U.S. and Mexico: Redefining the Relationship

By Kate Davidson

Though the September 11, 2001 attacks struck New York and Washington, their reverberations shook the administration of Mexican President Vicente Fox. Domestic political tensions complicated his government’s reaction to the attacks, and the burgeoning relationship between the two countries appeared in danger of being overshadowed.

"With the collapse of the twin towers came an apparent collapse of this budding new relationship between the two neighbors, that only four days before had led President George Bush to proclaim Mexico as..."
This issue of the newsletter begins with a report on a year-long series "The U.S. and Mexico: Redefining the Relationship." The themes dominating the discussions are very different post-September 11th than what we had anticipated last spring when we conceived the series. Nonetheless, issues such as migration are still very much with us and this may be an opportunity to redefine the agenda for both countries in a new and positive direction.

The process of democratization and institutional change continues to unfold in Mexico—despite fits, starts, and bumps in the road—and the emergence of the Latino vote in the U.S. will focus political attention on the relationship in inescapable ways in the years to come.

The series includes seminars with Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, Mexico’s Ambassador to the United Nations; Andrés Rozental, a special envoy for President Fox; and Professors Denise Dresser and Sergio Aguayo. We are also pleased to include the perspective of House Democratic Leader Richard Gephardt, who recently visited Mexico, in an article specially written for this edition.

This issue highlights both the Center’s program and research that affiliated faculty and students are carrying out. As part of our program, we sought to provide historical perspective on contemporary Mexico in a panel that brought three historians—Adofo Gilly, Alan Knight, and Alicia Hernández Chávez—to comment on the current situation. Accompanying this commentary are photos from the Bancroft Library exhibit, "The Mexican Revolution of 1910," which opened with a talk by Professor Alex Saragoza.

Ruth Collier, a professor of political science, describes a new research project on political participation in six countries—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela—at a time of greater reliance on markets and a smaller role for the state. Angelina Snodgrass Godoy, (PhD sociology UC Berkeley 2001), provides a frightening glimpse of violence in post-war Guatemala. Finally, visiting scholar Maria Filomena Gregori discusses the instability of street children’s lives in Brazil.

As we go to press, the Economist has blazoned across its cover the query "Has Latin America lost its way?" The Center will examine dimensions of this troubling question in five concurrent series this spring: "Colombia 2002;" "Conflict, Memory and Transition;" "Cine Chile;" "Development, Labor Standards, and Economic Integration in the Americas;" and "The U.S. and Mexico: Redefining the Relationship." We will report on our research and conversations in the next issue.
Everybody agrees that as we enter the 21st century, the global economy requires the United States to seek greater export opportunities. In addition, I believe that a new trade consensus must be rooted in our values. Not only is enhanced trade vital to U.S. economic growth and security, but it can also promote values fundamental to our democratic future: worker rights, environmental protection, and human rights. Working to open global markets and doing more to enhance global living standards will expand U.S., Mexican and global prosperity in the 21st century.

Some have called the progressive approach to trade “protectionist.” That is an erroneous label. In fact, progressives are for expanded trade and for the United States meeting its leadership obligations in the international economic arena. However, we believe a broader approach is needed based on three pillars of economic policy: free and fair trade, enhanced development assistance, and debt relief for the poorest nations. Such a program could create more markets for U.S. exports, strengthen the middle class at home and abroad, and maximize our national security through a comprehensive program of engagement in all parts of the world. We need to forge a progressive approach to trade and development and create a new consensus on global economic engagement.

At home in North America, we need to do more to promote trade and development with Mexico. NAFTA has been a real success in increasing trade between the U.S., Canada and Mexico, but it has done little to generate real development in Mexico. Despite the increases in trade, and enhanced Mexican productivity since 1993, a broad Mexican middle class has failed to emerge.

Today Mexico is facing a serious recession and maquiladora jobs are leaving as companies move to nations, such as China, where wage rates are lower. Mexico is facing a race to the bottom and America needs to do more to combat this trend. We need to assist the government of President Vicente Fox with enhanced trade, aid and development. America has a great opportunity in the bilateral meetings at the Monterrey summit in March 2002 to work with Mexico on a progressive development plan.
he wary friendship that exists between Mexico and the U.S. may be challenged if more ambitious and imaginative ways of realizing common interests are not soon developed, according to Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, Mexico’s Ambassador to the United Nations and former National Security Advisor to President Vicente Fox of Mexico, in a talk at UC Berkeley on November 16, 2001. While there has been a move away from the traditional antagonistic conceptions of national security in the last 20 years, the September 11th catastrophe in the U.S. poses a serious threat to the relationship between the two countries, especially on issues relating to the border.

The first state visit between Fox and U.S. President Bush was just one week before September 11th, and the issues on the agenda reflected a decided move away from the types of issues that dominated security discussions between the U.S. and Mexico during the Cold War; instead of focusing on conflicts between two competing national interests, collective security has become the operating principle—and with good reason. With the changed security threats that globalization presents to the neighboring countries, a unified front may be the only way to effectively confront the drug trafficking and organized crime rings that have used technological advancements to anchor themselves into both societies.

Historically, U.S. foreign policy has shaped the fight against drugs in Latin America. The U.S. government thought of drugs as a problem originating outside of its borders, infiltrating its unsuspecting society from the south. The U.S. thus saw fit to dictate to Mexico what it should be doing to contain the problem. Now, however, the issues look very different: the producers are becoming the users, and the users are becoming producers. More people are becoming drug abusers in Mexico than in the United States, where the rate of new drug abusers has flattened out, and the majority of drugs now consumed in the U.S. are produced at home.

The face of organized crime is also changing—becoming more sophisticated due to opportunities arising from democratization and globalization. The creativity that these transnational criminals use in their operations is limited only by the imagination. In both Mexico and the U.S., the capacity of the state to deal with organized crime has not kept pace with the swift rate at which organized crime has consolidated; and that is why cooperation between the two countries is more important than ever. Unfortunately, the historic lack of trust that has plagued relations between Mexico and its northern neighbor may continue to confound joint efforts to combat transnational crime.

Why is trust a problem? In recent years, the conflict has been over Mexico’s sense of national sovereignty versus the belief in the continued on page 29
Vicente Fox is the first Mexican president to govern like an American politician. He uses his popularity to pressure political elites. He appeals to public strategies to influence private negotiations. He seems to be certain—as Bill Clinton was—that a president needs a majority at all times, not only on election day. He seems to believe—as Mark Twain did—that “it’s better to be popular than to be right.” That’s why he jumps on the saddle, mounts his horse and stage-manages his presidency through the media. The Fox strategy of “going public” explains why, over a year after his victory, Mexico’s new president governs as if he were still treading down the campaign trail.

As part of the new government’s approach, the president perceives the country as divided into two different dimensions: the green circle, composed by the majority of the population, and the red circle, composed by elites who form opinion and make decisions. The first circle is where the votes are; the second circle has the capacity to influence them. The first circle is comprised of beneficiaries of the president’s promised programs; the legislators that can veto them are in the second circle. The green circle includes those who approve of Fox and the red circle incorporates those who have less lofty opinions about him.

Fox has tried to govern by “appealing to the public,” jumping over the red circle in order to convince the green circle, using his personality to generate popularity. Instead of locking himself in to negotiate, the president delegates that task to others. Instead of encouraging mobilization via political parties, the president appeals to the media. Instead of working within institutions, the president circumvents them. Fox has transformed the Mexican presidency into a public affair.

By doing so, Fox is adapting the presidency to the “Information Age,” as Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton—among others—have. As Samuel Kernell argues in Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership, modern presidents negotiate increasingly less and act increasingly more. They speak directly to the public instead of lobbying legislators. They appeal to millions of voters instead of convincing hundreds of members of Congress. They wage battles in front of the cameras instead of fighting them along the corridors of power. They use public relations to obtain popular support instead of building bridges to assure legislative support. They embrace the green circle with the hope that it will, in turn, pressure the red circle.

This article discusses why Mexico’s new president has decided to “go public,” how the strategy works, and what costs Fox incurs by jumping over Congress instead of working in tandem with it. I argue that Fox is going public and appealing to public opinion at large, at times bypassing political parties and their congressional representatives, because he won the presidential election in that fashion. In addition, the president believes that the successful promotion of himself and his policies will lead to key legislative victories and thus assure democratic governance. But the use of public relations to determine presidential success is fundamentally incompatible with bargaining—and without it, the Mexican Congress simply can and does say “no” to the president.

