central role in pre-Hispanic societies, in the negotiation of social relations through marriage, the maintenance of political hierarchies marked by privileged consumption of cacao by elites, and in the performance of rituals from the household to the polity. Early colonial descriptions of the place of cacao in the economy of the Mexica (or Aztec) tribute state have been used as models for understanding much earlier economies in Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, Honduras and El Salvador. These modern countries occupy territory where the plant, whose closest relatives are from northern South America, was cultivated and consumed in the 16th century A.D., when Spanish observers described cacao as a form of currency critical to long-distance trade.

Despite the centrality of cacao in models of pre-Columbian economies, actual evidence for its use prior to the period of Spanish colonization has been limited. Artistic representations of trees with wrinkled pods growing directly from the trunk, a diagnostic of cacao, have been identified in a few places in Guatemala, Belize, and Mexico dating to the Classic period (between 250 and 1000 A.D.), when Maya city states flourished in the same area. Modeled ceramic cacao pods and seeds, some so realistic they were originally mistaken for preserved plant remains, were recovered in sites of the same age in western Honduras and on the Pacific coast of Guatemala. Jars of foamy brown liquid depicted in historical manuscripts from Oaxaca, dating from 1000 to 1500 A.D., have been tentatively identified as cacao beverages. And some historical linguists have suggested that the word cacao itself spread around 1000 B.C. from a proposed original center of cultivation for the plant on the Mexican Gulf Coast.

These indirect indications of a history of the use of cacao are too scattered to allow researchers to say where cacao was grown, how...
On April 30th, 2002 the Center for Latin American Studies and the Brazilian Ministry of Culture proudly inaugurated the Mário de Andrade Chair in Brazilian Culture with a celebration of art, literature and music from Brazil. Benedito Nunes, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the Universidade Federal do Pará, delivered a lecture on *Poesia e filosofia*, followed by a selection of music by Heitor Villa Lobos. The event honors the work of Brazilian modernist poet, Mário de Andrade.

Professor Nunes is a Visiting Professor in the Department of Spanish and Portuguese at UC Berkeley this semester.

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**Inspiration**

São Paulo: tumult of my life...
My loves are flowers made from the original...
Harlequinate!... Diamond tights... Gray and gold...
Light and mist... Oven and warm winter...
Subtle refinements without scandals, without jealousy...
Perfumes from Paris ... Arys!
Lyrical slaps in the Trianon... Cotton field!

São Paulo! tumult of my life...
Gallicism crying in the wilderness of America!

– Mário de Andrade

Where even at the height of summer there were storms of wind and cold like unto the harshest winter.

-Fra. Luis de Sousa
Memories of Berkeley

Our flight from the mouth of the Amazon River in Belém, Pará in the extreme north of Brazil to Berkeley, Calif. took 17 hours. My wife and I flew from the 12th to the 13th of January; it was as if we had begun to go around the world. Was it worth it?

After being here for almost four months and weighing the fatiguing trip with what the university has had to offer, I believe it was well worth the journey for the following reasons: the wonderful reception to my classes; the polemic character of those classes; the rich intellectual sharing with students and fellow professors; and, last but not least, the enchanting beauty of the campus.

I teach an undergraduate class about the Brazilian short prose writer and novelist Clarice Lispector, whose work is appreciated internationally and translated extensively into English, and whose texts continue to awaken intense interest. The pleasure this class gives me is repeated in my graduate seminar on modernist Brazilian poets—those of the caliber of Carlos Drummond de Andrade, Manuel Bandeira, Cécilia Meireles, Murilo Mendes, Jorge de Lima, João Cabral de Melo Neto and Mário Faustino. Not all of them are well known in the United States, but each is comparable to the best poets of the English language. We have appreciated and discussed these Brazilian poets in the healthy environment of controversy that fills both my undergraduate and graduate seminars.

The ambiance of these encounters is always filled with the exchange of ideas and dialogue between students and professors—or, amongst professors, because some of my colleagues have given me the immense honor of participating in my seminars. In them, I am not so much a master as an older colleague who suggests paths and concepts to my listeners. The fruitful community that has formed among us makes up for the long journey that preceded our meeting.

I believe this enjoyable community will be transformed, later, when the impressions of the moment dissipate into the material of memory, and become an eternal source of remembrance. Perception is momentary; in memory we reclaim the moments we have lived and they constitute our cumulative past.

Beyond the memories and intellectual interchange, the constant stream of daily impressions of Berkeley will also remain with me, like a Technicolor film – the place of all places, where the forests, the grandiose and aged trees, and the scented eucalyptus seem to have arisen in tandem with the buildings of various departments.

Memories are like people, the poet Rainer Maria Rilke once wrote – I already visualize the memories of Berkeley I will keep, and they also watch me as I remember them.

Benedito Nunes
Berkeley 2002
Translated by Annette Rubado-Mejía
Psychology and Law: The Chilean Reconciliation

By Alexandra Huneeus

As a psychologist, Elizabeth Lira admitted she was baffled at first by human rights lawyers, with their arcane and sometimes contradictory legal arguments. The niceties of statutes of limitations and when they expire or discussions of whether amnesty applies to acts or to individuals seemed less pressing than the most painful question left by the Pinochet regime: what happened to those who disappeared? And why did these lawyers waste their time arguing before the very judges who had deliberately ignored thousands of claims of human rights violations filed during the dictatorship?