**Why Go Public?**

Fox has copied the American style of “going public” because of the way in which he was elected and because of the type of leader he is.
The victory of the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) in the 2000 presidential election set the stage for a panel discussion at CLAS in October on “Historical Perspectives on Contemporary Mexico.” Adolfo Gilly, one of Mexico’s leading public intellectuals and a member of the left of center Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), Alan Knight, a professor of history at Oxford University, and Alicia Hernández Chávez, a history professor at the Colegio de Mexico spoke before a tightly packed audience that included the consul general of Mexico in San Francisco, Georgina Lagos-Dondé. UC Berkeley history professor Margaret Chowning moderated the discussion.

Knight, more than Hernández, and distinct from the views of Adolfo Gilly, focused on the critical set of factors which, in combination with the internal workings of the PRI, spelled a devastating erosion of power for the party, leading to the end of its hold over Mexican politics. In this regard, Knight concentrated particular attention on two events that contributed crucially to the eventual PRI defeat of 2000: first, the debilitating schism of 1987-1988 that split the PRI with irreversible consequences; and second, the devastating impact of the 1994 economic crisis. For Knight, the vulnerability of the PRI originated with the defection of Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas and his reformist faction from the party. The cardenista challenge cohered dissidents from various points along the left of center spectrum into a potent force. The closely contested campaign of 1988 and the PRI’s slender, highly suspect victory sapped the PRI of much of its strength. In this light, the 1994 recession and its consequent devaluation of the peso dealt a final blow to an enfeebled, fragile party.

The ability of Carlos Salinas, the ostensible victor of the 1988 elections, to recoup a measure of support in the early years of his administration served to deepen the negative reaction to the events of 1994. Knight emphasized the enormous expectations generated by the initial success of the salinista administration, especially for Mexico’s growing middle class. These expectations were dashed by the abrupt, frightening downturn in the economy that eviscerated the newly minted hopes of the pro-Salinas middle class that had entrusted so much of their aspirations in his party’s prescriptions. The subsequent fall from grace by Salinas due to the revelations of corruption and other misdeeds by the former president only added to the woes of the PRI. Hence, the electoral victory of PRI candidate Ernesto Zedillo in 1994 reflected the fear of change at a time of severe crisis rather than the resiliency of the PRI. According to Knight, previous converts to salinista appeals, turned inevitably to a conservative opposition. In this regard, the PRI was ill served by Zedillo, who focused the energies of his office on economic recovery, instead of reviving the flagging political fortunes of the party. Zedillo refused, in Knight’s view, to be a party leader. Zedillo’s

continued on page 22
Crispina: Cutting A Deal

Crispina Perucho, a 74-year old Purépecha Indian woman, seemed far removed from the global economy as she knelt on the ground, weaving a thick wool shawl at lightening speed. She lives in Angahuan, a village of some 4,000 people tucked between pine-covered hills in the central western state of Michoacán. Here, women wear the long satin skirts and embroidered blouses of their ancestors, and most people still prefer to speak the ancient Tarascan tongue.

But Angahuan is intricately linked to the outside world and so are women like Perucho—often without choice. She is one of nearly two million peasants in Michoacán who face extinction as the Mexican government races toward full market integration with North America by 2009. As Mexican Secretary of Agriculture Javier Usiabaga said in a conference in January 2002, campesinos (farmers)—once the proud symbol of the Mexican Revolution—must now “adjust to the rules of the new economic game,” or be squeezed out by more profitable agribusiness.

Here, the government’s plan to make peasants behave like businessmen seems to be working. Despite the quaint charm Angahuan holds for tourists seeking vestiges of pre-Hispanic life, modernity has arrived with a vengeance. The sound of nearly 100 family-owned sawmills buzz through the town like an invasion of locusts. Most people here say they hate to cut down the majestic pine trees, leaving balding patches of forest on the surrounding hills—but the money is too good to pass up.

The region produces Hass avocados for the world market, and while most Purépechans cannot afford to grow the expensive export crop, many make the wooden shipping crates used to pack it. For about 3,000 pesos (US$300) a truckload, they are killing off the only valuable resource they own.

Perucho may not be chopping down trees, but she, too, has become a shrewd entrepreneur. On a typical afternoon, she proudly invited some Americans into her cramped one-room hut to see her handiwork. Famous for her skill, Perucho charges up to 40 dollars for a particularly fine blanket. The tourists tried to bargain her down to 30. She would not budge.

“You cannot get quality like this anywhere else,” said Alejandro, her wizened husband who stood nearby to translate from Purépecha to Spanish.

Together the couple manages a government-funded weaving cooperative—one of the ways indigenous people are carving a tiny niche in the post-NAFTA economy. Like many people here, they acquired start-up money from a son who migrated to the United States. Nearly one quarter of Angahuan’s male population lives in el Norte, according to Ignacio Gil, the village priest. Without the cash these men send home, Gil said, “these people would live in misery.”

Perucho must now comfort her daughter-in-law, Olivia Rita, who has been waiting for her husband’s return for more than two years. One wall in her house displays postcards from all over the United States, and photographs of a dark-skinned man standing in drifts of snow. He is in Virginia, working to save the money he needs to buy a sawmill of his own. Olivia Rita said she and her three daughters miss him terribly. “Don’t worry,” said Perucho, whose own husband worked in California as a bracero (laborer) fifty years ago, “The good ones always come back.”

continued on page 25
almost never asked about the war. But the stories came out of their own accord: usually sometime between the turning-on of the tape recorder and the phrasing of my carefully scripted first question, my respondents would simply start spilling their stories. And they always began with la violencia (the violence). This was as true of the elderly, some of whom could still remember how things had been before the conflict, as it was of the young. The young had grown up after the cessation of formal hostilities, but nonetheless felt the need to explain, up front, why they had no father, or no land, or no money for school.

For the Mayan campesino (farmer) communities of Guatemala’s western highlands, the scorched earth campaigns of the late 1970’s and early 1980’s were a defining experience. Although the 36-year civil war drew to a close in 1996, its legacies linger in unexpected ways. In my Ph.D. dissertation, I set out to study present-day violence in Guatemala, where a postwar wave of common crime has earned the country a homicide rate over 15 times greater than comparable figures in the United States. I found that in a country ravaged by decades of brutal state violence, there could be no understanding the present without exploring the past.

After a short time in the field, of course, this seemed obvious. It was not a coincidence that most Mayans tied their life histories so intimately to the war. It is also not a coincidence that their communities, besieged by criminal lawlessness, regularly seek to uphold order today through acts of counter-criminal terror, strikingly similar to those used by the Army against its enemies during the conflict period. The public torture and execution of suspected criminals—usually called linchamiento (lynchings)—has become common in the postwar era, as communities struggle to deal with crime through the only means familiar to them after decades of military control. Between the signing of the peace in 1996 and the beginning of 2001, the United Nations Mission in Guatemala continued on page 20
When Francisco Madero crossed the U.S.-Mexico border from Texas to initiate the rebellion against Porfirio Diaz in 1911, his act symbolized a key, and often unappreciated, dimension of the Mexican Revolution: its international significance.

The drama, lore, and reified personalities of the Mexican revolution have overwhelmed the historical understanding of the revolutionary era, encompassing the fall of Diaz in 1911 through the presidency of the great reformer, Lazaro Cardenas (1934-40). The romanticization of Emiliano Zapata, the Robin Hood-like idealization of Pancho Villa, the heroic battles between workers and reactionary capitalists, and the charismatic figures that followed in the arts, in education, and in literature have usually been the focus of the story of the revolution. In this respect, the historical documentation that makes up the “1910 Mexican Revolution” exhibit at the Bancroft Library points to the ways that the revolution has often been portrayed. I would argue, however, that we also recognize the signs of the global along with the local.

Indeed, even a localized view of the revolution suggests its international character: the world sugar market and its trajectory played a key role in the origins of the rebellion of small landholders and peasants in Morelos; the recession of 1907, especially in the U.S., and its economic fallout contributed significantly to the discontent among various social groups in northern Mexico; the development of new technologies negatively impacted the conditions of henequen plantations in the Yucatán; and nationalist sentiments from Eastern Europe to Japan and from Cuba to the Philippines reverberated in a country impatient with the overbearing presence of foreign companies and bosses.