But it was the slow, impersonal route of law that finally ushered in Chile’s post-regime reconciliation, Lira explained during her visit March 4 at the Center for Latin American Studies. In 1998, eight years into democracy and a quarter century after the regime’s crimes began, General Augusto Pinochet was detained in London. While the media followed each step of Pinochet’s drawn-out international legal saga, a monumental change quietly took place in Chile. Judges reversed themselves and slowly began to investigate cases of disappearances during the regime from 1973-1990.

The value of the human rights lawyers’ legalese suddenly became apparent: by adopting their arguments, Chile’s judges were able to open over 500 cases in recent years. Regardless of the legal fate of Pinochet, these cases will continue for several years. Together the national and international criminal investigations have spawned a process of rethinking the past, making public official information that had previously been denied, and providing information about the fate of some of los desaparecidos (the disappeared). Reconciliation began through the adversarial medium of law.

For Chile, it was a first. Lira and historian Brian Loveman have devoted the past several years to writing the history of reconciliation in Chile by studying past political conflicts as a way to understand how Chile could overcome its current divisions. In the past, they found, amnesties held fast, and conflicts were not resolved so much as forgotten. But as any psychologist will explain, this is not a way to overcome conflict or trauma. Lira and Loveman found that the same conflicts flared up again a few years later or in the next generation of politicians.

For Lira, amnesties block resolution by hiding responsibility. Criminal investigations, in contrast, allow people to distinguish levels of responsibility, bringing nuance to an otherwise black-and-white picture. Only then does reconciliation become possible. Today Chileans are able to see that it was not the army at large that was brutally violent against civilians under the regime, but rather a few people who were involved in planning, organizing, and executing the violence.

Lira’s current work details the history of political conflict and reconciliation in Chile, focusing on the recent resurgence of...
Human Rights Leader Evaluates Fox Administration

By Rachael Post

While the Fox Administration is making strides in foreign policy, it continues to fall short on keeping campaign promises, particularly concerning security, corruption and human rights,” said Sergio Aguayo, professor at El Colegio de México and a leading expert on human rights in Mexico. Aguayo spent the month of April at CLAS teaching a special seminar on Mexico’s transition to democracy.

“Although Fox has promised to wipe out the excesses of the old regime, his administration has not,” Aguayo said as part of his talk titled “Mexico at the Crossroads: An Evaluation of the Fox Administration.” Aguayo spoke the day after Mexico’s Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda visited San Francisco in place of President Fox, whose travel abroad, in an unprecedented move, had been blocked by the Mexican Senate.

Aguayo cautioned that “regime change is going to take much longer than expected.” Although Mexico may have undergone a change in government with the Fox Administration, it has yet to undergo a change in regime, he explained during his talk.

“Mexico’s authoritarian regime was one of the most sophisticated, shrewd and ruthless regimes in the 20th century,” said Aguayo, who has a Ph.D. in international relations from John Hopkins University. In fact, he maintained that Mexico’s old regime was widely admired by other authoritarian states around the world.

After 71 years of rule, the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) still shows signs of staying-power, remaining the largest party in Congress and maintaining a number of significant governorships. “As a candidate, Fox said he was going to kick the PRI out of Los Pinos [the Mexican White House],” Aguayo explained, “But he never said he was going to destroy the PRI as a concept.” Aguayo, like other Mexican political analysts, predicts that the PRI could regain the presidency in 2006.

Yet Mexico has by no means remained stagnant. In Fox’s 2000 presidential campaign he “understood that the key word was ‘change’ because we Mexicans wanted change,” Aguayo said. From the beginning of his presidency, change was in the air. His inauguration day exemplified this. Fox started the day with early mass at the Basilica of the Virgin of Guadalupe.
(a controversial move), followed by breakfast with street children in one of Mexico City’s tougher neighborhoods. Then he went to Congress for his inauguration, and the square was filled with housewives, indios and panistas, all representing a new Mexico.

To form his new cabinet, Fox hired headhunters “to chase the best and the brightest,” Aguayo said. “Fox received 11,000 applications to join his administration.” In the National Auditorium, Fox announced his new cabinet and said he would show results in 100 days, a concept he borrowed from U.S. president Franklin Roosevelt, Aguayo explained.

“One year later his approval rate has dropped by 24 points [from 70 to 46 percent],” Aguayo said. How did this happen?

Fox entered Los Pinos riding high in popularity, but the expectations he raised were even higher. And the forces for change quickly stalled.

“One of the most difficult decisions for any new administration in a country moving from authoritarianism to democracy is what to do with the security apparatus,” he said.

Security repeatedly topped the list of priorities of Mexicans in opinion polls. Some argued for dismantling CISEN (Center for Investigation and National Security), the spy network that covers the country, he said.

The Fox administration has only skimmed the surface of this problem. Shortly after he became president, a story came out in the press that intelligence police had spied on all the presidential candidates, including Fox. Fox responded by creating a commission to examine the practice. Months later it presented a short and “very superficial report,” Aguayo said.

A number of other events quickly proved that the Fox Administration was ill-equipped to make bold decisions or maneuver through the messy process of forming political alliances with opposition members.

“Disorder was one clear sign coming from Fox’s cabinet,” he said. One day Fox criticized the PRI, the next he praised them. He felt he could not afford to antagonize the old regime, so he shifted to appeasing the PRI, Aguayo said.

And that meant, for example, that no truth commission was created to look into corruption and past human rights offenses. In April of last year, Aguayo and other human rights leaders presented a proposal for a truth commission to Fox, who put off making a decision to support it for months. Such a commission was seen as a threat to some PRI members, who would run the risk of being indicted or placed under the scrutiny of the international community, he explained. In the end, Fox chose to appease his opponents and “the truth commission was forgotten,” Aguayo said, although the president did appoint a special prosecutor.