Thus, we should also appreciate the place of Mexico within a larger context, as the events, ideas, and policies of Mexico in the revolutionary era brought the country to a worldwide stage.

A global shift

The revolution and its course took place at a decisive turning point in world history, roughly spanning the period from the 1890s to the 1930s.

The political and economic events of these four decades held critical implications for a 
continued on page 10
major shift in the balance of power in various parts of the globe in this era, not to mention the cultural and technological changes that reinforced the long term consequences of that watershed period, from Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity to the artistic movements involving Pablo Picasso and Wassily Kandinsky, just to mention two notable names.

In this ferment, the eruption in Mexico meant much more than a change in government, and the fact that it took place next door to the U.S. was, of course, of crucial importance. Indeed, it was in this time period that the U.S. emerged forcefully as a major actor on the world stage. Though isolationist policies would make the U.S. a reluctant global player until 1941, American interventions in Central America, the Caribbean, and the Pacific in this era marked the undeniable and rising significance of the U.S. in world events. If there was any doubt of the weight of the U.S. in global affairs, the crash of 1929 held repercussions that rippled throughout much of the world with an enormous impact on the course of history.

In this sense, the questions facing Mexico over labor, over land, over foreign holdings, over educating its people, over political stability were questions whose discussion rippled throughout Latin America and beyond. It is no wonder then that Latin American reformers from throughout the region came to Mexico to study the country’s “revolutionary” experiments and their outcomes. Agusto Sandino of Nicaragua and Raul Haya de la Torre of Peru were but two examples of the scores of intellectuals and political leaders who were inspired by the revolution and its meanings for reform.

The answers to these questions such as land distribution however unevenly implemented in Mexico, held implications beyond Latin America. This is especially true in light of competing ideological forces that clashed in this period, namely communism, capitalism and fascism, and lest we forget, the stirrings of 20th century anti-colonial movements. Hence, Mexico became an important piece in the strategic intrigue over power in Europe that eventually extended to Asia as a result of agreements among the major parties involved. As Freidrich Katz, among others, has noted, European tensions and subsequent rivalries, notably between Britain and Germany particularly after WWI, held implications for Mexico, given its resources (especially oil), and its contiguous position relative to the U.S. We should appreciate the effort of Mexico to sustain its diplomatic independence and its autonomy in the face of international pressures—an affirmation of the central importance of nationalism and sovereignty to the meaning of the Mexican revolution. In this sense, the nationalization of the oil industry in 1938 by Lázaro Cárdenas possessed an international dimension that went far beyond issues of economic nationalism. Furthermore, and at no time more impressively than during the admin-

continued on page 26
With the help of American student activists and labor rights monitors, workers from the Kukdong apparel factory (now called Mexmode) in Atlixco, Mexico recently succeeded in creating one of the first independent unions for garment workers in the country. Leaders and advocates from the labor rights movement visited UC Berkeley on December 5, 2001 to share accounts of what took place.

Marcela Muñoz Tepepa, a Kukdong worker and leader of the independent union, reflected on the implications of the victory on a discussion panel cosponsored by the Henning Center for International Labor Relations and CLAS. She was joined by Scott Nova, Executive Director of the Worker Rights Consortium, a newly formed labor rights group that was instrumental in the reform effort, as well as Catalina Guzmán Albafull, a senior researcher at the Autonomous University of Puebla. Jon Rodney, a student anti-sweatshop activist at UC Berkeley also served on the panel.

In January 2001, Muñoz recounted, the conditions at Kukdong were dismal. The factory’s rancid cafeteria food, corrupt company-allied union, and firing of five workers for demanding better treatment, inspired approximately 800 workers, mostly women in their teens and early 20s, to go on wildcat strike. At midday they left their stations, and, for the next three days, camped in the factory’s front patio. Late on the third night, a battalion of riot police, led by the existing union’s secretary general, marched into the area wielding clubs and guns. By sunrise, 17 workers needed medical attention; several were struck unconscious.

This is, of course, not an uncommon story in Mexico. In fact, Muñoz recalled, many of Kukdong’s workers were joined in protest by parents and relatives who themselves had gone on strike and been attacked just months before in the neighboring city of Matamoros. It is not unusual for government backed “unions” to sign sweetheart protection contracts with employers to ensure for the union a constant influx of dues while obstructing genuine organizing. The vast majority of the country’s unionized workers suffer from this kind of representation.

What was unusual about Kukdong, Muñoz and others stressed, was the tremendous amount of international attention the strike generated. News of the uprising and violent dispersal, as well as the fact that Kukdong was a major producer for Nike and dozens of universities, spread quickly through the Internet to student anti-sweatshop activists in the United States. Spying another bout with the mammoth apparel firm, student activists, including Rodney, organized support rallies at Nike stores across the country. Meanwhile, a wave of factory monitoring organizations descended on Atlixco to conduct investigations. Within weeks the story had made it to the pages of the New York Times. By late February the factory had reinstated the majority of the fired workers, including several of the leaders terminated for complaining—a virtually unprecedented scenario in Mexican export plants. Then, by mid-September, the workers of Kukdong successfully transformed their factory into one of the only workplaces in the Mexican garment industry with a democratic, independent union. They have since won improvements in almost every aspect of factory life.

The surprising turn of events, the speakers emphasized, might not have been possible just several years ago. In the past three years, students at nearly 200 universities have launched
The Relentless Instability of Street Children’s Lives

By Misha Klein

Scholars and community members gathered at the Center for Latin American Studies on Thursday, November 29, 2001 to hear visiting scholar Maria Filomena Gregori give a talk entitled, “Street Children and Circulation: A Case Study in São Paulo, Brazil.” Drawing from her book, Viração (Companhia das Letras, 2000), Professor Gregori stressed the central importance of mobility in the survival strategies that children develop in the process of becoming street children.

Gregori began her talk by discussing the development of the concept of “street children” in Brazil and the assumptions that underlie it. A number of inaccuracies have informed popular opinion, media representations, institutional interventions, and juridical responses. The term “street children,” coined in the 1970s, refers to several different kinds of experiences of children who eke out a living on the street, ranging from children who attend school and return home every day to those whose relationships with their families have become weak. Gregori emphasized that even in the most extreme cases the children do not completely lose their family ties. Gregori cautioned scholars against defining these children only in terms of the street—as has been the case in recent research—since most of the children not only maintain ties with their families, but they also move in social worlds not defined exclusively by the street. She made clear that the transition from family life to street life is neither sudden nor easy, but instead is a process that takes place over an extended period of time, sometimes as long as a couple of years.

Through extensive ethnographic field research between 1989 and 1996, Gregori interviewed and observed street children, following them as they moved through the city and among the various locales where they interacted with other children and with institutions. According to Gregori, one of the greatest difficulties in studying street children stems from precisely that which best describes their lives: they are constantly mobile, moving between their family homes, various aid and disciplinary institutions, and the places on the city streets that they frequent. As they generally come from the poorest of Brazil’s impoverished families (though this does not explain their becoming street children, she noted), they are quite familiar with this kind of movement, which has long been a survival strategy for marginalized people in the country. These families continually break up and regroup in order to meet minimum, short-term needs, sending a child to live with a relative or neighbor, or seeking work wherever possible. Gregori termed this constant movement, viração...
Popular-sector political representation has become an important issue for Latin American democracies as neoliberal reform in the region has challenged old patterns and structures. A collaborative, cross-national project centered at UC Berkeley and the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), University of Sussex (UK) is asking to what extent, in this new setting, the lower and lower-middle classes (the vast majority in these societies) use structures within the political arena to solve their most pressing collective problems. The project focuses on the largest city in each of six Latin American democracies where neoliberal reform has profoundly reshaped politics: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. Peter Houtzager (UCB Ph.D. 1997) leads the IDS team, and we are assisted by political science graduate students Chris Cardona, Diana Kapiszewski, Sebastian Mazzuca, Sally Roever, and Jason Seawright.

Though much recent research deals with new forms of political participation, new civil society, and social movements, our study is the first to undertake the interrelated tasks of: (1) systematically mapping participation in different structures of representation; (2) attempting to explain participation in terms of conditions of work, social networks, and economic and political factors at the neighborhood, city, and country level; and (3) undertaking the theory-building task of conceptualizing and explaining different “interest regimes.”