Despite the obvious political disappointments and blunders that have characterized the change in administration, other sectors in Mexico refuse to be left behind.

“Mexican society is moving very actively and aggressively,” Aguayo said. “Perhaps it was good that Vicente Fox was not such an active president because it makes us understand that society can become an important actor in the transition.”

Rachael Post is a graduate student in journalism and Latin American studies.
Taken as a whole, the lectures explore both the roots of the contemporary trauma and other challenges Colombia faces unrelated to the violence.

Charles Bergquist, history professor at the University of Washington, spoke on “The Left and the Paradoxes of Modern Colombian History.” He focused on a particularly intriguing paradox: the same country that is convulsed by a potent guerrilla movement today historically has had one of the weakest lefts in the Americas.

Alfredo Molano, an exiled Colombian writer and social critic, utilized the format of an open conversation to address the peculiar intransigence of Colombia’s guerrilla organizations, their connection to drug trafficking and the role of peasants in agrarian reform and armed conflict.

Mary Roldán, a historian at Cornell University, examined “La Violencia in Historical Perspective: Implications for an Analysis of the Contemporary Conflict in Colombia.” She looked at the role that class, ethnicity and culture played in the state’s response to conflict during la Violencia (1946-1953) in the northwestern state of Antioquia.

Enrique Peñalosa, the former mayor of Bogotá (1998-2001) addressed the issues confronting major urban areas like Bogotá independent of the violence wracking the country. In his talk, “Towards a More Socially and Environmentally Sustainable Third World City,” he shared his vision of creating an environment where public spaces meet the needs of citizens and make them proud to be living in Bogotá.

Marco Palacios, former rector of the La Universidad Nacional and now a professor at El Colegio de México, spoke on “Knowledge is Power: the Case of Colombian Economists.” (Because Professor Palacios spoke after press time, an analysis of his talk and other related material is on the Center’s Web site at www.clas.berkeley.edu/clas.)

Cacao in Mesoamerica
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and where it circulated, and (despite historical linguistic arguments) when and where it was first cultivated. Botanical remains identifiable as fragments of cacao wood, pods, and seeds have rarely been identified. The strongest evidence of actual use of cacao up until now has come from chemical analyses of dried residues in pottery vessels preserved intact in graves. These analyses show that the material in these pots contained chemicals limited to the genus Theobroma, to which cacao belongs. Residue analyses have confirmed consumption of cacao as early as 600 B.C. in Belize. My excavation project co-director, Professor John Henderson of Cornell University, and I are collaborating with specialists to see if residues can be detected in the pieces of broken pottery that are much more commonly available in archaeological sites.

But from an economic perspective, consumption is only half of the story, so even if residue analysis turns out to be more widely useful, we still need other evidence for cultivation of the crop. Cacao served as a form of currency because the dried seeds could circulate far from their source of origin. Contrary to the image of growing your own plants invoked by Millon, cacao plants do not thrive everywhere in northern Central America. They require conditions best met in hot, humid lowlands, like the lower Ulua River Valley in northern Honduras, where I work. Converted in the 20th century to large-scale production of bananas
Sebastião Salgado: On Photography and Globalization

By Mimi Chakarova

Sebastião Salgado. I had heard the name many times. I had seen it underneath photographs that remained embedded in my memory for years: images of history, images of raw skin, sweat and blood. They were photographs that I held up for my students as proof that it is possible to become one with your work, to make it happen. Yesterday, the name that I had heard and seen so many times transformed itself into a warm handshake and a smile. Sebastião Salgado sat in my office and I had so much to say that nothing came out. I wanted to ask him how and why he has devoted 35 years of his life to documentary photography and activism. Why he paints, in shades of gray, the human condition of globalization. I wanted to ask him how he manages to shoot 200 rolls of film in twenty days. I wanted to know about those shoeboxes at home that contain 300,000 work prints instead of soft leather and laces. But most importantly, I wanted to know about the 300 photographs in four galleries on display at the Berkeley Art Museum and UC Berkeley’s Graduate School of Journalism.

I first saw “Migrations: Humanity in Transition” in New York’s International Center for Photography. I tried to absorb it, but couldn’t. I returned the next day and still felt I needed more time to comprehend the profound meaning of Salgado’s work. Fortunately for those of us in the Bay Area, the exhibit at UC Berkeley’s Art Museum was on display from January 16 until March 24, 2002. “Migrations: Humanity in Transition” and “The Children” tell the story of those who leave behind everything they know in search of a better life, work and safety. Salgado spent seven years on the migrations project and two years on research and preparation. Nine months out of the year he photographed 43 countries in Africa, Europe, Asia and the Americas. When a student asked him, “How do you connect with these people?” Salgado answered, “If you become a documentary photographer, it’s a way of life. You can’t be indifferent in your life. You must understand the story of these people. You must act along with humanitarian organizations. In the end, you write, you photograph, you film… It’s your own ideology. In the end, photography is nothing more than a mirror of the society in which you live. An image needs no translation.”

Salgado recently turned fifty-eight. He was born on a farm in Brazil. He had seven sisters. Later on he studied economics. He understands better than most that there is a price to be paid for each release of the shutter.

On Feb. 11, Salgado spoke to a diverse audience on campus as part of the Avenali Lecture series. “I met many people crossing the continued on next page
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border of Guatemala and Mexico,” he said. “Why are you going to the United States? What are you expecting? ‘Well, we want work, to get a small house. A car.’”