Two great transformations towards the end of the 20th century frame the project: first, the restructuring of the world economy, manifested in Latin America in a dramatic shift to neoliberal economic models, and the “third wave” of democracy. Neoliberal reforms (supply side reforms that include the opening of trade and privatization) have inflicted enormous economic hardship on the popular sectors and challenged classic interest structures, primarily unions and labor-based parties. Simultaneously, democratization has made possible new forms of popular mobilizing and organizing. These transformations raise the questions of what structures of interest representation are emergent, and
by Walter Brem

The Mexican Revolution of 1910, or the “explosion of the underground life of Mexico,” as poet Octavio Paz called it, came to the Bancroft Library in the form of an exhibit in the Latin Americana collection last November. Selected manuscripts, books, pamphlets, photos and posters tell the story of the revolution that changed the political, cultural and social conditions of life for many people.

These pages highlight some of the compelling images of the exhibit that give life again to the Mexican Revolution, over 90 years later.

The image of Pancho Villa looms large in the collections on the Revolution. Especially interesting are letters that recount in great detail a Wells Fargo train robbery in Chihuahua and the eventual ransom of 121 bars of bullion by Villa in the Spring of 1913. The pay-off by the company provided Villa with seed money to raise troops and buy arms as he rejoined the Revolution. The wanted poster (left) offers a $5,000 reward for Villa after the 1916 raid on Columbus, New Mexico. Images from John Murray’s Photographs of the Mexican Revolution show that the event wreaked far more destruction than the word raid suggests.

The famous Estampas de la Revolucion Mexicana by artists of the Taller de Gráfica Popular depict many of the themes, personalities, and events that define the mythology of the Mexican Revolution to 1940. Shown (page 15, top left) is Alberto Zalce’s particularly sinister rendition of the usurper General Victoriano Huerta, who sits with what appears to be a bottle of poison over the martyred bodies of President Francisco Madero and Vice President José María Pino Suárez, both of whom were killed in the Decena Trágica, in February 1913.

Walter Brem is the curator of the Latin Americana Collection at the Bancroft Library.
Photographs from various collections show many aspects of the revolutionary violence as well as the institutions created during the reconstruction of the nation. The Murray collection contains unique photographs showing the broad social bases of political and labor activism that occurred in Mexico. Included is the purportedly last photograph of Francisco Madero (shown on page 9) and a spectacularly posed snapshot of young boys from a local military school in front of the altar in the Church of Santa Maria in Orizaba (above, right). Below a delegation of Indian women from the “Hercules” cotton mill petition the Congress of Queretaro for the right to vote and the right to divorce.

The Mexican Revolution exhibit and Professor Alex Saragoza’s lecture on November 19, 2001 were sponsored by The Bancroft Library, CLAS and the Consulate General of Mexico in San Francisco.
In his keynote address at the Binational Forum on Migrant Health, Dr. Jose Ignacio Santos Preciado, Secretary of the Consejo Nacional de Vacunación, said that cooperation between the United States and Mexico was the only way to insure the health of the migrant population. A failure to coordinate health services and surveillance will result in serious illnesses and social problems such as tuberculosis (TB), human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), and substance abuse, he said. The net impact will be increased suffering and high social and economic costs on both sides of the border.

Dr. Santos Preciado made his remarks at the forum, held at UC Berkeley on October 18th and 19th. The event, Tenemos Historia... Hacemos Futuro or We Share a History... We’ll Make the Future, was an initiative of the state-wide Binational Health Week to promote services for Mexican migrants provided by a partnership between the state of California and the government of Mexico.

The two-day conference brought together health officials, agency directors, university researchers, and other distinguished participants from Mexico and California.

Xóchitl Casteñada from the California Policy Research Center said the conference underscored the importance of migrant health services and the fundamental contribution migrants make to both the U.S. and the Mexican economy.

Still, she said, the 3.2 million Mexicans who live and work in California continue to face significant obstacles in accessing even the most basic services. A 1999 study for the California Program on Access to Care showed that most farm worker families make less than $10,000 per year and that 42% of those surveyed live in dwellings shared by two or more households.

To further an understanding of cross border and migrant health, Professor Sylvia Guendelman of UC Berkeley’s School of Public Health stressed that it was a mistake to focus on how migrants “import” health problems. Studies that compare birth outcomes for Mexican-born women, Mexican-American women, and white women born in the United States reveal that many immigrant practices are healthier before being influenced by U.S. culture.

Promoting research and efforts to maintain these positive health behaviors—such as better diet and helpful social support—is good for migrant health and conceivably the health of other groups in the United States.

Other panelists pointed out gaps in services for specific issues such as mental health and substance abuse. Concerning mental health, programs can be misdirected when they fail to take into account that Latino workers often rely on rural, Spanish speaking practitioners instead of mental health programs, health officials said. In the case of substance abuse, policy continues to be based on a punitive, criminal approach instead of pursuance of the link between mental health and substance abuse, they said.

In a session dedicated specifically to infectious diseases (HIV, other sexually transmitted diseases, and TB), panelists presented both sobering statistics and intriguing initiatives. For example, in the case of HIV there is an under-studied relationship between the high risk for infection of male migrants in the United States and the increasing rates of heterosexual transmission of HIV to women in Mexico.
the most important country for the United States,” observed Andrés Rozental, Special Presidential Envoy for Fox.

Rozental’s view that relations quietly rebounded was one perspective offered in the Center for Latin American Studies’ 2001-2002 series, “The U.S. and Mexico: Redefining the Relationship.” The lecture series is well timed to examine not only the evolution of the Fox government, but also the impact on Mexican politics of the U.S.’s renewed commitment to security. The guest lecturers in Fall 2001 also included Denise Dresser, professor of political science at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México and Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, former National Security Advisor to President Fox and current Mexican ambassador to the United Nations. In Spring 2002, visitors will include Sergio Aguayo, professor at El Colegio de México’s Center for International Relations, among others.

The attention generated by the September 11th attacks highlighted conflicting attitudes toward the U.S. in Mexican party politics. It also demonstrated the extent to which contentious party relations influence the Mexican political agenda. On September 11, the attacks on the U.S. seized the world’s spotlight. Yet in formulating his response, Fox was forced to navigate domestic political tensions, some of which already concerned the United States.

Rozental explained that the general public and the political establishment in Mexico debated how extensively and in what manner Mexico should support the U.S. The government debate had an immediate goal: to determine the official statement it would issue. Mexico’s Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda had already released a statement of support when he received news of the attacks. This statement, Rozental maintained, put Mexico “solidly in support of the U.S.,” acknowledging that it had been attacked and had the right of reprisal under U.N. provisions and customary law. The government then had to assess whether this gesture was adequate, or whether Mexico should go further in expressing solidarity with its neighbor and NAFTA partner. The government, he explained, needed to come to agreement on a statement that would take into account both the partnership and the fact “that in Mexico there is still a serious series of issues about the U.S.’s international activity in the past and the present.”

Rozental described the process as “heart wrenching” and “bitter and acrimonious.” And while, in his opinion, the statement issued three weeks later was of the same tone as Castañeda’s, it came about only after intense consideration of how it would affect Fox’s domestic political agenda. “Many of his domestic political advisors told him that a strong pro-U.S. position on this issue would probably harm his domestic political constituency,” Rozental clarified.

Dresser was even more direct in her assessment of how party tensions influenced foreign policy on this occasion. “Vicente Fox had Jorge Castañeda whispering into his left ear and Santiago Creel whispering into his right ear,” she said, referring to the foreign minister and the minister of the interior. “And Santiago Creel was saying if you adopt a pro-American stance you will alienate the PRI at a critical juncture in terms of fiscal reform. Don’t do it.” Fox’s fiscal reform was “languishing” in a bitterly divided Congress. The president’s cabinet was itself divided about whether or not to pact with the PRI, the main opposition party. “Jorge Castañeda was arguing they’re never going to support us anyway, and we cannot risk

continued on page 30
Instead of waiting for the National Action Party (PAN) to nominate him, he began his campaign before the nomination period and then presented PAN leaders with a fait accompli. Instead of relying exclusively on the PAN’s campaign organization, he created a parallel fundraising and electoral mobilization agency known as Amigos de Fox (Friends of Fox). To win, he essentially had to work at the margins of the established party system. To position himself in the presidential race, Fox had to make himself well known among the electorate. To defeat the PRI, Fox had to mobilize majorities and not only the PAN’s traditional base. He had to obtain the useful vote, the volatile vote, the vote of all those who smile at the PAN in one election and frown at it the next. In this regard, although the PAN had made important electoral inroads in the 1990s through a “creeping federalist” strategy, and had steadily increased its congressional representation, the party could not have won the presidency without Fox and the political phenomenon he unleashed.