Migration has always existed, but as Salgado points out, never on the scale that it does now. Most listeners that night were surprised that Salgado spoke little of photography. Instead he addressed the audience by posing questions about the reality of today’s world. “How can we live in a society that’s a society for all?” he asked. “We must open our minds and have a discussion, a dialogue. We must act. We must work together. We must protect all people.”

Later in a conversation with Orville Schell, dean of the Graduate School of Journalism, Salgado was asked if he had become more or less hopeful in the last ten to fifteen years. “I’ve become less hopeful,” was the answer. “There are very few Third World countries where the second trip is better than the first. But I am not giving up hope. Photography for me is a universal language. It’s the reason. People allow you to come inside their lives. They accept you. It’s very powerful. To freeze this moment—a fraction of a second. You understand the distress of these people. These pictures are not objects. They speak of history. But the photographs alone are nothing.” “So what is the answer?” asked Schell. “That’s the question. What’s the answer?” Salgado replied, smiling at the audience.

But Salgado’s work is living proof of how one person’s efforts as a creative human being can sustain change. In 1998, he and his wife, Lélia Wanick Salgado, created Instituto Terra, a non-profit organization that promotes the reforestation of Bulcão Farm, a 1,600-acre private property in Brazil. Salgado’s hope is that reforestation will reduce rural poverty and global warming, and increase biodiversity. Salgado is currently working on a photography book on Ecuador. “I hope these photographs that are out there can help build a new society. We can achieve a much more human globalization,” Salgado said.

Mimi Chakarova is a photography lecturer at the Graduate School of Journalism.

The Left and Paradoxes of Colombian History
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presidential candidates, including the leader in the Colombian polls, Liberal Alvaro Uribe, who currently has the support of about 40 percent of perspective voters. To be sure, there are many reasons for the different success of these two labor candidates in the two countries, but Garzón’s poor showing is consistent with the extremely limited appeal of left-wing parties and candidates in Colombia throughout the 20th century.

The explanation of the weakness of the Colombian left is of paramount political significance today. The left itself, particularly the guerrilla left, attributes its electoral failings to repression, a repression it contends is particular and congenital to the Colombian state since the time of independence. The left has pointed to the deadly fate of the Patriotic Union (UP) party. UP was formed by the largest Colombian guerrilla group, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), following the so-called peace accords signed with the government of Belisario Betancourt in 1984. In subsequent years, hundreds of UP members were killed by right-wing forces. What the guerrilla left fails to acknowledge, however, is that the truce it signed with the government never resulted in a cease-fire. The FARC’s simultaneous pursuit of armed struggle and peaceful electoral politics during these years made the UP particularly vulnerable to state and private repression.

But the weakness of the left in earlier decades is more revealing and calls out more strongly for an explanation. Both the Communist Party and the Reformist Party (UNIR), founded by Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, were forced by electoral failure to ally themselves or meld with the Liberal Party in the 1930’s. As a Liberal, Gaitán became the most popular politician in Colombian history and his death at the hand of an obscure assassin in 1948 unleashed what was known as la Violencia, the partisan warfare between Liberals and Conservatives that convulsed the nation for a decade. The left, particularly Marxists, have tried to interpret la Violencia as an aborted social revolution. But while economic and
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conversation with California educators about California-Mexico relations: “Either there is a special relationship or there is not.”

And if there is, he said, it means cooperating to greater degrees and in ways that initially are likely to make both parties slightly ill at ease.

Mexico is clearly ready to test the possibilities.

Unlike former Mexican leaders, President Fox went to Washington in early September with a message and, Dresser said, a marriage proposal: “Think different.”


To get there, she added, Castañeda had in hand the talking points of a prenuptial agreement, including amnesty for Mexicans already living in the United States; the negotiation of a guest workers program; and bilateral border cooperation.

Not only was Mexico willing to be more aggressive, it correctly assumed that President Bush, a Texas Republican well aware of the need to court the American Latino vote, would be more receptive.

Villaraigosa credited the growing political power of the Latino community for this change. “Two years ago under a Democratic president, all of the dialogue around U.S.-Mexico relations centered on drug enforcement and Mexico’s failure to address drug interdiction issues,” he said. “Neither party is talking about that anymore.”

In 10 to 15 years, Villaraigosa said, the American Latino community will have the same impact on U.S.-Mexico relations, “as you see Jews having on U.S.-Israeli relations.”

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Peasants, Land, and Violence: Links between Colombia’s Guerrillas and Drug Trafficking
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Alfredo Molano.

disappear. In Molano’s view, it was the unresolved status of agrarian reform and the struggle over land distribution that led to continuing instability in the countryside, even after the formal cessation of partisan hostilities. Exacerbating this instability, growing unemployment in the 1960’s led to an increase in land invasions and the development of a national peasant movement. The latter culminated in a 1977 national strike. The state responded to the strike with repression. This military action pushed organized peasants out of the lowland areas they had invaded and into the mountains, including the Sierra Nevada range. It was these desplazados (displaced peasants) who discovered the marijuana trade in the Sierra Nevada at the end of the 1970s.

This discovery, in combination with the ongoing links between the colonos and desplazados and the guerrillas, set the stage for the transformation of the guerrilla movement by the drug trade in the 1980’s. Marijuana, and later coca, was an unusually high-yield crop; for the first time, the work of peasants generated real income. Colonos gained access to consumption, and became, in Molano’s terms, addicted to it. Guerrillas, who had previously set up a system of “taxing” local peasants, saw their “tax” revenues increase dramatically as the drug trade flourished.