Fox rode triumphantly into Los Pinos—the presidential residence—mounted on “The Millennium Project,” a campaign manual and political roadmap. Devised by one of Fox’s closest friends and former Coca-Cola colleague, José Luis González, the document set forth how Fox, “the product” would be sold, and what would compel Mexicans to buy him. The Millennium Project gave Fox precise instructions on how to steal banners from the left and contain the right, how to take advantage of his height and how to comb his hair, what to say and what to wear. Advised by a team of expert marketers, Fox learned how to develop a winning persona: stubborn and persistent, charismatic and contradictory, informal and intemperate, simple and sincere. Vicente Fox toppled the PRI by gambling on a simple formula: “Marketing + Money = Presidency.”

Today, Fox uses the same credo to govern the electorate he courted in an assiduous fashion. Just as he did during his three-year campaign, Fox constructs his image deliberately and carefully. He knows that 69 percent of Mexicans who wanted “change” voted for him, and therefore the word has become his sound bite of choice. He is aware that a majority of voters between the ages of 18 and 34 voted for him, and he wants to speak as colloquially as they do. He understands that the majority of Mexicans relate to politics through television, and consequently he acts onscreen as frequently as he can. Fox ran a personality-driven campaign and now he is running a personality-driven presidency. Day after day, event after event, Mexicans are treated to the presidency as a spectacle in which the president himself occupies center stage.

**How Going Public Works**

Fox has inaugurated a new way of doing politics in Mexico; this approach is based largely on the techniques he applied to propel himself to office. Like any other post-modern politician, the gladiator from Guanajuato relies heavily on polls, data processing, image management and marketing. Polls discover what the population thinks, data processing reveals the depth of those beliefs, image management builds upon detected desires, and marketing inserts the product into the media. Behind Fox’s carefully crafted persona, an army of advisors carries out polls and discusses their results, and designs media strategies and evaluates their impact. At the helm of the Office of the presidential Image, Francisco Ortiz, a former marketing executive with Procter and Gamble, takes the country’s
pulse through weekly opinion polls. When the president’s popularity dips, quick measures—including a televised marriage ceremony—are taken to counteract the downward trend.

Asalto al Palacio, a recent campaign book written by Guillermo H. Cantú, a businessman close to Fox, explains how marketing won the day, and suggests, inadvertently perhaps, why Mexicans like Vicente Fox but find it hard to define him. Throughout the presidential campaign, Fox eluded classifications and did so consciously. He staked out a position one day only to adopt its alter ego the next; he catered to the left, and then flirted with the right. As president, he continues to triangulate, projecting such enormous empathy to such diverse constituencies that it is often difficult to trace the continuity between positions A and B. Cantú’s book argues that Fox undertook a rhetorical, histrionic, media-driven campaign that wanted to be all things to all people. Fox triumphed, but now may find himself a victim of his own success: in office he has to deliver what he promised and is finding it hard to do so.

The Consequences of Going Public

Ultimately, the media-driven, peripatetic and public style that enabled Fox to win may be making it difficult for him to govern. The campaign produced a president who has a lot of media experience but little political experience, who can speak in front of cameras but has trouble convincing congressmen, who speaks to the masses but does not understand the country’s institutional elites. A recalcitrant, divided Congress has tripped the president at every turn. Because he and members of his team believe in “going public,” Fox fought for negotiations with the Zapatistas and introduced the indigenous rights bill last spring before building support for it in Congress. Because he gambles on “boomerang” politics, Fox advertised the need for fiscal reform, before having constructed consensus for it in his own party.

Moreover, Fox keeps appealing to the public because—as Samuel Kernell argues in his book about the Reagan and Clinton presidencies—it is not possible to be one kind of man and another kind of president. Fox behaves just as he did throughout the campaign because he is wired that way: he is a salesman, not a negotiator. He does not have the temperament or the talent for concertation. He does not like the give and take of politicking behind closed doors, nor does he have the inclination to engage in it. He prefers to travel, elicit support on television, and address the population directly. He prefers to get married in order to solve a popularity problem, rather than negotiate a fiscal reform in order to solve an economic problem.

However, “going public” is a strategy that works well in consolidated democracies, but does so less effectively in incipient counterparts. In the United States, for example, the green circle can and does influence the red circle, but in Mexico, the green circle has very little engagement with the red circle. In the United States, the population can and does pressure political elites, but in Mexico elites routinely ignore the population. In the United States, citizens know who their congressmen are and how to communicate with them, but in Mexico the majority of the people do not even know their congressman’s name, let alone how he or she votes. In the United States, a congressman who ignores his base runs the risk of losing his reelection, but in Mexico congressmen as a rule ignore their constituencies and pay no political price for doing so. In the United States, the president can use the bully pulpit to pressure recalcitrant adversaries in the legislature, but in Mexico, presidential popularity is irrelevant for lawmakers that do not face re-election. The future of a PAN congressman hinges more on the goodwill of the party’s leadership than on the good image of the president.

“Going public” creates congressmen who are ill disposed to a president who prefers to deal with them indirectly. “Going public” entails posturing, and pigeonholes the president’s bargaining position, making it difficult to reach subsequent compromises. As a form of presidential leadership, the public route undermines the legitimacy and the pride of other politicians. Thus, when Fox skirts Congress, he wins the popularity contest, but loses the legislative battle. The more Vicente Fox appeals to the population for support, the more likely it is for congressmen to continue to make him pay the price for ignoring them. What the president perceives as persuasion, congressmen perceive as coercion. When Fox appeals to the public at large, he places obstacles along the road of concertation.

In all fairness, Fox’s problems with Congress are not only of his own making. The PAN itself has yet to adjust to the imperatives, constraints and responsibilities of a party in power. At times PAN congressmen have exhibited an extraordinary amount of anti-Fox discipline, as

continued on page 21
(MINUGUA) documented over three hundred such incidents, and many more may have slipped by undetected. Typically, a few community members detain a suspected criminal—sometimes accused of an offense as minor as the theft of a case of soda pop—and summon a crowd, at times numbering into the thousands, to witness the execution. Police, judges, and human rights authorities are held at bay, as most communities are convinced that their intervention will only result in the release of the “criminal.”

Faced with rising crime rates and an utterly unresponsive justice system, many communities defend these acts as a desperate attempt to protect themselves through the only means they have available. In such a climate, the use of violence to impose order in times of purported peace recurrently seems not incongruous, but imperative. Indeed, in many Guatemalans’ lived experience, the neat distinctions between “war” and “peace” that history books encourage us to imagine, make very little sense. As one woman explained to me, “The violence is like the rain… it comes down hard for awhile, then it passes a little bit, and you might think it’s over but it always comes back.”

Notwithstanding, there is more to contemporary problems in Guatemala than the mere repetition of past patterns. The cycle of terror, if we can envision it as such, becomes more complicated at every turn. While in the past, the victims of violence were chosen predominantly for political reasons—they were community organizers, social justice advocates, leftist guerrillas or anyone who could be construed as their collaborators—today’s targets, common criminals, are more indiscriminate. The perpetrators of the violence are different too: no longer are state agents the principal victimizers, although the state helps fuel the cycle by failing to bring those responsible for past atrocities to justice. What is more, the active participation of some communities in lynchings shows that today, not merely the state, but private citizens are able to employ terror tactics to suit their purposes. The human rights struggle must therefore shift its terrain from the relatively simple clash between a murderous state and a victimized citizenry that characterized wartime Guatemala, to the much more complex confrontations between and among citizens that cloud the panorama today.

At the same time, however, the state and its agents, among them those implicated in war crimes, often lurk beneath the surface of contemporary developments. In some cases (although not all), lynchings have been led by former paramilitary leaders seeking to regain a measure of local authority stripped from them by the peace process; many highland residents told me they had been threatened with death if they did not participate in these acts. At times, opportunists have branded their enemies “criminals,” capitalizing on communities’ willingness to lynch as a way to settle personal or political differences.

While lynchings have earned the opprobrium of the Guatemalan government, little has been done to effectively combat the trend. Ultimately, for those forces affiliated with the violence of the past (many of whom occupy positions of power in the current administration), the lynchings’ present-day persistence serves a convenient political purpose. The overriding sense that violence and criminality are out of control serves to justify the Army’s expanded role in domestic policing—a postwar provision that directly contravenes the government’s commitments in the Peace Accords, but which nonetheless earned the

continued on next page
they did when they opposed the president’s stance on Chiapas. Animosities between key members of the PAN hierarchy and Fox run deep, and at critical junctures PAN leaders appear more intent on sabotaging the president than on working with him. Many traditional panistas feel that the party is slipping through their fingers; they reject the replacement of dogmatic panismo by pragmatic foxismo; they fought for power and now do not know exactly how Fox should exercise it. “Going public” simply underscores to the PAN what Fox declared when he took office: 

*gobernaré yo y no el PAN* (I, not the PAN, will govern). The party feels resentful and wants the president to pay the price.

Surrounded by pollsters and marketers, the former Coca-Cola executive spent years selling a product—himself—and on July 2, 2000 a majority of the electorate bought the artifact. Yet today, Mexican voters are beginning to wonder whether the package they purchased may be attractive but ineffectual, popular but inefficient. Fox’s popularity in the polls has ebbed and his record of accomplishments to date is meager. Peace in Chiapas remains elusive, fiscal reform was cannibalized by Congress, social programs are at a standstill, the economy is grinding to a halt, and the president seems to spend more time promoting himself than getting the job done.

Mexicans have learned that Fox is a great salesman but a mediocre decision-maker, a good builder of public relations but a bad negotiator. Critics increasingly point out that Fox does not seem to understand the difference between aspiring to public office and actually exercising power. Even his supporters admit that he seems to care more about bolstering his popularity than achieving the objectives he mapped out and that he seems more preoccupied with the package than with its content. The Mexican executive has discovered—to his chagrin—that in contrast with the presidential campaign, the presidential chair does not come with operating instructions, and that the learning curve is steep. If Fox cannot negotiate in private what he has promised in public, “going public” may turn out to be the wrong strategy, in the wrong place, at the wrong time.

*Denise Dresser is a professor of political science at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM). During the month of March 2002, Professor Dresser is in residence at UC Berkeley, offering a graduate seminar at the Center for Latin American Studies.*
stance, combined with the corrosive effects of 1994 and the continuing schism within the party, proved to be a fatal formula for the PRI’s chances in the 2000 elections.

Knight further pointed out that the PRI’s political slide was already apparent before the internal split of 1987-1988. On the other hand, Salinas’ initial popularity demonstrated the PRI’s capacity to recoup from weakening popular support. But Salinas’ policies, such as his stubborn support for an overvalued peso and refusal to heed the warning signs of impending economic problems, imperiled his administration, and his party, for the hard fall of 1994.

Knight’s conclusions reflected a view grounded in the contemporary, internal elements that shaped the defeat of the PRI and the resultant electoral success of the PAN candidate in 2000. Knight argued that the elections represented a fundamental turn in Mexican history, with much promise for the democratization of the country, though those gains remain to be completely consolidated.

Hernández, on the other hand, took a historical view of the PRI’s defeat. According to her analysis, the election of Vicente Fox was less a victory for the opposition and more a consequence of the accumulation of errors by the former dominant party and its leaders. For Hernández, the PRI’s loss in 2000 was related to the historical outcomes of the mistaken, misguided policies of the 1960s and 1970s. Mexico’s economic development fell far behind that of other countries in that period; its infrastructure, industrial capacity, and technological progress were undermined by short sighted decisions aimed at benefiting a small circle of high ranking politicians, large businessmen, and party operatives. As a result, the effort to reverse the outcomes of those policies led to a crude, brutalizing policy shift to compensate for the “backwardness” produced by three decades of mismanagement of the country’s economy and human resources. Hernández enumerated the gradual disaffection by a number of constituencies within the PRI, including small merchants, hard pressed landholders, fed-up workers, and embattled peasants. These and various other social groups generated an expanding range of dissident movements that joined the established left of center opposition or its conservative counterpart, the PAN. In this light, Hernández argued that the PRI had squandered its political capital by the end of the 20th century. The cumulative consequences of the PRI’s mistakes led to its own demise.

For Hernández, perhaps the most telling example of this predicament was Salinas’ formation of the Solidaridad, a business and labor alliance, which attempted to create a bureaucratic means to circumvent a calcified party apparatus riddled with corruption. But it was an effort that was in effect too little, too late. Hernández’ comments suggested that the PRI was the victim of its internal rot; it was not a set of conjunctural factors that explain the sudden fall of the PRI. Indeed, Salinas’s actions aggravated the irrevocable decomposition of the party, but his administration was not the cause of the PRI’s acute state. Hernández acknowledged the influence of external contingent factors, such as the end of the Cold War, on Mexico’s current situation, but her historically based analysis clearly points to the centrality of the internal logic of the reversal of the PRI’s political fortunes.

In light of the comments of Hernández and Knight, the perspective of Gilly on contemporary Mexico was based on the critical importance of external processes and events. For Gilly, the main source of the
PRI’s decline was to be found in the outcomes of globalization. As a means of demonstrating his thesis, Gilly discussed the historic equilibrium that characterized the relationship between the United States and Mexico. Without naming Salinas specifically, it is easy to infer from Gilly’s analysis that the eclipse of that equilibrium began with the ex-president and his embrace of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the quintessential example of globalization in Mexican terms. Thus, the election of Vicente Fox for Gilly only affirmed the policy process initiated by Salinas with ominous implications for Mexico. From Gilly’s viewpoint, the adoption of neo-liberal policies for Mexico represents a watershed moment for the country. Gilly proposed that the economic imperatives embedded in NAFTA should have a social counterpart, i.e., a social compact involving the three countries that promotes human rights, democracy, and social justice. In this regard, Mexico can decide to push for such an agenda and offer a compassionate counter to the grim repercussions of free market thinking, according to Gilly, of poverty and the scarcity of human rights.

Hernández offered a bleak assessment for the future. The huge structural problems created by the PRI over the last thirty to forty years, according to Hernández, will prove resistant to quick fixes, given the enormity of the cost involved to improve education, public health, industrial efficiency, and technological capital, among other large societal tasks. Gilly, on the other hand, placed the burden of the meaning of the PRI’s downfall on the relationship between Mexico and the processes of the international political economy, in which the U.S. and its interests play a preponderant role. In this respect, Gilly’s comments held small comfort for the near future, as he suggested that the horrific events of September 11th reflected the inevitably tragic effects of globalization gone amok. Relatively speaking, Knight proved to be the most hopeful about Mexico’s prospects, especially when making comparisons to the deep-seated problems facing many other countries in the region, such as Argentina.

Alex M. Saragoza, a specialist on modern Mexico, is a professor in the ethnic studies department.
“sweat free campus” campaigns, demanding that their administrations adopt anti-sweatshop policies for their schools’ licensed products. Many of these policies included a provision requiring that licensees publicly disclose the names and locations of the contractors they hire to make their products. Before the policies were enacted, Rodney said, it was virtually impossible for a concerned citizen or researcher to identify the factory where a particular garment was made—such information was concealed by companies as a trade secret. But last spring, after refusing for years, companies began to post lists of factory addresses on the Internet. Kukdong was on a list disclosed by Nike. A local advocate wielding this information told the story to the student activist community in the U.S. and the campaign took off from there. Without student support and the university policies, Kukdong might have faded into obscurity.

Muñoz described the workers’ surprise when they learned of the students’ interest. “During the work stoppage,” she recalled, “we began to receive e-mails from American university students, encouraging us to continue with our struggle. At first we said to ourselves, ‘Who are these students and why do they want to support us?’ That’s when we began to learn about the student movement.”

Another crucial development in recent years was the emergence of a crop of agencies designed to inspect garment factories for anti-sweatshop policies. Several of these organizations, including the Workers’ Rights Consortium, Verité, and the International Labor Rights Fund, traveled to Atlixco shortly after the strike to investigate alleged abuses. Their findings, circulated widely among university and apparel industry personnel and the media, verified the workers’ claims of rancid food, child labor, and physical abuse, and helped to persuade Nike and other licensees to intervene.