This growing mutual interest between peasants and guerrillas in the success of drug trafficking contributed to a fundamental shift in the priorities of the guerrillas during the 1980’s.

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paramilitary forces to remove locally elected authorities from office and recalcitrant populations from strategic areas.

Armed Liberal groups or guerrillas emerged, in turn, to resist the increasing number of official and paramilitary forces. By 1952, so-called partisan-motivated violence gave way to armed groups that waged violence indiscriminately. Their main goal was to rearrange and control local labor and distribution markets, and enforce private forms of justice for competing economic and political bosses. In parts of western and eastern Antioquia where violence proved most severe, state agents or paramilitary groups, which were tacitly endorsed and supported by parts of the regional government, became the primary instigators of local disorder.

Violence in contemporary and mid-century Colombia, although difficult to summarize and compare, both share some salient features. Antioquia continues to be a focal point of violent struggle in Colombia, and the towns that suffered most severely between 1950 and 1953 continue to be the region’s most violent today. The main victims of violence continue to be unarmed civilians who are still seen as inherently rebellious, uncooperative and politically radical because they belong to “inferior” racial or ethnic groups, or have a long tradition of political militancy and participation in leftist unions and organizations.

Most of the recorded human rights violations against victims today and during *la Violencia* continue to be perpetrated by privately organized, right wing paramilitary groups. Areas of endemic violence have had unresolved conflicts over highly concentrated resources and land for decades. Struggles over territorial access and control continue to be severe. In most cases, during *la Violencia* and now, the state’s role in violence has been complex and is not simply limited to the state’s absence or lack of legitimacy. Instead, multiple competing and overlapping “states” existed and continue to exist in Colombia. Where mutual obligations and rights underwrote the relationship between citizens and the state, the latter enjoyed legitimacy and partisan conflict rarely evolved. The state did not enjoy legitimacy, in contrast, where local populations perceived the state solely as a colonial or repressive force. This is also true where there were few or no local democratic mechanisms or traditions of power negotiations that did not involve violence.

Finally, both during *la Violencia* and now, simple analyses that attribute violence to either partisan hatred, narcotics trafficking or guerrilla terrorism fail to capture the complexity of violence. Furthermore, such analyses threaten to obscure the true victims and longstanding causes of conflict. A peaceful resolution in Colombia is not possible without taking into account the long-term role of the state in promoting or failing to impede violence—a violence that has deep roots in local dissatisfaction and rebellion.

Mary Roldán is a professor of history at Cornell University.

Peasants, Land, and Violence: Links between Colombia’s Guerrillas and Drug Trafficking

The main guerrilla organization’s attempt to field a political party was murderously repressed by right-wing paramilitaries. The end of the Cold War undermined Communist ideological commitments. As the political option diminished, further militarization became more attractive. Revenue from the drug trade fueled an arms race with the government, generating a vicious cycle of delegitimation. As ideological commitments faded and financial incentives grew, the central issue of contention with the government shifted from agrarian reform to the role of the military and its sponsorship of right-wing paramilitary groups. However, this is the one issue the government will not—or cannot—negotiate. Similarly, the guerrillas will not consider surrendering their weapons without fundamental changes in the military.

“Unfortunately, I think we have a lot of war to make before we get to a point where the two sides can be sincere about their interests,” Molano said.

Chris Cardona is a Ph.D. student in the political science department.
While U.S. Jews have been closely aligned with Israeli interests, however, U.S. Latino and Mexican government interests sometimes clash. September 11 stalled any new accord with Mexico, but it’s clear that when negotiations resume, they will be complicated by these differences.

The proposed guest worker program is a case in point. Dresser said that this was probably the only concrete proposal the Bush Administration was likely to succeed in pushing forward. The guest worker program satisfies the Republican Party’s business interests to provide low-cost labor and the Mexican interests to provide any jobs at all.

It is precisely, however, the program that many Latino politicians dislike. “There is without question a very strong bias among Latino leadership against a guest worker program,” Villaraigosa said. “I don’t know how they make a program like that work in a way that it respects the rights of workers to organize.”

Mexicans coming in on any guest worker program would compete head-on with Latinos already in the United States.

Amnesty for Mexican immigrants already in the United States, a program the right wing of Republican Party, he said, “at the end of the day, both Republicans and Democrats are going to be supportive of regularization.” Latino leaders, he said, would play an important role in what that policy will look like.

Maybe, but disagreements between Latino leaders and Mexican leaders slow progress, Dresser said. “The Fox Administration perceived the importance of the Latino community and that is why when he first came into office he said, ‘I am going to be the president of all Mexicans,’ and so on but I think he and those around him perceive many Latinos as a community to be catered to and seduced, but not to be listened to,” she said. “If you speak to many Latino leaders they will tell you that they have not been listened to in this debate and that they have been underestimated and under-appreciated.”

“Well put,” said Villaraigosa, who maintained that the two groups still had much more in common than not.

Meanwhile as Mexicans and Latinos wait for U.S.-Mexico relations to re-emerge as a priority in Washington, it is the Fox Administration that is suffering most, the panelists said.

Mexico’s president gambled on improved relations with the U.S.,” said Dresser. “And he is now beginning to incur significant political costs for having done so. Opposition politicians in Mexico are arguing that the president should have known better than to place his bets on an unreliable neighbor to the north. They are beginning to say it’s been too much pain and too little gain; that the Fox vision is just another mirage.”