Nova commented, “A lot of us who have been involved in this effort around codes of conduct and working conditions for university clothing have been wondering whether, in fact, at the end of the day, colleges and universities can make a concrete difference in helping real workers in the real world achieve significant improvements in the level of respect for workers’ rights. What Kukdong tells us is that the answer to the question is yes.”

Jeremy Blasi is a junior specialist at the Center for Labor Research and Education, Institute of Industrial Relations.

Binational Forum on Migrant Health

continued from page 16

Notwithstanding, the Mexican government’s AIDS program, CONASIDA, represented at the conference by a pioneer researcher, Carlos Magis Rodríguez, showed that Mexico’s HIV rates are lower than those in the United States. If culturally appropriate HIV programs for migrants increased, he said, the lower HIV rate could continue in the migrant population.

UC Berkeley Professor Kurt Organista promoted the use of community knowledge and peer influence to create and distribute fotonovelas (comic books) to migrant men and sex workers. Professor María Gudelia Rangel Gómez of El Colegio de la Frontera Norte discussed using the shelters set up for migrants in border cities as sites for conducting both disease prevention and surveillance.

Overall, researchers and agency leaders concurred that while certain areas need further research, the greatest efforts need to go toward the implementation and rigorous evaluation of programs known to work well.

There are several million Mexican-born workers supporting the California economy; conference organizers noted that it is time to better coordinate the services created on their behalf.

Andrés Jimenez, Director of the California Policy Research Center, said that while there are policies in place, political will and coordination are necessary to make them relevant. The Binational Health Week and the Binational Forum on Migrant Health, he said, are merely the beginning and a punta de lanza (launching point) for what needs to follow.

Paula Worby is a student in the Graduate School of Public Health. Her research focuses on Guatemala’s land acquisition programs and community well being.
Marta: Making It Alone

Not every Purépecha village has a handicraft tradition to sell—and not every woman has a man in the North sending dollars. The most recent census reveals that women head more than 30 percent of Mexican households. While more women are migrating to the United States to join their spouses, many are left alone to fend for themselves. The typical Michoacán village has become a “ghost town of widows and orphans,” according to Clara Ochoa Valdés, the director of the State Population Council, who said women have paid a high cost for the region’s massive migration.

Driving from Angahuan to nearby Charápan is like entering a time warp to the future. TV satellites sprout from Spanish-tile roofs and shiny Ford pick-up trucks line the streets with license plates from California, Texas, and Oklahoma. It is easy to tell where the people without migrant relatives live; their dilapidated wooden shacks stand in stark contrast to the sturdy concrete homes of their more fortunate neighbors.

Marta Bonaparte was born in one of those shacks, but was forced to move out after her husband migrated to Los Angeles and stopped writing a few months later. When relatives made it clear they were not willing to support her and her two children, Bonaparte moved to Uruapan—the nearest city of any size—where she found a job washing dishes in a hotel for 300 pesos a week.

Like most people from Charápan, she wears modern clothes and only knows a few words of the Purépecha language. Although Bonaparte is indigenous, her lack of handicraft skill means she does not qualify for government credit to start her own business. And because she now lives in the city, she no longer receives help from PROGRESA, a program designed to help rural women pay for their children’s education.

Carmen, her bright-eyed 10-year old daughter, should be in fifth grade. Instead, she stays home all day to baby-sit her brother because Bonaparte cannot afford childcare.

“I want Carmen to have a better life than I did growing up,” said Bonaparte, who started working in the fields when she was eight. But as a single mother, Bonaparte struggles to make ends meet. The three of them share a dingy room with a leaky roof in a rough part of town, and Bonaparte works double shifts to pay the 200 peso-a-month rent. She dreams of saving enough money to move up to the border town of Ciudad Juárez, where she hopes to find work in a maquiladora. Only then, she said, will she be able to buy her own land.

“Even if it’s only five square meters, I want to buy a little plot and build a real home,” Bonaparte said, running a brush through Carmen’s long, black hair. Blood drips from a deep gash from where she accidentally dropped a knife on her foot at work the day before. Despite the pain, she will stand for about twelve hours that day. It is worth it, she said, to create a better future for her children.

Purépecha women were once “guaranteed a life of hard work on the land and stability in the home,” Bonaparte said. Now, more of them than ever must make it alone as more and more men seek opportunities that beckon in the north.

Annelise Wunderlich, a second year student in the Graduate School of Journalism, recently returned from a month of field work in Michoacán, Mexico.
Political Participation in the Age of Neoliberalism

continued from page 13

how efficacious they are across different policy areas.

The literature addressing changes in representation and civil society in Latin America suggests two different images. Some analysts point to a flowering of new forms of community associations and social movements. They view these not only as replacing parties and unions in representing popular interests, but also as more responsive to their constituencies and more autonomous from external influence and control. Others see no effective structures replacing the old ones. They posit that the popular sectors are today less able to voice their demands effectively or to pursue common interests through collective channels, and therefore they primarily resort to private, individual, nonpolitical problem-solving strategies. For these analysts, democratic Latin America is experiencing a crisis of political representation.

Our preliminary fieldwork, however, has revealed a far more complex picture, with fascinating variations in the form and strength of popular-sector associational life across issue areas, neighborhoods, and countries. A few

continued on next page
examples are suggestive. In São Paulo, Brazil, relatively little organizing takes place around the important issue of property titles, whereas grass-roots associational activities are proliferating around urban infrastructure and are aggregated by novel organizational structures at the municipal and national levels. In Santiago, Chile, civil society seems generally less vibrant and effectively representative, though this outcome varies by class: middle-class advocacy groups are increasing in number and influence, but the popular sectors are experiencing escalating levels of atomization and political alienation. In Buenos Aires, Argentina, new experiments in community organization and a revival of old traditions of cooperativism in some neighborhoods contrast with spreading clientelistic linkages between parties and constituencies in others. In Lima, Peru, the extent of organization among street vendors and micro-entrepreneurs in some neighborhoods is impressive, despite the difficulties that informal-sector groups typically experience in organizing around work-related issues. Finally, in Caracas, Venezuela, President Hugo Chávez has sought to dismantle pre-existing organizations and is sponsoring the creation of a new set of state-led associations.

These above-mentioned snapshots raise some of the questions on which the project seeks to shed light. In virtually all of these countries, the popular sectors have been negatively affected by the introduction of similar neoliberal economic reforms. Why, then, is there significant cross-national and cross-neighborhood variation in the amount and type of activities through which individuals attempt to defend their interests, and in their choice to either make claims on the state or seek private solutions? To what extent are effective local structures of participation being constructed and to what degree do channels for exerting influence at the national level seem ineffective? Why do these patterns of activity and organization appear to aggregate to the municipal and national levels in different ways? And how can we conceptualize these different patterns as distinct types of interest regimes?

Despite the attention that civil society, social and human capital, and responsive or participatory governance have received in the comparative politics literature and in policy debates among multilateral organizations, the above questions have yet to be analyzed in a systematic cross-national study. Our present research explores specifically the contours of the interest regime, focusing on two inter-related levels: associations as intermediary structures and individual-level participation. Our goal is to first map and then explain (1) the issues around which associations develop, the structures that link and coordinate their activities, and their relationships with the state, political parties, and their constituencies; and (2) how citizens attempt to address their most salient collective problems either individually or collectively, and politically or apolitically. We are tracing participation through parties, unions, voting, and protest, as well as involvement in associations and other local activities. In addition to the aggregate data on political and economic variables in each country, the analysis that we are preparing relies primarily on two research instruments: a survey of associations, based on leaders as informants; and an individual-level survey of political participation and problem-solving activities.

Ruth Berins Collier is professor of political science at UC Berkeley.
As a first step the resources of the North American Development Bank must be freed up to provide hundreds of millions of dollars of new environmental infrastructure along the border. Housing, health, and transportation infrastructure must also be improved at the border.

We also need to work with the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) to provide greater development funding for the interior of Mexico. Finally we need to provide more U.S. resources for microcredit programs like the IDB's multilateral investment fund to enhance small businesses.

Over the longer term, it is my belief that NAFTA must have a development component incorporated into its charter. More resources could be provided both for development across Mexico and for displaced workers in regions of the U.S. and Canada that have lost jobs to Mexico. This could be done based on a model provided by the European Union.

The E.U. provides $30 billion a year in what they call Structural Adjustment Funds for development in the poorer regions of Portugal, Spain, Greece and Ireland as well as to declining areas in the more industrial nations. This program has achieved real success in closing income gaps between the member nations. A similar program in North America could be a real catalyst to enhanced living standards in Mexico. I am encouraged that Mexican leaders have signaled interest in such an approach.