While not disagreeing, Aguayo offered a slightly different assessment. The revolution in
social tensions lay beneath the surface, most participants in la Violencia professed traditional partisan political aims. The struggle itself was brought to an end in 1958 when Liberal and Conservative leaders converged on the formula of sharing power equally under an arrangement known as the National Front. Eligible voters turned out in high numbers during the first elections held under the National Front. While dissatisfaction with the National Front grew over time, many voters registered their disillusionment or boredom by abstaining from voting in subsequent elections. The left never benefitted from these attitudes.

Reasons for the weakness of the left are closely related to a second paradox, which is the nature of Colombian economic development. The Colombian economy revealed an exceedingly poor record of export-oriented growth during the 19th century. In 1910, even after the rise of the coffee economy in the late 1800’s and the first decade of the 20th century, Colombia had one of the lowest rates of exports per capita of all Latin American nations. After that, coffee-paced development allowed Colombia to build one of the most consistent and impressive records of economic growth and industrial development in Latin America during the 20th century. The coffee economy was owned by Colombians, and most of the coffee was grown on small and medium-sized, producer-owned farms. During the 1930’s and 1940’s the number of these farms grew and their share of national coffee production increased. This outcome was not primarily a result of collective protest or leftist organization, (although that did happen in exceptional regions, particularly in south-western Cundinamarca and northern Tolima, where the agrarian movement that became the FARC was born). Rather, the democratization of coffee production was mainly the result of individual efforts, sanctioned by the two traditional parties, and rewarded in the capitalist marketplace.

During the years of the Violence, a lot of land changed hands, especially in the coffee zone, but research indicates that the structure of land ownership barely changed. During the 1930’s and 1940’s, the classic era of Latin American import-substitution industrialization, the Colombian economy, paced by coffee exports, showed one of the most impressive developmental records in all of Latin America. Then, during the entire second half of the 20th century, the Colombian economy turned in a record of steady and impressive growth virtually unmatched in Latin America. Inflation was kept under control, the country largely avoided the debt trap of the 1980’s, and it was able to put off radical neo-liberal reform measures until the 1990’s.

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Colombian economic success throughout the entire 20th century simply and powerfully explains the hegemony of liberal thought and liberal economic and social policies championed by the two traditional parties. These liberal policies were unsuccessfully challenged by third parties of the left, or of the authoritarian or populist right, throughout the century.

Focusing on the political and economic paradoxes in Colombia and what they mean for the Colombian left help deepen understanding of the current crisis, including the political isolation and intransigence of the Colombian left. The historical context undercuts the main rationale advanced by guerrillas for the violent insurgency it has mounted against the Colombian state in recent decades. The Colombian left has been weak historically not because of some special aptitude or vocation on the part of the Colombian elite for repression. It has been weak because the historical experience of most Colombians limited the appeal of the left.

Those who support a peaceful, democratic resolution to the Colombian crisis must not only oppose current U.S. policy, especially drug policy, toward Colombia. They must work to improve the protection of human rights in Colombia and encourage peace negotiations based on meaningful economic, social, and political reform. They must take a hard look at the left’s rationale for insurgency. It is time democrats in the United States, in Europe, and elsewhere join with the vast majority of Colombians to demand that the guerrillas enter into an effective ceasefire agreement immediately and begin meaningful negotiations for peace.

Charles Bergquist is a professor of Latin American history at the University of Washington.

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how Mexicans view their role in the world, he said, would have far greater long-term effect on U.S.-Mexico relations than any temporary setbacks or policy failures. The new attitude, he said in a discussion later in the month, is “very complicated.” “It’s how we are going to incorporate the U.S. in our ethos. It goes very deep.”

And Dresser agreed that over the long run, a new paradigm would prevail: “Despite the waffling that’s taking place north of the Rio Grande and the wiggling south of it, I think ultimately greater convergence and integration, whether it’s negotiated or not, between the two governments is here to stay.”

Lydia Chávez is a professor of journalism at UC Berkeley.
most often is ‘underestimated.’” In Guatemala, the truth commission produced a far stronger report than its creators anticipated, including its legal analysis of a finding of genocide. What remains to be seen is whether the information collected by the Guatemalan truth commission will strengthen the rule of law and destroy the impunity that the perpetrators have enjoyed.

As the experiences in Guatemala and South Africa demonstrate, truth commissions have complex powers and identities. The establishment of a particular truth commission arises out of the unique circumstances of each nation’s conflict and its negotiated resolution. Once established, these truth commissions are subjected to the struggles within sectors of society striving to control the truth commission, and make it respond to certain interests. However, what both South Africa and Guatemala demonstrate is that these truth commissions can take on a life of their own, despite the politics of their birth. Truth commissions, rather than representing the last word on the history of violence, are sites of struggle in which areas of conflict continue to assert force.

I have often been asked my opinion of what an “ideal” truth commission would look like. After nearly eight years working on this topic, I confess that I have failed to come up with a good answer. After all, truth commissions only arise in circumstances in which tremendous pain and violence have occurred, and where serious constraints on the remedies available to those who have suffered exist. Imagining a “perfect” or ideal-type truth commission is impossible precisely because the very need for a truth commission indicates a world of circumstances far from any ideal.

In both Guatemala and South Africa, people went to the truth commissions with a multitude of motives. But the persons and communities most affected by the violence wanted more than simply a place to tell their stories. They wanted their words to matter.

Over and over, I heard this from victims of violence. The telling of the story, in and of itself, fails to satisfy. The words must translate into material changes in life circumstances. We need help, people told me. We need a house, they told me in South Africa. We need land, they said in Guatemala. And everywhere: We need the bones, even just a few, something that we can bury so that a loved one may rest in peace.

But these needs and others of the communities most affected by the violence have yet to be met, even though both truth commissions claimed to be “victim-friendly.” If the results of the truth commissions in Guatemala and South Africa translate into concrete improvements in the lives of survivors, and transformations in the structures of power that caused the violence, then perhaps we will see the power of the truth. Otherwise, we will see the truth about power.

Amy Ross is a professor of geography at the University of Georgia and 1999 graduate of the doctoral program in geography at UC Berkeley.

Cacao in Mesoamerica

and sugar, this fertile, 800-square mile valley was noted in the 16th century A.D. as a prime cacao producing area. The high esteem expressed for Ulua Valley cacao led my colleagues and I to identify cacao production as a possible specialty of residents of early Ulua villages like Puerto Escondido (dating to before 1500 B.C.), with unexpected evidence of wealth and long-distance connections to other early societies in Mexico.

Like coffee and wine, the taste of cacao is influenced by geographic conditions and skills in the processing of plant products. The French concept of terroir, used in talking about vineyards, provides a useful analogy. Terroir encompasses the unique features of a local production area: not only soil, microgeography, and microclimate, but also features of the local production tradition, including use of specific cultivars and craft skills of cultivation, and approaches to processing of grapes to produce...
Towards a New Third World City

The task for all of us involved in creating environments where many generations will live is not simply to create a city that functions efficiently. It is to create an environment where the majority of people will be as happy as possible. Happiness is difficult to define and impossible to measure; but let us not forget that it is what all our efforts, collective or individual, are about. Over the last 40 years, the natural environment became an issue of deep concern to all societies. Curiously, a similar interest in the human environment has not yet arisen. There is much more clarity in our time as to what the ideal environment is for a happy gorilla or a happy whale, than what the ideal environment is for a happy child. We are far from having a shared vision of an ideal human environment, much less the transportation system for it.

Transport differs from all other problems developing societies face, because it gets worse rather than better with economic development. While sanitation, education and all other challenges improve with economic growth, transport gets worse. Transport is also at the core of a different, more appropriate model that could and should be implemented by Third World cities. More than a socio-political model, the model I will describe is a model for a different way of living in cities, but it has profound social and economic implications. If we are truly committed to social justice, environmental sustainability, and economic growth, we need to espouse a city model different from the one the world has pursued over the last century and up to now.

Enrique Peñalosa, former mayor of Bogotá.

Excerpt from “Urban Transport and Urban Development: A Different Model.”
Psychology and Law: The Chilean Reconciliation

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Pinochet-era cases. To a lawyer what might seem a challenging legal phenomenon becomes, in Lira’s hands, a psychosocial portrait of a traumatized nation slowly approaching resolution. Law for her is not about punishment or deterrence, nor does she stress questions of impunity and the rule of law. Rather, the regime-era cases have provided a site for processing trauma. The law has the virtue that it moves so slowly and technically that it tends to fall beneath the radar of mainstream politics. Even as cases are a site of ongoing reconciliation, they are not the focus of debate. Such a quiet, thorough manner of reconciliation befits legalistic Chile, where even the military dictator usurped power in the name of “restoring legality,” Lira explained.

Furthermore, law does not aim at vengeance or bringing down the mighty, Lira said, for that is not the Chilean way. True punishment comes from God. “Dios castiga, pero no a palos (God punishes, but with mercy),” she said. Take for example, the way the once-famous Pinochet trials slowly faded out of public view. By now it is difficult to remember his actual legal status. In fact, he has been indicted and declared mentally unfit for trial, and his case stands sobreseido temporalmente (temporarily suspended). The upshot is that he will not be tried and punished, but at the same time, he is no longer a public figure. Indeed, as soon as he makes a cogent public comment, lawyers will rush in to argue that he is no longer mentally unfit, reactivating the cases against him. Either Pinochet plays the court-imposed role of dementia, or he faces trial. This, Lira said, is the perfect Chilean resolution.

Alexandra Huneeus is a Ph.D. student in the Program for Jurisprudence and Social Policy.

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wine. Processing of cacao involves a sequence of steps carried out prior to consumption, beginning with harvesting pods, then fermenting the pulp and seeds, extracting, drying, and toasting the seeds. Differences in practices at any step can influence the final results, as they do with wine or coffee. Native people in the 16th century A.D. expressed strong opinions about the quality of cacao from different areas. Throughout its history of use, it is likely that cacao from different regions varied in perceived quality, creating conditions for a regional system of exchange. To establish that this was the case, we need to be able to identify both production and consumption. With our current NSF-funded project, we are taking the first steps to systematically address that goal.

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VIEWPOINT: U.S on a Steep Slope in Colombia
by Robert Collier

As slippery slopes go, Colombia’s is getting steeper and steeper, and the United States is barreling down it faster and faster. There appear to be few obstacles to a major U.S. military involvement in Colombia’s complicated bloodletting.

The Bush administration and Congress have made a historic shift, jettisoning narcotics as the axis of Colombia policy and replacing it with terrorism.

In recent months, while American public attention is focused on the Mideast and the Afghan war, an apparent consensus has formed between the White House and Capitol Hill to cast aside the central, decade-long fiction of U.S. involvement in Colombia — the claim that American aid is only for fighting drug trafficking, not for helping the government’s war against the leftist guerrillas. Under this policy, U.S. weapons and military advisers were used against the rebels only incidentally, whenever they overlapped with drug operations. This distinction was largely a fiction, but an important one. Now, however, it has collapsed completely. The United States is planning to become directly involved in arming and training Colombian armed forces for combat against the guerrillas — the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) or the National Liberation Army (ELN).