More broadly, nations from Africa to Latin America to the Middle East failed to see economic growth in the 1990s. Across the globe, income inequality increased. At a time of rapid expansion in the industrialized world, many in the developing world were left trailing behind. Free trade and free markets alone are insufficient to make progress for all.

Originally trade agreements were about reducing tariffs. Over time the agenda expanded to include issues like intellectual property and investment. I strongly support enforcement of intellectual property and investment laws. If Microsoft is having problems with pirated software in China, it is legitimate to use the WTO dispute settlement process and our trade laws to obtain enforcement of intellectual property rules.

However, we believe workers' rights, human rights, and environmental protections are also issues relevant to the trade agenda. Trade agreements can help to raise wages abroad. Trade agreements can encourage growth in consumption as well as production. Trade agreements can reward rather than penalize strong environmental standards. Trade agreements must help combat the AIDS pandemic, not undermine national efforts to make drugs more affordable.

The recent agreement between the United States and Jordan offers a model of how to proceed. It strengthened ties to a critical ally, and for the first time in a trade agreement, it contained worker and environmental provisions in the core text. The issues were equal to other issues and subject to the same dispute resolution procedure.

The governments of Chile and Singapore — models of development in their respective regions — have said they could support similar agreements. The Bush Administration wants to consider free trade agreements from those nations next year. Whether these agreements contain meaningful labor and environmental provisions will be a critical test of whether the Administration has real interest in building a consensus on trade.

Second, we need to strengthen economic assistance to build markets for U.S. exports and increase the benefits of free and fair trade for all. We need to help other countries give people access to health care, food, and public education.
We should pursue the United Nations’ goal of universal primary education by 2015. We should take steps to address the crisis of 1.4 billion people subsisting on less than $1 a day. And we need to do all this because it is in our clear, deep self-interest to strengthen the ranks of the global middle class, reduce hostilities toward the United States, and enhance the global economy.

American economic assistance amounts to less than .3 percent of the Gross Domestic Product. We should double this assistance, and create benchmarks that will result in tangible social progress in developing regions. According to the United Nations, if all countries double their economic assistance, the vital goal of halving global poverty could be met by 2015.

Finally, we must build upon the Jubilee 2000 program to help the poorest countries struggling under the burden of tremendous debt. We need to insure this relief doesn’t enrich corrupt governments, we should help nations once they demonstrate a commitment to channeling assistance to the poor. We must work both with multilateral institutions and on a bilateral basis to make progress in this area.

There are no panaceas to poverty and illiteracy, but the traditional trade program is insufficient. It addresses one part of a complicated problem and fails to maximize the benefits of the emerging global economy. We should forge a new broad and bipartisan policy on trade and development that enhances American allies in the Middle East, South Asia, Africa, and Latin America. We must make progress on the global development issue in a manner that reflects the highest aspirations of the American people and enhances their long-term national security needs.

Richard A. Gephardt (D-Mo) is House Democratic Leader.
alienating the United States for the sake of [a compromised] fiscal reform,” said Dresser. And for a time, Creel dominated the media. It appeared, though it ultimately did not come to pass, that his position would prevail.

In Dresser’s view, this debate was emblematic of the fundamental weakness of the Fox presidency. “Fox is essentially governing within a box,” she described, indicating that the president has had to negotiate with a divided Congress at every step of the way. This political necessity has proven to be a stumbling block for him, as his initial success in attaining the presidency did not require such political maneuvering. Instead, she said, “Fox ran a personality driven campaign. He won by doing so, and now he is running a personality driven presidency.” Frustrated by the resistance he encounters among Mexico’s political elites, Dresser explained, Fox attempts to bypass those circles and influence popular opinion directly by “going public.” “And ultimately,” she said, “this peripatetic, media driven public style that enabled Fox to win may be counterproductive for executive-legislative relations.”

Whereas in a more consolidated democracy, public opinion would ultimately influence the political elite, Dresser argued that such a sense of accountability is still developing in Mexico. Congressional lawmakers do not face reelection, senators routinely ignore their constituencies, and the will of the party is often more important than the will of the voters. What is more, she said, when Fox goes public with demands for fiscal reform or an indigenous rights bill, he acts without building political consensus—sometimes even within his own party. This angers lawmakers and undermines the painstaking work that does go on behind the scenes. Despite his problems with institutional building, Dresser believed that one reason Fox feels he is governing under siege is that he himself is being subject to greater accountability—a positive sign for the deepening of the Mexican democracy.

Zinser presented another cooperative challenge highlighted by the September 11th attacks. He described the traditional perception of security in the Americas as national and ideological. “We have to understand the problems of security today as truly collective problems,” he said. While the nature of drug trafficking, organized crime, and now terrorism has globalized, traditional conceptions of boundaries, distrust, and the debilitating effects of corruption hamper cooperation between countries.

Zinser imparted that security was a central issue during Fox’s state visit to Washington the week before the attacks. The visit resulted in a decision to “de-narcotize” U.S.-Mexico relations and to try to create a more balanced agenda of security. The subsequent attacks threatened to derail this new emphasis on partnership, which both Zinser and Rozental described as groundbreaking. After September 11, security concerns took on multifaceted importance. Zinser elucidated that he feared that any attack “in the United States’ territory will completely destroy the fabric of a relationship with Mexico.” He added, “As the American society feels unsafe, it would tend to demand actions to strangle the border,” threatening the most intense trade that takes place between any two countries in the world.

What lies ahead for U.S.-Mexico relations? Dresser was reserved in her estimation of how high Mexico currently ranks as a U.S. priority. But Zinser and Rozental expressed hope that new security threats might actually advance some of the causes that have long been on the Mexican agenda. Zinser said that durable long-term security should not be concentrated in the borders between the North American countries, but in regional security standards applied throughout. He further stated that it is now essential to bring the issue of migration to security discussions. By documenting and regularizing Mexican workers, he contended, the United States will enhance its own ability to monitor homeland security.

Kate Davidson is a student in the Graduate School of Journalism.
Brazil was tragically robbed of one of its most important policy makers and intellectuals on November 28, 2001. At the age of 58, Vilmar Faria, a sociologist and special advisor to President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, died suddenly and unexpectedly from a gastric hemorrhage.

Faria was at the peak of a long career that had combined an intense commitment to political activism with consistently rigorous intellectual analysis. From his earlier days fighting against the military dictatorship in Brazil as a member of the clandestine leftist group, Ação Popular, to the long and arduous hours that he devoted to the search for a more equitable and effective social policy as part of the Cardoso administration, Faria’s dedication to a progressive political agenda was unflagging. At the same time, he was convinced that good intentions were futile unless grounded in uncompromising analysis of the reality that needed to be changed.

Trained as a sociologist at Harvard University, where he received his Ph.D. in 1976, Faria focused his academic work from the beginning in the areas that he felt were most crucial to Brazil—poverty alleviation and social policy. In spite of the magnitude of his responsibilities in Brazil, he was exceptionally generous in sharing his expertise and insights with colleagues and students at UC Berkeley. In addition to participating in conferences and seminars over the years, he agreed to hold Berkeley’s Rio Branco Chair in Brazilian Studies in the spring of 1999.

The entire Berkeley community benefited from the insightful, information-packed lectures in which Dr. Faria dissected the daunting obstacles that countries like Brazil face in trying to provide decent jobs and adequate services to their citizens, and analyzed the feasibility of alternative policy solutions. The extensive examination of Brazilian social policy—“Preparing Brazil for the 21st Century”—which was published as a Center for Latin American Studies working paper, remains as a reminder of how much the kind of cogent analysis he offered will be missed, both in Brazil and at Berkeley.

Those who worked with him at CLAS will also remember Vilmar Faria as unfailingly good-humored and unassuming, someone who never let prestige or pressing obligations prevent him from treating everyone around him with consideration and respect. Berkeley’s sense of loss is all the more acute because we had hoped that the end of the Cardoso’s term in Brazil would be the occasion for expanding our collaboration with Vilmar. As we extend our condolences to Vilmar’s family, friends and colleagues in Brazil, we also hope that we will be able, in some small way, to carry forward the crucial political and intellectual project that Vilmar Faria embodied so well.

Peter Evans is a professor of sociology at UC Berkeley.