Congress has appropriated $490 million in military and economic aid for the current fiscal year, and the Bush administration made an “emergency” request in March for another $35 million in military aid. For fiscal year 2003, $435 million is requested, including $98 million to help protect the Cano Limón pipeline used by Occidental Petroleum Corp and frequently bombed by the guerrillas. The administration is requesting authority from Congress to dramatically increase intelligence sharing with the Colombian military, ranging from intercepts of guerrilla communications to satellite photos of rebel formations.

The U.S. policy switch has two main reasons, which need to be examined separately.

The drug war’s failure

Despite the $1.7 billion given by the United States to Colombia over the past two years in drug-fighting aid, coca cultivation is booming. According to CIA estimates, total coca cultivation in Colombia increased from 136,000 to 170,000 hectares in 2001.

In part, this failure is because the campaign to encourage coca farmers to switch to growing legal crops has failed pitifully. For example, a classified study by the U.S. Agency for International Development that was recently leaked to the Los Angeles Times found that in Putumayo state, the heart of the coca region, only a small percentage of the farmers who signed agreements to switch crops have actually done so.

The Colombian government had promised to pay the 38,000 farmers who signed the pacts as much as $1,000 each to help them grow other crops. In part, the problem was incompetent bureaucracy — as of early April, only 9,500 had been paid. But the problem also is that the program was designed without taking into consideration that the Putumayo’s thin jungle soils are virtually worthless for growing anything but coca. Put simply, farmers earn much more growing coca than they would grazing cattle or growing hearts of palm — two of the prescribed alternatives. As a result, the U.S. government has quietly decided to abandon crop-substitution campaign, switching the $52 million in annual funding to infrastructure projects and social spending in Putumayo.

Many critics, including European governments, say that to make a crop-substitution program work, there will have to be a cease-fire between government and guerrillas, and lots more money will have to be ponied up.

The FARC, in a little-noticed proposal in 1999, offered to completely eradicate coca cultivation in a large area of Caqueta and Meta provinces — but the plan included a price tag of $200 million. Some anti-drug experts say the FARC proposal, which included detailed plans for local development, was serious and merited
further discussion. These experts point out that the seemingly outlandish price tag may simply be a market-based approximation of the vast sums that will be needed to turn poverty-stricken peasants away from drugs. However, the plan was ignored by the Colombian and U.S. governments and was quickly forgotten by nearly all concerned.

**Terrorism**

After the Sept. 11 attacks in New York and Washington, politicians in Washington and Bogotá alike wrapped themselves in the war against terrorism. In April, for example, the chairman of the House International Relations Committee, Rep. Henry Hyde, R-Ill., called Colombia “a potential breeding ground for international terror equaled perhaps only by Afghanistan.” The same month, Colombian President Andrés Pastrana got an enthusiastic response in Washington by casting his country as a Latin American beachhead in the global war on terror.

However, this rhetoric appears misplaced. Certainly, the FARC and ELN have poor human-rights records, especially their practice of kidnapping civilians for ransom and their assassinations of national politicians and local priests. For these reasons, the two rebel groups are on the State Department’s list of foreign terrorist organizations. However, there is no evidence that either group has been involved in attacks outside Colombia’s borders, and most experts believe that neither organization is likely to do so.

Human-rights organizations in both countries accuse the two governments of turning a blind eye to Colombia’s most violent band of killers, the rightist paramilitary United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC). Although the AUC also is on the State Department’s terrorist list, and the Colombian government claims to be combatting the group as assiduously as the leftist rebels, human-rights organizations have long documented tight clandestine links between the paramilitaries and the Colombian army. Despite U.S. diplomatic pressure on Bogotá leaders to clean up their act, these tight links continue unabated – as does American aid to the Colombian military. Meanwhile, U.S. intelligence agencies’ Colombia efforts appear focused exclusively on the FARC, giving short shrift to the AUC’s mass killings and its tight links to cocaine trafficking.

In Congress, many lawmakers are concerned that the United States is turning a blind eye to the paramilitaries. In March, for example, Sens. Patrick Leahy, D-Vt., and Edward M. Kennedy, D-Ma., wrote to Secretary of State Colin Powell to demand a tougher line, including the firing of three Colombian generals for collaborating with the AUC. Here, however, is the “certification” trap. In recent years, Leahy, Kennedy and others have focused on making sure any Colombia aid includes clauses requiring the administration to “certify” that the Colombian military is making progress in cleaning up its miserable human-rights record. Last year’s aid bill included such a clause; the current Bush administration request doesn’t; the critics will fight (and probably succeed) in inserting one this year.

Yet the value of these clauses is debatable. In Colombia as with the 1980s conflict in El Salvador, the State Department has proven adept at certifying that its local military proxies have good human-rights records despite abundant evidence to the contrary.

In all, the U.S. military gamble on Colombia lurches forward, apparently unstoppable. Congress is likely to approve the administration’s request for expanded military aid and the removal of the restrictions on fighting guerrillas.

Bloodshed, not crop substitution or peace, seems to be the only outlook for years to come. Peace talks with the FARC have collapsed. The leading candidate in the May presidential elections, Alvaro Uribe, is calling for full-fledged counterinsurgency war. Is it Vietnam or El Salvador all over again? Americans will have plenty of time to decide, and Colombians will have plenty of time to bleed.

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Lichens of Baja California: The Fringe of the Sonoran Desert
Photos by Sylvia and Stephen Sharnoff now on exhibit at the Center for Latin American Studies
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